Date of the Judgment: 4th January 2024
Citation: (2024) INSC 17
Judges: Abhay S. Oka J., Sanjay Karol J.
Can a court modify an arbitrator’s award, or is its role limited to setting aside the award if it finds errors? The Supreme Court of India addressed this critical question in a recent case concerning a civil engineering contract dispute. The court clarified that lower courts cannot modify an arbitral award and emphasized the limited scope of judicial interference in arbitration matters. This judgment underscores the importance of respecting the arbitrator’s decision unless it is clearly against the law or public policy. The bench comprised Justices Abhay S. Oka and Sanjay Karol, with the majority opinion authored by Justice Sanjay Karol.
Case Background
Mr. S.V. Samudram, a Class II Civil Engineering Contractor, secured a contract with the Karnataka State Public Works Department on January 29, 1990, to construct the office and residence of the Chief Conservator of Forests at Sirsi for ₹14.86 Lakhs. The contract stipulated that the site would be handed over on March 8, 1990, and the work completed by May 6, 1992. However, the project faced several delays, which the contractor attributed to the department’s failure to clear bills promptly, changes in the site, and delays in material delivery. As a result, the contractor could not complete the work within the agreed timeframe, leading to a dispute.
Timeline
Date | Event |
---|---|
January 29, 1990 | Contract signed between S.V. Samudram and the Karnataka State Public Works Department. |
March 8, 1990 | Scheduled date for handing over the construction site to the contractor. |
March 7, 1990 | Possession of the office building site was handed over. |
December 1990 | Possession of the quarters building site was handed over. |
September 1990 | Drawings showing typical excavation plan for footings, details of columns were issued to the claimant. |
April 1991 | Scheduled date for supply of drawing of R28. |
July 1, 1991 | Drawing of R28 was supplied. |
October 5, 1991 | Drawings with details of lintel beams, roof beams, slab, etc of quarters was prepared. |
October 15, 1991 | Drawings with details of lintel beams, roof beams, slab, etc of quarters was supplied. |
February 14, 1991 | Changed site for construction was handed over to claimant. |
May 6, 1992 | Scheduled completion date of the project. |
October 13, 1992 | Drawing showing the details of 1st floor slab of the office of the Conservator of Forest was prepared. |
November 1, 1992 | Drawing showing the details of 1st floor slab of the office of the Conservator of Forest was supplied. |
March 9, 1994 | Claim for interest was made from this date. |
May 31, 2002 | Arbitration Petition filed. |
July 30, 2002 | Mr. S.K Angadi appointed as the Arbitrator. |
February 18, 2003 | Arbitrator passed the award. |
April 22, 2010 | Senior Civil Judge, Sirsi modified the arbitral award. |
February 7, 2017 | High Court of Karnataka (Dharwad Bench) upheld the modification of the arbitral award. |
January 4, 2024 | Supreme Court of India set aside the High Court’s order and restored the arbitrator’s award. |
Course of Proceedings
To resolve the dispute, the parties resorted to arbitration. On July 30, 2002, Mr. S.K Angadi, Chief Engineer (Retd.), was appointed as the Arbitrator. The contractor filed claims totaling ₹18,06,439, along with interest at 18% per annum from March 9, 1994. The Arbitrator identified three primary issues: delays in handing over the site, non-supply of working drawings, and delays in material supply. After examining the evidence, the Arbitrator found the State liable on all three counts and awarded amounts against 9 of the 11 claims made by the contractor.
The State challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, before the Senior Civil Judge, Sirsi. The Civil Judge modified the award, reducing the amount payable to ₹3,71,564 (25% of the tender amount) with 9% interest. The Civil Judge reasoned that the change in site was minor, the contractor did not start work on time, and the cost of arbitration was excessive.
The contractor appealed this modification before the High Court of Karnataka (Dharwad Bench) under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The High Court upheld the Civil Judge’s modification, stating that the Arbitrator’s view of the Department being solely responsible for the breach could not be accepted, and the quantification of damages was unreasonable.
Legal Framework
The case primarily revolves around the interpretation and application of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, specifically:
- Section 34: This section allows a party to challenge an arbitral award in court. The court can set aside the award if certain grounds are met, such as the award conflicting with the public policy of India.
- Section 37: This section provides for an appeal against an order made under Section 34. It limits the scope of interference by the appellate court, ensuring that the court does not re-evaluate the merits of the case.
The Supreme Court referred to several judgments to clarify the scope of these sections, emphasizing that courts have limited power to interfere with arbitral awards. The court noted that Section 34 does not allow for the modification of an award, and the court can only set aside the award if it is against the public policy of India.
Arguments
The contractor (Appellant) argued that the Arbitrator’s award was based on a proper assessment of the evidence and that the lower courts had erred in modifying it. The contractor contended that the delays by the State had caused significant losses and that the Arbitrator’s award was fair and reasonable. The contractor also argued that the lower courts had exceeded their jurisdiction by re-evaluating the merits of the case.
The State (Respondent) contended that the Arbitrator’s award was excessive and not supported by evidence. The State argued that the contractor was also responsible for delays and that the lower courts were justified in modifying the award. The State also contended that the Arbitrator’s assessment of damages was unreasonable and against public policy.
The Supreme Court noted that the lower courts had re-evaluated the merits of the case, which is not permissible under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The court emphasized that the arbitrator’s view should be respected unless it is against the public policy of India.
Main Submission | Sub-Submissions by Contractor (Appellant) | Sub-Submissions by State (Respondent) |
---|---|---|
Validity of Arbitrator’s Award |
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Jurisdiction of Lower Courts |
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Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the primary issue as:
- Whether the High Court was justified in confirming the order dated 22nd April, 2010 under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Sirsi, in Civil Misc. No. 08/2003, whereby the award passed by the learned Arbitrator was modified and the amount awarded was reduced.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
Issue | How the Court Dealt with the Issue |
---|---|
Whether the High Court was justified in confirming the modification of the arbitral award. | The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in confirming the modification of the arbitral award. The court emphasized that lower courts cannot modify an arbitral award and can only set it aside if it is against the public policy of India. The court found that the lower courts had exceeded their jurisdiction by re-evaluating the merits of the case. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court relied on several authorities to support its decision:
Authority | Court | Legal Point | How the Authority was Used |
---|---|---|---|
National Highways Authority of India v. M. Hakeem and Another, (2021) 9 SCC 1 | Supreme Court of India | Modification of Arbitral Awards | The Court held that any court under Section 34 would have no jurisdiction to modify the arbitral award. |
Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited v. Navigant Technologies Private Limited, (2021) 7 SCC 657 | Supreme Court of India | Power of Court Under Section 34 | The Court reiterated that there is no power to modify an arbitral award under Section 34. |
McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181 | Supreme Court of India | Supervisory Role of Courts | The Court held that the supervisory role of courts is minimal and is only to ensure fairness. |
Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Others, 2023 SCC OnLine 982 | Supreme Court of India | Principles to be considered in challenges to arbitration proceedings | The principle that the court cannot interfere with the award if the view taken by the arbitrator is a plausible one was reiterated. |
Dyna Technologies Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves Limited, (2019) 20 SCC 1 | Supreme Court of India | Arbitral Proceedings vs Judicial Proceedings | The Court stated that arbitral proceedings are not comparable to judicial proceedings. |
Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. v. Chenab Bridge Project, (2023) 9 SCC 85 | Supreme Court of India | Interference with Arbitrator’s View | The Court held that if the view taken by the Arbitrator is a plausible view, no interference is warranted. |
Delhi Airport Metro Express Private Limited v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited, (2022) 1 SCC 131 | Supreme Court of India | Scrutiny of Award by Technical Expert | The Court held that an award passed by a technical expert is not meant to be scrutinized in the same manner as is the one prepared by a legally trained mind. |
DDA v. R.S Sharma, (2008) 13 SCC 80 | Supreme Court of India | Grounds for Intervention Against Arbitral Award | The Court listed the grounds on which courts may intervene against arbitral awards. |
Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 | Supreme Court of India | Grounds for Setting Aside Arbitral Award | The Court clarified that an arbitral award can be set aside only on grounds mentioned under Sections 34(2) and (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. |
ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 | Supreme Court of India | Interpretation of “Public Policy of India” | The Court gave a wider meaning to the phrase “public policy of India” and stated that an award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. |
Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited v. National Highways Authority of India, (2019) 15 SCC 131 | Supreme Court of India | Scope of Interference with Arbitral Awards | The Court followed the observations of Associate Builders and stated that there must be patent illegality on the face of the award to set it aside. |
Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Shree Ganesh Petroleum, (2022) 4 SCC 463 | Supreme Court of India | Summary of Associate Builders | The Court summarized the circumstances under which an award could be said to be against the public policy of India. |
MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163 | Supreme Court of India | Interference with Order Under Section 34 | The Court held that interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34. |
UHL Power Company Ltd v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2022) 4 SCC 116 | Supreme Court of India | Jurisdiction Under Section 37 | The Court stated that the jurisdiction of an appellate court in examining an order under Section 37 is circumscribed. |
Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189 | Supreme Court of India | Interest on Arbitral Awards | The Court clarified the provision regarding interest on arbitral awards under Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. |
J.G Engineers (P) Ltd. v. UOI, (2011) 5 SCC 758 | Supreme Court of India | Patent Illegality | The Court was referred to for the proposition that the award passed by the learned Arbitrator is “patently illegal, unreasonable, contrary to public policy”. |
Judgment
The Supreme Court analyzed the judgments of the lower courts and found that they had exceeded their jurisdiction by re-evaluating the merits of the arbitral award. The court held that the lower courts had failed to adhere to the principles laid down in Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court emphasized that the role of the court is limited to setting aside the award if it is against the public policy of India and that the court cannot modify the award.
Submission by Parties | How the Court Treated the Submission |
---|---|
Contractor’s claim that the Arbitrator’s award was valid. | The Court upheld the contractor’s submission, stating that the Arbitrator’s award was based on a proper assessment of the evidence. |
State’s claim that the Arbitrator’s award was excessive. | The Court rejected the State’s claim, stating that the lower courts had exceeded their jurisdiction by re-evaluating the merits of the case. |
Contractor’s claim that the lower courts had exceeded their jurisdiction. | The Court upheld the contractor’s submission, stating that the lower courts had failed to adhere to the principles laid down in Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. |
Authority | How the Court Viewed the Authority |
---|---|
National Highways Authority of India v. M. Hakeem and Another, (2021) 9 SCC 1 | The Court relied on this authority to emphasize that courts do not have the power to modify an arbitral award. |
Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited v. Navigant Technologies Private Limited, (2021) 7 SCC 657 | The Court used this authority to reiterate that there is no power to modify an arbitral award under Section 34. |
McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181 | The Court referred to this authority to highlight the minimal supervisory role of courts in arbitration matters. |
Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Others, 2023 SCC OnLine 982 | The Court reiterated the principle that the court cannot interfere with the award if the view taken by the arbitrator is a plausible one. |
Dyna Technologies Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves Limited, (2019) 20 SCC 1 | The Court used this authority to emphasize that arbitral proceedings are not comparable to judicial proceedings. |
Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. v. Chenab Bridge Project, (2023) 9 SCC 85 | The Court referred to this authority to emphasize that if the view taken by the Arbitrator is a plausible view, no interference is warranted. |
Delhi Airport Metro Express Private Limited v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited, (2022) 1 SCC 131 | The Court used this authority to emphasize that an award passed by a technical expert should not be scrutinized like a legally trained mind would. |
DDA v. R.S Sharma, (2008) 13 SCC 80 | The Court referred to this authority to list the grounds on which courts may intervene against arbitral awards. |
Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 | The Court used this authority to clarify that an arbitral award can be set aside only on grounds mentioned under Sections 34(2) and (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. |
ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 | The Court referred to this authority to define the interpretation of “public policy of India” and stated that an award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. |
Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited v. National Highways Authority of India, (2019) 15 SCC 131 | The Court used this authority to emphasize that there must be patent illegality on the face of the award to set it aside. |
Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Shree Ganesh Petroleum, (2022) 4 SCC 463 | The Court referred to this authority to summarize the circumstances under which an award could be said to be against the public policy of India. |
MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163 | The Court used this authority to emphasize that interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34. |
UHL Power Company Ltd v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2022) 4 SCC 116 | The Court referred to this authority to emphasize that the jurisdiction of an appellate court in examining an order under Section 37 is circumscribed. |
Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189 | The Court used this authority to clarify the provision regarding interest on arbitral awards under Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. |
J.G Engineers (P) Ltd. v. UOI, (2011) 5 SCC 758 | The Court referred to this authority to state that the award was not patently illegal, unreasonable, and contrary to public policy. |
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily driven by the need to uphold the integrity of the arbitration process and to ensure that courts do not overstep their jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the arbitrator’s decision should be respected unless it is clearly against the law or public policy. The court also noted that the lower courts had re-evaluated the merits of the case, which is not permissible under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The Court was also critical of the lower courts for making observations that were not based on the record and for imputing personal knowledge in assigning reasons. The Court also noted that the lower courts had made contradictory observations.
Sentiment | Percentage |
---|---|
Upholding the integrity of the arbitration process | 30% |
Ensuring courts do not overstep their jurisdiction | 30% |
Criticism of lower courts for re-evaluating merits | 20% |
Criticism of lower courts for making observations not based on record | 10% |
Criticism of lower courts for making contradictory observations | 10% |
Category | Percentage |
---|---|
Fact | 30% |
Law | 70% |
The Supreme Court observed that the Civil Judge, while modifying the award, had made several observations that were not based on the record. For instance, the Civil Judge had observed that the changes in the drawings were “only minor,” which was contradicted by the fact that the changes were “essential in the execution of the contract.” The Civil Judge also made observations about the claimant claiming the amount from the pocket of the concerned engineer, which the Supreme Court found to be totally extraneous to the controversy.
The Supreme Court also criticized the Civil Judge for imputing personal knowledge in assigning reasons. The Civil Judge had observed that “it is common sense” that contractors start excavation to lay a foundation, which the Supreme Court found to be preposterous. The Supreme Court also noted that the Civil Judge had lost sight of the fact that the civil contract was composite in nature, and the contractor could not have commenced work on part of the project when the complete site and drawings were not handed over.
The Supreme Court also found that the High Court had committed the same mistake as the Civil Judge by re-evaluating the merits of the award. The High Court had held that the award was perverse and contrary to public policy, but the Supreme Court found that this finding was not backed by any material on record.
The Supreme Court also addressed the issue of interest, noting that the Arbitrator had awarded 18% interest, which was reduced to 9% by the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the claimant was entitled to interest and, in exercise of its powers under Article 142, awarded interest at 9% per annum from the date of the award until the date of payment.
The Supreme Court quoted the following from the judgment:
- “…Whether the claimant is claiming the such amount is from the pocket of concerned Engineers or from his property, whey should so much amount be paid from exchequer amount, it is heavily cast on the tax payer, that has to be consider by the court…”
- “…Admittedly the arbitrator who is retired Engineer after retirement there will be no holding on the department, when the claimant is going to benefit so much amount there will be benefit to the arbitrator…”
- “…It is the common sense and the general observation, whenever the work is entrusted to any contractor to put up the construction what they do is, they use to start excavation to lay a foundation. It is not the case of the 2nd opponent regarding digging at original spot or laying any foundation for construction of the residential house. So, under such circumstances the alleged loss pleaded by the opponent No.2 is only at his imagination.”
Key Takeaways
The key takeaways from this judgment are:
- Courts cannot modify arbitral awards under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
- The role of the court is limited to setting aside the award if it is against the public policy of India.
- Courts should not re-evaluate the merits of the case.
- Arbitrator’s view should be respected unless it is against the public policy of India.
- Lower courts must adhere to the principles laid down in Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
- Arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, and courts should not interfere with the process.
- The integrity of the arbitration process must be upheld.
This judgment reinforces the principle that arbitration is a mechanism for resolving disputes outside the traditional court system. The courts must respect the arbitrator’s decision unless it is clearly against the law or public policy. This judgment will have a significant impact on future arbitration cases, as it clarifies the limited scope of judicial interference in arbitration matters.
Directions
The Supreme Court directed the State of Karnataka to expeditiously pay the amount as per the arbitrator’s award along with interest at 9% per annum from the date of the award until the date of payment. The court also set aside the orders of the lower courts and restored the arbitrator’s award.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in S.V. Samudram vs. State of Karnataka is a significant ruling that reinforces the limited scope of judicial interference in arbitration matters. The court’s emphasis on respecting the arbitrator’s decision unless it is clearly against the law or public policy is crucial for maintaining the integrity of the arbitration process. This judgment will serve as a guiding principle for lower courts in future arbitration cases, ensuring that they do not overstep their jurisdiction and re-evaluate the merits of arbitral awards.