Supreme Court Restores Criminal Proceedings: Anil Mishra vs. State of U.P. (2024)

Date of the Judgment: March 1, 2024

Citation: 2024 INSC 189

Judges: Vikram Nath, J. and Satish Chandra Sharma, J.

Can a criminal case be quashed by a High Court based on a settlement if the original complainant, who is also an injured party, is not part of that settlement? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in a criminal appeal, clarifying the limits of High Court’s power to quash criminal proceedings. The Court emphasized that the High Court cannot quash criminal proceedings if the original complainant and injured victim is not a party to the settlement agreement. This judgment, delivered by Justices Vikram Nath and Satish Chandra Sharma, sets aside the High Court’s order and reinstates the criminal proceedings.

Case Background

The case began with a First Information Report (FIR) lodged by Anil Mishra (the Appellant) on August 7, 1999. The FIR, numbered 966 of 1999, was filed at Police Station Kotwali Farrukhabad, alleging offences under Sections 364, 147, 148, 149, and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The Appellant stated that he and Respondent No. 5 were attacked by Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 (the Accused Persons), who were wielding weapons, and that Respondent No. 5 was abducted. Following an investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the Accused Persons for offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, and 364 of the IPC. The Civil Judge, Junior Division, Tirwa, District, took cognizance of the offences and issued summons to the Accused Persons, rejecting their objections on November 29, 1999, and April 18, 2000.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Accused Persons initially challenged the Summoning Order by filing a criminal revision petition and a petition to quash the chargesheet before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. However, on May 28, 2010, the High Court dismissed both petitions. Subsequently, the Appellant sought non-bailable warrants against the Accused Persons from the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Farrukhabad, which were issued on January 17, 2020. During the trial, the Accused Persons presented a settlement agreement dated September 28, 2022, to the Trial Court, which was executed between the Accused Persons and Respondent No. 5. The Accused Persons then filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) before the High Court, seeking to quash the proceedings based on this settlement. The High Court directed the Trial Court to consider the settlement. The Trial Court rejected the settlement on January 23, 2023, noting that the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, and 364 of the IPC are non-compoundable, the Appellant was not a party to the settlement, and the Appellant had objected to it. The High Court, however, allowed the second application by the Accused Persons and quashed the FIR and proceedings on April 6, 2023, leading to the current appeal before the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around Section 482 of the CrPC, which grants inherent powers to the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court referred to its earlier judgment in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, which laid down the principles governing the exercise of this power. According to Gian Singh, the High Court’s power to quash criminal proceedings is distinct from the power to compound offences under Section 320 of the CrPC. While the inherent power is broad, it must be used to secure justice or prevent abuse of process. The Court also noted that heinous and serious offences cannot be quashed even if there is a settlement between the victim and the offender, as these offences have a serious impact on society. The Court also noted that offences of private nature can be quashed by the High Court if the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice.

The relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) are:

• Section 147, IPC: “Punishment for rioting.—Whoever is guilty of rioting, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
• Section 148, IPC: “Rioting, armed with deadly weapon.—Whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.”
• Section 149, IPC: “Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object.—If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.”
• Section 323, IPC: “Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.—Whoever, except in the case provided by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”
• Section 364, IPC: “Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder.—Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that such person may be murdered or may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of being murdered, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The Appellant, being the original complainant and an injured victim, was not a party to the settlement agreement.
• The High Court erred in quashing the FIR and proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC, as it failed to consider that the Appellant did not consent to the settlement.
• The Impugned Order is perverse and illegal because it overlooked the fact that the Appellant, as the original complainant, was not part of the settlement.

Accused Persons’ Arguments:

• The Accused Persons had reached a settlement with Respondent No. 5, the principal victim who was allegedly abducted.
• Once Respondent No. 5 had settled the matter, there was no justification to continue criminal proceedings against the Accused Persons.
• The Impugned Order was well-reasoned and did not require any interference from the Supreme Court.

Innovativeness of the argument: The Appellant’s argument highlighted the importance of the original complainant’s consent in settlement agreements, especially when they are also an injured victim. This argument underscored the principle that criminal proceedings cannot be quashed without the consent of all affected parties, particularly when the offences are serious and non-compoundable.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issue:

1. Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR and the criminal proceedings emanating from it, based on a settlement agreement, when the original complainant and injured victim was not a party to the settlement.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court relied on the following authorities:

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303: The Supreme Court relied on this case to reiterate the principles governing the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC by High Courts. The Court emphasized the distinction between the power to compound offences and the power to quash criminal proceedings, highlighting that heinous offences cannot be quashed even if there is a settlement.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the fact that the Appellant, who was the original complainant and an injured party, was not a party to the settlement agreement. The Court emphasized that the High Court had overlooked this crucial aspect while quashing the proceedings. The Court also considered the nature of the offences, noting that they were serious and non-compoundable. The Court’s reasoning was based on the principle that the High Court’s inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC should be exercised to secure justice and prevent abuse of process, which was not achieved in this case.

Logical Reasoning:

The Supreme Court found that the High Court erred in quashing the FIR and criminal proceedings because the Appellant, the original complainant and an injured victim, was not a party to the settlement agreement. The Court emphasized that the High Court’s decision neither secured the ends of justice nor prevented an abuse of the process of law. The Court referred to the principles laid down in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, stating that the High Court must consider the nature and gravity of the crime before quashing proceedings. The Court noted that the offences in this case were serious and non-compoundable, and thus, the settlement between the Accused Persons and Respondent No. 5 was not sufficient to quash the proceedings against the Appellant’s wishes. The Court stated:

“…we fail to understand how the High Court proceeded to quash the FIR; and the proceedings emanating thereof in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.”

“…the High Court failed to notice that the Appellant i.e., an injured victim; and original complainant was not a party to the Settlement Agreement and nor was agreeable to such a course of action.”

“…we find that Impugned Order neither secured the ends of justice nor prevented an abuse of process of law, thus we find that the Impugned Order was erroneous and contrary to principles laid down in Gian Singh (Supra).”

The Court did not consider any alternative interpretations, as the facts and legal principles were clear. The Court’s reasoning was based on established legal principles and the specific circumstances of the case, leading to the conclusion that the High Court’s order was erroneous.

Key Takeaways

• A High Court cannot quash criminal proceedings based on a settlement agreement if the original complainant and injured victim is not a party to the settlement.
• The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC must be exercised to secure justice and prevent abuse of the process of law.
• Serious and non-compoundable offences cannot be quashed based on a settlement agreement, especially when the original complainant and injured victim does not consent to the settlement.

This judgment reinforces the principle that the rights of the original complainant, especially when they are also an injured victim, must be protected in criminal proceedings. It clarifies that settlement agreements cannot override the interests of justice and the rights of all affected parties.

Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the Impugned Order of the High Court and restored the criminal proceedings to the file of the Trial Court. The Trial Court was directed to dispose of the case expeditiously, preferably within one year, considering that the FIR dates back to 1999.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a High Court cannot quash criminal proceedings based on a settlement agreement if the original complainant and injured victim is not a party to the settlement. This reaffirms the principles laid down in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and clarifies the limits of the High Court’s power under Section 482 of the CrPC. There is no change in the previous position of law, but this judgment reinforces the importance of protecting the rights of the original complainant and injured victim in criminal proceedings.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Anil Mishra vs. State of U.P. is a significant ruling that emphasizes the importance of the original complainant’s consent in settlement agreements, particularly when they are also an injured victim. The Court’s decision to set aside the High Court’s order and restore the criminal proceedings underscores that the High Court’s inherent powers must be exercised judiciously, ensuring that justice is served and the process of law is not abused. This judgment serves as a reminder that settlement agreements cannot be used to bypass the rights of all affected parties, especially in cases involving serious and non-compoundable offences.