Supreme Court Restores Injunction Against Nuisance Causing Flour Mill: Ramji Singh Patel vs. Gyan Chandra Jaiswal (2018)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: January 11, 2018

Citation: 2018 INSC 24

Judges: A.K. Sikri, J., Ashok Bhushan, J.

Can a civil suit seeking injunction against a nuisance be dismissed on the ground of limitation, if the nuisance evolved over time? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case involving a flour mill causing noise and air pollution. The Court examined whether the cause of action arose when the mill was initially set up, or when the nature of the nuisance changed. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice A.K. Sikri and Justice Ashok Bhushan, with Justice A.K. Sikri authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The appellant, Ramji Singh Patel, an advocate, and the respondent, Gyan Chandra Jaiswal, were neighbors. The respondent operated a flour mill, oil mill, and ice factory from his residential property. Initially, the respondent used electricity to power his machines, but from 2003 onwards, he switched to a diesel engine. The appellant contended that this change caused severe vibrations and air pollution, leading to cracks in his house and health issues for his family. The appellant also claimed that the noise and pollution disrupted his professional activities as an advocate.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court decreed the appellant’s suit, granting a permanent injunction against the respondent from operating the machines causing pollution. The respondent’s suit was dismissed. The First Appellate Court upheld the Trial Court’s decision, noting that the change to a diesel engine in 2003 caused the nuisance. The Allahabad High Court, however, allowed the respondent’s second appeals, holding that the suit was barred by limitation since the flour mill was established in 1990, and the suit was filed in 2004. The High Court framed the substantial question of law as:

“Whether the suit in question was barred by time inasmuch as prayer sought in the plaint shows that cause of action arose in 1990 though the suit was filed in 2004 and admittedly the period of limitation is only three years.”

Legal Framework

The judgment primarily revolves around the interpretation of the Limitation Act, specifically concerning the accrual of the cause of action in cases of continuing nuisance. The court also considered the concept of private nuisance and the right of a person to enjoy their property without undue interference from neighbors.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that the cause of action arose in 2003 when the respondent started using a diesel engine, which caused severe vibrations, air, and noise pollution.
• The appellant contended that the nuisance was not present when the respondent was using electricity to operate the machines.
• The appellant stated that the suit was filed in 2004, within the limitation period from the date the nuisance started.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The respondent argued that the flour mill was established in 1990, and the suit was filed in 2004, which is beyond the limitation period.
• The respondent contended that the cause of action arose in 1990 when the mill was first set up.

Analysis of Arguments:

The core of the appellant’s argument was that the change in the mode of operation of the mill (from electricity to diesel) created a new cause of action. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the cause of action was the establishment of the mill itself, regardless of the mode of operation. The High Court sided with the respondent, focusing on the initial establishment of the mill. The Supreme Court, however, found the appellant’s argument to be more compelling, recognizing that the nature of the nuisance had changed significantly.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues, but the core issue was whether the High Court was correct in holding the suit to be barred by limitation. The underlying issue was whether the change in the nature of the nuisance (from no pollution to pollution) created a new cause of action.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates how the Court decided the issue:

Authorities

The court did not cite any specific case laws or books in this judgment. The primary focus was on the interpretation of the Limitation Act and the factual matrix of the case.

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court interpreted the Limitation Act to mean that the cause of action arises when the actual nuisance occurs, not when the potential for nuisance is created.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court was primarily influenced by the fact that the nature of the nuisance changed significantly when the respondent switched to a diesel engine. The findings of fact by the lower courts that the use of the diesel engine caused vibrations, air, and noise pollution, which was detrimental to the health of the appellant and his family, also weighed heavily in the Court’s decision. The Court emphasized that the cause of action should be considered as a continuing one, especially when the nuisance is ongoing and affects the health and well-being of individuals.

Fact:Law Ratio

Logical Reasoning:

The Court rejected the High Court’s view that the cause of action arose when the mill was initially established in 1990. The Court emphasized that the nuisance was a continuing one, and the limitation period should be calculated from the date the nuisance began, which was when the diesel engine was installed.

The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had not disturbed any of the findings of facts recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the First Appellate Court. The Court stated:

“A perusal of the judgment of the High Court shows that it is not tinkered with any of the findings recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the first appellate court.”

The Court also noted that the issue of limitation was not raised in the written submissions by the respondent, and no issue on limitation was framed by the Trial Court. The Court noted:

“It may be noted that in the first instance no such plea was taken up by the respondent in the written submissions filed by him to the suit which was filed by the plaintiff/appellant and no issue on limitation came to be casted.”

The Court held that the High Court was incorrect in considering the issue of limitation as a pure question of law, as it was a mixed question of law and fact. The Court observed:

“However, such a plea could have been taken by the respondent in the Second Appeal before the High Court only if the issue of limitation was raised as a pure question of law. In the instant case, we find it to be a mixed question of law and fact and, therefore, it could not have been entertained by the High Court for the first time in the second appeal filed by the respondent.”

Key Takeaways

• A cause of action for a nuisance suit arises when the nuisance actually begins, not when the potential for nuisance is created.
• If the nature of a nuisance changes significantly, it can create a new cause of action.
• Courts should consider the continuing nature of a nuisance when determining the limitation period.
• Findings of fact by lower courts should not be disturbed lightly by higher courts.

Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and restored the decree passed by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. The respondent was restrained from operating the machines causing noise and air pollution.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the cause of action for a nuisance suit arises when the actual nuisance occurs and not when the potential for nuisance is created. This judgment clarifies the application of the Limitation Act in cases of continuing nuisance, emphasizing that the nature of the nuisance can create a new cause of action. This is a departure from the High Court’s view that the cause of action arose when the mill was initially established, thus reaffirming the principle that the limitation period should be calculated from the date the nuisance began.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Ramji Singh Patel vs. Gyan Chandra Jaiswal clarifies that a suit for injunction against a nuisance is not barred by limitation if the nuisance evolved over time. The Court emphasized that the cause of action arises when the actual nuisance begins, especially when there is a significant change in the nature of the activity causing the nuisance. This judgment reinforces the importance of considering the continuing nature of a nuisance and its impact on the health and well-being of individuals.