Supreme Court restricts amendment of pleadings at fag end of trial: Basavaraj vs. Indira (2024) INSC 151

Case Background

The case revolves around a suit filed by Indira and others (respondents No. 1 and 2) seeking partition of ancestral property. The respondents claimed that no actual partition of the property had ever taken place. During the pendency of the suit, the respondents filed an application to amend their plaint to include a prayer for a declaration that a compromise decree dated 14.10.2004 was null and void. This compromise decree had been passed in an earlier suit. The respondents sought this amendment at the fag end of the trial, stating that the omission to challenge the compromise decree was due to oversight and mistake.

The Trial Court dismissed the application for amendment. However, the High Court of Karnataka set aside the Trial Court’s order and allowed the amendment, subject to payment of costs. The appellant, Basavaraj, then appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s decision.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court initially dismissed the application for amendment filed by the respondents, who sought to add a prayer for declaration that the compromise decree dated 14.10.2004 was null and void. The Trial Court did not find merit in the reasons given by the respondents, which was stated to be oversight and mistake.

On appeal, the High Court of Karnataka set aside the Trial Court’s order and allowed the amendment, subject to payment of costs of ₹2,000. The High Court found that the amendment would not cause prejudice to the defendants and would help to achieve complete justice.

Aggrieved by the High Court’s order, the appellant approached the Supreme Court, contending that the amendment was impermissible at such a late stage of the trial and that it fundamentally altered the nature of the suit.

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court considered the following key legal provisions:

• Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC): This provision deals with the amendment of pleadings. The proviso to this rule states that no amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced unless the Court concludes that, despite due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.
  
  “Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.”
• Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC): This rule pertains to compromise decrees. It states that a compromise decree can only be challenged before the court that recorded the compromise.

Arguments

Arguments by the Appellant

• The appellant argued that the nature of the suit was changed from partition to declaration, which is impermissible.
• The appellant contended that in terms of proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC, no amendment could be allowed after the commencement of trial. The suit was at the fag end, as it was fixed for arguments.
• The appellant submitted that the compromise decree could only be challenged before the same court that passed it, as per Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC.
• The appellant argued that the relief of declaration of the compromise decree being null and void was time-barred, as the application for amendment was filed on 08.02.2010, while the decree was passed on 14.10.2004.
• The appellant stated that the application filed by the respondents did not meet the pre-conditions laid down in Order VI Rule 17 CPC for permitting amendment at the fag end of the trial. No due diligence was pleaded; only oversight was stated.
• The appellant pointed out that some parties to the compromise decree were not parties to the current suit, making the challenge to the decree not maintainable.
• The appellant relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and sons and others [ (2009) 10 SCC 84 ] and Vidyabai and others v. Padmalatha and another [ (2009) 2 SCC 409 ].

Arguments by the Respondents

• The respondents submitted that it was merely an oversight mistake that occurred at the time of filing the suit.
• The respondents argued that they had fairly pleaded about the earlier compromise decree, and inadvertently, the prayer for declaration was not made.
• The respondents stated that no fresh evidence was to be led, and the case could be argued by re-framing the issues.
• The respondents contended that the amendment would avoid multiplicity of litigation and ensure complete justice.
• The respondents argued that the other side could be compensated with costs, as was done by the High Court, and no prejudice would be caused to the appellant.
• The respondents relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Dondapati Narayana Reddy v. Duggireddy Venkatanarayana Reddy and others [ (2001) 8 SCC 115 ] and Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. [ (2001) 8 SCC 97 ].

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not frame any specific issues in this case. However, the core issue before the Court was whether the High Court was correct in allowing the amendment of the plaint at such a late stage of the trial, particularly when it sought to challenge a compromise decree and when the reasons given were oversight and mistake.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:

• Delay and Lack of Due Diligence: The Court emphasized that the application for amendment was filed at the fag end of the trial, and the respondents failed to demonstrate due diligence in not seeking the relief earlier. The mere plea of oversight and mistake was not considered sufficient.
• Change in the Nature of the Suit: The Court noted that the amendment would change the nature of the suit from a simple partition suit to one that also included a challenge to a compromise decree. This was deemed impermissible.
• Time-Barred Relief: The Court pointed out that the relief sought through the amendment was time-barred, as the application was filed more than three years after the compromise decree was passed.
• Prejudice to the Appellant: The Court observed that allowing the amendment would cause prejudice to the appellant, as a right had accrued in their favor due to the delay in challenging the compromise decree.
• Non-Compliance with Order VI Rule 17 CPC: The Court reiterated that the requirements of Order VI Rule 17 CPC, especially the proviso regarding due diligence, were not met.

Logical Reasoning

Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. The Court held that the application for amendment of the plaint was not maintainable. The Court emphasized that the amendment was sought at a very late stage of the trial, and the reasons provided by the respondents were insufficient.

The Court also noted that the amendment would change the nature of the suit, and the relief sought was time-barred. The Court observed that the respondents had not shown due diligence, as required by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC.

The Court stated, “The same cannot be accepted as a ground to allow any amendment in the pleadings at the fag end of the trial especially when admittedly the facts were in knowledge of the respondents No. 1 and 2/plaintiffs.”

The Court further stated, “Leave to amend may be refused if it introduces a totally different, new and inconsistent case, or challenges the fundamental character of the suit.”

The Court also noted, “What cannot be done directly, cannot be allowed to be done indirectly.”

The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench, with both judges concurring on the decision. The majority opinion was authored by Justice Rajesh Bindal.

Key Takeaways

• Timely Action: Parties must be diligent and seek necessary amendments to pleadings before the commencement of trial.
• Due Diligence: A mere plea of oversight or mistake is not sufficient for allowing amendments at a late stage. Parties must demonstrate due diligence.
• Nature of Suit: Amendments that change the fundamental nature of the suit are generally not allowed, especially at the fag end of the trial.
• Limitation: Parties must be mindful of the limitation period when seeking to challenge a decree or order.
• Prejudice: Courts will consider whether the amendment would cause prejudice to the other party.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed that:

• The impugned order passed by the High Court was set aside.
• The application filed for amendment of the plaint was dismissed.
• The appellant was entitled to costs of ₹1,00,000/- to be paid jointly or severally by respondents No. 1 and 2.
• The appellant shall be paid the amount of cost on the next date of hearing before the Trial Court by way of demand draft.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that amendments to pleadings at the fag end of the trial will not be allowed unless the party seeking the amendment demonstrates due diligence in not raising the matter earlier, and the amendment does not fundamentally alter the nature of the suit. This judgment reinforces the importance of timely action and adherence to procedural rules. It also clarifies that a mere plea of oversight or mistake is insufficient to justify late amendments, especially when they challenge existing decrees. This case reinforces the principles laid down in Pushpa Devi Bhagat (Dead) through L.R. Sadhna Rai (Smt.) v. Rajinder Singh and others [ (2006) 5 SCC 566 ], Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and sons and others [ (2009) 10 SCC 84 ] and M. Revanna v. Anjanamma (Dead) by legal representatives and others [ (2019) 4 SCC 332 ].

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s judgment in Basavaraj vs. Indira emphasizes the importance of due diligence and timely action in legal proceedings. The Court held that amendments to pleadings at the fag end of a trial are impermissible if they change the nature of the suit, are time-barred, and lack a sufficient explanation for the delay. The judgment serves as a reminder to parties to be proactive and diligent in pursuing their claims and to adhere to the procedural requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.