Supreme Court Reverses High Court Acquittal in Dowry Death Case: State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Jogendra & Anr. (2022) INSC 24

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 11 January 2022

Citation: (2022) INSC 24

Judges: N.V. Ramana, CJI, A.S. Bopanna, J., Hima Kohli, J. (authored the majority opinion)

Can a demand for money to construct a house be considered dowry? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in a case involving the tragic death of a young woman. The court examined whether the High Court was correct in acquitting the accused, who were the husband and father-in-law of the deceased, by holding that the demand for money for construction of a house cannot be treated as a dowry demand.

The Supreme Court, in this case, overturned the High Court’s decision, emphasizing that any demand for money or property connected to a marriage can be considered dowry, especially when it leads to the death of a woman. The bench was composed of Chief Justice N.V. Ramana, Justice A.S. Bopanna, and Justice Hima Kohli, with Justice Kohli authoring the majority opinion.

Case Background

Geeta Bai, an 18-year-old woman, married Jogendra (Respondent No. 1) on May 7, 1998, in a community marriage ceremony. Before her marriage, she lived with her mother, Kamla Bai, and brother, with her maternal uncle, Bansi Lal (PW-1). Tragically, within four years of her marriage, Geeta Bai committed suicide by setting herself on fire at her matrimonial home on April 20, 2002. She was five months pregnant at the time of her death. An FIR was lodged on April 23, 2002, after the attending doctor informed the police. The investigation led to a charge sheet and a trial in the Sessions Court.

The prosecution argued that Geeta Bai was constantly harassed by her husband and father-in-law, Badri Prasad (Respondent No. 2), for money to construct a house. Her family was unable to meet these demands, which led to her suicide. The trial court convicted Jogendra and Badri Prasad under Sections 304-B (dowry death), 306 (abetment of suicide), and 498-A (cruelty) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, sentencing them to life imprisonment, seven years, and three years respectively. However, the High Court overturned the conviction under Sections 304-B and 306, maintaining the conviction of Jogendra under Section 498-A but reducing his sentence to the period already served, while acquitting Badri Prasad completely.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The trial court, after examining the evidence, acquitted Sushila (A-3), the mother-in-law, and Jitender (A-4), the brother-in-law, of the deceased. However, it convicted Jogendra (A-1) and Badri Prasad (A-2) under Sections 304-B, 306, and 498-A of the IPC. The conviction was based on testimonies from Geeta Bai’s maternal uncles, Bansi Lal (PW-1), Shyam Bihari (PW-2), and Amrit Lal (PW-4), who stated that the respondents had been demanding money for house construction, which led to her harassment and eventual suicide. The post-mortem report confirmed that Geeta Bai’s death was due to burns.

On appeal, the High Court acquitted Badri Prasad (A-2) and set aside Jogendra’s (A-1) conviction under Sections 304-B and 306. The High Court reasoned that the demand for money for house construction could not be considered a dowry demand. It also found no evidence to suggest that the respondents had abetted Geeta Bai’s suicide. However, Jogendra’s conviction under Section 498-A for cruelty was upheld, although his sentence was reduced to the period already served.

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court examined the following key legal provisions:

• Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC): This section deals with dowry death. It states that if a woman dies due to burns or bodily injury, or otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of her marriage, and it is shown that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives for dowry, it is considered a dowry death.
• Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: This section defines “dowry” as any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given, directly or indirectly, at or before or any time after the marriage, in connection with the marriage.
  
  “2. Definition of ‘dowry’ – In this Act, “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly – (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal law (Shariat) applies. Explanation I.—xxx xxxxx Explanation II.— The expression “valuable security” has the same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”
• Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC): This section deals with cruelty by a husband or his relatives towards a woman.
• Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC): This section deals with abetment of suicide.
• Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: This section provides for the presumption of dowry death if it is shown that the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before her death.

The court emphasized that the interpretation of “dowry” should be expansive to include any demand connected to the marriage, and the term “soon before her death” should be interpreted pragmatically, considering the circumstances of each case.

Arguments

Appellant (State of Madhya Pradesh):

• The State argued that the High Court failed to appreciate that the deceased was constantly harassed for money to construct a house and purchase land.
• The testimonies of Bansi Lal (PW-1), Shyam Bihari (PW-2), Amrit Lal (PW-4), and Rajesh Bhai (PW-6) clearly indicated that the deceased was assaulted and harassed for not bringing ₹50,000 for house construction.
• The demand for money to construct a house should be considered a dowry demand, thus making the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC applicable.
• This was a clear case of abetment to commit suicide, and the trial court had rightly convicted the respondents, which the High Court erroneously overturned.

Respondents (Jogendra and Badri Prasad):

• The respondents argued that the demand for money to construct a house cannot be treated as a dowry demand. They relied on previous judgments, such as K. Prema S. Rao and Another v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and Others, Saro Rana and Others v. State of Jharkhand, and Appasaheb and Another v. State of Maharashtra, to support their claim.
• They contended that the prosecution failed to establish that they had abetted the deceased to commit suicide.
• They argued that the High Court was correct in setting aside the conviction under Section 304-B and 306 of the IPC.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issues:

1. Whether the demand for money for the construction of a house can be treated as a dowry demand under Section 304-B of the IPC.
2. Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the conviction of the respondents under Section 304-B and 306 of the IPC.
3. Whether the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before her death.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The court expressly overruled the view taken in Appasaheb and Another v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 9 SCC 721]* stating that the demand for money for construction of a house can be treated as dowry.
• The court relied on Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab [(2015) 6 SCC 477]* to interpret the definition of dowry expansively.
• The court relied on Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana [(2014) 4 SCC 129]* to interpret the term “soon before her death”.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was driven by a combination of legal interpretation and a deep concern for the social evil of dowry. The Court emphasized the need for a pragmatic and sensitive approach to cases involving dowry deaths. The Court’s reasoning was heavily influenced by the following points:

• Expansive Definition of Dowry: The Court adopted a broad interpretation of the term “dowry,” including any demand for money or property connected to the marriage. This was crucial in recognizing the demand for money for house construction as a dowry demand.
• Proximity of Cruelty and Death: The Court emphasized that the harassment and cruelty must be “soon before” the death, but this term should not be interpreted as “immediately before.” The Court considered the continuous harassment and demands for money as a live link to the suicide.
• Social Context: The Court considered the social milieu of the parties, noting that the marriage was conducted in a community marriage organization, indicating financial constraints. This context was essential in understanding the deceased’s helplessness and the pressure she faced.
• Rebuttable Presumption: The Court highlighted the importance of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which creates a rebuttable presumption of dowry death if the necessary ingredients are met.

Fact:Law Ratio

The court’s reasoning involved a careful analysis of the facts, combined with the application of relevant legal principles. The court emphasized that the interpretation of dowry should be expansive to include any demand made on a woman, whether in respect of a property or a valuable security of any nature. The court was also sensitive to the social milieu from which the parties hailed.

The court rejected the argument that the deceased was complicit in the demand, stating that she was compelled by the persistent demands of the respondents. The court also noted that the High Court had wrongly interpreted the law by not considering the demand for money for house construction as dowry.

The court quoted from the judgment:

“Given that the statute with which we are dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and common sense interpretation so as to fulfil the object sought to be achieved by Parliament, we feel that the judgment in Appasaheb case… followed by the judgment of Vipin Jaiswal… do not state the law correctly.”

“The word “soon” does not mean “immediate”. A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304-B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression. Time-lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman under Section 304-B.”

“In the facts of the instant case, we are of the opinion that the trial Court has correctly interpreted the demand for money raised by the respondents on the deceased for construction of a house as falling within the definition of the word “dowry”.”

Key Takeaways

• Expansive Definition of Dowry: The term “dowry” includes any demand for money, property, or valuable security made in connection with a marriage, even demands for house construction.
• “Soon Before Death” Interpretation: The phrase “soon before her death” is a relative term and does not mean “immediately before.” It requires a proximate and live link between the dowry demand and the death.
• Relevance of Social Context: Courts must consider the social and economic context of the parties involved in dowry death cases.
• Overruling of Precedents: The Supreme Court overruled the narrow interpretation of “dowry” in Appasaheb’s case, emphasizing the need for a pragmatic approach to combat dowry demands.
• Burden of Proof: Once the prosecution establishes the necessary ingredients for dowry death, the burden shifts to the accused to rebut the presumption.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed the respondents to surrender before the trial court within four weeks to undergo the remaining period of their sentence.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the demand for money for construction of a house can be considered as dowry and the term ‘soon before’ is a relative term and does not mean ‘immediately before’. This case has changed the previous positions of law by overruling the judgment in Appasaheb and Another v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 9 SCC 721]* which had held that the demand for money to purchase manure would not fall within the purview of “dowry”.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Jogendra & Anr. is a significant step in addressing the social evil of dowry. By adopting an expansive definition of dowry and emphasizing the need for a pragmatic approach, the court has reinforced the legal framework to protect women from dowry-related harassment and violence. The court’s decision to overturn the High Court’s acquittal and reinstate the conviction under Section 304-B of the IPC underscores the judiciary’s commitment to curbing dowry deaths and ensuring justice for victims.