Supreme Court Rules on Adverse Possession in Property Dispute: Brij Narayan Shukla vs. Sudesh Kumar (2024)

Date of the Judgment: 03 January 2024

Citation: 2024 INSC 9

Judges: Vikram Nath, J. and Rajesh Bindal, J.

Can a tenant’s possession be considered adverse to the owner? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a property dispute case, clarifying the principles of adverse possession. The core issue revolved around whether the High Court was correct in holding that the defendants had perfected their title by adverse possession. The Supreme Court bench comprising of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Rajesh Bindal delivered the judgment, with Justice Vikram Nath authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The dispute concerns a plot of land measuring 3500 sq. ft. in Village Hardoi, Uttar Pradesh. The plaintiff, Brij Narayan Shukla, claimed ownership through a registered sale deed dated 21 January 1966, from the erstwhile Zamindar, Rai Bahadur Mohan Lal. The land was an open piece of land. In 1975, when the plaintiff attempted to construct on the land, the defendants, Sudesh Kumar and others, objected, leading to the filing of the suit on 28 May 1975. The plaintiff sought an injunction and, alternatively, possession of the land.

The defendants contended that there were prior proceedings in 1944 between Rai Bahadur Mohan Lal and his co-sharers and their tenants (ancestors of the defendants) regarding arrears of rent for the same plot and other plots. They further claimed that the land came to Siddheshwari Narain and Deep Chandra in a private partition and they became the owners. The defendants also argued that they had continued in possession at the time of the abolition of Zamindari, thereby becoming the owners. Furthermore, they pointed to proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in May 1966, where it was found that the defendants were in possession.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding them to be the owner and in possession of the land. The court relied on the sale deed, mutation, and Khasra and Khewat entries. It also held that the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, were not relevant as it was unclear if they pertained to the land in question. The First Appellate Court upheld the plaintiff’s ownership but modified the decree to one for possession, agreeing that the Section 145 proceedings related to the disputed land. The First Appellate Court also found that the land was non-agricultural and therefore not subject to Zamindari abolition. The High Court, in second appeal, reversed these decisions, holding that the defendants had perfected their rights by adverse possession since 1944. The Supreme Court heard the appeal against the High Court’s judgment.

Legal Framework

The case primarily involves the interpretation of the concept of adverse possession and its application to the facts. The relevant legal provisions include:

• Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: This section deals with the procedure for second appeals in the High Court. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court, in second appeal, should not re-appreciate the findings of fact.
• Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: This section deals with the procedure in cases where a dispute concerning land or water is likely to cause a breach of peace. The Supreme Court noted that such proceedings do not determine ownership but only possession.

Arguments

Plaintiff’s Arguments:

• The plaintiff claimed ownership based on a registered sale deed dated 21 January 1966, from the erstwhile Zamindar.
• The plaintiff argued that the defendants’ possession was not adverse, as they were tenants and their possession was permissive in nature.
• The plaintiff contended that the suit was filed within 12 years from the date of the sale deed, and thus, was within the limitation period.
• The plaintiff relied on the findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court that they had established ownership.

Defendant’s Arguments:

• The defendants claimed ownership based on their continuous possession since 1944 when a suit for arrears of rent was filed against them.
• They argued that the land came to their ancestors in a private partition and they became owners.
• The defendants contended that they became owners upon the abolition of Zamindari.
• They relied on the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to show their possession of the land.
• They argued that they had perfected their title by adverse possession.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame the issues in a separate section but the issues can be inferred from the judgment:

1. Whether the High Court was correct in reversing the findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court on the issue of adverse possession.
2. Whether the defendants could claim adverse possession from 1944, given that they were tenants.
3. Whether the suit was barred by limitation.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Court did not cite any cases or books, but it did refer to the following legal provisions:

• Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: This section deals with the procedure for second appeals in the High Court.
• Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: This section deals with the procedure in cases where a dispute concerning land or water is likely to cause a breach of peace.

Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s judgment and restoring the First Appellate Court’s decision. The Court held that the High Court had erred in re-appreciating the findings of fact in a second appeal, which is not permissible under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court also emphasized that the defendants’ possession was permissive as they were tenants, and thus, they could not claim adverse possession from 1944. The Court further clarified that the limitation period for claiming possession started from the date of the sale deed, 21 January 1966, and the suit was filed within 12 years.

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: The Court held that the High Court had violated the provision by re-appreciating the facts in the second appeal.
• Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: The Court clarified that proceedings under this section do not determine ownership but only possession.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:

• The High Court’s error in re-appreciating the findings of fact in a second appeal, which is not permissible under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
• The principle that a tenant’s possession is permissive and not adverse to the owner unless there is a clear assertion of a hostile title.
• The correct calculation of the limitation period, which starts from the date of the sale deed and not from the date of the defendants’ possession as tenants.
• The First Appellate Court’s finding that the land was non-agricultural and not subject to Zamindari abolition, which was not disturbed by the High Court.

Logical Reasoning:

The court considered the argument that the defendants had perfected their title by adverse possession since 1944. However, it rejected this argument because the defendants were tenants, and their possession was permissive, not adverse. The court also considered the argument that the defendants became owners upon the abolition of Zamindari, but it rejected this argument because the First Appellate Court had found that the land was non-agricultural and not subject to Zamindari abolition. The court concluded that the plaintiff had established their ownership through the registered sale deed and that the suit was filed within the limitation period.

“The High Court was hearing the Second Appeal under section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and it having reappreciated the findings to disturb findings of fact, committed an error.”

“The suit of the year 1944 was for the arrears of rent and not relating to any dispute of possession. The defendant respondents were tenants and therefore their possession was permissive as against the then landlords. There was no question of them claiming any adverse possession from 1944.”

“In our considered view, the plaintiff appellants got their ownership /title under the registered sale deed on 21.01.1966. The dispute for possession vis -à-vis the defendant respondents would arise only after the said date and not on any date prior to it.”

Key Takeaways

• A tenant’s possession is considered permissive and not adverse to the owner unless there is a clear assertion of a hostile title.
• The limitation period for claiming possession starts from the date of the sale deed, not from the date of the defendants’ possession as tenants.
• High Courts should not re-appreciate findings of fact in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Directions

The Supreme Court did not issue any specific directions other than setting aside the judgment of the High Court and restoring the judgment of the First Appellate Court.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a tenant’s possession is permissive and not adverse to the owner unless there is a clear assertion of a hostile title. This case reaffirms the settled position of law regarding adverse possession and the limitations on the powers of the High Court in second appeals.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s judgment in Brij Narayan Shukla vs. Sudesh Kumar clarifies that a tenant’s possession is not adverse to the owner unless there is a clear assertion of a hostile title. The Court also reiterated that High Courts should not re-appreciate findings of fact in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and restored the judgment of the First Appellate Court, thereby upholding the plaintiff’s claim of ownership and right to possession.