Supreme Court Rules on Full Benefits from Initial Appointment Date in Giridhar vs. State of Maharashtra (2019) INSC 185

Date of the Judgment: 6 March 2019

Citation: (2019) INSC 185

Judges: L. Nageswara Rao, J., M. R. Shah, J.

Can an employee be denied full monetary benefits from their initial appointment date due to a delay in approaching the court, especially when the delay is not their fault? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a service law matter concerning a lecturer appointed against a reserved post. The court clarified that if the delay in seeking benefits is not attributable to the employee, they are entitled to all benefits from the date of their initial appointment. The judgment was delivered by a bench comprising Justices L. Nageswara Rao and M. R. Shah, with Justice M. R. Shah authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The appellant, Giridhar, was appointed as a Lecturer in Respondent No. 4 College on December 26, 1989, against a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribe category. Although he did not belong to this category, he was appointed because no suitable candidate from the Scheduled Tribe was available despite advertising. A Government Resolution (G.R.) dated January 25, 1990, allowed such appointments, mandating continuous advertising for five years and de-reservation of the post if no suitable candidate was found. Giridhar’s appointment was initially approved until April 20, 1990, but he continued in the position as no reserved category candidate was found. The University granted approval to his appointment on August 16, 1993, and his service breaks were condoned on March 6, 1997. By July 2, 1997, he was shown as appointed on December 25, 1989, and the post was de-reserved. Giridhar and other employees applied for de-reservation on December 8, 1997, but received no response. Citing a government circular that discouraged direct court approaches, Giridhar waited before filing a writ petition in 2011. Subsequently, another employee received relief from the High Court, prompting Giridhar to seek pay fixation from his initial appointment date on October 16, 2007. Despite a confirmation order on March 4, 2009, showing his confirmation from December 26, 1991, his requests for pay fixation and arrears were not addressed, leading him to file a writ petition in 2011. The High Court initially directed the State to decide on his representation, which was rejected on September 6, 2013, due to a claimed break in service. Giridhar filed another writ petition in 2015, seeking benefits from his initial appointment date. The High Court granted benefits but restricted them to three years prior to his 2011 petition, leading to this appeal.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The High Court initially disposed of Giridhar’s Writ Petition No. 3694 of 2011, directing Respondent No. 3 to decide on his representation. Subsequently, Respondent No. 3 rejected the representation, citing a 314-day break in service. Giridhar then filed Writ Petition No. 5450 of 2015, seeking placement and pay fixation from his initial appointment date of December 26, 1989. The High Court, referencing the case of Harshendu Vinayak Madge v. Chembur Trombay Education Society, held that Giridhar was entitled to all benefits from December 26, 1989, but restricted the monetary benefits to a period commencing from three years prior to his 2011 writ petition, i.e., from July 3, 2008.

Legal Framework

The case revolves around the interpretation of the Government Resolution dated January 25, 1990, which addressed the appointment of candidates against reserved posts when no suitable candidates from the reserved category were available. The resolution stipulated that:

• In the absence of candidates for appointment to posts reserved for a backward class category, persons not belonging to the said category can be appointed.
• Advertisements were to be issued for five years continuously for appointment of the reserved category candidate.
• If, despite the above, no such candidate is available, the post be de-reserved.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that the High Court erred in restricting the benefits to July 3, 2008, and not from the initial appointment date of December 26, 1989.
• The appellant had been making representations since 1997 for redressal of his grievances and de-reservation of the post.
• As per the G.R. dated January 25, 1990, the post should have been de-reserved after five years of continuous advertising without a suitable reserved category candidate being found.
• The appellant had continuously worked from December 26, 1989, and the delay in approaching the court was due to the government circulars that discouraged direct court approaches.
• The Bombay High Court in Harshendu Vinayak Madge v. Chembur Trombay Education Society granted similar relief with benefits from the initial appointment date, which should have been followed.
• The delay in filing the writ petition was not attributable to the appellant, as he waited for the outcome of his representations.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The respondent-State of Maharashtra contended that the High Court order was a consent order and the appellant agreed to restrict benefits from July 3, 2008.
• The respondent argued that the High Court was correct in restricting benefits to three years prior to the 2011 writ petition, as the appellant approached the court for the first time in 2011.

Submissions Table

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was:

1. Whether the High Court was justified in restricting the grant of arrears and other benefits from July 3, 2008, and not from the date of the first appointment of the writ petitioner, i.e., December 26, 1989?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

✓ Harshendu Vinayak Madge v. Chembur Trombay Education Society: The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had correctly applied this precedent initially but erred in restricting the benefits later. The court used this case to support its decision to grant benefits from the initial appointment date.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the fact that the delay in approaching the court was not attributable to the appellant. The Court emphasized that the appellant had been making representations since 1997 and was waiting for the outcome of these representations. The Court also noted that the State and the concerned authorities should have taken the decision to de-reserve the post earlier. The Court also considered the precedent set by the Bombay High Court in Harshendu Vinayak Madge v. Chembur Trombay Education Society, where similar relief was granted from the initial date of appointment. The Court emphasized that the appellant was vigilant and did not sleep over his rights. The key points that weighed in the mind of the court are:

• The appellant’s continuous efforts to seek redressal of his grievances.
• The government circulars that discouraged direct court approaches.
• The precedent set by the Bombay High Court.
• The fact that the delay was not attributable to the appellant.
• The failure of the State and the concerned authorities to take timely action.

These factors led the Supreme Court to conclude that the appellant was entitled to all monetary benefits from the date of his initial appointment.

Logical Reasoning

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the impugned order was a consent order, stating that there was no concession made by the appellant’s counsel. The Court also rejected the argument that the benefits should be restricted due to delay, as the delay was not attributable to the appellant. The Court emphasized that the appellant was vigilant and did not sleep over his rights.

The Supreme Court stated, “Therefore, in the facts and circumstances narrated above and, more particularly, that the delay is not attributable to the appellant-original writ petitioner at all, the High Court is not justified in restricting the monetary benefits w.e.f. 03.07.2008 only.”

The Court further stated, “The appellant-original writ petitioner shall be entitled to all the monetary benefits, including the arrears etc. treating his appointment from 26.12.1989 and all such consequential benefits accordingly.”

The Court also noted, “In fact, the State and the appropriate authority/College/University ought to have taken the decision earlier to de-reserve the post on which the appellant was working, in view of G.R. dated 25.02.1990 and the subsequent communications.”

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in restricting the monetary benefits to July 3, 2008, and that the appellant was entitled to all monetary benefits from his initial appointment date, i.e., December 26, 1989. The Court reasoned that the delay in approaching the court was not attributable to the appellant, who had been making representations since 1997 and was awaiting their outcome. The Court also noted that the State and the concerned authorities should have taken the decision to de-reserve the post earlier.

Key Takeaways

• Employees are entitled to monetary benefits from their initial appointment date if the delay in claiming such benefits is not attributable to them.
• Government authorities should act promptly on employee representations and de-reserve posts as per regulations.
• Courts should consider the circumstances of the delay and not penalize employees for delays not caused by them.
• Precedents set by High Courts should be followed consistently, and benefits should be granted from the initial date of appointment in similar cases.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed that the appellant shall be paid all arrears and other consequential benefits within a period of three months from the date of the judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that an employee is entitled to all monetary benefits from the date of their initial appointment if the delay in claiming such benefits is not attributable to them. This judgment clarifies that employees should not be penalized for the inaction or delays of the authorities. This ruling reinforces the principle that employees who are vigilant in pursuing their rights should not be denied their due benefits due to procedural delays or administrative inaction.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s order that restricted monetary benefits to the three years preceding the filing of the writ petition. The Supreme Court held that the appellant is entitled to all monetary benefits from his initial appointment date of December 26, 1989. The Court emphasized that the delay in approaching the court was not attributable to the appellant, who had been making representations since 1997. This judgment ensures that employees are not penalized for delays not caused by them and reinforces the principle of granting benefits from the initial date of appointment.

Category

Parent Category: Service Law
Child Category: Arrears of Pay
Child Category: Appointment against Reserved Post
Child Category: Delay in Approaching Court
Parent Category: Government Resolution
Child Category: Government Resolution dated January 25, 1990

FAQ

Q: What was the main issue in the Giridhar vs. State of Maharashtra case?

A: The main issue was whether an employee is entitled to full monetary benefits from their initial appointment date, even if there was a delay in approaching the court, especially when the delay was not their fault.

Q: What did the Supreme Court decide in this case?

A: The Supreme Court ruled that the employee, Giridhar, was entitled to all monetary benefits from his initial appointment date of December 26, 1989, because the delay in approaching the court was not attributable to him.

Q: Why did the High Court initially restrict the benefits?

A: The High Court restricted the benefits to three years prior to the filing of Giridhar’s writ petition in 2011, citing a delay in approaching the court.

Q: What was the significance of the Government Resolution dated January 25, 1990?

A: The Government Resolution allowed appointments against reserved posts when no suitable candidates from the reserved category were available, mandating continuous advertising for five years and de-reservation of the post if no suitable candidate was found.

Q: What should employees do if they face similar situations?

A: Employees should make timely representations to the concerned authorities and keep records of their communications. They should also be aware of their rights and not hesitate to approach the court if their grievances are not addressed promptly.

Q: What is the practical implication of this judgment?

A: This judgment ensures that employees are not penalized for delays not caused by them and reinforces the principle of granting benefits from the initial date of appointment. It also emphasizes the importance of government authorities acting promptly on employee representations.