Supreme Court sets aside condonation of delay in filing appeal against ex-parte decree: Thirunagalingam vs. Lingeswaran (2025) INSC 672 (May 13, 2025)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: May 13, 2025

Citation: (2025) INSC 672

Judges: Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma

Can a court condone a delay in filing an appeal if the reasons for the delay have already been considered and rejected in earlier proceedings? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in a civil appeal concerning a dispute over a sale agreement. The core issue revolved around whether the High Court was justified in condoning a delay of 1116 days in filing an appeal against an ex-parte decree, especially when the reasons for the delay had already been raised and dismissed in previous applications. The judgment was delivered by a bench comprising Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma.

Case Background

The case originated from a sale agreement executed on August 17, 2015, between Thirunagalingam (the Appellant) and Lingeswaran (Respondent No. 1) for Rs. 3 lakhs concerning property in Nainarkoil @ Naganathasamoothiram Village. Respondent No. 1 failed to execute the sale deed, leading the Appellant to file a civil suit (O.S. No. 110/2015) in the Sub Court, Paramakudi, on September 21, 2015, seeking specific performance of the sale agreement. During the suit’s pendency, Respondent No. 1 executed a sale deed in favor of Respondent No. 2 on November 26, 2015. Both defendants initially filed written statements but later stopped appearing, resulting in an ex-parte decree in favor of the Appellant on February 7, 2017. Subsequently, the Appellant initiated execution proceedings (E.P. No. 10/2017), leading to the execution of the sale deed in his favor.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 filed separate applications under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (I.A. No. 119/2015 and I.A. No. 462 of 2018) along with applications for condonation of delay of 712 and 467 days, respectively. The trial court allowed both applications on August 19, 2019, setting aside the ex-parte decree and condoning the delay. The Appellant then preferred a revision before the High Court by filing CRP(MD) No. 1688 and 1689 of 2019, which was allowed on November 9, 2021. The Respondents challenged this order in the Supreme Court via Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 2054-55 of 2022, but the petitions were dismissed on February 25, 2022, affirming the ex-parte judgment and decree.

Following the dismissal of their Special Leave Petitions, the Respondents initiated a second round of litigation by appealing against the ex-parte judgment and decree. As the appeal was significantly delayed, they filed an application for condoning the delay of 1116 days under Order XLI Rule 3A read with Section 151 of the CPC. The First Appellate Court dismissed this application on February 8, 2023. Aggrieved, the Respondents preferred a revision before the High Court (C.R.P.(MD) No. 1113 of 2023), which set aside the First Appellate Court’s order on April 25, 2023, condoning the delay of 1116 days subject to a payment of Rs. 1 lakh as costs.

Legal Framework

The legal framework relevant to this case includes:

• Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC): This provision allows a court to set aside an ex-parte decree if the defendant can show sufficient cause for their non-appearance.
• Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963: This section empowers the court to admit an appeal or application after the prescribed period if the appellant or applicant shows sufficient cause for the delay.
• Section 96(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC): This section provides for an appeal from an original decree passed ex-parte.
• Order XLI Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC): This rule requires an appellant to file an application for condonation of delay along with the memorandum of appeal if the appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation.
• Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963: This section allows for the exclusion of time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in the court of first instance or in the court of appeal, which is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
• Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC): This section saves the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.

Arguments

Arguments by the Appellant/Plaintiff:

• ✓ The Appellant argued that there was no clear explanation for the delay in the first round of litigation while filing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to condone the delay under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC.
• ✓ The High Court failed to appreciate that only the delay caused in filing the appeal under Section 96(2) read with Order XLI Rule 1 of CPC can be excluded by applying the principle in Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
• ✓ The Respondents cannot reagitate the same question that attained finality in earlier proceedings.
• ✓ The High Court erred in applying the decision of the Supreme Court in N. Mohan v. R. Madhu (2020) 20 SCC 302 [Supreme Court of India] because, unlike that case, the Respondents were properly served with the suit summons, appeared, filed a Vakalatnama, and submitted a written statement.
• ✓ The Supreme Court in N. Mohan v. R. Madhu (2020) 20 SCC 302 [Supreme Court of India] did not lay down any ratio to be followed and the order was not based on any legal principle.
• ✓ The High Court should not have interfered with the First Appellate Court’s order, as the Respondents were negligent in not filing the appeal in time, and the delay was not properly explained.
• ✓ There was no bar for the Respondents to file the appeal under Section 96(2) of the CPC against the ex-parte decree while pursuing the application filed under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC for condonation of delay.

Arguments by the Respondents/Defendants:

• ✓ The non-representation before the Trial Court was neither willful nor wanton.
• ✓ A plausible explanation was given for the delay, and the High Court was convinced by it.
• ✓ The High Court correctly relied upon the judgment of N. Mohan (supra) [Unspecified Court] as it squarely applies to the instant case.
• ✓ The application filed under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC and the application filed under Order 41 Rule 3(A) of the CPC stand on a different footing, citing Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar (2005) 1 SCC 787 [Supreme Court of India].
• ✓ Regarding the delay of 1116 days, Section 14 of the Limitation Act should be considered, and the time taken during the pendency of the Petition under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC and also the revision petitions before the various judicial forums necessarily have to be excluded.
• ✓ The Respondents paid a sum of Rs. 1 lakh to the Appellant as directed by the High Court, proving their bona fide credentials.
• ✓ The Respondent No. 2 holds a valid title as a bona fide purchaser.
• ✓ Irreparable damage, loss, and hardships would be caused to the Respondents if the appeal is allowed.

Submissions Table

Innovativeness of the Argument

The Appellant’s argument that the High Court misapplied the precedent set in N. Mohan v. R. Madhu (2020) 20 SCC 302 [Supreme Court of India] by highlighting the factual differences is particularly noteworthy. The Respondents’ reliance on Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to justify the exclusion of time spent in previous proceedings, while not novel, is a standard legal strategy in delay condonation cases.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

1. Whether the delay is to be condoned or not.
2. If the delay is justifiable, then whether the case should be allowed to proceed on merits or be dismissed on procedural grounds.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Court considered the following authorities:

• N. Mohan v. R. Madhu (2020) 20 SCC 302 [Supreme Court of India]: The High Court relied on this case to condone the delay, but the Supreme Court distinguished it, noting that the facts were different. In N. Mohan v. R. Madhu (2020) 20 SCC 302 [Supreme Court of India], the summons was unserved, whereas, in the present case, the respondents were duly served and participated in the initial stages.
• Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar (2005) 1 SCC 787 [Supreme Court of India]: The Respondents cited this case to argue that applications under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC and Order 41 Rule 3(A) of the CPC stand on a different footing.
• Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765 [Supreme Court of India]: This case was referred to in the order of the High Court which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2054 & 2055 of 2022. It was observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
• Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 [Supreme Court of India]: This case was referred to in the order of the High Court which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2054 & 2055 of 2022. It was observed and held that the law of limitation is founded on public policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay.
• Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963: This section empowers the court to admit an appeal or application after the prescribed period if the appellant or applicant shows sufficient cause for the delay.
• Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC): This provision allows a court to set aside an ex-parte decree if the defendant can show sufficient cause for their non-appearance.

Authority Consideration Table

Judgment

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the fact that the Respondents had previously raised the same grounds for condonation of delay in earlier proceedings, which had already been dismissed by the Court. The Court emphasized that repeating the same arguments without any fresh evidence constitutes an abuse of the process of law. Additionally, the Court reiterated that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity, and the pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party.

The Court’s reasoning was step-by-step, relying on the principle that a party cannot relitigate issues already decided by a competent court. The Court considered the factual background, the previous proceedings, and the principle against abuse of the legal process.

The Court rejected the argument that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 should be considered, stating that once the reasons for the delay are found to be insufficient, the Court is not inclined to go into the merits of the contentions raised regarding Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The decision was reached by considering the previous orders of the Court and the lack of any new or distinguishing factors in the Respondents’ arguments.

In clear, accessible language, the Court held that the delay in filing the appeal could not be condoned because the reasons for the delay had already been considered and rejected in previous proceedings.

Reasons for the decision:

• ✓ The Respondents raised the same grounds for condonation of delay that were raised in the applications filed under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC in the earlier round of litigation.
• ✓ The Supreme Court had already held that the delay had not been properly explained in the earlier proceedings.
• ✓ Repeating the same grounds without fresh evidence constitutes an abuse of the process of law.
• ✓ Delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity, and the pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party.

Direct quotes from the judgment:

“…the High Court has not properly appreciated the facts and circumstances of the case and has misapplied the decision of this Court in N. Mohan (supra).”

“…we are of the considered opinion that the High Court has erred in condoning the delay of 1116 days in filing the appeal by the respondents.”

“…we are of the view that the reasons assigned by the High Court for condoning the delay cannot be sustained.”

“…the High Court has not taken into consideration the fact that the very same grounds were raised for condoning the delay in the applications filed under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC in the earlier round of litigation.”

Decision of the Court

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court dated April 25, 2023, which had condoned the delay of 1116 days in filing the appeal.

Dissenting Opinion

There was no dissenting opinion.

Personal Comments

This judgment reinforces the principle that courts should not condone delays when the reasons for the delay have already been adjudicated. It underscores the importance of finality in legal proceedings and prevents parties from repeatedly raising the same arguments. The Supreme Court’s emphasis on avoiding prejudice to the opposing party is also noteworthy, highlighting the need for a balanced approach in dispensing justice. The decision serves as a reminder that while the courts aim to provide substantial justice, this should not come at the expense of established legal principles and the rights of the other party.

Impact of the Judgment

This judgment is likely to be cited in future cases involving the condonation of delay, particularly where the reasons for the delay have already been considered in previous proceedings. It reinforces the principle that courts should be cautious in condoning delays and should not do so merely as an act of generosity. The judgment will likely have a deterrent effect on parties seeking to relitigate issues that have already been decided.

The judgment also highlights the importance of providing clear and sufficient reasons for any delay in filing legal proceedings. Parties should be prepared to demonstrate that the delay was not due to negligence or a lack of diligence.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Thirunagalingam vs. Lingeswaran & Anr. (2025) INSC 672 [Supreme Court of India] serves as an important reminder of the principles governing the condonation of delay. The Court’s emphasis on finality, avoiding prejudice, and the need for sufficient reasons for delay reinforces the integrity of the legal process. This judgment is likely to have a significant impact on future cases involving similar issues and will serve as a valuable guide for courts in determining whether to condone delays in filing legal proceedings.