Supreme Court Sets Aside High Court Order in Domestic Violence Case: Manmohan Attavar vs. Neelam Manmohan Attavar (2017)

Introduction

Can a woman claim the right to reside in a property under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (D.V. Act) if she has never lived there with the person she claims a relationship with? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in the case of Manmohan Attavar vs. Neelam Manmohan Attavar. This case clarifies the definition of “shared household” under the D.V. Act.

The Supreme Court bench comprised of Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman and Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul. The judgment was authored by Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul.

Case Background

The case revolves around a dispute between Manmohan Attavar (the appellant), an 84-year-old man, and Neelam Manmohan Attavar (the respondent), a 62-year-old woman. The respondent claims to be the wife/companion of the appellant, a status the appellant denies.

The respondent was previously married to Shri Harish Chander Chhabra, and they divorced on 10.10.1996. She claims to have developed a relationship with the appellant starting in 1987. The respondent alleges that the appellant proposed to her in December 1993. She also claims that she traveled with the appellant to Bangalore on 30.10.1996. The respondent further claims that on 10.1.1998, the appellant applied “kumkum” to her forehead. She accompanied him to a felicitation ceremony on 21.3.1998.

The respondent claims that from 2002-2008, she stayed in different residences hired by the appellant. The relationship soured, and reconciliation efforts failed. The appellant’s wife passed away on 22.2.2010. The respondent’s attempts to seek remedy through the Women and Child Welfare Department of Karnataka were unsuccessful.

The respondent initiated proceedings under Section 12 of the D.V. Act on 16.9.2013. The appellant’s attempt to quash these proceedings in the High Court failed. The case was transferred to another court, and eventually, the respondent’s application was dismissed on 30.7.2015.

Aggrieved, the respondent filed an appeal, which was also transferred multiple times. The respondent sought interim relief, which was rejected. She then filed a writ petition in the High Court of Karnataka seeking a transfer of the appeal to the High Court itself.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The respondent initially filed a petition under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, which was dismissed by the Metropolitan Magistrate. She then filed a criminal appeal, seeking interim relief, which was also rejected. The respondent, dissatisfied with the proceedings, filed a writ petition in the High Court of Karnataka.

The High Court, through an ex-parte order, allowed the respondent to occupy the appellant’s premises. The High Court also sought to withdraw the appeal proceedings from the Additional Sessions Judge to the High Court itself. These orders were challenged by the appellant in the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court examined the following provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005:

• Section 17: Right to reside in a shared household

  This section states that every woman in a domestic relationship has the right to reside in the shared household, regardless of whether she has any right, title, or beneficial interest in it. It also states that an aggrieved person shall not be evicted from the shared household except by procedure established by law.

  (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. (2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law.

• Section 19: Residence orders

  This section empowers the Magistrate to pass residence orders, including restraining the respondent from dispossessing the aggrieved person from the shared household or directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household.

  (1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order – (a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household; (b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household; (c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides; (d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off the shared household or encumbering the same; (e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate; or (f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require: Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman.

• Section 2(f): Definition of “domestic relationship”

  This section defines a domestic relationship as a relationship between two persons who live or have lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption, or are family members living together as a joint family.

  “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family;

• Section 2(s): Definition of “shared household”

  This section defines a shared household as a household where the aggrieved person lives or has lived in a domestic relationship, either singly or with the respondent. It includes households owned or tenanted by either or both parties, or belonging to a joint family of which the respondent is a member.

  “shared household” means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household.

Arguments

The respondent argued that the provisions of the D.V. Act should be liberally construed in favor of women seeking relief, as it is a social legislation meant for the protection of women’s rights. She relied on the provisions of the D.V. Act, particularly Sections 17 and 19, to claim her right to reside in the appellant’s property.

The appellant contended that the respondent had never stayed with him in the premises in question, and therefore, the definition of “shared household” under Section 2(s) of the D.V. Act was not satisfied. He argued that the High Court’s ex-parte order allowing the respondent to occupy his premises was unsustainable. The appellant also argued that the High Court was not justified in withdrawing the proceedings from the appellate court to the High Court itself.

The appellant further argued that the respondent’s approach of seeking transfers whenever she fails to obtain a favorable order should not be encouraged. He contended that the transfer of the case to the High Court deprived him of a valuable right to an additional forum to ventilate his grievances.

The respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the appellate court should have focused on the merits of the case rather than interim reliefs. She claimed that the order of the appellate court was predictable and that the High Court was right to intervene.

The respondent also argued that she was not well-versed in legal procedures and should be given some latitude due to her appearing in person.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following two issues:

1. Whether an interim order could have been passed on 19.9.2016 permitting the respondent to occupy the premises of the appellant.
2. Whether the learned Single Judge was right in withdrawing the proceedings pending before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge to the High Court vide the impugned order dated 24.10.2016.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s ex-parte order permitting the respondent to occupy the appellant’s premises was not sustainable. The Court emphasized that for a woman to claim a right of residence in a “shared household,” she must have lived in that household with the respondent.

The Court also found that the High Court’s decision to withdraw the proceedings from the appellate court was not justified. This action deprived the appellant of a valuable right to an additional forum for scrutiny. The Court stated that the appellate authority could not be faulted for its conduct.

The Supreme Court set aside both the orders of the High Court.

The Court observed that the respondent had never stayed with the appellant in the premises she sought to occupy. The Court noted that the “domestic relationship” as defined under Section 2(f) of the D.V. Act requires that the parties have lived together in a “shared household.”

The Court also stated that the parties had separated more than seven years ago and that the appellant’s wife was alive until 22.2.2010. The Court noted the appellant’s claim that he is a Christian and that there could be no question of marrying the respondent by applying “kumkum.”

The Court also observed that the respondent had repeatedly sought interim reliefs and transfer of the case, and that the appellate court could not be faulted for not focusing on the merits of the case.

The Court relied on the case of A.R.Antulay vs. Ram Naik [1988] 2 SCC 602* to emphasize that transfer of proceedings cannot take place at the whims and fancy of the respondent. The court stated that such transfer deprives the appellant of a valuable right to an additional forum.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the interpretation of the term “shared household” under the D.V. Act. The Court emphasized that a crucial element for invoking the right to reside in a shared household is the actual cohabitation of the parties in that household. The Court was also concerned about the procedural impropriety of the High Court in passing an ex-parte order and withdrawing the case from the appellate court.

The Court’s reasoning was based on the factual matrix of the case, where the respondent had never resided with the appellant in the disputed property. The Court also considered the appellant’s argument that the respondent was repeatedly seeking transfers of the case, which was not considered appropriate.

The Court’s reasoning was based on the interpretation of the law, particularly the definition of “shared household” under the D.V. Act. However, the factual aspect of the case, namely the lack of cohabitation between the parties in the disputed property, also played a significant role in the Court’s decision.

The Supreme Court rejected any alternative interpretations, emphasizing the literal interpretation of the “shared household” definition under the D.V. Act. The Court held that the absence of cohabitation in the disputed property was a fundamental flaw in the respondent’s claim.

The Court’s decision was clear and accessible, stating that the respondent’s claim could not be sustained because she had never lived with the appellant in the disputed property.

The Court’s reasons for the decision were:

• The respondent had never stayed with the appellant in the premises in question.
• The “domestic relationship” requires that the parties have lived together in a “shared household.”
• The High Court’s ex-parte order was not sustainable.
• The High Court’s decision to withdraw the proceedings from the appellate court was not justified.

“The facts of the present case are that the respondent has never stayed with the appellant in the premises in which she has been directed to be inducted.”

“In order for the respondent to succeed, it was necessary that the two parties had lived in a domestic relationship in the household.”

“We are thus unequivocally of the view that the nature of the ex-parte order passed on 19.9.2016 permitting the respondent to occupy the premises of the appellant cannot be sustained and has to be set aside…”

Key Takeaways

The key takeaways from this judgment are:

• The definition of “shared household” under the D.V. Act requires that the parties have lived together in the household.
• A woman cannot claim a right to reside in a property under the D.V. Act if she has never lived there with the person she claims a relationship with.
• High Courts should exercise caution while passing ex-parte orders and should not withdraw proceedings from lower courts without valid reasons.
• Repeated attempts to seek transfers of cases without valid reasons should not be encouraged.

This judgment clarifies the scope of the D.V. Act and provides guidance on the interpretation of “shared household.” It may impact future cases by emphasizing the need for actual cohabitation fora woman to claim residence rights under the Act. The judgment also serves as a reminder for High Courts to exercise restraint in their intervention in lower court proceedings.