Supreme Court Sets Aside High Court Order Quashing Sanction in Corruption Case: State of Punjab vs. Hari Kesh (2025)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: January 7, 2025

Citation: 2025 INSC 50

Judges: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Bela M. Trivedi and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prasanna B. Varale

Can a High Court halt a corruption trial midway by quashing the sanction order, especially after the prosecution has presented its case? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this crucial question, clarifying the circumstances under which such interventions are permissible. This judgment emphasizes the importance of allowing trials to proceed and limiting interference based on technicalities, unless a clear miscarriage of justice has occurred. The bench consisted of Hon’ble Ms. Justice Bela M. Trivedi and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prasanna B. Varale.

Case Background

The case involves an FIR (First Information Report) No. 02, dated January 10, 2024, registered at Police Station-Vigilance Bureau, Patiala Range, Patiala. The respondent, Hari Kesh, was accused of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, through its order dated May 20, 2019, had quashed the Sanction Order dated November 19, 2018, which had allowed the prosecution of Hari Kesh. This decision by the High Court led the State of Punjab to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh allowed the petition filed by the respondent, Hari Kesh, and quashed the Sanction Order dated November 19, 2018. This order also set aside the proceedings arising from the FIR. The State of Punjab appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court should not have intervened, especially after the trial had commenced and the prosecution had examined seven witnesses.

Legal Framework

The case revolves around Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which deals with the sanction required for prosecuting public servants. Specifically, sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 19 are relevant.

Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 states:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.”

Section 19(4) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 further clarifies:

“In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.”

The explanation to sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, includes the “competency of the authority to grant sanction” within the definition of “error”.

Arguments

Arguments by the Appellant (State of Punjab):

• The High Court erred in quashing the Sanction Order and setting aside the proceedings, especially after the trial had commenced and the prosecution had examined seven witnesses.
• The appellant relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Karnataka, Lokayukta Police Versus S. Subbegowda (2023 SCC Online SC 911), which held that the High Court should not interfere with the trial at an advanced stage unless there was a failure of justice.

Arguments by the Respondent (Hari Kesh):

• The High Court was correct in quashing the proceedings because the initial sanction was not granted by the competent authority.
• The current Sanction Order was passed by an officer who was not authorized to grant such sanction.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The main issue framed by the Supreme Court was:

✓ Whether the High Court could have set aside the impugned Sanction Order and the proceedings arising from it, especially after the trial had commenced and the prosecution had examined seven witnesses.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

Cases:

• State of Karnataka, Lokayukta Police Versus S. Subbegowda (2023 SCC Online SC 911) – The Supreme Court relied heavily on this case, which held that a High Court should not reverse or alter an order passed by the Special Judge on the ground that the sanction was bad, unless there is a failure of justice. The Supreme Court of India held that the High Court should not interfere with the trial at an advanced stage unless there was a failure of justice.

Legal Provisions:

• Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – The Court considered sub-sections (3) and (4) of this section, which deal with the validity of sanction orders and the circumstances under which they can be challenged.

Judgment

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily driven by the need to ensure that trials are not disrupted by procedural technicalities at an advanced stage, unless there is a clear failure of justice. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the legal framework provided under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which limits the scope of interference by appellate courts in matters of sanction. The Court’s reasoning also reflected a concern that the High Court had not considered whether the alleged error in the sanction had caused a failure of justice.

The Court stated, “In the instant case, it appears that the petition for quashing of Sanction Order was filed by the respondent after the trial court framed the charge and commenced the trial, rather after the prosecution examined five witnesses.” The Court also noted, “There is not a whisper in the impugned order about any failure of justice having occurred on account of the impugned Sanction Order.” The Court further clarified that “whether the Sanction Order was passed by the competent authority or not, would be a matter of evidence to be proved by the prosecution during the course of trial.”

Key Takeaways

• High Courts should be cautious in interfering with ongoing trials, especially in corruption cases, based on challenges to sanction orders.
• The competency of the sanctioning authority is a matter of evidence to be determined during the trial.
• Interference by the High Court is only warranted if a failure of justice has occurred due to the error in the sanction order.
• This judgment reinforces the principle that trials should not be disrupted by technicalities unless there is a clear miscarriage of justice.

Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and restored the proceedings before the Special Court-Sangrur. The Special Court was directed to proceed with the trial from the stage at which it was stopped.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that High Courts should not quash sanction orders and related proceedings in corruption cases mid-trial unless there is a clear failure of justice. This reinforces the principle established in S. Subbegowda, clarifying that the competency of the sanctioning authority is a matter of evidence to be determined during the trial and not a ground for quashing proceedings at an advanced stage.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in State of Punjab vs. Hari Kesh sets aside the High Court’s order that had quashed the sanction order and related proceedings in a corruption case. The Supreme Court emphasized that such interference is not permissible at an advanced stage of the trial unless there is a clear failure of justice. The Court restored the trial proceedings, directing the Special Court to continue from the point where it was halted.