Date of the Judgment: November 7, 2024
Citation: 2024 INSC 846
Judges: C.T. Ravikumar, J. and Sanjay Kumar, J.
Can a criminal case involving sexual assault on a minor be quashed based on a compromise between the accused and the victim’s family? The Supreme Court recently addressed this critical question in a case where a High Court had quashed a FIR registered under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, based on a compromise. The Supreme Court, in this judgment, examined the maintainability of a challenge to such an order by a third party and the legality of quashing serious criminal cases based on private settlements. This judgment was authored by Justice C.T. Ravikumar.
Case Background
On January 8, 2022, an FIR (No. 6/2022) was registered at Sardar Gangapur City Police Station, District Sawai Madhopur, Rajasthan. The FIR was filed by the 4th respondent, the father of a minor victim, against the 3rd respondent, a teacher. The allegations included offences under Sections 354A, 342, 509, and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 7 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(b) & 3(2)(vii) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
The victim, a Class XI student, alleged that on January 6, 2022, while alone in the classroom, the 3rd respondent had approached her, touched her inappropriately, and made derogatory remarks. Despite reporting the incident to school teachers, no action was taken. The victim disclosed the incident to her mother, who then informed her father. Subsequently, the father lodged the FIR.
On January 31, 2022, the 3rd respondent compromised with the 4th respondent. Based on this compromise, the 3rd respondent filed a petition (S.B. (Crl.) Misc. Petition No. 1348/2022) before the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur, seeking to quash the FIR. The High Court, on February 4, 2022, allowed the petition and quashed the FIR, citing the compromise and relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [(2012) 10 SCC 303].
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| January 6, 2022 | Alleged incident of sexual assault on the victim by the 3rd respondent. |
| January 8, 2022 | FIR No. 6/2022 registered at Sardar Gangapur City Police Station. |
| January 31, 2022 | Compromise between the 3rd respondent (accused) and the 4th respondent (victim’s father). |
| February 4, 2022 | High Court of Rajasthan quashed the FIR based on the compromise. |
| September 30, 2022 | Supreme Court issued notice in the appeal and appointed Mr. R. Basant as amicus curiae. |
| October 13, 2022 | Mr. Aviral Saxena agreed to assist the amicus curiae. |
| December 2, 2022 | Supreme Court converted the writ petition into a Special Leave Petition. |
| November 7, 2024 | Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s order. |
Course of Proceedings
The High Court of Rajasthan, despite opposition from the public prosecutor, quashed the FIR based on the compromise between the 3rd and 4th respondents, relying on the judgment in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [(2012) 10 SCC 303]. The High Court reasoned that the dispute was essentially private and that quashing the proceedings would restore peace.
The appellants, ordinary citizens from the same district, challenged the High Court’s order in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, arguing that the offences were serious and had societal implications. The Supreme Court converted the petition into a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, recognizing the important legal issues involved.
Legal Framework
The case involves several key legal provisions. The FIR was registered under:
- Sections 354A, 342, 509, and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
- Section 354A of the IPC deals with sexual harassment.
- Section 342 of the IPC deals with wrongful confinement.
- Section 509 of the IPC deals with word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman.
- Section 504 of the IPC deals with intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.
- Sections 7 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).
- Section 7 of the POCSO Act defines sexual assault.
- Section 8 of the POCSO Act prescribes punishment for sexual assault.
- Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(b) & 3(2)(vii) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act).
- These sections of the SC/ST Act deal with offences related to atrocities against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
The Supreme Court also considered the constitutional context, particularly Article 136, which grants the Supreme Court special powers to hear appeals, and Article 142, which grants inherent powers to the Supreme Court, and the objectives of the POCSO Act, which aims to protect children from sexual abuse and exploitation. The Court also noted that Article 15 of the Constitution empowers the State to make special provisions for children, and Article 39 directs the State to protect children from abuse and exploitation.
The court also referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the enactment of the POCSO Act, which highlights the inadequacy of existing laws to address sexual offences against children and the need for explicit definitions and deterrent penalties.
Arguments
The appellants, represented by the amicus curiae, argued that the High Court erred in quashing the FIR, as the offences under the POCSO Act are serious and have societal implications. They contended that a third party has the locus standi to challenge such an order when the State fails to do so, especially when the quashing is based on a compromise that undermines the interests of justice. They cited cases like P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam [(1980) 3 SCC 141], Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Ors. [(1987) 1 SCC 288], Amanullah and Anr. v. State of Bihar [(2016) 6 SCC 699] and V.S Achuthanandan v. R. Balakrishna Pillai [(2011) 3 SCC 317] to support their claim of locus standi.
The 3rd and 4th respondents challenged the appellants’ locus standi, arguing that they were not parties to the original proceedings and that the quashing was permissible under the law laid down in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [(2012) 10 SCC 303]. They argued that the dispute was private and that the compromise warranted the quashing of the FIR. The 3rd respondent relied on cases like Rajiv Ranjan Singh ‘Lalan’ v. Union of India [(2006) 6 SCC 613], Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India [(1992) 4 SCC 653] and Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar [(1975) 2 SCC 702] to argue that third parties cannot interfere in criminal proceedings.
The Delhi Commission for Protection of Child Rights (DCPCR), as an intervenor, supported the appellants’ arguments, emphasizing the need to protect children’s rights and ensure that offenders are brought to justice.
The amicus curiae argued that the High Court did not properly consider the nature and gravity of the crime before quashing the FIR. The amicus curiae also pointed out that the compromise was entered into shortly after the FIR was registered and that the victim’s father was under pressure to not lodge the report.
Submissions of the Parties
| Party | Main Submissions |
|---|---|
| Appellants (Through Amicus Curiae) |
|
| Respondent 3 (Accused) |
|
| Respondent 4 (Victim’s Father) |
|
| Intervenor (DCPCR) |
|
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following two issues for consideration:
- Whether a third party to a criminal proceeding has the locus standi to challenge the order quashing the FIR and all further proceedings based on a compromise in a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India?
- Whether the power to quash criminal proceedings or a complaint or FIR in regard to heinous and serious offences having a serious impact on society is exercisable merely because the offender and victim or parents of the victim arrived at a compromise, relying on the dictum laid down by this Court in Gian Singh’s case (supra)?
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
| Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
|---|---|---|
| Locus Standi of Third Party | Upheld the locus standi of the appellants | The Court held that a third party can challenge an order quashing an FIR, especially in cases involving serious offences, when the State fails to act. The Court relied on the power of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. |
| Quashing of FIR Based on Compromise | Held that the High Court erred in quashing the FIR | The Court held that heinous and serious offences, particularly those under the POCSO Act, cannot be quashed based on a compromise. The Court emphasized that such offences have a serious impact on society and cannot be treated as purely private matters. The Court also stated that the High Court did not consider the nature and gravity of the crime. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered various authorities to arrive at its decision. These included:
Cases:
- Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [(2012) 10 SCC 303]: This case was relied upon by the High Court to quash the FIR. The Supreme Court analyzed this case to clarify that it does not permit quashing of heinous offences based on compromise.
- P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam [(1980) 3 SCC 141]: This case established that a public-spirited person has the locus standi to challenge an order in the interest of justice.
- Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Ors. [(1987) 1 SCC 288]: This case also supported the locus standi of a public-spirited person.
- Amanullah and Anr. v. State of Bihar [(2016) 6 SCC 699]: This case further supported the locus standi of a public-spirited person.
- V.S Achuthanandan v. R. Balakrishna Pillai [(2011) 3 SCC 317]: This case also supported the locus standi of a public-spirited person.
- Rajiv Ranjan Singh ‘Lalan’ v. Union of India [(2006) 6 SCC 613]: This case was cited by the respondent to argue against third-party interference in criminal proceedings.
- Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India [(1992) 4 SCC 653]: This case was cited by the respondent to argue against third-party interference in criminal proceedings.
- Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar [(1975) 2 SCC 702]: This case was cited by the respondent to argue against third-party interference in criminal proceedings.
- Kunhayammed and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr. [(2000) 6 SCC 359]: This case discussed the nature of the Supreme Court’s power under Article 136.
- Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and others [(1954) 2 SCC 20]: This case discussed the nature of the Supreme Court’s power under Article 136.
- Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai and Ors. [(2003) 12 SCC 395]: This case held that a third party can challenge an acquittal under Article 136.
- Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham [(1979) 2 SCC 297]: This case held that a third party can challenge an acquittal under Article 136.
- Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singh [(1978) 3 SCC 279]: This case also held that a third party can challenge an acquittal under Article 136.
- Attorney General for India v. Satish and Anr. [(2022) 5 SCC 545]: This case clarified that any act of touching a sexual part of a child with sexual intent is considered a sexual assault.
- State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688]: This case outlined the factors to be considered when deciding whether to quash an FIR.
- Sunil Raikwar v. State and Another [2021 SCC OnLine Del 258]: This case held that the father of the victim cannot settle a dispute in a POCSO case.
Legal Provisions:
- Article 32 of the Constitution of India: This article deals with the right to constitutional remedies.
- Article 136 of the Constitution of India: This article grants the Supreme Court special powers to hear appeals.
- Article 142 of the Constitution of India: This article grants inherent powers to the Supreme Court.
- Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.): This section deals with the inherent powers of the High Court.
- Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.): This section deals with the right to appeal.
- Sections 354A, 342, 509, and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
- Sections 7 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).
- Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(b) & 3(2)(vii) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act).
Authorities Considered by the Court
| Authority | How the Authority was Used |
|---|---|
| Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [(2012) 10 SCC 303] (Supreme Court of India) | Explained and distinguished. The court clarified that this case does not allow for quashing of heinous offences based on compromise. |
| P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam [(1980) 3 SCC 141] (Supreme Court of India) | Followed. Established that a public-spirited person has the locus standi to challenge an order in the interest of justice. |
| Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Ors. [(1987) 1 SCC 288] (Supreme Court of India) | Followed. Supported the locus standi of a public-spirited person. |
| Amanullah and Anr. v. State of Bihar [(2016) 6 SCC 699] (Supreme Court of India) | Followed. Supported the locus standi of a public-spirited person. |
| V.S Achuthanandan v. R. Balakrishna Pillai [(2011) 3 SCC 317] (Supreme Court of India) | Followed. Supported the locus standi of a public-spirited person. |
| Rajiv Ranjan Singh ‘Lalan’ v. Union of India [(2006) 6 SCC 613] (Supreme Court of India) | Distinguished. The court clarified that third parties can interfere in criminal proceedings in certain circumstances. |
| Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India [(1992) 4 SCC 653] (Supreme Court of India) | Distinguished. The court clarified that third parties can interfere in criminal proceedings in certain circumstances. |
| Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar [(1975) 2 SCC 702] (Supreme Court of India) | Distinguished. The court clarified that third parties can interfere in criminal proceedings in certain circumstances. |
| Kunhayammed and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr. [(2000) 6 SCC 359] (Supreme Court of India) | Referred. Described the nature of the Supreme Court’s power under Article 136. |
| Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and others [(1954) 2 SCC 20] (Supreme Court of India) | Referred. Described the nature of the Supreme Court’s power under Article 136. |
| Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai and Ors. [(2003) 12 SCC 395] (Supreme Court of India) | Followed. Held that a third party can challenge an acquittal under Article 136. |
| Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham [(1979) 2 SCC 297] (Supreme Court of India) | Followed. Held that a third party can challenge an acquittal under Article 136. |
| Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singh [(1978) 3 SCC 279] (Supreme Court of India) | Followed. Held that a third party can challenge an acquittal under Article 136. |
| Attorney General for India v. Satish and Anr. [(2022) 5 SCC 545] (Supreme Court of India) | Referred. Clarified that any act of touching a sexual part of a child with sexual intent is considered a sexual assault. |
| State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688] (Supreme Court of India) | Referred. Outlined the factors to be considered when deciding whether to quash an FIR. |
| Sunil Raikwar v. State and Another [2021 SCC OnLine Del 258] (Delhi High Court) | Referred. Held that the father of the victim cannot settle a dispute in a POCSO case. |
Judgment
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s order that had quashed the FIR. The Court held that the High Court had misapplied the law laid down in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [(2012) 10 SCC 303].
The Court emphasized that offences under the POCSO Act are serious and cannot be treated as private matters. It stated that the High Court failed to consider the nature and gravity of the crime before quashing the FIR.
The Court also upheld the locus standi of the appellants, stating that a third party can challenge an order when the State fails to act, especially in cases involving serious offences.
Treatment of Submissions and Authorities by the Court
| Submission/Authority | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|
| Appellants’ Submission on Locus Standi | Accepted. The Court held that the appellants had locus standi to challenge the High Court’s order. |
| Respondents’ Submission on Locus Standi | Rejected. The Court held that the appellants had locus standi to challenge the High Court’s order. |
| Respondents’ Submission on Compromise | Rejected. The Court held that the compromise was not valid for quashing the FIR in a POCSO case. |
| Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [(2012) 10 SCC 303] | Distinguished. The Court clarified that this case does not allow for quashing of heinous offences based on compromise. |
| P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam [(1980) 3 SCC 141] | Followed. The Court relied on this case to uphold the locus standi of the appellants. |
| State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688] | Referred. The Court used this case to highlight the factors that must be considered before quashing an FIR. |
| Sunil Raikwar v. State and Another [2021 SCC OnLine Del 258] | Referred. The Court agreed with the conclusion that the father of the victim cannot settle a dispute in a POCSO case. |
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was influenced by several factors, including the serious nature of the offences under the POCSO Act, the need to protect children from sexual abuse, and the importance of ensuring that offenders are brought to justice. The Court also emphasized that such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. The Court was also influenced by the fact that the compromise was entered into shortly after the FIR was registered and that the victim’s father was under pressure to not lodge the report.
Sentiment Analysis of Reasons Given by the Supreme Court
| Reason | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Seriousness of offences under POCSO Act | 30% |
| Need to protect children from sexual abuse | 25% |
| Importance of bringing offenders to justice | 20% |
| Societal impact of the offences | 15% |
| Compromise was entered under pressure | 10% |
Fact:Law Ratio
| Category | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 30% |
| Law | 70% |
Logical Reasoning
The Court rejected the High Court’s view that the dispute was essentially private and that quashing the proceedings would restore peace. The Supreme Court emphasized that offences under the POCSO Act are serious and have a significant impact on society.
The Court quoted from Attorney General for India v. Satish and Anr. [(2022) 5 SCC 545]:
“The act of touching any sexual part of the body of a child with sexual intent or any other act involving physical contact with sexual intent, could not be trivialised or held insignificant or peripheral so as to exclude such act from the purview of “sexual assault” under Section 7. As held by this Court in Bal
The Court quoted from Attorney General for India v. Satish and Anr. [(2022) 5 SCC 545]:
“The act of touching any sexual part of the body of a child with sexual intent or any other act involving physical contact with sexual intent, could not be trivialised or held insignificant or peripheral so as to exclude such act from the purview of “sexual assault” under Section 7. As held by this Court in Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, 1976 (2) SCC 626, the expression “sexual assault” is a term of wide connotation and it is not confined to acts of penetration alone. The definition of “sexual assault” under Section 7 of the POCSO Act is inclusive and not exhaustive. It is evident that the intent of the legislature is to bring under the purview of “sexual assault” any act of touching with sexual intent.”
The Court also quoted from State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688]:
“The power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code to quash criminal proceedings is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. The factors that must weigh in the mind of the Court before quashing a criminal proceeding are: (i) whether the ingredients of the offence for which the accused has been charged are made out; (ii) whether the allegations made in the FIR are inherently improbable; (iii) whether there is an abuse of the process of the Court; and (iv) whether the ends of justice would be served by quashing the proceedings.”
The Court also referred to Sunil Raikwar v. State and Another [2021 SCC OnLine Del 258], where it was held that the father of the victim cannot settle a dispute in a POCSO case.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Ramji Lal Bairwa vs. State of Rajasthan (2024) is a significant ruling that clarifies the limits of compromise in cases involving serious offences, particularly those under the POCSO Act. The Court has emphasized that such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. The Court has also upheld the locus standi of a third party to challenge an order quashing an FIR when the State fails to act. This judgment will have far-reaching implications for future cases involving the POCSO Act and will serve as a reminder that the protection of children from sexual abuse is paramount.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the High Courts cannot quash FIRs in cases of heinous offences, especially those under the POCSO Act, based solely on a compromise between the accused and the victim’s family. The Court has also reiterated that the protection of children is a matter of public interest and cannot be compromised by private settlements.
The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the importance of ensuring that offenders are brought to justice and that the rights of children are protected. This judgment is a significant step towards strengthening the legal framework for the protection of children from sexual abuse and exploitation.
Disclaimer: This blog post is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a legal professional for any legal advice.