Supreme Court settles land acquisition dispute: Delhi Development Authority vs. Bhim Sain Goel (2022)

Date of the Judgment: 25 April 2022

Citation: 2022 INSC 417

Judges: K.M. Joseph, J., Hrishikesh Roy, J.

Can a landowner claim that a land acquisition has lapsed if they themselves prevented the authorities from taking possession through court orders? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case involving the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and several landowners. The core issue revolved around the interpretation of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, concerning the lapsing of land acquisition proceedings. The bench comprised Justices K.M. Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy, with Justice K.M. Joseph authoring the judgment.

Case Background

The case began with a notification issued on 21 March 2003, under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for acquiring lands belonging to the respondents. This was followed by a declaration under Section 6 of the same Act on 18 March 2004. An award was passed on 22 August 2005. The respondents challenged the Section 6 declaration by filing a writ petition before the High Court. On 18 November 2005, the High Court ordered a status quo regarding the nature, title, and possession of the land. The appellant, DDA, claims that this interim order prevented them from taking possession.

The writ petition was eventually dismissed, but the High Court extended the stay order for a week on 18 September 2007, at the respondents’ request. The respondents then approached the Supreme Court, which also granted an interim stay. In the meantime, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, came into effect on 1 January 2014. The respondents then filed another writ petition in 2015, arguing that the land acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The High Court allowed this petition on 2 February 2016, leading to the present appeal by the DDA.

Timeline

Legal Framework

The core of the legal dispute centers on Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. This section deals with the lapsing of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Specifically, it states that if an award has been made five years or more before the commencement of the 2013 Act, and physical possession of the land has not been taken, or compensation has not been paid, the acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed.

Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 states:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said Act has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

Arguments

Appellant (Delhi Development Authority) Arguments:

• The appellant argued that the High Court’s judgment should be overturned in light of the Constitution Bench decision in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others (2020) 8 SCC 129.
• The appellant contended that the respondents’ actions in filing writ petitions and obtaining interim orders prevented the DDA from taking possession of the land.
• The appellant submitted that the respondents should not benefit from the lapsing provision under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act because they themselves caused the delay.
• The appellant argued that the respondents cannot take advantage of a situation created by their own court orders.

Respondents’ Arguments:

• The respondents argued that the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
• They also pointed to subsequent developments, namely, the notification under Section 3A of the National Highways Act, 1956, on 1 December 2018, and the declaration under Section 3D on 22 March 2019, which included the lands in question.
• The respondents contended that they should receive compensation under the 2013 Act due to these later developments.

Appellant’s Counter-Argument:

• The appellant countered that the respondents were not entitled to any benefit based on the subsequent developments.
• The appellant noted that the Collector excluded the respondents’ lands in the final award under the National Highways Act, 1956, because the lands were already vested with the government.
• The appellant relied on the principle that the State cannot acquire land that is already vested with it.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court addressed the following issue:

1. Whether the respondents can claim the benefit of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, when they themselves prevented the authorities from taking possession of the land through court orders.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Court considered the following authorities:

Cases:

• Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others (2020) 8 SCC 129 – Constitution Bench decision regarding the interpretation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
• Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Ors.: (2014) 3 SCC 183 – Regarding the interpretation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
• Union of India and Ors. v. Shiv Raj and Ors: (2014) 6 SCC 564 – Regarding the interpretation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
• Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors: Civil Appeal No. 8700/2013 decided on 10.09.2014 – Regarding the interpretation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
• Jaipur Development Authority v. Mahesh Sharma and Another (2010) 9 SCC 782 – On the principle that the government cannot acquire land already vested in it.
• State of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma [1995 Supp (3) SCC 249] – On the principle that the government cannot acquire land already vested in it.
• Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of India [(2004) 7 SCC 362] – On the principle that the government cannot acquire land already vested in it.
• Collector of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri [AIR 1955 SC 298 : (1955) 1 SCR 1311] – On the principle that the government cannot acquire land already vested in it.
• Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [AIR 1954 SC 340 : (1955) 1 SCR 117] – On the principle that a judgment passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity.
• Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437 – On the principle of restitution.
• V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer , (2012) 12 SCC 133 – On the issue of frivolous litigation and delays.

Legal Provisions:

• Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
• Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
• Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
• Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
• Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
• Section 3A of the National Highways Act, 1956
• Section 3D of the National Highways Act, 1956

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

The Supreme Court relied heavily on the Constitution Bench decision in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others (2020) 8 SCC 129. The Court reiterated the principle that litigants cannot benefit from delays caused by their own actions, especially when they obtain interim orders that prevent authorities from performing their duties. The Court also relied on Jaipur Development Authority v. Mahesh Sharma and Another (2010) 9 SCC 782 to emphasize that the government cannot acquire land that is already vested with it. The court also considered Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Ors.: (2014) 3 SCC 183, Union of India and Ors. v. Shiv Raj and Ors: (2014) 6 SCC 564 and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors: Civil Appeal No. 8700/2013 decided on 10.09.2014 to understand the interpretation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The court also considered State of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma [1995 Supp (3) SCC 249], Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of India [(2004) 7 SCC 362] and Collector of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri [AIR 1955 SC 298 : (1955) 1 SCR 1311] to support the principle that the government cannot acquire its own land. The court also referred to Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [AIR 1954 SC 340 : (1955) 1 SCR 117] to emphasize that a judgment passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity. The court also considered Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437 to support the principle of restitution and V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer , (2012) 12 SCC 133 on the issue of frivolous litigation and delays.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the principle that a litigant cannot benefit from their own wrong. The Court emphasized that the respondents had actively prevented the DDA from taking possession of the land through court orders. This conduct, the Court held, disentitled them from claiming the benefit of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The Court also highlighted the importance of the principle of restitution, which seeks to prevent undue enrichment by litigants who use the courts to delay proceedings. The Court also noted that the land was needed for a public purpose, namely, the construction of a road, and it would be against public interest to allow the respondents to benefit from their own delays.

Fact:Law

The Court’s reasoning was based on a combination of factual circumstances and legal principles. The factual aspects of the case, such as the respondents obtaining interim orders and the subsequent developments under the National Highways Act, 1956, were considered. However, the legal principles, such as the interpretation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, the doctrine of restitution, and the principle that the government cannot acquire its own land, played a more significant role in the Court’s decision.

The Supreme Court considered the alternative interpretation that the subsequent proceedings under the National Highways Act, 1956, might entitle the respondents to compensation under the 2013 Act. However, the Court rejected this interpretation, reasoning that the land was already vested with the government under the 1894 Act and that the subsequent proceedings could not override this fact. The Court also emphasized that it would be against public interest to allow the respondents to benefit from their own delays and to compel the government to acquire land that it already owned.

The Court’s decision was clear: “On the application of the aforesaid principles to the facts of this case, there cannot be any doubt that the respondents cannot take shelter under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. This is for the simple reason that it is by their conduct in approaching the Courts and obtaining interim orders that the appellant was prevented from taking possession of the lands.” The Court also stated, “We must proceed on the basis that but for the interim orders passed which cannot survive the final disposal of the cases, the land would have stood vested with the Government under the earlier regime.” Furthermore, the Court noted, “It is clear as daylight that it would be completely antithetical to public interest were the Government be compelled to shell out public funds under the 2013 Act to acquire land which already belongs to it.”

The Court did not have a dissenting opinion, and the judgment was delivered by a bench of two judges.

Key Takeaways

• Landowners cannot claim the benefit of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act if they themselves caused delays in the acquisition process through court orders.
• The principle of restitution prevents litigants from benefiting from delays caused by their own actions.
• The government cannot acquire land that is already vested with it.
• Public interest considerations are paramount in land acquisition cases.

The judgment clarifies that the benefit of Section 24(2) is not available to those who actively prevent the authorities from taking possession of the land. This has significant implications for future land acquisition cases, as it emphasizes that the conduct of the landowners is a crucial factor in determining whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed. The judgment also reinforces the principle that the government cannot be compelled to acquire land that it already owns, and that public interest must be given due consideration in land acquisition matters.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed that if the respondents had not filed any application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, seeking reference and claiming enhanced compensation, they should be granted an opportunity to do so within one month from the date of the judgment. The Court also directed that if such an application is made, it should be dealt with in accordance with the law as it stood under the 1894 Act. The application would not be dismissed on the ground of delay.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a landowner cannot claim the benefit of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, if they themselves have prevented the authorities from taking possession of the land through court orders. This decision reinforces the principle laid down in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others (2020) 8 SCC 129, clarifying that the benefit of Section 24(2) is not available to those who actively obstruct the acquisition process. This case does not change the previous position of law but rather reaffirms and clarifies the existing principles.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the Delhi Development Authority, setting aside the High Court’s judgment. The Court held that the respondents could not claim the benefit of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act because they had prevented the DDA from taking possession of the land through court orders. The Court also emphasized that the government cannot acquire land that it already owns and that public interest considerations are paramount in land acquisition matters. The Court did, however, grant the respondents an opportunity to seek enhanced compensation under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, if they had not already done so.