Supreme Court settles promotion rules for LDCs and UDCs in District Courts: Rajinder Pal Singh Lamba vs. Suraj Bhan (2008)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: October 3, 2008

Judges: Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J., R.V. Raveendran J.

Does a delay in seeking a promotion nullify a legitimate claim under statutory service rules? The Supreme Court in Rajinder Pal Singh Lamba vs. Suraj Bhan examined appeals against a Delhi High Court order concerning the promotion of Lower Division Clerks (LDCs) to Upper Division Clerks (UDCs) within the Delhi District & Sessions Judge’s office. The core issue revolved around whether the appellants were entitled to retrospective promotion benefits under Rule VI, Chapter 18-A of the High Court Rules and Orders, despite a significant delay in raising their claim. The bench, comprising Justice Dr. Mukundakam Sharma and Justice R.V. Raveendran, delivered the judgment.

Case Background

Rajinder Pal Singh Lamba and V.K. Garg were appointed as Lower Division Clerks (LDCs) on October 1, 1972, and November 24, 1969, respectively, in the Ministerial Establishment of the District & Sessions Judge, Delhi. They completed their graduation from Delhi University in 1975 and 1974, respectively.

On December 24, 1986, and January 2, 1987, Rajinderpal Singh Lamba and V.K. Garg applied to the District & Sessions Judge, Delhi, seeking promotion to the posts of Upper Division Clerk (UDC). These applications were made under Rule VI, Chapter 18-A, High Court Rules and Orders, Vol. 1, framed under Section 35(3) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918.

The appellants sought promotion effective from 1975, contending that permanent vacancies in the UDC cadre occurred that year. Their applications were rejected by the District and Sessions Judge, Delhi, leading them to file service appeals in the Administrative side of Delhi High Court. By a communication dated March 2, 1988, the service appeals were allowed, entitling them to consideration for promotion to the UDC grade, but any promotion would be prospective only.

Dissatisfied with the denial of retrospective promotion and service benefits, the appellants approached the Delhi High Court, on the Judicial Side, by filing two separate writ petitions.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Ld. Single Judge disposed of the writ petitions, holding that the appellants’ claims should have been considered in accordance with Rule VI, Chapter 18-A, High Court Rules and Orders, given the vacancies in 1975-76. Consequently, the judge ordered that the appellants be deemed promoted as UDCs w.e.f. January 1, 1976, but without monetary benefits for the said period. The Single Judge also directed that the High Court of Delhi and the District & Sessions Judge, Delhi, extend the benefit to other similarly situated persons who had become graduates before January 1, 1976.

This order was challenged by Suraj Bhan and Radha Krishan, private respondents, primarily on the grounds that the representations were made after a lapse of about 11/12 years, thus the claim was barred by laches, and that Section 35(3) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, under which Rule VI was framed, stood repealed by the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Law) Order 1937, as a result of which the said rule ceased to exist. The appellants also filed an appeal claiming monetary benefits, which were denied by the Ld. Single Judge.

The Division Bench allowed the appeal filed by the private respondents, primarily on the ground that since the rule of promotion with retrospective effect involves the issue of seniority as well, the said issue and question cannot be re-opened after lapse of a considerable time and reasonable period to disturb the settled position. It was therefore held that the writ petition was liable to be rejected. On the issue of validity and applicability of Rule VI it was held that the said rule was applicable at the relevant time as the same was saved by virtue of Article 9 of Order of 1937. As against the said impugned order this appeal was filed.

Legal Framework

The case hinges on Rule VI, Chapter 18-A, High Court Rules and Orders, which governs promotions within the ministerial establishment of the District & Sessions Judge, Delhi. This rule, framed under Section 35(3) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, outlines the criteria for promotion to higher grades, emphasizing seniority, educational qualifications, and fitness for duty.

Rule VI states:

“Promotion–(1) Appointments to the higher grades of the ministerial establishment should ordinarily be made by seniority from lower grades, provided that the official who would thus receive promotion possesses the prescribed educational qualifications and is otherwise fit to perform the duties to which he will be promoted; for which purpose tests may be imposed. This rule does not apply to such posts as that of stenographer; for which special qualifications are needed; but preference should be given to officers with such qualifications who are already working in the lower grades;
Provided that permanent vacancies in the 75-5-125 grade shall be filled by the District & Sessions Judges in the following rotation:–
(i) By selection on merit out of graduates who have at least two years’ experience in the work of the office, if there is no suitable graduate who fulfills this condition an ‘outsider’ graduate may be appointed, but he must be one who normally resides within the jurisdiction of the District & Sessions Judge.
(ii) & (iii) By normal promotion in the office, i.e., the appointment of the next senior man whether graduate or non-graduate subject to his fitness:
Provided further that the rotation may be modified in very exceptional cases when the direct appointment of a graduate would mean the ousting of a man, who had been officiating quasi-permanently in the post concerned for an appreciable period. What is an appreciable period will depend on the circumstances of each case. After such a modification, the rotation should be restored as soon as possible.
(2) In making promotions preference may invariably be shown to officials who are known to be strictly honest. No promotion should be given and no recommendation for promotion made in the case of an official who does not possess and maintain a reputation for strict integrity. Efficiency without honesty is not to be regarded as constituting a claim to promotion.”

The applicability of Rule VI was challenged based on the argument that Section 35(3) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, was repealed by the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Law) Order 1937. However, Article 9 of the Order of 1937 saved the rule.

Article 9 reads as under:

“The provisions of this Order which adapt or modify Indian laws so as to alter the manner in which, the authority by which, or the law under, or in accordance with which, any powers are exercisable, shall not render invalid any notification, order, commitment, attachment, byelaw, rule or regulation duly made, or issued, or anything duly done, before the commencement, of this Order; and any such notification, order, commitment, attachment, byelaw, rule, regulation or thing may be revoked, varied or undone in the like manner, to the like extent and in the like circumstances as if it had been made, issued or done after the commencement of this Order by the competent authority and under and in accordance with the provisions then applicable to such a case.”

Rule VI remained in operation until March 19, 1999, when fresh promotion rules were framed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court, substituting Rule VI.

Arguments

Arguments by the Appellants:

• ✓ The appellants’ counsel argued that Rule VI was a statutory rule valid and applicable at the relevant time. Therefore, the respondents (Nos. 4 and 5) were obligated to consider the appellants for promotion to the grade of UDC when vacancies existed in 1975-76.
• ✓ They contended that the benefit of the statutory rule should not be denied based on delay and laches.
• ✓ The appellants submitted that pursuant to the order of the Ld. Single Judge, they had been granted promotion w.e.f. 01.01.1976 and were further promoted to the post of Assistant.

Arguments by the Respondents:

• ✓ The respondents reiterated the stand taken before the Division Bench.
• ✓ The private respondents (Shri Suraj Bhan and Radha Krishan) argued that the representations were made after a lapse of about 11/12 years, thus the claim was barred by laches.
• ✓ They also contended that Section 35(3) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, under which Rule VI was framed, stood repealed by the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Law) Order 1937, as a result of which the said rule ceased to exist.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

1. Whether the benefits granted to the appellants and already received by them pursuant to the order of Ld. Single Judge shall be taken away as they have enjoyed such benefit for a very long period of time.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The judgment does not explicitly cite any cases or books as authorities. However, it refers to the following legal provisions:

• ✓ Rule VI, Chapter 18-A, High Court Rules and Orders, Vol. 1: This rule governs promotions within the ministerial establishment of the District & Sessions Judge, Delhi.
• ✓ Section 35(3) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918: This section provided the basis for framing Rule VI.
• ✓ Article 9 of the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Law) Order 1937: This article saved Rule VI from being invalidated after the repeal of Section 35(3) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918.

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court:

• ✓ Rule VI, Chapter 18-A, High Court Rules and Orders: The Court acknowledged the validity of Rule VI and considered it as the basis for the appellants’ claim for retrospective promotion.
• ✓ Section 35(3) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918: The Court acknowledged that this section was the basis for framing Rule VI but noted its repeal.
• ✓ Article 9 of the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Law) Order 1937: The Court relied on this article to establish the continued validity of Rule VI despite the repeal of Section 35(3) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

Several factors weighed in the mind of the Court, leading to its decision:

• ✓ Delay: The Court acknowledged the considerable delay of 11-12 years on the part of the appellants in giving representation for promotion to the grade of UDC. The Court noted that delay defeats equity and jeopardizes the existing positions of a large number of members of the service.
• ✓ Benefits Already Received: The appellants had already been granted promotion w.e.f. 01.01.1976 pursuant to the order of the Ld. Single Judge and had been further promoted to the post of Assistant. The Court considered whether it should take away the benefits that the appellants had actually obtained.
• ✓ Equity: The Court considered the fairness of taking away the benefits that the appellants had secured, especially since they had enjoyed such benefits for a long period of time (nearly 10 years).
• ✓ Peculiar Facts and Circumstances: The Court emphasized that its decision was based on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and should not be construed as a precedent in any other matter.

Fact:Law Ratio

The sentiment analysis of the Supreme Court shows the ratio of fact:law percentage that influenced the court to decide. Fact is defined as “percentage of the consideration of the factual aspects of the case” and Law is defined as “percentage of legal considerations”.

Logical Reasoning:

Issue: Whether the benefits granted to the appellants and already received by them pursuant to the order of Ld. Single Judge shall be taken away as they have enjoyed such benefit for a very long period of time.

Court’s Logical Reasoning:

Key Takeaways

• ✓ Timely Representation: Employees should make timely representations regarding their grievances to avoid the plea of delay and laches.
• ✓ Equity Considerations: Courts may consider equity and the length of time benefits have been enjoyed when deciding whether to take away benefits already granted.
• ✓ Case-Specific Decisions: The Supreme Court emphasized that its decision was based on the specific facts and circumstances of the case and should not be construed as a precedent in other matters.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed that the benefits granted to the appellants and already received by them pursuant to the order of Ld. Single Judge shall not be taken away as they have enjoyed such benefit for a very long period of time. However, they shall not be entitled to any additional benefit, and no additional benefit will be granted. The Court also clarified that this relief cannot be granted to anybody else.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of the case is that while delay in making a representation can be a valid ground for denying relief, the Court may consider equity and the length of time benefits have been enjoyed when deciding whether to take away benefits already granted. The Court also clarified that its decision was based on the specific facts and circumstances of the case and should not be construed as a precedent in other matters.

Conclusion

In Rajinder Pal Singh Lamba vs. Suraj Bhan, the Supreme Court disposed of the appeals, directing that the benefits granted to the appellants and already received by them pursuant to the order of Ld. Single Judge shall not be taken away, considering the delay in making the representation and the equity of the case. The Court clarified that its decision was based on the specific facts and circumstances of the case and should not be construed as a precedent in other matters.

Category

Parent category: Service Law

Child categories:

• ✓ Promotion
• ✓ Retrospective Promotion
• ✓ Delay and Laches
• ✓ High Court Rules and Orders
• ✓ Punjab Courts Act, 1918

FAQ

Q: Can a promotion be denied due to delay in representation?

A: Yes, a promotion can be denied due to delay in representation, but courts may consider equity and the length of time benefits have been enjoyed when deciding whether to take away benefits already granted.

Q: What factors do courts consider when deciding on retrospective promotions?

A: Courts consider the validity of the applicable rules, the delay in making the claim, and the equity of the case, including the benefits already received by the employee.

Q: Is the Rajinder Pal Singh Lamba vs. Suraj Bhan judgment a precedent for all similar cases?

A: No, the Supreme Court clarified that its decision was based on the specific facts and circumstances of the case and should not be construed as a precedent in other matters.