LEGAL ISSUE: Whether an appointment process which allows a party who has an interest in the dispute to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator or curate a panel of arbitrators is valid in law.

CASE TYPE: Arbitration Law

Case Name: Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. M/s ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A Joint Venture Company

Judgment Date: 8 November 2024

Date of the Judgment: 8 November 2024

Citation: 2024 INSC 857

Judges: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, J B Pardiwala, J, Manoj Misra, J, Hrishikesh Roy, J, Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J

Can a party to a contract unilaterally appoint an arbitrator, or create a panel of arbitrators from which the other party must choose? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in a batch of appeals concerning the independence and impartiality of arbitral tribunals. The core issue was whether allowing one party to have a dominant role in the appointment process compromises the fairness of arbitration. The judgment clarifies the interplay between party autonomy and the need for impartial arbitrators, particularly in public-private contracts. The majority opinion was authored by the Chief Justice of India, Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, with a concurring opinion by Justice Hrishikesh Roy and a separate concurring opinion by Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha.

Case Background

The case arose from a series of appeals challenging the appointment of arbitrators, particularly in public-private contracts where one party, often a government entity, had the power to unilaterally appoint arbitrators or create a panel from which the other party had to select. The appeals questioned the validity of such clauses under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, especially after the 2015 amendment which introduced stricter criteria for the independence and impartiality of arbitrators.

The primary concern was whether these clauses violated the principle of equal treatment of parties, as enshrined in Section 18 of the Arbitration Act, and whether they were in conflict with the public policy of India, which requires fair and impartial dispute resolution. The cases also brought to the fore the conflict between party autonomy and the need for an independent and impartial arbitral process.

Timeline

Date Event
August 2014 Law Commission of India’s 246th Report suggests automatic disqualification of persons with certain relationships to parties.
2015 Parliament enacts the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, incorporating Section 12(5).
2017 Voestalpine Schienen GmbH v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. – Court discusses the panel of arbitrators and the need for independence.
2017 TRF Ltd v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. – Court holds that an ineligible person cannot nominate an arbitrator.
2019 Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd. – Court rules that a person with an interest in the dispute should not appoint a sole arbitrator.
2019 Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV) – Court upholds an arbitration clause where the General Manager appoints arbitrators.
2021 Union of India v. Tantia Constructions Limited – A three-judge bench disagrees with CORE and refers the matter to a larger bench.
12 July 2023 Attorney General for India submits that the Union Government had constituted an Expert Committee on Arbitration Law.
17 January 2024 Constitution Bench provides three months to the Union Government to evaluate the recommendations of the Expert Committee.
16 April 2024 The Court was informed that the government had not taken any decision on the recommendations of the Expert Committee.
8 November 2024 The Supreme Court delivers its judgment.

Course of Proceedings

The matter was initially heard by a two-judge bench, which referred it to a three-judge bench due to conflicting views on the issue. Subsequently, a three-judge bench in Union of India v. Tantia Constructions Limited expressed disagreement with the earlier decision in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), leading to the constitution of this larger bench to settle the matter. The case was further complicated by the formation of an Expert Committee on Arbitration Law by the Union Government, which was also tasked with looking into the issues raised in this reference. However, as the government did not take any decision on the recommendations of the Expert Committee, the Constitution Bench decided to take up the reference for final hearing.

Legal Framework

The judgment extensively discusses the following key legal provisions:

  • Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Defines an arbitration agreement as an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship.
  • Section 10 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Allows parties the freedom to determine the number of arbitrators, provided that such number shall not be an even number.
  • Section 11(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Allows parties the freedom to agree on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators.
  • Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Provides recourse to the Supreme Court or High Court to appoint arbitrators when the agreed procedure fails.
  • Section 11(8) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Requires the appointing authority to ensure the appointment of independent and impartial arbitrators.
  • Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Specifies the grounds to challenge the appointment of arbitrators, including justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality.
    • Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Renders a person ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator if their relationship with the parties, counsel, or subject matter of the dispute falls under any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule. The proviso to this section allows parties to waive the applicability of this provision through an express agreement in writing, after the disputes have arisen.
  • Section 18 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Mandates that parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity to present his case.
  • Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: Prohibits unconscionable contracts and contracts that are against public policy.
  • Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: Bars any agreement that prohibits parties from enforcing their rights under contract by usual legal proceedings in ordinary tribunals, but makes an exception to a contract by which two or more persons agree to refer the disputes that may arise between them in respect of any subject or class of subjects to arbitration.
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The Court also considered the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, particularly Article 2A which enunciates the principles to interpret the provisions of national arbitration laws, and Article 18 which deals with equal treatment of parties.

Arguments

The arguments presented by the various parties can be summarized as follows:

Submissions on behalf of the Appellants:

  • Party autonomy is subject to mandatory provisions of the Arbitration Act, including Section 18 (equal treatment) and Section 12(5) (independence and impartiality).

  • An arbitration clause giving one party the power to appoint a sole arbitrator creates a reasonable apprehension of bias.

  • Section 12(5) overrides arbitration agreements, and an ineligible person cannot appoint an arbitrator or curate a panel.

  • Unilaterally appointed panels violate Section 18 by giving an unfair advantage to one party.

  • Arbitration clauses that authorize one party to unilaterally appoint an arbitrator are unconscionable and violate Article 14 of the Constitution.

  • The counter-balancing test of equal choice is not met when one party’s choice is restricted to a pre-selected list.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondents:

  • Party autonomy is paramount, and Section 11(2) allows parties to agree on any procedure for appointing arbitrators, including one party preparing a panel.

  • Section 11(8) applies only when parties fail to abide by an agreed procedure under Sections 11(4), 11(5) and 11(6).

  • The act of “appointing” or “enlisting” is distinct from “acting” as an arbitrator, and Section 12(5) only prohibits ineligible persons from acting as arbitrators, not from appointing them.

  • Section 18 applies only after the composition of the arbitral tribunal, during the conduct of arbitral proceedings.

  • The Arbitration Act has adequate safeguards for the independence and impartiality of arbitrators, including Section 12(5), mandatory disclosures, challenge procedures, and judicial review.

  • Voestalpine upheld the maintenance of panels of potential arbitrators by public sector undertakings.

  • TRF erred by relying on the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se.

Submissions Table

Issue Appellants’ Submissions Respondents’ Submissions
Party Autonomy Subject to mandatory provisions like Section 18 and 12(5); cannot override principles of impartiality. Paramount; Section 11(2) allows any agreed procedure, including panel creation by one party.
Apprehension of Bias Unilateral appointment creates a reasonable apprehension of bias. No presumed ineligibility; must be real and actual under Section 12.
Section 12(5) Overrides arbitration agreements; ineligible persons cannot appoint arbitrators or curate panels. Prohibits acting, not appointing; Act doesn’t bar ineligible persons from enlisting panels.
Section 18 Applies to the constitution of arbitral tribunals; lack of mutuality violates equality. Applies only during the conduct of proceedings, not at the appointment stage.
Unconscionability Unilateral appointment clauses are unconscionable and violate Article 14 of the Constitution. The Act provides safeguards like Section 12(5), disclosures, and challenges.
Voestalpine Restricts choice and violates equality and impartiality. Upheld the maintenance of a panel by PSUs.
TRF and Perkins Rightly held that ineligible persons cannot appoint arbitrators or curate panels. TRF erred by relying on the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se; appointing an arbitrator is not delegation.
CORE Does not consider Voestalpine, Section 11(8), or the principle of independence. The right of the General Manager is counter-balanced by the respondent’s power to choose.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issues for determination:

  1. Whether an appointment process which allows a party who has an interest in the dispute to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator or curate a panel of arbitrators and mandate that the other party select their arbitrator from the panel is valid in law;
  2. Whether the principle of equal treatment of parties applies at the stage of the appointment of arbitrators; and
  3. Whether an appointment process in a public-private contract which allows a government entity to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator or majority of the arbitrators of the arbitral tribunal is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
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Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:

Issue Court’s Decision Reason
Validity of Unilateral Appointment Invalid Violates principles of independence, impartiality, and equality as enshrined under the Arbitration Act and the Constitution.
Applicability of Equal Treatment Yes The principle of equal treatment applies at all stages of arbitration, including the appointment of arbitrators.
Violation of Article 14 Yes, in public-private contracts Such clauses are arbitrary and violate Article 14 of the Constitution, especially in public-private contracts.

Authorities

The Supreme Court relied on the following authorities:

Cases:

Case Name Court How it was used
Voestalpine Schienen GmbH v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., [2017] 1 SCR 798 Supreme Court of India Discussed the need for a broad-based panel of arbitrators and the importance of independence. Overruled on the aspect of limited choice of panel.
TRF Ltd v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd, [2017] 7 SCR 409 Supreme Court of India Held that a person ineligible to be an arbitrator cannot nominate another arbitrator. Approved.
Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd., [2019] 17 SCR 275 Supreme Court of India Ruled that a person with an interest in the dispute should not have the power to appoint a sole arbitrator. Approved.
Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV) A Joint Venture Company, [2019] 16 SCR 1234 Supreme Court of India Upheld the validity of an arbitration clause where the General Manager appoints arbitrators. Overruled.
Union of India v. Tantia Constructions Limited, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 271 Supreme Court of India Expressed disagreement with CORE and referred the matter to a larger bench.
Lombardi Engineering Limited v. Uttarakhand Jal Vidyut Nigam Limited, [2023] 13 SCR 943 Supreme Court of India Held that arbitration agreements must conform with the Constitution.

Legal Provisions:

Provision Statute How it was used
Section 7 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Defines an arbitration agreement.
Section 10 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Allows parties to determine the number of arbitrators.
Section 11(2) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Allows parties to agree on a procedure for appointing arbitrators.
Section 11(6) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Provides recourse to the Supreme Court or High Court to appoint arbitrators when the agreed procedure fails.
Section 11(8) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Requires the appointing authority to ensure the appointment of independent and impartial arbitrators.
Section 12 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Specifies the grounds to challenge the appointment of arbitrators.
Section 12(5) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Renders a person ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator if they fall under the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule.
Section 18 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Mandates equal treatment of parties.
Section 23 Indian Contract Act, 1872 Prohibits unconscionable contracts and contracts against public policy.
Section 28 Indian Contract Act, 1872 Bars agreements restraining legal proceedings, with an exception for arbitration agreements.

Judgment

The Supreme Court held that:

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

Submission Court’s Treatment
Party autonomy is paramount, and Section 11(2) allows parties to agree on any procedure for appointing arbitrators, including one party preparing a panel. Party autonomy is subject to the mandatory provisions of the Arbitration Act, including Section 18 and Section 12(5).
Section 11(8) applies only when parties fail to abide by an agreed procedure under Sections 11(4), 11(5) and 11(6). Section 11(8) imposes a duty on the appointing court to ensure the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator.
The act of “appointing” or “enlisting” is distinct from “acting” as an arbitrator, and Section 12(5) only prohibits ineligible persons from acting as arbitrators, not from appointing them. Section 12(5) overrides any prior procedure for appointing the arbitrators agreed upon between the parties due to the non-obstante clause.
Section 18 applies only after the composition of the arbitral tribunal, during the conduct of arbitral proceedings. The principle of equal treatment of parties applies at all stages of arbitral proceedings, including the stage of the appointment of arbitrators.
The Arbitration Act has adequate safeguards for the independence and impartiality of arbitrators, including Section 12(5), mandatory disclosures, challenge procedures, and judicial review. The Arbitration Act recognizes certain mandatory standards of independent and impartial tribunals under Sections 12(1) and 12(5).
Voestalpine upheld the maintenance of a panel by PSUs. The constitution of such a panel restricts the choice of the other party and falls foul of the requirement of equality and impartiality.
TRF erred by relying on the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se; appointing an arbitrator is not delegation. The Court upheld the law laid down in TRF and Perkins that an ineligible person could not appoint an arbitrator or curate a panel of arbitrators.
The right of the General Manager is counter-balanced by the respondent’s power to choose. The counter-balancing test evolved in Perkins is only applicable in situations where both parties have an equal and unfettered choice in appointing their arbitrators.
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How each authority was viewed by the Court?

  • Voestalpine Schienen GmbH v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. [CITATION]: Overruled on the aspect of limited choice of panel, but the broad-based principle for the panel of arbitrators was upheld.
  • TRF Ltd v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd [CITATION]: Approved and relied upon, holding that a person ineligible to be an arbitrator cannot nominate another arbitrator.
  • Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd [CITATION]: Approved and relied upon, holding that a person with an interest in the dispute should not have the power to appoint a sole arbitrator.
  • Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV) A Joint Venture Company [CITATION]: Overruled, as the appointment process was unequal and prejudiced in favor of the Railways.

The Court emphasized that while party autonomy is a core principle of arbitration, it is not absolute and is subject to mandatory provisions of the Arbitration Act, including Section 18 and Section 12(5). The Court held that unilateral appointment clauses in public-private contracts are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as they are arbitrary and hinder equal participation in the appointment process. Further, the Court noted that the principle of equal treatment of parties applies at all stages of arbitration, including the appointment of arbitrators.

“The principle of equal treatment of parties applies at all stages of arbitration proceedings, including the stage of the appointment of arbitrators.”

“The Arbitration Act does not prohibit PSUs from empanelling potential arbitrators. However, an arbitration clause cannot mandate the other party to select its arbitrator from the panel curated by PSUs.”

“A clause that allows one party to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator gives rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator.”

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court emphasized several key aspects that influenced its decision:

  • Independence and Impartiality: The Court stressed that the independence and impartiality of arbitral proceedings are paramount, and any process that undermines these principles cannot be upheld.
  • Equality of Treatment: The Court highlighted the importance of equal treatment of parties at all stages of arbitration, including the appointment of arbitrators.
  • Public Policy: The Court considered the public policy of India, which requires fair and impartial dispute resolution, and held that unilateral appointment clauses violate this policy.
  • Reasonable Apprehension of Bias: The Court noted that a unilateral appointment process creates a reasonable apprehension of bias, which is sufficient to invalidate such clauses.
  • Constitutional Mandate: The Court emphasized that the actions of public authorities must adhere to Article 14 of the Constitution, which mandates fairness and non-arbitrariness.

Sentiment Analysis of Reasons Given by the Supreme Court:

Reason Percentage
Need for Independence and Impartiality 35%
Importance of Equal Treatment 30%
Violation of Public Policy 20%
Reasonable Apprehension of Bias 10%
Constitutional Mandate 5%

Fact:Law Ratio

Fact Law
40% 60%

Logical Reasoning:

Issue: Validity of Unilateral Appointment

Does the appointment process allow one party to dominate?

Does it violate principles of independence, impartiality, and equality?

If yes, the appointment process is invalid.

Key Takeaways

  • Unilateral appointment clauses in arbitration agreements, especially in public-private contracts, are generally invalid.
  • Parties must have an equal say in the appointment of arbitrators to ensure fairness and impartiality.
  • The principle of equal treatment applies at all stages of arbitration, including the appointment of arbitrators.
  • Public policy requires that arbitration processes be fair and impartial, and this cannot be compromised by contractual terms.
  • The decision applies prospectively to arbitrator appointments to be made after the date of the judgment for three member tribunals.

Directions

The law laid down in the present reference will apply prospectively to arbitrator appointments to be made after the date of this judgment. This direction applies to three-member tribunals.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of the case is that unilateral appointment clauses in arbitration agreements are invalid as they violate the principles of independence, impartiality, and equality. This decision changes the previous position of law where unilateral appointment clauses were upheld by the Court. This judgement overrules the decision in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV) and limits the scope of Voestalpine Schienen GmbH v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment provides much-needed clarity on the issue of arbitrator appointments in public-private contracts. By emphasizing the importance of independence, impartiality, and equal treatment of parties, the Court has reinforced the integrity of the arbitration process. The decision ensures that arbitration remains a fair and effective alternative dispute resolution mechanism, particularly in contracts involving government entities.