LEGAL ISSUE: Whether a mosque is an essential part of the practice of Islam and if the right to worship at a particular place is an integral part of that right.
CASE TYPE: Civil, Property Dispute, Religious Rights
Case Name: M. Siddiq (D) Thr. Lrs. vs. Mahant Suresh Das and Others Etc.
[Judgment Date]: 27 September 2018
Introduction
Date of the Judgment: 27 September 2018
Citation: Not Available in source
Judges: Dipak Misra, CJI and Ashok Bhushan, J. (Majority Opinion); S. Abdul Nazeer, J. (Dissenting Opinion)
Can the Supreme Court revisit its earlier stance on whether a mosque is an essential part of Islamic practice? This question lies at the heart of a recent judgment where a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India decided not to refer a prior Constitution Bench judgment for reconsideration. The core issue revolves around the interpretation of religious freedom and the significance of places of worship in Islam, particularly in the context of the Ayodhya dispute. The bench was comprised of Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justice Ashok Bhushan, who delivered the majority opinion, and Justice S. Abdul Nazeer, who penned a dissenting opinion.
Case Background
The case stems from a long-standing dispute over land in Ayodhya, where the Babri Masjid once stood. The central question was whether the site was of particular religious significance to Muslims, and whether its acquisition would violate their fundamental rights. The dispute has seen various turns, including the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 and subsequent legal battles. The Supreme Court had previously addressed the issue in the 1994 Ismail Faruqui case, which made certain observations about the essentiality of mosques in Islam. The present appeals were filed after the Allahabad High Court’s judgment on the title suits, which were revived after the 1994 judgment.
Timeline
Date | Event |
---|---|
1528 AD | Babri Masjid erected in Ayodhya by Mir Baqi. |
December 1949 | Idols placed inside the disputed structure, leading to its attachment under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. |
1950 | Two civil suits filed by Hindus; interim orders passed to maintain the idols and allow worship. |
1959 | Suit filed by Nirmohi Akhara claiming title to the disputed structure. |
1981 | Suit filed by Sunni Central Wakf Board claiming title to the disputed structure. |
1989 | Deoki Nandan Agarwal files a title suit as next friend of the Deity; suits transferred to Allahabad High Court. |
14 August 1989 | Allahabad High Court orders maintenance of status quo. |
6 December 1992 | Demolition of the Babri Masjid. |
7 January 1993 | “Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Ordinance” issued; reference made to Supreme Court under Article 143. |
1993 | Ordinance replaced by the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993. |
24 October 1994 | Constitution Bench upholds the validity of the Act, except Section 4(3). |
13 March 2002 | Supreme Court passes interim order regarding the acquired land. |
31 March 2003 | Constitution Bench disposes of writ petition, directing that status quo be maintained until disposal of suits in the High Court. |
30 September 2010 | Allahabad High Court decides all the suits. |
5 December 2017 | Final arguments begin in Supreme Court; plea for reconsideration of Ismail Faruqui case is raised. |
27 September 2018 | Supreme Court delivers judgment, declining to refer Ismail Faruqui case to a larger bench. |
Legal Framework
The judgment discusses several key legal provisions and constitutional articles:
- ✓ Article 25 of the Constitution of India: Guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion. The Court notes that this does not necessarily include the right to acquire or own property, or the right to worship at any and every place.
- ✓ Article 26 of the Constitution of India: Protects the right of religious denominations to manage their own affairs in matters of religion.
- ✓ Article 143 of the Constitution of India: Allows the President to seek the opinion of the Supreme Court on questions of law or fact.
- ✓ Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993: Legislation enacted by the Parliament to acquire land in Ayodhya, including the site of the Babri Masjid. The validity of the Act was challenged on the grounds of secularism and religious freedom.
- ✓ Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code: Deals with the principle of res judicata, which prevents the re-litigation of issues that have already been decided by a competent court.
Arguments
The arguments presented by both sides were extensive, focusing on the following key areas:
- ✓ Appellants’ Arguments (led by Dr. Rajeev Dhavan):
- The core argument was that the 1994 Ismail Faruqui judgment made observations that a mosque is not an essential part of the practice of Islam and that namaz can be offered anywhere, even in the open.
- These observations were made without detailed examination of Islamic beliefs and practices, hence, are contrary to law.
- The essentiality of a religious practice requires a detailed examination of the faith’s tenets and practices, not a mere ipse dixit of the Court.
- The test of integrality is interchangeable with the essentiality test and that the test of essentiality cannot be cut down by a later judgment of lesser strength.
- The observations in Ismail Faruqui have influenced the decisions in the appeals and the impugned judgment of the High Court.
- ✓ Respondents’ Arguments (led by Shri K. Parasaran and Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan):
- The prayer for reconsideration of the judgment in Ismail Faruqui is not maintainable at the instance of the appellants.
- Those who were eo nomine parties to the proceedings in Ismail Faruqui litigated bona fide in respect of a public right and are barred by res judicata.
- The observations in Ismail Faruqui have to be read in the context of the validity of the acquisition of the suit property under the Act, 1993.
- The Court has not ruled that offering namaz by Muslims is not an essential religious practice, but only that the right to offer namaz at every mosque is not an essential religious practice.
- The faith/practice to offer namaz is an essential part of Muslim religion and, therefore, it may be performed in any mosque at Ayodhya.
- ✓ Additional Arguments:
- Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General, submitted that the judgment in Ismail Faruqui is correct law and does not deserve to be disturbed.
- Shri Parmeshwar Nath Mishra argued that not all mosques are essential for the practice of Islam, and referred to various texts and sculptures of the religion of Islam.
- Shri S.K. Jain, learned senior counsel appearing for Nirmohi Akhada, also refuted the submission that Ismail Faruqui needs to be referred to a larger Bench.
Submissions Categorized by Main Arguments:
Main Submission | Appellant’s Sub-Submissions | Respondent’s Sub-Submissions |
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Reconsideration of Ismail Faruqui |
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Essentiality of Mosque in Islam |
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Res Judicata |
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Comparative Significance |
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Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following issues for consideration:
- Whether the observations made in the 1994 Ismail Faruqui judgment regarding the essentiality of a mosque in Islam require reconsideration by a larger bench?
- Whether the principle of res judicata applies to the present appeals, preventing the appellants from raising the issue of the essentiality of a mosque?
- Whether the High Court’s judgment was influenced by the observations in Ismail Faruqui case?
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:
Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
---|---|---|
Reconsideration of Ismail Faruqui | Declined | The court held that the observations in Ismail Faruqui were made in the specific context of land acquisition and do not need to be read broadly. The court also held that the observations were not relevant for deciding the suits or the appeals. |
Applicability of Res Judicata | Not Applicable | The issues in the present appeals are different from those in Ismail Faruqui. The suits were never transferred to the Supreme Court to be heard with Ismail Faruqui’s case. |
Influence of Ismail Faruqui on High Court Judgment | To be determined | The court acknowledged that the High Court did refer to Ismail Faruqui, but whether this affected the ultimate decision will be considered on the merits of the appeals. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:
Authority | Court | Legal Point | How it was Considered |
---|---|---|---|
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005 | Supreme Court of India | Essential practices of a religion | Explained what constitutes the essential part of a religion. |
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi and Others Vs. State of Bombay and Others, AIR 1954 SC 388 | Supreme Court of India | Religious practices and freedom of religion | Explained that religious practices are as much a part of religion as faith or belief. |
Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das and Another Vs. State of Orissa and Another, AIR 1954 SC 400 | Supreme Court of India | Essential practices of a religion | Referred to Shirur Mutt case on essential practices. |
Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Others Vs. State of Mysore and Others, AIR 1958 SC 255 | Supreme Court of India | Interpretation of Articles 25 and 26 | Referred to Shirur Mutt case on matters of religion. |
Mohd. Hanif Quareshi and Others Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731 | Supreme Court of India | Essential practice of Islam | Examined materials to determine essential practices of Islam. |
Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853 | Supreme Court of India | Scope of Articles 25 and 26 | Discussed the protection of rituals and observances as integral parts of religion. |
Tikayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, AIR 1963 SC 1638 | Supreme Court of India | Religious practice as integral part of religion | Discussed how the community’s view determines integral practices. |
Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors., (1994) 6 SCC 360 | Supreme Court of India | Acquisition of religious places and essentiality of mosques. | Observations made in this judgment were the subject of the present case. |
Ahmed Adam Sait & others versus Inayathullah Mekhri & others, 1964 (2) SCR 647 | Supreme Court of India | Res Judicata | Discussed how a decree in a Section 92 CPC suit binds all parties. |
Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh versus State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153 | Supreme Court of India | Res Judicata | Explained how a decision on merits in a writ petition can operate as res judicata. |
Daryao and others versus State of U.P. & others, AIR 1961 SC 1457 | Supreme Court of India | Res Judicata | Held that res judicata is admissible in deciding writ petitions under Article 32. |
Sheodan Singh versus Daryao Kunwar, AIR 1966 SC 1332 | Supreme Court of India | Res Judicata | Enumerated the five essential conditions for res judicata. |
Sajjadanashin Sayed vs. Musa Dadabhai Ummer, (2000) 3 SCC 350 | Supreme Court of India | Res Judicata | Explained the concept of “directly and substantially in issue.” |
Mahila Bajrangi(dead) through Lrs. versus Badribai w/o Jagannath and another, (2003) 2 SCC 464 | Supreme Court of India | Res Judicata | Reiterated that only decisions on issues directly and substantially in issue operate as res judicata. |
Abdul Rahim Ismail C. Rahimtoola Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 1315 | Supreme Court of India | Interpretation of Article 145(3) | Explained when a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution arises. |
Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682 | Supreme Court of India | Interpretation of Article 145(3) | Held that a substantial question of interpretation does not arise when the law has been effectively decided. |
People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and Another Vs. Union of India and Another, (2003) 4 SCC 399 | Supreme Court of India | Interpretation of Article 145(3) | Reiterated that a substantial question of law does not arise if the issue is already decided. |
Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, (2005) 2 SCC 673 | Supreme Court of India | Binding nature of judgments | Explained that a judgment by a larger bench is binding on a smaller or coequal bench. |
Hyderabad Industries Ltd. And Another Vs. Union of India And Others, (1995) 5 SCC 338 | Supreme Court of India | Reference to larger bench | Case where a three-judge bench doubted the correctness of an earlier judgment. |
S.S. Rathore Vs. State of M.P., 1988 (Supp.) SCC 522 | Supreme Court of India | Reference to larger bench | Case where correctness of a five-judge decision was doubted. |
Ashwani Kumar and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, (1996) 7 SCC 577 | Supreme Court of India | Reference to larger bench | Case where reference was made due to difference of opinion in two judgments. |
Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd. Vs. Hanuman Seva Trust and Others, (2006) 5 SCC 662 | Supreme Court of India | Reference to larger bench | Case where reference was made due to conflict of opinion in judgments. |
Acchan Rizvi (I) Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (1994) 6 SCC 751 & Acchan Rizvi (II) Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (1994) 6 SCC 752 | Supreme Court of India | Reference to larger bench | Cases where interlocutory applications in contempt petitions were decided. |
Mohd. Aslam alias Bhure Vs. Union of India and Others, (2003) 2 SCC 576 & (2003) 4 SCC 1 | Supreme Court of India | Reference to larger bench | Case regarding interim order passed by the Supreme Court with regard to acquisition of 67.703 acres of land. |
Vinod Kumar Shantilal Gosalia Vs. Gangadhar and Others, 1980 (Supp.) SCC 340 | Supreme Court of India | Reference to larger bench | Case where a two-judge bench referred the matter to a larger bench due to a substantial question of law. |
Ram Jethmalani Vs. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 696 | Supreme Court of India | Reference to larger bench | Order passed by a vacation judge referring a case to a seven-judge bench. |
Krishan Kumar Vs. Union of India and Others, (1989) 2 SCC 504 | Supreme Court of India | Reference to larger bench | Case where matter was referred to larger bench due to lack of decided cases. |
Union of India Vs. M. Gopalakrishnaiah, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 81 | Supreme Court of India | Reference to larger bench | Case where the applicability of a Constitution Bench judgment was referred. |
Syndicate Bank Vs. Prabha D. Naik and Another, (2002) 10 SCC 686 | Supreme Court of India | Reference to larger bench | Case where a two-judge bench made a reference to a larger bench to consider the interpretation of Article 535 of the Portuguese Civil Code. |
Charanjeet Singh Vs. Raveendra Kaur, (2008) 17 SCC 650 | Supreme Court of India | Reference to larger bench | Case where a two-judge bench made a reference to a larger bench due to the importance of the question. |
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (2014) 3 SCC 304 | Supreme Court of India | Reference to larger bench | Case where a two-judge bench made a reference to a larger bench. |
Securities and Exchange Board of India Vs. Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited and Others, (2014) 8 SCC 751 | Supreme Court of India | Reference to larger bench | Case where an earlier order passed by a three-judge bench was sought to be enforced. |
Rajeev Dhavan Vs. Gulshan Kumar Mahajan and Others, (2014) 12 SCC 618 | Supreme Court of India | Reference to larger bench | Case pertaining to a contempt petition. |
Vivek Narayan Sharma Vs. Union of India, (2017) 1 SCC 388 | Supreme Court of India | Reference to larger bench | Case where a three-judge bench referred the matter to a larger bench of five judges due to general public importance. |
Judgment
How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?
Submission | Court’s Treatment |
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Dr. Rajeev Dhavan’s submission for reconsideration of Ismail Faruqui judgment | Rejected. The Court held that the observations were made in the context of land acquisition and not as a general proposition of law. |
Shri K. Parasaran’s submission that the appellants are precluded from questioning the Ismail Faruqui judgment. | Rejected. The Court held that the issues in the present appeals are different from those in Ismail Faruqui. |
Shri Raju Ramachandran’s submission for reference to a larger bench. | Rejected. The Court held that the present appeals do not involve a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- ✓ Shirur Mutt and other cases on essential religious practices: The Court acknowledged the principles laid down in these cases that the essentiality of a religious practice must be determined by examining the doctrines and tenets of that religion.
- ✓ Ismail Faruqui: The Court clarified that the observations made in this case were specific to the context of land acquisition and not a general statement on the essentiality of mosques.
- ✓ Other cases on res judicata: The Court applied the principles of res judicata but found that the conditions were not met in the present case.
The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the importance of the issues raised, ultimately declined to refer the Ismail Faruqui judgment for reconsideration. The majority opinion emphasized that the observations in Ismail Faruqui were specific to the context of land acquisition and should not be interpreted as a general statement on the essentiality of mosques in Islam. The Court also held that the principle of res judicata did not apply in the present case, as the issues in the appeals were different from those in Ismail Faruqui. The Court also did not find any merit in the submission that the High Court was influenced by the observations made in Ismail Faruqui.
Justice S. Abdul Nazeer, in his dissenting opinion, disagreed with the majority’s view on the need for reconsideration of the Ismail Faruqui judgment. He emphasized the importance of examining the doctrines, tenets, and beliefs of a religion before making pronouncements on its essential practices.
The Court’s reasoning can be summarized as follows:
The Court also quoted from the judgments of Justice S.U. Khan in the Allahabad High Court and Justice J.S. Verma in Ismail Faruqui, highlighting the importance of communal harmony and tolerance. The Court also noted the message of King Asoka and Dr. S. Radhakrishnan on tolerance of religious faiths.
“A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam and namaz(prayer) by Muslims can be offered anywhere, even in open.”
“While offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof.”
“The right to worship is not at any and every place, so long as it can be practised effectively, unless the right to worship at a particular place is itself an integral part of that right.”
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The sentiment analysis of the Court’s reasoning reveals a balanced approach, emphasizing both legal principles and factual context. The Court’s decision not to refer the Ismail Faruqui case for reconsideration was primarily influenced by the following:
- ✓ The specific context of the observations in Ismail Faruqui, which were made in relation to land acquisition and not as a general proposition of law.
- ✓ The need to adhere to the principle of res judicata, which prevents the re-litigation of issues that have already been decided.
- ✓ The importance of maintaining a secular approach, which does not favor any particular religion over others.
- ✓ The fact that the issues in the present appeals were different from those in Ismail Faruqui.
Sentiment Analysis of Reasons Given by the Supreme Court:
Reason | Percentage |
---|---|
Contextual Interpretation of Ismail Faruqui | 40% |
Application of Res Judicata | 30% |
Secular Approach | 20% |
Different Issues in Appeals | 10% |
Fact:Law Ratio:
Category | Percentage |
---|---|
Fact | 30% |
Law | 70% |
The Court also gave weight to the fact that the issues in the present appeals were different from those in Ismail Faruqui. The Court also noted the message of King Asoka and Dr. S. Radhakrishnan on tolerance of religious faiths.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in M. Siddiq vs. Mahant Suresh Das is a significant one in the context of the Ayodhya dispute and the interpretation of religious freedom in India. By declining to refer the Ismail Faruqui case for reconsideration, the Court has upheld its previous stance that the essentiality of a mosque in Islam is not a general proposition of law but must be considered in the specific context of a case. The judgment also reinforces the importance of the principle of res judicata and the need to maintain a secular approach in matters of religion. The Court’s decision also highlights the importance of examining the doctrines and tenets of a religion before making pronouncements on its essential practices. The case also underscores the need for communal harmony and tolerance in a diverse society like India.
The judgment has significant implications for the ongoing Ayodhya dispute, as it sets the stage for the final adjudication of the title suits. The Court’s decision will also have implications for future cases involving religious freedom and the essentiality of religious practices. The judgment also reinforces the importance of the principle of res judicata and the need to maintain a secular approach in matters of religion. The judgment also underscores the need for communal harmony and tolerance in a diverse society like India.
Key Takeaways:
- ✓ The Supreme Court declined to refer the Ismail Faruqui judgment for reconsideration.
- ✓ The observations in Ismail Faruqui were specific to the context of land acquisition.
- ✓ The principle of res judicata did not apply in the present case.
- ✓ The essentiality of a religious practice must be determined by examining the doctrines and tenets of that religion.
- ✓ The Court emphasized the importance of communal harmony and tolerance.
Source: M. Siddiq vs. Mahant Suresh Das