Supreme Court Upholds Acquittal in Murder Case Based on Inconsistent Dying Declarations: State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Shabana Bi (2018) INSC 724 (29 August 2018)

Date of the Judgment: 29 August 2018
Citation: (2018) INSC 724
Judges: R. Banumathi, J. and Vineet Saran, J.
Can inconsistencies in dying declarations lead to the acquittal of an accused in a murder case? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question, upholding the High Court’s decision to acquit an accused due to discrepancies in the deceased’s dying statements. This case highlights the critical importance of consistent and reliable evidence in criminal trials, particularly when relying on dying declarations. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice R. Banumathi and Justice Vineet Saran.

Case Background

The case involves the tragic death of Farida, who was allegedly set ablaze by her neighbor, Shabana Bi, the respondent in this appeal. The incident occurred on April 19, 2004. The prosecution’s case rested heavily on the dying declarations of the deceased.

Initially, the trial court convicted Shabana Bi under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and sentenced her to life imprisonment, primarily relying on a dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate, Tehsildar (PW-13). However, the High Court overturned this conviction, citing inconsistencies between this dying declaration and an earlier statement made by the deceased to Dr. Rakesh Chouksey (PW-9).

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court convicted the respondent based on the dying declaration (Ex.P-25) recorded by the Executive Magistrate, Tehsildar (PW-13). However, the High Court reversed this conviction. The High Court noted a critical inconsistency: in her statement to Dr. Rakesh Chouksey (PW-9), the deceased had mentioned that she was burnt by her neighbor Sabana (respondent) and Noorafza, who were mother and daughter, whereas in the dying declaration recorded by the Tehsildar (PW-13), she stated that she was set on fire by Sabana alone. The High Court concluded that these inconsistencies created reasonable doubt, warranting the acquittal of the accused.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which defines the punishment for murder. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on the dying declarations of the deceased. The admissibility and reliability of these declarations were central to the legal analysis.

Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 states: “Punishment for murder.—Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or [imprisonment for life], and shall also be liable to fine.”

Arguments

The State of Madhya Pradesh, as the appellant, argued that the trial court’s conviction should be upheld based on the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate, Tehsildar (PW-13).

The respondent, Shabana Bi, argued that the inconsistencies in the dying declarations created reasonable doubt, justifying the High Court’s decision to acquit her. Specifically, the defense highlighted the discrepancy between the deceased’s statement to Dr. Rakesh Chouksey (PW-9) where she named both Shabana and Noorafza as her attackers, and the subsequent dying declaration (Ex.P-25) where she only named Shabana.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in overturning the trial court’s conviction based on the inconsistencies in the dying declarations of the deceased.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court did not cite any specific cases or books in its judgment. The decision was based on the factual inconsistencies in the dying declarations and the principle that if two reasonable views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the view taken by the lower court.

Judgment

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to acquit Shabana Bi. The Court emphasized that when two reasonable views are possible, and the High Court has adopted a plausible view, there is no substantial ground to interfere with the order of acquittal.

The Supreme Court observed the following in its judgment:

• “The High Court has held that there are inconsistencies between the statement of deceased to Dr. Rakesh Chouksey (PW-9) and dying declaration (Ex.P-25) recorded by the Tehsildar (PW-13) and that benefit of doubt to be given to the respondent-accused.”
• “When there are two reasonable views and the High Court has adopted one such view which is a plausible one, we do not find any substantial ground warranting interference with the order of the acquittal.”

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the inconsistencies in the dying declarations. The court emphasized that when there are two reasonable views, the High Court’s plausible view should not be interfered with. The court’s reasoning was based on the principle of giving the benefit of the doubt to the accused in cases of conflicting evidence.

Key Takeaways

• Inconsistencies in dying declarations can lead to the acquittal of the accused.
• The benefit of doubt should be given to the accused when there are conflicting statements.
• Appellate courts should not interfere with a plausible view taken by the lower court when two reasonable views are possible.

Directions

No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court in this case.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that inconsistencies in dying declarations can create reasonable doubt, leading to the acquittal of the accused. This case reinforces the principle that the benefit of doubt should be given to the accused when there are conflicting statements. There is no change in the previous position of law.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s decision to acquit Shabana Bi. The judgment underscores the importance of consistent and reliable evidence, particularly in cases involving dying declarations. The court’s decision reinforces the principle that the benefit of doubt should be given to the accused when there are significant inconsistencies in the evidence.