Supreme Court Upholds Age Limits for Higher Judicial Service: Hirandra Kumar vs. Allahabad High Court (29 January 2019)

Date of the Judgment: 29 January 2019
Citation: The case does not have an official citation in the INSC format in the provided document.
Judges: Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J and Hemant Gupta, J. This was a division bench. The majority opinion was authored by Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J.

Can a High Court set age limits for its judicial service exams, even if those limits prevent some candidates from appearing due to delays in the recruitment process? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a recent judgment, upholding the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975 concerning age criteria for direct recruitment. The Court examined whether the rules violated the principles of equality and fair opportunity in public employment.

Case Background

The case involves multiple petitioners who were seeking direct recruitment to the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service (UPHJS). The petitioners challenged the validity of Rule 8(1) and Rule 12 of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975, which govern the recruitment process, particularly concerning the age limits for candidates. The petitioners argued that the rules, which stipulate that recruitment should occur at intervals not exceeding three years, and that candidates should not be older than 45 years (with a three-year relaxation for SC/ST candidates) as of the first day of January following the year of the advertisement, unfairly excluded them. They contended that delays in the recruitment process had made them ineligible due to age, thus violating their fundamental rights.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The petitioners initially challenged the validity of Rule 8(1) before the Allahabad High Court in Gauri Shankar Prasad v Registrar General, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The High Court, relying on its earlier decision in Suraj Bali Singh v Registrar General High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, upheld the validity of the rules and dismissed the petition. The High Court also noted that the petitioner had opportunities to appear in previous recruitment processes. An interim direction was issued by the Supreme Court on 18 June 2018, allowing one of the appellants to appear in the preliminary and main examinations, with the results kept in a sealed cover. The petitioners, who were debarred due to age, then approached the Supreme Court, challenging the constitutional validity of Rules 8(1) and 12 of the UPHJS Rules.

Legal Framework

The primary legal provisions in question are Rules 8(1) and 12 of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975:

• Rule 8(1): “The Court, shall, from time to time, but not later than three years from the last recruitment, fix the number of officers to be taken at the recruitment keeping in view the vacancies then existing and likely to occur in the next two years.” This rule mandates that the High Court determines the number of officers to be recruited, considering existing and anticipated vacancies, but not later than three years from the last recruitment.
• Rule 12: “A candidate for direct recruitment must have attained the age of 35 years and must not have attained the age of 45 years on the first day of January next following the year in which the notice inviting applications is published; Provided that the upper age limit shall be higher by three years in case of candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and such other categories as may be notified by the Government from time to time.” This rule sets the age criteria for direct recruitment, specifying a minimum age of 35 years and a maximum age of 45 years, with a three-year relaxation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, calculated as of the first day of January following the year of the recruitment advertisement.

These rules are framed under the powers conferred by Article 233 and Article 309 of the Constitution of India, which deal with appointments of district judges and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State.

Arguments

Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners:

• The petitioners argued that Rule 8 mandates recruitment to the UPHJS at intervals not exceeding three years.
• They contended that Rule 12, when combined with Rule 8, unfairly debars candidates who cross the age limit between the last recruitment and the current recruitment process.
• The petitioners argued that this debarment violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, which guarantee fair and equal treatment in public employment. They relied on the judgment in Delhi Transport Corporation v DTC Mazdoor Congress [(1991) Supp. 1 SCC 600].
• They submitted that the time schedule fixed in Malik Mazhar Sultan v U.P Public Service Commission [(2008) 17 SCC 703] for filling vacancies in the HJS should be on a yearly basis and that the cut-off for determining age must be prescribed with reference to the year in which recruitment must take place.
• The petitioners also argued that fixing the age limit of 45 years (48 years for SC/ST) with reference to the first day of January of the year following the advertisement is arbitrary and discriminatory.
• They contended that the advertisement arbitrarily uses different cut-off dates for determining the seven years’ standing at the Bar (last date for submission of application forms) and the age criterion (first day of January following the year of advertisement).

Submissions on behalf of the Respondents (High Court):

• The High Court argued that the Rules of 1975 are legislative and can only be invalidated if manifestly arbitrary.
• They contended that candidates do not have a fundamental right to assert that vacancies must be filled every year; their right is only to be considered based on the existing rules at the time of selection.
• The High Court stated that Rule 8(1) allows recruitment from time to time, but not later than three years from the last recruitment, and that they have complied with this rule.
• They argued that the petitioners, who did not participate or were unsuccessful in previous recruitments, cannot claim a violation of their fundamental rights.
• The High Court cited Malik Mazhar Sultan (supra), stating that the general directions to hold recruitment every year are subject to the rules of each High Court, and that these directions do not create an enforceable right for candidates.
• They cited the decision in Suraj Bali Singh (supra), where the constitutional validity of Rule 8 was upheld, and that a special leave petition against this judgment was withdrawn.
• The High Court argued that the age criterion in Rule 12 is reasonable, and that the prescription of cut-off dates is within the discretion of the rule-making authority.
• They cited Dr Ami Lal Bhat v State of Rajasthan and Others [(1997) 6 SCC 614] and Sanjay Agarwal v State of U P [(2007) 3 UPLBEC 255], where similar provisions have been upheld.

Submissions Table

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issues:

1. Whether the prescription “of not later than three years” in Rule 8 and of the upper age limit in Rule 12 is ultra vires and arbitrary.
2. Whether the decision in Malik Mazhar Sultan (supra) can be construed as leading to a vested right in a candidate who applies for recruitment to the HJS to assert that they may be granted an age relaxation by virtue of the fact that between the last date of recruitment and the current, the candidate has crossed the prescribed age limit.
3. Whether the prescription of an age limit of 45 years (48 years in the case of candidates belonging to the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe category) with reference to the first day of January of the year following the year in which the notice inviting applications is published, is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
4. Whether the different cut-off dates for determining the requirement of seven years’ standing at the Bar (last date for the submission of application forms) and the age criterion (first day of January of the year following the date on which the advertisement is issued) results in discrimination.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• Suraj Bali Singh v Registrar General High Court of Judicature at Allahabad: The Court concurred with the reasoning of the High Court in upholding Rule 8.
• Sanjay Agarwal v State of U P: The Court concurred with the reasoning of the High Court in upholding Rule 12.
• Delhi Transport Corporation v DTC Mazdoor Congress [(1991) Supp. 1 SCC 600]: The Court distinguished this case and did not find a violation of Articles 14 and 16.
• Malik Mazhar Sultan v U.P Public Service Commission [(2008) 17 SCC 703]: The Court clarified that the directions in this case do not override existing recruitment rules or create a right to age relaxation.
• Dr Ami Lal Bhat v State of Rajasthan and Others [(1997) 6 SCC 614]: The Court relied on this case to support the principle that fixing cut-off dates is within the discretion of the rule-making authority.
• State of Bihar v Ramjee Prasad [(1990) 3 SCC 368]: The Court cited this case to support the principle that the choice of a cut-off date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical.
• Union of India v Sudheer Kumar Jaiswal [(1994) 4 SCC 212]: The Court cited this case to support the principle that the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide of any reasonable mark.
• Union of India v Shivbachan Rai [(2001) 9 SCC 356]: The Court cited this case to support the principle that prescribing age limits and relaxations are matters of policy.
• Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v Ramesh Chandra Agarwal [(2009) 3 SCC 35]: The Court cited this case to support the principle that the State is entitled to fix a cut-off date, which can be struck down only when it is arbitrary.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the principle that fixing cut-off dates and age limits for recruitment is a matter of policy and is within the discretion of the rule-making authority. The Court emphasized that such decisions can only be struck down if they are manifestly arbitrary or without any rational basis. The Court also recognized that while cut-off dates may lead to some individual hardship, this does not make the cut-off date arbitrary unless it is wholly unreasonable. The Court also noted that the directions issued in Malik Mazhar Sultan (supra) were intended to address the issue of vacancies in the district judiciary and do not override the prevailing rules which govern selections to the HJS in the States and the Union Territories.

Fact:Law Ratio

Logical Reasoning

Key Takeaways

• The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Rules 8 and 12 of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975.
• The Court affirmed that setting cut-off dates and age limits for recruitment is a matter of policy and within the discretion of the rule-making authority.
• The Court clarified that the directions in Malik Mazhar Sultan (supra) do not create a vested right for candidates to claim age relaxation.
• The Court emphasized that cut-off dates can only be struck down if they are manifestly arbitrary or without any rational basis.
• The judgment reinforces the principle that individual hardship does not invalidate cut-off dates unless they are wholly unreasonable.

Directions

The Supreme Court did not issue any specific directions in this case. The writ petitions and civil appeal were dismissed.

Development of Law

Ratio Decidendi: The ratio decidendi of this case is that the determination of cut-off dates and age limits for recruitment is within the discretion of the rule-making authority and can only be struck down if manifestly arbitrary or without any rational basis. The Court also clarified that the directions in Malik Mazhar Sultan (supra) do not create a vested right for candidates to claim age relaxation, and that individual hardship does not invalidate cut-off dates unless they are wholly unreasonable.

Change in Previous Positions of Law: This case does not establish a new legal principle but reinforces existing principles regarding the discretion of rule-making authorities in setting cut-off dates and age limits. It clarifies that the directions in Malik Mazhar Sultan (supra) do not override existing recruitment rules and that individual hardship does not invalidate cut-off dates unless they are wholly unreasonable.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petitions and civil appeal, upholding the constitutional validity of Rules 8 and 12 of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975. The Court emphasized that setting cut-off dates and age limits for recruitment is within the discretion of the rule-making authority and can only be struck down if manifestly arbitrary or without any rational basis. The judgment provides clarity on the application of recruitment rules and reinforces the principle that individual hardship does not invalidate cut-off dates unless they are wholly unreasonable.

Category

Parent Category: Service Law

Child Categories:

• Recruitment Rules
• Age Limits
• Cut-off Dates
• Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975
• Rule 8, Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975
• Rule 12, Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975

FAQ

Q: Can a candidate claim age relaxation if the recruitment process is delayed?

A: No, the Supreme Court has clarified that delays in the recruitment process do not automatically grant candidates a right to age relaxation. The age criteria are determined by the rules in place at the time of the recruitment advertisement.

Q: What is the significance of the cut-off date in recruitment?

A: The cut-off date is a specific date set by the recruiting authority to determine whether a candidate meets the eligibility criteria, such as age or experience. The Supreme Court has held that setting cut-off dates is a matter of policy and is within the discretion of the rule-making authority.

Q: Can a court interfere with the cut-off dates set by recruiting authorities?

A: A court can only interfere with cut-off dates if they are found to be manifestly arbitrary, without any rational basis, or wholly unreasonable. The court cannot interfere simply because a different cut-off date might be more favorable to some candidates.

Q: What does this judgment mean for future recruitment processes?

A: This judgment reinforces the principle that recruiting authorities have the discretion to set cut-off dates and age limits. It emphasizes that candidates must meet the criteria set by the rules at the time of the recruitment advertisement and that delays in the process do not automatically grant a right to age relaxation.