Date of the Judgment: 19 January 2021
Citation: (2021) INSC 19
Judges: Rohinton Fali Nariman, Navin Sinha, and K.M. Joseph, JJ.
Can a group of homebuyers be required to meet a threshold before initiating insolvency proceedings against a builder? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question while examining the validity of amendments to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016. This judgment has significant implications for financial creditors, particularly homebuyers and lenders in real estate projects.
Case Background
The case involves a batch of writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, challenging the constitutional validity of certain amendments to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016. The primary challenge was directed against Sections 3, 4 and 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act 2020, which introduced new thresholds for certain financial creditors, especially homebuyers and lenders in real estate projects, seeking to initiate the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).
The petitioners, primarily allottees in real estate projects, argued that the amendments imposed unreasonable restrictions on their right to initiate CIRP, specifically the requirement for a minimum number of allottees to file an application. Additionally, they challenged Section 32A, which provides immunity to corporate debtors from certain liabilities.
Timeline
Date | Event |
---|---|
2016 | Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code enacted. |
2017 | Provisions of the Code enforced. |
2018 | Explanation to Section 5(8)(f) of IBC inserted, recognizing homebuyers as financial creditors. |
06.06.2018 | Section 12A and 25A inserted in the Code. |
16.08.2019 | Provisos added to Section 12 of the Code. |
28.12.2019 | Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020, comes into force, introducing the impugned provisos. |
19.01.2021 | Supreme Court delivers judgment upholding the amendments. |
Legal Framework
The judgment primarily deals with the interpretation and validity of the following sections of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, as amended:
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Section 7(1): This section deals with the initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process by a financial creditor. The amendment introduced three provisos to this section, imposing a threshold for certain classes of financial creditors, particularly allottees under a real estate project. The provisos state:
- “Provided that for the financial creditors, referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (6A) of section 21, an application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against the corporate debtor shall be filed jointly by not less than one hundred of such creditors in the same class or not less than ten per cent. of the total number of such creditors in the same class, whichever is less:”
- “Provided further that for financial creditors who are allottees under a real estate project, an application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against the corporate debtor shall be filed jointly by not less than one hundred of such allottees under the same real estate project or not less than ten per cent. of the total number of such allottees under the same real estate project, whichever is less:”
- “Provided also that where an application for initiating the corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor has been filed by a financial creditor referred to in the first and second provisos and has not been admitted by the Adjudicating Authority before the commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020, such application shall be modified to comply with the requirements of the first or second proviso within thirty days of the commencement of the said Act, failing which the application shall be deemed to be withdrawn before its admission.”
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Section 11: This section lists persons not entitled to make an application to initiate CIRP. The amendment added Explanation II, clarifying that nothing in this section prevents a corporate debtor from initiating CIRP against another corporate debtor.
- “Explanation II. – For the purposes of this section, it is hereby clarified that nothing in this section shall prevent a corporate debtor referred to in clauses (a) to (d) from initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against another corporate debtor.”
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Section 32A: This newly inserted section provides immunity to a corporate debtor from certain liabilities and prosecutions for offenses committed prior to the commencement of the CIRP, subject to specific conditions.
- “32A. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code or any other law for the time being in force, the liability of a corporate debtor for an offence committed prior to the commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process shall cease, and the corporate debtor shall not be prosecuted for such an offence from the date the resolution plan has been approved by the Adjudicating Authority under section 31, if the resolution plan results in the change in the management or control of the corporate debtor to a person who was not— (a) a promoter or in the management or control of the corporate debtor or a related party of such a person; or (b) a person with regard to whom the relevant investigating authority has, on the basis of material in its possession, reason to believe that he had abetted or conspired for the commission of the offence, and has submitted or filed a report or a complaint to the relevant statutory authority or Court:
Arguments
The petitioners advanced several arguments against the amendments, primarily focusing on the following points:
- Discrimination: The amendments create a hostile discrimination between financial creditors, particularly homebuyers, and other financial and operational creditors by imposing a threshold requirement that is not applicable to others.
- Arbitrariness: The threshold requirement is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, and excessive, making it practically impossible for individual allottees to initiate CIRP due to the lack of accessible information and the difficulty in organizing a group of 100 allottees from the same project.
- Retrospectivity: The third proviso to Section 7(1) operates retrospectively, taking away the vested rights of those who had already filed applications under the unamended law.
- Violation of Constitutional Rights: The amendments violate Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 21, and 300A of the Constitution by infringing upon the rights to equality, freedom of trade, life, and property.
- Unworkability: The practical difficulties in meeting the threshold requirements, such as the lack of a mechanism to obtain information about other allottees and the differing dates of default, make the amended law unworkable.
- Section 32A: Section 32A was challenged for granting immunity to corporate debtors and their assets from criminal liabilities, thereby undermining the rights of creditors and the objectives of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
The respondents, on the other hand, defended the amendments, arguing that:
- Reasonable Classification: The amendments are a reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia, distinguishing allottees and debenture holders from other financial creditors due to their numerosity, heterogeneity, and lack of expertise in financial decision-making.
- Rational Nexus: The classification has a rational nexus with the objects of the Code, which include preventing abuse of the process, streamlining the CIRP, and ensuring a more effective and time-bound resolution process.
- No Vested Right: The right to file an application under Section 7 is a statutory right and can be conditioned. The third proviso does not affect any vested rights as no right accrues until the application is admitted.
- Workability: The amendments are workable, and the necessary information to comply with the threshold requirements is available through RERA and the Companies Act.
- Public Interest: The amendments are in the public interest as they prevent misuse of the Code by a few individuals and protect the interests of the larger group of stakeholders.
Submission | Petitioner’s Argument | Respondent’s Argument |
---|---|---|
Threshold Requirement | Discriminatory and arbitrary, making it difficult for individual homebuyers to initiate CIRP. | Reasonable classification based on numerosity and heterogeneity; prevents misuse of the Code. |
Retrospectivity | Third proviso takes away vested rights of those who filed applications before the amendment. | No vested right accrues until admission of application; proviso protects collective interests. |
Section 32A | Grants undue immunity to corporate debtors and undermines the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. | Provides a clean break for resolution applicants and encourages participation in the CIRP. |
Workability | Impractical due to lack of information and logistical difficulties in organizing a large group of allottees. | Information is available through RERA and the Companies Act; the threshold is a procedural requirement. |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following key issues for consideration:
- Whether the amendments to Section 7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, particularly the second proviso, are constitutionally valid, especially concerning the threshold requirements for allottees under real estate projects to initiate CIRP.
- Whether the third proviso to Section 7(1) is valid, particularly regarding its retrospective application and the deemed withdrawal of applications not complying with the threshold requirements.
- Whether the insertion of Explanation II to Section 11 of the Code is valid and whether it can be applied retrospectively.
- Whether Section 32A of the Code is constitutionally valid and whether it provides undue immunity to corporate debtors and their assets.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues
Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reason |
---|---|---|
Validity of threshold requirements for allottees under Section 7(1). | Upheld | The classification is reasonable, based on intelligible differentia (numerosity, heterogeneity) and has a rational nexus with the objects of the Code. |
Validity of the third proviso to Section 7(1). | Upheld with Directions | While the proviso has retrospective effect, it is not manifestly arbitrary. The Court directed that the authorities shall condone the delay in filing fresh applications to comply with the threshold requirement. |
Validity of Explanation II to Section 11. | Upheld | The explanation is clarificatory and does not violate any constitutional provision. It is intended to prevent abuse of the Code. |
Validity of Section 32A. | Upheld | The provision is a policy decision to provide a clean slate to resolution applicants and is subject to ample safeguards. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following cases and legal provisions:
Authority | Type | How it was used |
---|---|---|
Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 8 SCC 416 | Case | Discussed and distinguished; the Court clarified that the present amendments do not contradict the principles laid down in this case. |
Ameerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum (1953) SCR 404 | Case | Cited to explain reasonable classification under Article 14. |
State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa (1974) 1 SCC 19 | Case | Cited to explain reasonable classification under Article 14. |
Murthy Match Works v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise (1974) 4 SCC 428 | Case | Cited to explain reasonable classification under Article 14. |
Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 127 | Case | Cited to explain reasonable classification under Article 14. |
Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 4 SCC 34 | Case | Cited to explain reasonable classification under Article 14. |
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp.(3) SCC 217 | Case | Cited to explain reasonable classification under Article 14. |
Lord Krishna Sugar Mills v. Union of India (1960) 1 SCR 39 | Case | Cited to explain reasonable classification under Article 14. |
State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310 | Case | Cited to explain reasonable classification under Article 14. |
State of West Bengal v. Rash Behari Sarkar (1993) 1 SCC 479 | Case | Cited to explain reasonable classification under Article 14. |
State of Kerala v. Aravind Ramakant Modawdakar (1999) 7 SCC 400 | Case | Cited to explain reasonable classification under Article 14. |
Sansar Chand Atri v. State of Punjab (2002) 4 SCC 154 | Case | Distinguished; the Court held that it does not apply to the present case as there is a rational basis for creating a sub-class. |
Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. (1985) 4 SCC 369 | Case | Cited to explain that there can be no estoppel against the Legislature. |
K. Nagaraj v. State of A.P. (1985) 1 SCC 523 | Case | Cited to state that malice does not furnish a ground to attack a plenary law. |
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Narain Singh (2009) 13 SCC 165 | Case | Cited to state that malice does not furnish a ground to attack a plenary law. |
Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corp. of the City of Ahmedabad (1999) 4 SCC 468 | Case | Cited to state that the right to file an application under Section 7 is a statutory right and can be conditioned. |
Howrah Municipal Corp v. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC 663 | Case | Cited to explain that mere right to take advantage of a statute is not a vested right. |
Arcelormittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta (2019) 2 SCC 1 | Case | Cited to explain that mere right to take advantage of a statute is not a vested right. |
Swiss Ribbons Private Limited v. Union of India (2019) 4 SCC 17 | Case | Cited to explain that mere right to take advantage of a statute is not a vested right. |
Karnail Kaur v. State of Punjab (2015) 3 SCC 206 | Case | Cited to explain that mere right to take advantage of a statute is not a vested right. |
Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta (2019) SCCONLINE SC 1478 | Case | Cited to explain that mere right to take advantage of a statute is not a vested right. |
Director of Public Works v. Ho Po Sang [1961]3 WLR 39 | Case | Cited to explain that mere right to take advantage of a statute is not a vested right. |
M.S. Shivananda v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (1980) 1 SCC 149 | Case | Cited to explain that mere right to take advantage of a statute is not a vested right. |
Lalji Raja and Sons v. Hansraj Nathuram (1971) 1 SCC 721 | Case | Cited to explain that mere right to take advantage of a statute is not a vested right. |
Kanaya Ram v. Rajender Kumar (1985) 1 SCC 436 | Case | Cited to explain that mere right to take advantage of a statute is not a vested right. |
J.P. Srivastava & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. (2005) 1 SCC 172 | Case | Cited to explain that a minimum threshold is a common feature of class action litigation. |
Anjum Hussain v. Intellicity Business Park Private Limited (2019) 6 SCC 519 | Case | Cited to explain that a minimum threshold is a common feature of class action litigation. |
Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry AIR 1957 SC 540 / 1957 SCR 488 | Case | Cited to explain that even a vested right can be taken away by the Legislature. |
Thirumalai Chemicals Limited v. Union of India (2011) 6 SCC 739 | Case | Cited to explain that a proviso cannot override the main provision. |
Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Pal Singh (2018) 14 SCC 161 | Case | Cited to explain that a proviso cannot override the main provision. |
State of Karnataka v. Karnataka Pawn Brokers Association (2018) 6 SCC 363 | Case | Cited to explain that an amendment has been engrafted without removing the premise on which Pioneer was decided. |
Vasant Ganpat Padvave v. Anant Mahadev Sawant 2019 (12) SCALE 572 | Case | Cited to explain that the law must be considered having regard to consequences it produces. |
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 | Case | Cited to explain that a law falls foul of Article 14 if it is found to be vague. |
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1 | Case | Cited to explain that a law falls foul of Article 14 if it is found to be manifestly arbitrary. |
Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39 | Case | Cited to explain that a law falls foul of Article 14 if it is found to be manifestly arbitrary. |
Justice K.S. Puttuswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 | Case | Cited to explain that a law falls foul of Article 14 if it is found to be manifestly arbitrary. |
Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 2020 SC 122 | Case | Cited to explain that a law falls foul of Article 14 if it is found to be manifestly arbitrary. |
Innoventive Industries Limited v. ICICI Bank (2018) 1 SCC 407 | Case | Cited to explain the working of the Code. |
B.K. Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates (2019) 11 SCC 633 | Case | Cited to explain the applicability of the Limitation Act to the Code. |
Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta (2019) SCCONLINE SC 1478 | Case | Cited to explain the time limit for the CIRP. |
S. Sundaram Pillai v. R. Pattabiraman (1985) 1 SCC 591 | Case | Cited to explain the scope of an Explanation. |
Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P. (1981) 2 SCC 585 | Case | Cited to explain the scope of an Explanation. |
Virtual Soft Systems Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi -I (2007) 9 SCC 665 | Case | Cited to explain the scope of an Explanation. |
Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. A. Nageshwara Rao AIR 1956 SC 213 / 1957 SCR 488 | Case | Cited to explain that the validity of a petition must be judged on the facts as they were at the time of its presentation. |
Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2019) 9 SCC 304 | Case | Cited to explain that the object itself cannot be discriminatory. |
Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1 | Case | Cited to explain that a law falls foul of Article 14 if it is found to be manifestly arbitrary. |
Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of U.P. (1973) 1 SCC 216 | Case | Cited to explain that an Explanation can widen the scope of a main provision. |
Gopeshwar Pal v. Jiban Chandra Chandra AIR 1914 Calcutta 806 | Case | Cited to explain that a right to sue is a vested right. |
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra (1975) 2 SCC 840 | Case | Cited to explain that a vested right of action exists, but not a vested right of forum. |
V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal (1979) 4 SCC 214 | Case | Cited to explain that a notice to quit is not necessary in all cases. |
D. C. Bhatia v. Union of India (1995) 1 SCC 104 | Case | Cited to explain that a mere right to take advantage of a statute is not a vested right. |
Mst. Bibi Sayeeda v. State of Bihar (1996) 9 SCC 516 | Case | Cited to define the word “vested”. |
State Bank’s Staff Union v. Union of India AIR 2005 SC 3446 / (2005) 7 SCC 584 | Case | Cited to explain that vested rights can be taken away by the legislature. |
West v. Gwynne (1910) WLR 976 | Case | Cited to explain that retrospective operation is one matter, interference with existing rights is another. |
L’Office Cherifien Des Phosphates and another And Yamashita -Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. (1994) 1 AllER 20 | Case | Cited to explain the principle of fairness in retrospective laws. |
Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (1991) Suppl.(1) SCC 600 | Case | Cited to explain the principle of reading down a statute. |
Vijay v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 6 SCC 289 | Case | Cited to explain that a right created by a statute can be taken away by a statute. |
Abbott v. Minister for Lands (1895) AC 425 | Case | Cited to explain that a mere right to take advantage of a statute is not a vested right. |
Hamilton Gell v. White (1922) 2 K.B. 422 | Case | Cited to explain that a mere right to take advantage of a statute is not a vested right. |
Ogden Industries Pty. Ltd. v. Haider Doreen Lucas (1969) (1) All England Reports 121 | Case | Cited to explain that a mere right to take advantage of a statute is not a vested right. |
In Re: Pulborough Parish School Board Election, Bourke v. Nutt (1894) 1 QB 725 | Case | Cited to explain that a proviso cannot override the main provision. |
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 | Statute | Discussed in the context of saving clauses and accrued rights. |
Section 11 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 | Statute | Discussed in the context of persons not entitled to make an application. |
Section 12 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 | Statute | Discussed in the context of time limits for completion of insolvency resolution process. |
Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 | Statute | Discussed in the context of moratorium. |
Section 17 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 | Statute | Discussed in the context of management of affairs of corporate debtor by interim resolution professional. |
Section 21 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 | Statute | Discussed in the context of committee of creditors. |
Section 25A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 | Statute | Discussed in the context of rights and duties of authorized representative of financial creditors. |
Section 30 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 | Statute | Discussed in the context of submission of resolution plan. |
Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 | Statute | Discussed in the context of approval of resolution plan. |
Section 33 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 | Statute | Discussed in the context of liquidation order. |
Section 4 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 | Statute | Discussed in the context of minimum amount of default. |
Section 5(8)(f) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 | Statute | Discussed in the context of definition of financial debt. |
Article 14 of the Constitution of India | Constitutional Provision | Discussed in the context of equality before law and equal protection of laws. |
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India | Constitutional Provision | Discussed in the context of freedom to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. |
Article 21 of the Constitution of India | Constitutional Provision | Discussed in the context of protection of life and personal liberty. |
Article 300A of the Constitution of India | Constitutional Provision | Discussed in the context of right to property. |
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 | Statute | Discussed in the context of criminal liabilities. |
Ratio Decidendi
The core legal principles established by the Supreme Court in this judgment are:
- Reasonable Classification: The amendments to Section 7(1) of the IBC, which impose a threshold for certain classes of financial creditors, particularly homebuyers, are a reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia and have a rational nexus with the objects of the Code. The Court held that the classification is not arbitrary or discriminatory.
- Retrospective Operation: The third proviso to Section 7(1), which has a retrospective effect, is valid but the court directed that the authorities shall condone the delay in filing fresh applications to comply with the threshold requirement.
- Statutory Right: The right to file an application under Section 7 is a statutory right and can be conditioned by the legislature. No vested right accrues until the application is admitted.
- Section 32A’s Validity: Section 32A is valid as it is a policy decision to provide a clean slate to resolution applicants and is subject to ample safeguards. The immunity granted is not absolute and is subject to specific conditions.
- Explanation II to Section 11: The insertion of Explanation II to Section 11 is clarificatory and does not violate any constitutional provision. It is intended to prevent abuse of the Code.
Obiter Dicta
The Supreme Court made several obiter dicta observations, including:
- The amendments are intended to streamline the CIRP and prevent its abuse by a few individuals, thereby protecting the interests of the larger group of stakeholders.
- The court clarified that the amendments do not contradict the principles laid down in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 8 SCC 416.
- The court emphasized the importance of a time-bound resolution process and the need to prevent delays in the CIRP.
- The court acknowledged the practical difficulties faced by homebuyers in meeting the threshold requirements but clarified that the necessary information is available through RERA and the Companies Act.
- The court highlighted that the amendments are a policy decision and are subject to judicial review only on limited grounds.
Implications
The Supreme Court’s judgment has significant implications for various stakeholders:
- Homebuyers: The judgment upholds the threshold requirements, making it more challenging for individual homebuyers to initiate CIRP. They must now organize themselves into a group of 100 or 10% of the total allottees to file an application. However, the court’s direction to condone delays in filing fresh applications to comply with the threshold requirement provides some relief.
- Real Estate Developers: The judgment provides clarity and stability to the real estate sector by preventing frivolous applications and ensuring a more organized resolution process. The immunity granted under Section 32A encourages participation in the CIRP.
- Financial Creditors: The judgment clarifies the distinction between different classes of financial creditors and the conditions for initiating CIRP. It provides a framework for a more efficient and time-bound resolution process.
- Lenders: The judgment gives more clarity on the process of insolvency resolution, which will help lenders in real estate projects to better assess the risk and manage their portfolios.
- Insolvency Professionals: The judgment emphasizes the need for a time-bound resolution process and the importance of adhering to the provisions of the Code.
- Adjudicating Authority: The judgment provides guidance on the interpretation of the amended provisions and the need to ensure a fair and efficient resolution process.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Manish Kumar v. Union of India is a landmark decision that upholds the validity of the amendments to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The court has clarified the position regarding the threshold requirements for certain financial creditors, particularly homebuyers, and has provided a framework for a more organized and efficient resolution process. While the judgment may pose challenges for individual homebuyers, it provides stability and clarity to the real estate sector and ensures that the objectives of the Code are met. The decision balances the interests of various stakeholders and promotes a more effective and time-bound resolution process.
Flowchart of CIRP Initiation by Homebuyers
