Supreme Court Upholds Concurrent Findings in Land Dispute: Kirpa Ram vs. Surendra Deo Gaur (2020)

Date of the Judgment: November 16, 2020

Citation: Not Available

Judges: L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta, Ajay Rastogi, JJ.

Can a civil court hear a case about land ownership when the defendant claims the land belongs to a different village? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a case involving a dispute over land in Delhi. The Court had to decide if the lower courts were correct in their findings and whether the High Court should have framed specific legal questions before dismissing an appeal. The bench comprised Justices L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta, and Ajay Rastogi, with the judgment authored by Justice Hemant Gupta.

Case Background

The case began with a suit filed by Surendra Deo Gaur and others (the plaintiffs) on July 31, 1971, seeking a permanent injunction. They claimed ownership and possession of land identified as Khasra No. 238, located in Village Basai Darapur, Delhi. Previously, the plaintiffs had won a case on October 7, 1960, declaring them the owners of the same land, and an attempt by the Union of India to overturn this decree was dismissed on May 24, 1968. The plaintiffs filed the injunction suit because they felt threatened by Defendant No. 1, who claimed the land was part of their allotment.

Defendant No. 4, Kirpa Ram (now deceased and represented by the appellants), contested the plaintiffs’ claim, asserting that the land was not part of Khasra No. 238 in Village Basai Darapur but was actually Khasra No. 79 in Village Shakarpur. This dispute led to the filing of the suit for a permanent injunction.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, stating that the land was indeed part of Khasra No. 238 in Village Basai Darapur and that the plaintiffs were in possession. The first appellate court upheld this decision, finding that Defendant No. 4 had not proven possession of Khasra No. 79 in Village Shakarpur. Defendant No. 4 then filed a second appeal in the High Court, which was also dismissed. The High Court did not frame any substantial question of law before dismissing the appeal.

Legal Framework

The case references several legal provisions. Section 85 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, is mentioned in the context of barring civil court jurisdiction over Bhumidari land. However, the court notes that the suit was for a simple injunction, not a dispute over Bhumidari rights. The court also discusses Section 28 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954, which deals with boundary disputes between revenue estates, and Section 83 of the same Act, which lists matters where civil court jurisdiction is barred. The Supreme Court also refers to Section 9 and Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 9 of the Code states that civil courts have jurisdiction over all disputes unless expressly or impliedly barred. Section 100 of the Code outlines the process for second appeals to the High Court, requiring a substantial question of law to be involved.

The court also considered the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium, which means “where there is a right, there is a remedy.” This principle underscores the idea that civil courts should be accessible to those seeking redress for grievances.

Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

“100. Second appeal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte.
(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.
(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.”

Arguments

Arguments by the Appellants (Defendant No. 4):

• The primary argument was that the High Court should have framed substantial questions of law before dismissing the second appeal. They contended that the High Court’s failure to do so was a violation of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
• The appellants argued that the first appellate court had ordered that the issue of jurisdiction of the civil court would be decided first but the appeal was decided without dealing with the said issue.
• The appellants also argued that the first appellate court did not decide their application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for permission to lead additional evidence.
• It was argued that the dispute was essentially a boundary dispute between Village Basai Darapur and Village Shakarpur, which should be resolved by the Commissioner under Section 28 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954, and not by a civil court.

Arguments by the Respondents (Plaintiffs):

• The respondents argued that the suit was a simple suit for injunction based on possession, which is within the jurisdiction of the civil court.
• They contended that the Land Revenue Act does not bar the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of boundary disputes between private parties.
• The respondents maintained that the issue of jurisdiction was a legal issue and could be decided while hearing the entire appeal.
• They argued that the additional evidence sought by the appellants was not relevant to the case.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues, but the core issues addressed were:

1. Whether the High Court was required to frame substantial questions of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, before dismissing the second appeal.
2. Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to hear the suit for injunction, given that the appellants claimed the land was part of a different revenue estate.
3. Whether the first appellate court was right in not deciding the application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for additional evidence.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court cited South Delhi Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Today Homes and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. etc. [2019 SCC OnLine SC 1052]* to emphasize the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium and the plenary jurisdiction of civil courts unless expressly or impliedly barred.
• The Court distinguished Md. Mohammad Ali (dead) by LRs v. Jagadish Kalita & Ors. [(2004) 1 SCC 271]*, noting that it involved the High Court setting aside the findings of the First Appellate Court without framing substantial questions of law, unlike the present case.
• The Court noted that Hubli Dharwar Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. H.S. Mohd. Khan (dead) by LRs. & Ors. [(2002) 2 SCC 109]*, Madhavan Nair v. Ramankutty & Anr. [(2000) 2 SCC 356]*, N. Venkatareddy & Ors. v. Gopal & Ors. [(2000) 10 SCC 309]*, Chandragouda & Anr. v. Shekharagouda S. Pittanagoudar (dead) by LRs. & Ors. [(2000) 10 SCC 617]*, and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait & Ors. [(1997) 5 SCC 438]* were all cases where the High Court had set aside the findings of the First Appellate Court without framing substantial questions of law, unlike the present case.
• The Court cited Ashok Rangnath Magar v. Shrikant Govindrao Sangvikar [(2015) 16 SCC 763]* to support its view that a second appeal can be dismissed without even formulating a substantial question of law.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the fact that the suit was a simple suit for injunction based on possession, which falls under the jurisdiction of the civil court. The Court emphasized that the Land Revenue Act does not bar civil court jurisdiction in such cases. The Court also noted that the issue of jurisdiction was a legal issue and could be decided while hearing the entire appeal and that the additional evidence sought was not relevant to the plea raised by the appellant. The Court also relied on the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium, which supports the idea that civil courts should be accessible to those seeking redress for grievances.

The Court also emphasized that the High Court is not obligated to frame a substantial question of law if it finds no error in the findings of the First Appellate Court.

Logical Reasoning:

The Court considered alternative interpretations but rejected them because they were not supported by the relevant laws and facts. The Court emphasized the importance of the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium, stating that civil courts should be accessible to those seeking redress for grievances. The Court also relied on previous judgments to support its view that a second appeal can be dismissed without even formulating a substantial question of law.

The Supreme Court’s decision was based on a careful analysis of the facts, the relevant legal provisions, and the arguments of the parties. The Court’s reasoning was clear and concise, and it provided a well-reasoned explanation for its decision.

“The trial court had also not treated issue No. 2 relating to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as a preliminary issue. Therefore, it cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused to the appellants by not deciding the issue of jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the first instance by the First Appellate Court.”

“The Land Revenue Act does not expressly bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of boundary disputes. The boundary disputes are between two revenue estates and does not include the demarcation of the land of the parties.”

“If the High Court is satisfied that such substantial question of law is involved, it is required to formulate that question. The appeal has to be heard on the question so formulated. However, the Court has the power to hear appeal on any other substantial question of law on satisfaction of the conditions laid down in the proviso of Section 100 of the Code.”

Key Takeaways

• Civil courts have jurisdiction over suits for injunction based on possession, even if the defendant claims the land belongs to a different revenue estate.
• The Land Revenue Act does not bar the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of boundary disputes between private parties.
• The High Court is not obligated to frame substantial questions of law if it finds no error in the findings of the First Appellate Court.
• Additional evidence can be rejected if it is not relevant to the case.

Directions

No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a civil court has the jurisdiction to entertain a suit for injunction based on possession even if the defendant claims that the land belongs to a different revenue estate. The court reiterated that the High Court is not obligated to frame a substantial question of law if it finds no error in the findings of the First Appellate Court. This case clarifies the scope of civil court jurisdiction in land disputes and the procedure for second appeals in the High Court.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court held that the High Court was not required to frame substantial questions of law before dismissing the second appeal. The Court also reiterated that civil courts have jurisdiction over suits for injunction based on possession, and the Land Revenue Act does not bar such jurisdiction. This judgment reinforces the principle that civil courts have plenary jurisdiction to entertain all disputes unless expressly or impliedly barred.