Supreme Court Upholds Concurrent Findings of Fact in Property Dispute: Avtar Singh vs. Bimla Devi (29 September 2021)

Date of the Judgment: 29 September 2021

Citation: Civil Appeal No. OF 2021 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 35655 of 2016)

Judges: K.M. Joseph, J., S. Ravindra Bhat, J.

Can a High Court overturn the factual findings of lower courts in a property dispute? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case involving a contested “chaubara” (a room on the roof) in a property dispute. The core issue revolved around whether the High Court was correct in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the first appellate court. The Supreme Court bench, comprising Justices K.M. Joseph and S. Ravindra Bhat, delivered the judgment, with Justice Bhat authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The dispute concerns a property located at GT Road, Shahabad Markanda. The property, marked ‘ABCD’ in the site plan, was purchased in the name of Girdhari Lal. The plaintiffs, Bimla Devi and her husband Rajpal, claimed that the property was part of a joint family holding. They asserted that Girdhari Lal, Rajpal’s brother, agreed to sell a portion of the property marked ‘GFEDCB’ along with the first-floor roof of the entire building to Bimla Devi for ₹2500 in 1961. It was alleged that Girdhari Lal received the sum and agreed to execute the sale deed when required, also handing over possession to Rajpal. They further claimed that in 1978, Bimla Devi purchased another portion of the property marked ‘IHDA’. The plaintiffs stated that they demolished the existing structure and built a residential house on the portion marked ‘OJHC’ and reconstructed the shops marked ‘GFOB’ and ‘IJEA’. They also constructed a residential house on the first floor, including the portion purchased in 1978, and the Market Committee assessed the portion marked ‘OJHC’ as a separate unit in Bimla Devi’s name.

The plaintiffs alleged that on 05.03.2000, Defendants 2 to 4 illegally broke the lintel portion of the roof and secretly constructed a staircase in the portion marked ‘AEFG’ to take forcible possession of the first floor of the building.

Girdhari Lal denied the claims, stating that the property was purchased with his own funds and not part of any joint family. He denied any agreement to sell to Rajpal or receiving any consideration. Girdhari Lal claimed that he sold the shop marked ‘AGFE’ to the second defendant, Avtar Singh, by a registered sale deed dated 06.08.1999, along with the first floor of the shop. Avtar Singh claimed that he had been in possession of the property since then.

Defendants 2 to 4, in a joint written statement, supported Girdhari Lal’s claims, stating that Avtar Singh purchased the shop along with the “chaubara” (a room surrounded by door/windows on all four sides) on the roof for ₹3 lakhs by a sale deed dated 06.08.1999. They also alleged that Avtar Singh was a tenant in the shop for over 30 years before the purchase.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The trial court and the first appellate court dismissed the suit after considering the evidence, including a local commissioner’s report. The High Court, in a second appeal, framed a substantial question of law regarding the possession of the “chaubara” and whether the lower courts had ignored material evidence. The High Court answered the question in favor of the plaintiffs, Bimla Devi and Rajpal, and allowed the second appeal, leading to a decree in their favor.

Legal Framework

The High Court framed a substantial question of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), which deals with second appeals to the High Court. The section allows for appeals on substantial questions of law. The Supreme Court also discussed Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, which governs second appeals in Punjab and Haryana. The court noted that Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, was not a law made by the Legislature of a State after the Constitution of India came into force. It was a law made by a Provincial Legislature under Section 80A of the Government of India Act, 1915, which was continued by Section 292 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and then by Article 372(1) of the Constitution of India.

Arguments

Appellants’ (Defendants’) Arguments:

• The appellants argued that the High Court erred in overturning concurrent findings of fact based on a misappreciation of evidence.
• They contended that the substantial question of law framed by the High Court did not fall within the scope of Section 100 of the CPC.
• They highlighted that the trial court and the district court had correctly appreciated the evidence, including the registered sale deed dated 06.08.1999 (Ex.D-1), which stated that the “chaubara” was part of the property purchased by Avtar Singh.
• The appellants emphasized that the plaintiffs’ claim of a prior agreement to sell was not supported by any evidence and was introduced only during the trial.
• They argued that the High Court ignored the fact that the plaintiffs had admitted to Avtar Singh’s tenancy prior to the execution of Ex.D-1.
• They submitted that the lower courts correctly gave importance to the registered document (Ex.D-1) and its contents.

Respondents’ (Plaintiffs’) Arguments:

• The respondents argued that they were given possession of the property after the agreement to sell in 1978.
• They contended that they had reconstructed portions of the property and that the dimensions of the “chaubara” were different from what was alleged by the appellants.
• They drew attention to the Local Commissioner’s report, which supported their claim that a staircase was under construction and that holes had been drilled in the lintels.
• They submitted that the dimensions of the “chaubara” found by the Local Commissioner were in accordance with their claims.
• They stated that the allegations in the suit that holes had been drilled on the lintels in order to make separate staircase from within the shop premises (of Avtar Singh) was borne out because the Local Commissioner found such holes.

[TABLE] of Submissions by Parties

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not frame specific issues in this case. However, the core issue was whether the High Court was correct in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts. The High Court framed the following substantial question of law:

• “Whether the findings of the Courts below in regard to claim of the appellants qua their possession of the chobaras on the first floor of the three shops and mandatory injunction to close the holes in the lintel of the shop in occupation of Avtar Singh are the result of ignoring material evidence and misreading of evidence rendering it perverse”.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:

Authorities

Cases Cited by the Court:

• Pankajakshi v. Chandrika [(2016) 6 SCC 157] – Supreme Court of India: This case was cited to establish that Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 continues to be in force and not Section 100 of the CPC. It overruled the previous judgment in Kulwant Kaur v Gurdial Singh Mann.
• Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann [(2001) 4 SCC 262] – Supreme Court of India: This case was expressly overruled by Pankajakshi v. Chandrika. It had held that Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act was inconsistent with Section 100 of the CPC after its amendment in 1976.
• Dhanpat v. Sheo Ram [(2020) 16 SCC 209] – Supreme Court of India: This case reiterated that findings of fact should not be interfered with even under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918.
• Randhir Kaur v. Prithvi Pal Singh [(2019) 17 SCC 71] – Supreme Court of India: This case was cited to delineate the scope for interference in a second appeal under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, stating that findings of fact should not be interfered with.

Legal Provisions Considered by the Court:

• Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC): This section deals with second appeals to the High Court on substantial questions of law.
• Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918: This section governs second appeals in Punjab and Haryana. It was held to be the applicable provision in this case, not Section 100 of CPC.
• Article 372(1) of the Constitution of India: This article was mentioned to show that the Punjab Courts Act was continued as a law in force in the territory of India.

[TABLE] of Authorities and their Treatment by the Court

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Supreme Court relied on Pankajakshi v. Chandrika [(2016) 6 SCC 157]* to establish that Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, and not Section 100 of the CPC, applied to the case. This case overruled Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann [(2001) 4 SCC 262]*.
• The Court followed Dhanpat v. Sheo Ram [(2020) 16 SCC 209]* and Randhir Kaur v. Prithvi Pal Singh [(2019) 17 SCC 71]*, which reiterated that findings of fact should not be interfered with in second appeals under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was heavily influenced by the principle that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts should not be overturned by the High Court unless there is a significant error in law or procedure. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the specific provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, which limits the scope of interference in second appeals. The Court was also influenced by the fact that the High Court had re-appreciated the evidence, which is not permissible under the Act. The Court acknowledged the local commissioner’s report but did not find it sufficient to justify overturning the concurrent findings of fact.

[TABLE] Ranking of Sentiment Analysis of Reasons Given by the Supreme Court

Fact:Law Ratio

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily driven by legal considerations rather than factual disputes. The court focused on the correct application of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 and the limitations on the High Court’s power to interfere with concurrent findings of fact.

Logical Reasoning Flowchart:

The Court reasoned that the High Court’s interference was not justified because it re-appreciated the evidence, which is not permissible under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918. The Court emphasized that mere findings of fact cannot be interfered with in the exercise of second appellate jurisdiction. The Court also noted that the High Court had ignored the limitations on its jurisdiction in second appeals.

The Court considered alternative interpretations but rejected them because they did not align with the legal framework governing second appeals under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918. The decision was reached by applying the established legal principles and precedents concerning the scope of second appellate jurisdiction.

The Court’s decision was unanimous, with both judges agreeing on the outcome. There were no dissenting opinions.

“mere findings of fact cannot be interfered with in exercise of second appellate jurisdiction given the three limbs of jurisdiction available under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act.”

“Findings of fact which are unreasonable, or which are rendered by overlooking the record, therefore, per se do not appear to fall within the scope of second appellate review by the High Court.”

“In these circumstances, the High Court’s findings – which are based entirely on the reappreciation of the record – and consequent interference with the concurrent findings of the lower courts, cannot be upheld.”

The decision has significant implications for future cases, particularly those falling under the jurisdiction of the Punjab and Haryana High Courts. It clarifies the limitations on the High Court’s power to interfere with concurrent findings of fact in second appeals. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts should not re-appreciate evidence unless there is a clear error of law or procedure. The Supreme Court has reinforced the principle that appellate courts should not re-appreciate evidence unless there is a clear error of law or procedure. This ruling also underscores the importance of adhering to the specific provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918.

Key Takeaways

• High Courts should be cautious when overturning concurrent findings of fact by lower courts.
• Second appeals should primarily focus on errors of law or procedure, not on re-appreciation of evidence.
• The specific provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, should be strictly adhered to in cases falling under its jurisdiction.
• The Supreme Court has reinforced the principle that appellate courts should not re-appreciate evidence unless there is a clear error of law or procedure.

Directions

The Supreme Court did not give any specific directions other than setting aside the High Court’s judgment and upholding the findings of the lower courts.

Specific Amendments Analysis

There was no specific amendment discussed in this judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the High Court cannot interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts unless there is a clear error of law or procedure. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, continues to be in force and not Section 100 of the CPC, in the context of second appeals. This judgment has clarified the limits of the High Court’s jurisdiction in second appeals and has reinforced the importance of adhering to the specific provisions of the applicable law. The Court also emphasized that the High Court’s findings should not be based on a re-appreciation of the record.