Supreme Court Upholds Conviction in 1989 Gangrape Case, Addresses Sentencing Discretion: State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Raghubir Singh & Ors. (2024)

Date of the Judgment: 15 May 2024

Citation: 2024 INSC 421

Judges: Abhay S. Oka, J., Ujjal Bhuyan, J.

Can a High Court reduce the minimum sentence prescribed for gang rape under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, based on the age of the case and the circumstances of the accused? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question while reviewing a 1989 gang rape case. The court examined whether the High Court was correct in upholding the conviction of the accused and whether it was justified in awarding a sentence less than the minimum prescribed under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. This case highlights the complexities of balancing justice for victims with considerations of time and the personal circumstances of the accused.

Case Background

The case revolves around an incident that occurred on 8th July 1989, involving the gang rape of the prosecutrix (PW-5). Initially, six accused were prosecuted under Section 376, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The Trial Court acquitted the accused, citing a lack of corroborating evidence of struggle or injury. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla, on 28th March 2008, overturned this acquittal and remanded the case for a retrial on charges of gang rape. After the remand, the case proceeded against five accused, as one had died. The Sessions Court again acquitted the accused on 24th September 2008. The High Court, in a subsequent appeal, convicted the accused under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC but imposed a reduced sentence of three years, citing adequate and special reasons under the proviso to Section 376(2) of the IPC, as it existed before the 2013 amendment.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court initially acquitted the accused due to a lack of corroborating evidence. The High Court, in the first appeal, remanded the case for retrial on gang rape charges. After the remand, the Trial Court again acquitted the accused, citing contradictions and improvements in the prosecutrix’s testimony and her conduct. The High Court, in a subsequent appeal by the State, overturned the acquittal, convicting the accused under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the reduced sentence, while one of the accused, Vijay, also appealed his conviction.

Legal Framework

The case primarily involves the interpretation and application of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), specifically clause (g) of sub-section (2), which deals with gang rape. The relevant provisions of Section 375 and 376 of the IPC are those that were substituted by Act No. 43 of 1983, effective from 25th December 1983. These sections were further substituted by Act No. 13 of 2013, effective from 3rd February 2013. The court considered the version of Section 376 of the IPC as it existed before the 2013 amendment. The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the IPC, as it existed at the time of the offense, allowed the court to impose a sentence of less than ten years for adequate and special reasons. Section 375 of the IPC, at the relevant time, specified that sexual intercourse with a woman who was not less than sixteen years old with consent did not constitute rape.

The relevant part of Section 376 of the IPC as it existed at the time of the offence, reads as follows:

“376 .………………………………………………………
(2)…………………………………………………… ……..
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and
special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment,
impose a sentence of imprisonment of either
description for a term of less than ten years. ”

Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.PC), which allows the court to consider the statements of the accused, was also considered. Sub-section (4) of Section 313 of the Cr.PC provides that the answers given by the accused in his examination under sub-section (1) of Section 313 of the Cr.PC may be taken into consideration in the trial.

Arguments

Accused’s Arguments:

• The accused argued that there were two judgments of acquittal in their favor on the same evidence.
• The High Court, in the first appeal, did not convert the acquittal into a conviction but remanded the case.
• The prosecutrix was more than sixteen years old at the time of the incident, and consensual sex with a woman over sixteen was not an offense under Section 375 of the IPC at the relevant time.
• The prosecutrix willingly accompanied accused Vijay and had an acquaintance with him, who had shown interest in marrying her.
• The prosecutrix had multiple opportunities to raise an alarm but failed to do so.
• The Sessions Court, on two occasions, acquitted the accused after detailed consideration of the evidence, noting contradictions and improvements in her testimony.
• The High Court should not have interfered simply because another view was possible on the same evidence.

State’s Arguments:

• The judgment of the Sessions Court after remand was perverse.
• No reasonable person, after reading the testimony of the prosecutrix, would conclude that the sexual intercourse was with her consent.
• The approach of the Trial Court while dealing with such a serious case of gang rape was entirely uncalled for.
• There was no reason for the High Court to show leniency and let off the accused on a sentence that was less than the minimum prescribed term.
• A minimum prescribed sentence should be awarded by allowing the appeal by the State.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in a separate section. However, the following issues were considered:

1. Whether the High Court was correct in converting the acquittal of the accused into a conviction for the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC.
2. Whether the High Court was justified in imposing a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than ten years, considering the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the IPC as it existed before the 2013 amendment.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

• Manu Sao v. State of Bihar [ (2010) 12 SCC 310 ] – Supreme Court of India: The Court considered the scope of sub-section (4) of Section 313 of the Cr.PC, stating that while the statements of the accused can be used in the trial, it cannot be the sole basis for conviction. The statements must be considered in conjunction with the evidence.
• Vijendrajit Ayodhya Prasad Goel v. State of Bombay [(1953) 1 SCC 434] – Supreme Court of India: The Court held that the statement of the accused under Section 342 of the old Cr.PC (corresponding to Section 313 of the current Cr.PC) can be used to support the prosecution’s case.
• Ajay Singh v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 12 SCC 341] – Supreme Court of India: The court reiterated that the purpose of Section 313 of the Cr.PC is to enable the accused to explain the circumstances against him, and such statements can be considered in judging his guilt or innocence.
• Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat [1951 SCC 1060] – Supreme Court of India: The Court held that the statements of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.PC are important and must be considered at the trial.
• State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [(1996) 2 SCC 384] – Supreme Court of India: The Court discussed the appreciation of testimony of a victim of rape, stating that her testimony is vital and can be relied upon without corroboration unless there are compelling reasons to seek corroboration.
• State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain [(1990) 1 SCC 550] – Supreme Court of India: The Court held that a prosecutrix of a sex offense cannot be put on par with an accomplice and her evidence must receive the same weight as that of an injured witness.

The Court also considered the following legal provisions:

• Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: The Court considered the version of the Section as it existed in 1989, which specified that sexual intercourse with a woman who was not less than sixteen years old with consent did not constitute rape.
• Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: The Court considered the version of the Section as it existed in 1989, which provided a minimum punishment of rigorous imprisonment for ten years but allowed for a lesser sentence for adequate and special reasons.
• Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: The Court considered the provision which allows the court to consider the statements of the accused.

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court:

• Manu Sao v. State of Bihar [(2010) 12 SCC 310]*: The court used this case to clarify that statements under Section 313 of the Cr.PC cannot be the sole basis for conviction but must be considered with other evidence.
• Vijendrajit Ayodhya Prasad Goel v. State of Bombay [(1953) 1 SCC 434]*: The court relied on this case to support the use of accused’s statements under Section 313 of the Cr.PC to support the prosecution’s case.
• Ajay Singh v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 12 SCC 341]*: The court cited this case to reiterate the purpose of Section 313 of the Cr.PC, which is to allow the accused to explain circumstances against him.
• Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat [1951 SCC 1060]*: The court used this case to emphasize the importance of considering the accused’s statements under Section 313 of the Cr.PC.
• State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [(1996) 2 SCC 384]*: The court relied on this case to support the view that a rape victim’s testimony is vital and can be relied upon without corroboration.
• State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain [(1990) 1 SCC 550]*: The court cited this case to support the view that a prosecutrix of a sex offense cannot be treated as an accomplice.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:

• The consistent testimony of the prosecutrix, which was not shaken in cross-examination.
• The inconsistent statements of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.PC, which contradicted their defense of consensual sex.
• The High Court’s finding that the evidence established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
• The special circumstances of the case, including the age of the case (35 years since the incident), the previous acquittals, and the age and family responsibilities of the accused, which justified the reduced sentence.

Fact:Law Ratio

Logical Reasoning:

The court considered the alternative interpretation that the sexual intercourse was consensual, but rejected it based on the prosecutrix’s testimony and the inconsistencies in the accused’s statements. The court also considered the argument that the High Court should not have interfered with the Sessions Court’s acquittal, but found that the High Court’s conclusion was the only possible one based on the evidence.

The Supreme Court’s decision was to uphold the High Court’s judgment, both on conviction and sentencing. The court found that the High Court had correctly appreciated the evidence and had adequate reasons to impose a reduced sentence. The Supreme Court stated that the High Court’s conclusion was the only possible conclusion based on the evidence on record. The court also noted that the High Court had considered the special circumstances of the case, including the passage of time and the personal circumstances of the accused.

The court quoted from the judgment of the High Court, “What was in the back of the mind of the learned judges of the High Court was that they were dealing with an incident that had taken place twenty -eight years back, and, in the meantime , the accused and their families had moved ahead in life. Therefore, the High Court was of the view that there were adequate reasons which warranted the exercise of powers under the proviso.”

The Supreme Court also observed that, “In the facts of the case, enhancement in sentence is not justified nearly 35 years after the incident.”

The Court further stated, “The evidence of the prosecutrix in her examination -in-chief that the accused committed sexual intercourse with her has not been shaken.”

Key Takeaways

• The testimony of a rape victim is vital and can be relied upon without corroboration if it is found to be credible.
• Statements made by the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.PC can be used to evaluate their defense, but cannot be the sole basis for conviction.
• Courts have the discretion to impose a sentence less than the minimum prescribed under Section 376 of the IPC for adequate and special reasons, especially in cases where a significant amount of time has passed since the incident.
• The case highlights the importance of a thorough and fair trial process, as well as the need to balance justice for victims with considerations of time and the personal circumstances of the accused.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed accused Vijay to surrender before the Trial Court within one month to undergo the remaining sentence in terms of the High Court’s judgment.

Specific Amendments Analysis

The judgment does not discuss any specific amendments.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of the case is that the testimony of a prosecutrix in a rape case is vital and can be relied upon without corroboration if it inspires confidence. Additionally, the court reiterated that statements of accused under Section 313 of Cr.PC must be considered in conjunction with prosecution evidence. The Supreme Court also upheld the High Court’s discretion to impose a reduced sentence under the proviso to Section 376(2) of the IPC, emphasizing that courts can consider the age of the case and the personal circumstances of the accused. This case does not change previous positions of law but rather reinforces existing principles.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals by both the State and the accused, upholding the High Court’s decision to convict the accused for gang rape and impose a reduced sentence of three years. The court emphasized the importance of the prosecutrix’s testimony and the discretion of the court in sentencing, especially in cases where a significant amount of time has passed. This judgment reinforces the principles of victim-centric justice while acknowledging the need for a balanced approach in sentencing.