Supreme Court Upholds Conviction in Assault Case: Raju Ambadas vs. State of Maharashtra (24 January 2019)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 24 January 2019

Citation: 2019 INSC 64

Judges: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J and Hemant Gupta, J. The judgment was authored by Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J.

Can a High Court reverse a trial court’s acquittal in a criminal case? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in the case of Raju Ambadas Gangekar vs. The State of Maharashtra. This case explores the limits of appellate jurisdiction in overturning acquittals, particularly when a trial court’s decision is deemed perverse. The Supreme Court examined the evidence and upheld the High Court’s decision to convict the accused.

Case Background

On July 10, 1988, Captain Vinod Rawat, an officer in the Indian Army, and his colleague Lieutenant Mellvin Desouza visited the New Jagdamba Hotel in Ahmednagar. A dispute arose between the two officers and the hotel staff. The prosecution alleged that the hotel staff threw chili powder into the eyes of the two officers, who then fled the hotel. The prosecution further claimed that the accused chased and assaulted the officers. Police Constable Divakar Shinde (PW-13), who was on patrol, witnessed the appellant, Raju Ambadas Gangekar, assaulting Captain Rawat with a gupti, a type of knife. Captain Rawat fell on the road and was taken to the police station and then to the Civil Hospital.

At the Civil Hospital, Captain Rawat’s statement was recorded by Special Executive Magistrate Vishnu Narang. Based on this statement, an offense was initially registered under Sections 326 and 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The appellant was arrested on July 11, 1988. The prosecution alleged that blood-stained clothes (a vest and lungi) and a blood-stained gupti were seized from the appellant. The blood group on the clothes matched that of the deceased. Captain Rawat died on July 23, 1988, after which the investigation proceeded under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmednagar, acquitted all four accused, including the appellant, of offenses under Sections 302 and 325 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 37 and 135 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951. The State of Maharashtra appealed this decision to the Bombay High Court. The High Court upheld the acquittal of three of the accused but reversed the trial court’s judgment concerning the appellant, finding him guilty under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The High Court sentenced the appellant to five years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of INR 2,000/-. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The case involves the following key legal provisions:

• Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section defines the punishment for murder.
• Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section defines the punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Part II of this section applies when the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
• Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section defines the punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt.
• Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section deals with acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.
• Sections 37 and 135 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951: These sections relate to offenses under the Bombay Police Act, 1951.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The trial court had valid reasons for acquitting the accused, noting discrepancies in the investigation. The High Court should not have interfered with this acquittal.
• No effort was made by the investigating officer to produce the accused before the victim for identification, despite the incident occurring on July 10, 1988, and the victim’s death on July 23, 1988.
• The evidence of PW-13, the beat constable, did not establish the identity of the appellant. PW-13 admitted that he followed the accused and the victim from behind and did not see the assailant’s face.
• The prosecution failed to conduct a Test Identification Parade, which was significant given the lack of clear identification by PW-13.
• Two independent witnesses, PW-3 and PW-9, turned hostile.
• The panch witnesses relied upon by the prosecution for the seizure also turned hostile.
• The accompanying beat constable, Ram Deshmukh, was not examined by the prosecution.
• The victim’s colleague, Lt. Melvin Desouza, who was present during the incident, was not examined by the prosecution.
• The recovery of blood-stained clothes was a single piece of circumstantial evidence, insufficient to justify reversing the trial court’s acquittal.

State’s Arguments:

• The trial court’s appreciation of evidence was perverse, and the High Court rightly interfered to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
• The evidence of the beat constable on duty (PW-13) was reliable.
• The dying declaration (Ex. 21) was credible.
• The evidence of the investigating officer (PW-14) was consistent with the prosecution’s case.
• The case involved the death of an army officer, making it a matter of significant public interest.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was:

1. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Cases:

• K Gopal Reddy v State of Andhra Pradesh [1979] 1 SCC 355: The Supreme Court affirmed that the High Court, adopting a cautious approach, may review the evidence on record to come to its own conclusion and that the benefit of doubt claimed by the accused must also be reasonable. The Court observed that if two reasonably probable and evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. However, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account.
• Chandrappa v State of Karnataka [2007] 4 SCC 415: The Supreme Court reviewed the law on the power of the appellate court in reversing a finding of acquittal and laid down guiding principles. The court held that an appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate, and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. The court also noted that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
• Mookiah v State, Rep. by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu [2013] 2 SCC 895: The Supreme Court affirmed the principles laid down in Chandrappa (supra). The appellate court is justified in reversing an order of acquittal where the order of acquittal suffers from a perversity and has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
• Murugesan v State, through Inspector of Police [2012] 10 SCC 383: The Supreme Court affirmed the principles laid down in Chandrappa (supra).
• Prem Singh v State of Haryana [2013] 14 SCC 889: The Supreme Court affirmed the principles laid down in Chandrappa (supra).

Judgment

The Supreme Court analyzed the evidence and arguments presented by both sides. The Court noted that the High Court had provided cogent reasons for reversing the trial court’s acquittal. The trial court’s judgment was based on surmises and failed to consider crucial evidence.

How each authority was viewed by the Court:

• K Gopal Reddy v State of Andhra Pradesh [1979] 1 SCC 355:* The Court used this case to highlight the appellate court’s power to review evidence and the concept of reasonable doubt.
• Chandrappa v State of Karnataka [2007] 4 SCC 415:* The Court relied on this case to establish the principles for appellate courts when reversing acquittals, including the double presumption of innocence.
• Mookiah v State, Rep. by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu [2013] 2 SCC 895:* The Court used this case to affirm that an appellate court can reverse an acquittal if it is perverse and leads to a miscarriage of justice.

The Supreme Court quoted from the judgment:

“The appellate court is justified in reversing an order of acquittal where the order of acquittal suffers from a perversity and has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”

“The trial court has proceeded purely on the basis of surmises when it observed that it was unlikely that PW-13 had witnessed the incident. In failing to refer to crucial parts of the evidence, the trial court had fallen into a grievous error which was justifiably corrected by the impugned judgment of the High Court.”

“The judgment of the trial court suffered from a clear perversity and had resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was heavily influenced by the need to correct a miscarriage of justice. The Court found that the trial court had overlooked crucial evidence and made assumptions without a proper basis. The High Court’s re-evaluation of the evidence was deemed necessary and justified. The Court emphasized the importance of credible eye-witness testimony, the reliability of dying declarations, and the significance of forensic evidence like blood-stained clothes. The Court also considered the fact that the victim was an army officer, which added a layer of public interest to the case.

Logical Reasoning:

Key Takeaways

• An appellate court has the power to reverse an acquittal if the trial court’s judgment is perverse and leads to a miscarriage of justice.
• Credible eye-witness testimony, dying declarations, and forensic evidence are crucial in establishing guilt.
• The double presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is not absolute and can be overcome by strong evidence.
• Trial courts must thoroughly evaluate all evidence and not rely on surmises or assumptions.

Directions

The Supreme Court ordered that the appellant’s bail bonds be cancelled and that he surrender to serve his sentence. A copy of the judgment was to be forwarded to the Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned to ensure compliance.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that an appellate court can reverse a trial court’s acquittal if the trial court’s judgment is perverse and leads to a miscarriage of justice. This case reaffirms the principles laid down in Chandrappa v State of Karnataka [2007] 4 SCC 415 and Mookiah v State, Rep. by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu [2013] 2 SCC 895 regarding the appellate court’s power to review evidence and reverse acquittals in cases of perversity and miscarriage of justice. There is no change in the previous position of law, but the case emphasizes the importance of appellate review in ensuring justice.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s conviction of the appellant under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court found that the trial court’s acquittal was based on flawed reasoning and a failure to consider crucial evidence. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of appellate review in correcting miscarriages of justice and affirmed the principles governing the reversal of acquittals.