Supreme Court Upholds Conviction in Dowry Death Case: Nagabhushan vs. State of Karnataka (2021)

Date of the Judgment: March 8, 2021

Citation: (2021) INSC 144

Judges: Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J., M.R. Shah, J.

Can a conviction for dowry death be upheld based on a dying declaration, even when there are conflicting statements? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in a case where a husband was accused of setting his wife on fire. This judgment delves into the evidentiary value of dying declarations and the circumstances under which an appellate court can reverse an acquittal. The bench, comprising Justices Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and M.R. Shah, delivered a unanimous judgment authored by Justice M.R. Shah.

Case Background

The case revolves around the death of Rekha, who was married to the appellant, Nagabhushan, nine years prior to the incident. The prosecution alleged that Rekha was subjected to mental cruelty and dowry demands. On June 24, 2010, at approximately 9 p.m., Nagabhushan allegedly quarreled with Rekha, poured kerosene on her, and set her on fire in their matrimonial home. Rekha was taken to the hospital, where her statement was recorded on June 27, 2010 (Exhibit P5). Earlier, on June 25, 2010, another statement (Exhibit D2) was also recorded. The police filed a chargesheet against Nagabhushan and his family members under Sections 498A (cruelty to a married woman) and 302 (murder) read with 34 (common intention) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The trial court acquitted all the accused, citing contradictions in the two dying declarations.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The trial court, after examining the evidence, including two contradictory dying declarations (Exhibits P5 and D2), acquitted all the accused. The State of Karnataka appealed this decision to the High Court of Karnataka. The High Court reversed the trial court’s decision concerning Nagabhushan, convicting him under Sections 498A and 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, while upholding the acquittal of the other accused. Nagabhushan then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The case primarily involves the following legal provisions from the Indian Penal Code, 1860:

• Section 498A: “Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.” This section deals with cruelty towards a married woman by her husband or his relatives.
• Section 302: “Punishment for murder.” This section prescribes the punishment for the offense of murder.
• Section 300: “Murder.” This section defines murder. Clause fourthly states that culpable homicide is murder if the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury.
• Section 34: “Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.” This section deals with the concept of common intention in criminal acts.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments (Nagabhushan):

• The High Court erred in reversing the trial court’s acquittal, which was based on material contradictions in the two dying declarations.
• The earlier dying declaration (Exhibit D2), stating the fire was accidental, should be given more weight as it was recorded closer to the incident.
• The High Court did not consider that the later dying declaration (Exhibit P5) was recorded in the presence of the deceased’s parents, raising the possibility of tutoring.
• The defense’s version of an accidental fire, due to a kerosene stove incident, was not properly considered.
• The High Court should not have re-appreciated the evidence unless the trial court’s findings were perverse.
• The appellant tried to extinguish the fire and also sustained burn injuries.

Respondent’s Arguments (State of Karnataka):

• The High Court was justified in re-appreciating the evidence as the trial court’s findings were perverse.
• The second dying declaration (Exhibit P5) was more reliable as it was supported by medical evidence and the injuries sustained by the deceased.
• The deceased explained in Exhibit P5 that she had initially stated it was an accident due to threats from the appellant.
• The defense’s version of an accidental fire was not supported by evidence and was contradicted by the nature of the injuries and the absence of a stove at the scene.
• The act of pouring kerosene and setting the deceased ablaze falls under clause fourthly of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, constituting murder.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issues:

1. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the order of acquittal passed by the trial court.
2. Whether the High Court was right in relying on the second dying declaration (Exhibit P5).
3. Whether the act of the accused falls under clause fourthly of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Supreme Court relied on Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189* to reiterate the principles for interfering with acquittal judgments, emphasizing that appellate courts should not interfere unless the trial court’s view is perverse.
• The Court cited Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227* to outline factors for appellate courts to consider when reviewing trial court decisions, such as the trial judge’s view of witness credibility and the presumption of innocence.
• The Court referred to Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415* to reiterate the appellate court’s power to review evidence in acquittal appeals, emphasizing that expressions like ‘substantial reasons’ are not to curtail the court’s power.
• The Court used Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P, (2008) 10 SCC 450* to stress that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence, and the appellate court should consider the trial court’s advantage of observing witnesses.
• The Court cited State of Rajasthan v. Naresh, (2009) 9 SCC 368* to state that an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with, even with some evidence against the accused.
• The Court used State of U.P. v. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271* to provide illustrative circumstances for interfering with acquittal judgments, such as erroneous views of law or conclusions contrary to evidence.
• The Court considered Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436* to reiterate the scope of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal.
• The Court used Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228* to state that the High Court is entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion.
• The Court cited Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412* to hold that the High Court should first record its conclusion on whether the trial court’s approach was illegal or its conclusions untenable before interfering with an acquittal.
• The Court referred to Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807* to state that the High Court can review the entire evidence and come to its own conclusion in an appeal against acquittal.
• The Court cited K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355* to hold that the High Court should interfere if the trial court rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons.
• The Court relied on Nallam Veera Stayanandam v. Public Prosecutor, (2004) 10 SCC 769* to hold that each dying declaration has to be considered independently on its own merit.
• The Court used Kashmira Devi v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 11 SCC 343* to reiterate that each dying declaration has to be considered independently on its own merit.
• The Court cited Ashabai v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 2 SCC 224* to reiterate that each dying declaration has to be considered independently on its own merit.
• The Court referred to Santosh v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 7 SCC 641* to hold that the act of pouring kerosene and setting the deceased ablaze falls under clause fourthly of Section 300 of the IPC, constituting murder.
• The Court distinguished the facts from the present case from Kalu Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 10 SCC 324*, where the accused was not inebriated and the act was intentional.
• The Court cited Satya Narayan Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2010) 13 SCC 689* to stress the need for vigilance in cases where a woman dies of burn injuries within a short span of her marriage and that stern view needs to be adopted in all such cases.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was significantly influenced by the reliability of the second dying declaration (Exhibit P5), which was corroborated by medical evidence and the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased. The Court noted that the deceased had explained the discrepancy in her earlier statement, stating that she was threatened by the appellant. The Court also considered the fact that the defense’s version of an accidental fire was not supported by evidence and was contradicted by the nature of the injuries and the absence of a stove at the scene.

The Court emphasized that the act of pouring kerosene and setting the deceased ablaze was imminently dangerous and fell under clause fourthly of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, constituting murder. The Court also stated that the fact that the accused tried to extinguish the fire did not negate the offense of murder.

Logical Reasoning:

The Court rejected the defense’s argument that the appellant’s attempt to extinguish the fire mitigated the offense. The Court emphasized that the act of pouring kerosene and setting the deceased ablaze was imminently dangerous and fell under clause fourthly of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, constituting murder.

The Supreme Court considered the possibility of the deceased being tutored by her parents, but found the second dying declaration (Exhibit P5) to be reliable and consistent with medical evidence and the nature of injuries. The Court also considered the defense’s version of an accidental fire, but found it to be false and unsupported by evidence.

The Court’s final decision was reached after a thorough analysis of the evidence, including the two dying declarations, medical evidence, and the circumstances surrounding the incident. The Court concluded that the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s acquittal and convicting the appellant for the offense of murder.

The Court quoted from the judgment in Satya Narayan Tiwari v. State of U.P., [(2010) 13 SCC 689 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 393], stating: “Crimes against women are not ordinary crimes committed in a fit of anger or for property. They are social crimes. They disrupt the entire social fabric. Hence, they call for harsh punishment.”

The Court also quoted from the judgment in Santosh v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 7 SCC 641, stating: “When the accused poured kerosene on the deceased from the kerosene lamp and also threw the lighted matchstick on the deceased to set her on fire, he must have intended to cause the death of the deceased.”

The Court further stated: “Merely because thereafter the A1 might have tried to extinguish the fire, that will not bring the case out of clause fourthly of Section 300 IPC.”

Key Takeaways

• Evidentiary Value of Dying Declarations: The judgment reaffirms the importance of dying declarations as evidence, particularly in cases of dowry death. When there are multiple dying declarations, each must be assessed independently on its own merits.
• Reversal of Acquittal: Appellate courts can reverse acquittals if the trial court’s findings are deemed perverse or against the weight of evidence.
• Clause Fourthly of Section 300: Acts that are imminently dangerous and likely to cause death, such as pouring kerosene and setting someone on fire, fall under clause fourthly of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and constitute murder.
• No Mitigation for Attempt to Extinguish Fire: An attempt to extinguish the fire after setting someone ablaze does not negate the offense of murder.
• Stern View in Bride Burning Cases: The Court emphasized the need for a stern view in bride burning cases, highlighting the social nature of these crimes and the need for harsh punishment to deter such acts.

Directions

The Supreme Court did not issue any specific directions in this judgment. The primary focus of the judgment was to uphold the conviction of the appellant and to clarify the legal principles related to dying declarations and the scope of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Nagabhushan vs. State of Karnataka (2021) is a significant ruling in the context of dowry death cases. It reinforces the importance of dying declarations as reliable evidence, particularly when corroborated by medical evidence. The judgment also clarifies the circumstances under which an appellate court can reverse an acquittal and the application of clause fourthly of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. This case serves as a reminder of the judiciary’s commitment to addressing crimes against women and ensuring that perpetrators of such heinous acts are brought to justice.