Supreme Court Upholds Conviction in Murder Case, Addresses Juvenile Status: Devilal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (25 February 2021)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 25 February 2021

Citation: Criminal Appeal No. 989 of 2007

Judges: Uday Umesh Lalit, J., Indira Banerjee, J., and K.M. Joseph, J.

Can an FIR be considered a dying declaration if the victim’s medical condition is in question? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question while examining a criminal appeal related to a murder case. The court also deliberated on the issue of juvenility of one of the accused and its implications under the Juvenile Justice Act. This judgment clarifies the evidentiary value of a First Information Report (FIR) as a dying declaration and the applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act in cases where the accused’s age is a matter of contention.

Case Background

The case originates from an incident on July 19, 1998, in Khera Kushalpura, Madhya Pradesh. Ganeshram, a resident of the village, was attacked by Devilal and his sons, Gokul and Amrat Ram. The attack occurred after a previous quarrel between Ganeshram and Devilal. According to the FIR filed by Ganeshram, Devilal, armed with a Kulhari (axe), Gokul with a Talwar (sword), and Amrat Ram with a lathi (stick), assaulted him. Ganeshram sustained severe injuries, including cuts to his legs and fractures to his hands. He was also verbally abused with casteist slurs.

Ganeshram was taken to the Community Health Centre in Manasa, where his condition was critical. He was referred to the District Hospital in Mandasaur but passed away at 1:00 a.m. on July 20, 1998. A post-mortem examination revealed multiple incised wounds and fractures, with the cause of death attributed to excessive bleeding.

The police investigation led to the arrest of Devilal, Gokul, and Amrat Ram. Weapons were recovered based on their disclosure statements. The prosecution relied on the eyewitness accounts of Sajan Bai (wife of the deceased), Saman Bai (sister-in-law of the deceased), and Lakshminarayan (brother of the deceased), along with the FIR lodged by Ganeshram, which was treated as a dying declaration.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court convicted Devilal, Gokul, and Amrat Ram under Section 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), sentencing them to life imprisonment. The court relied on the FIR as a dying declaration and the testimonies of eyewitnesses. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh upheld the Trial Court’s decision, dismissing the appeal filed by the accused. The High Court, however, did not rely on the testimony of PW7-Laxminarayan. The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the appeal, the Supreme Court considered the juvenility claim of Amrat Ram.

Legal Framework

The case involves several key legal provisions:

• Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): This section defines the punishment for murder. It states, “Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”
• Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): This section deals with acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. It states, “When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.”
• The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act): Sections 3(1)(10) and 3(2)(5) of the SC/ST Act were invoked, but the Trial Court found that the charges under this Act were not proved.
• The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986: This Act was in force at the time of the incident. It defined a male juvenile as someone who had not attained the age of 16 years.
• The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000: This Act raised the age of juvenility to 18 years for both males and females and contained provisions for pending cases.
• Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000: This section provides special provisions for pending cases involving juveniles, stating that proceedings should continue as if the 2000 Act had not been passed, but if the court finds the juvenile guilty, it should forward the case to the Juvenile Justice Board for appropriate orders. The explanation to this section clarifies that the determination of juvenility should be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2 of the 2000 Act, even if the juvenile ceased to be so before the commencement of the Act.

Arguments

Appellants’ Arguments:

• The appellants argued that the FIR could not be relied upon as a dying declaration due to the medical evidence presented by PW9-Dr. Kothari. They contended that Ganeshram was likely unconscious and unable to make any statement to the police.

• They further submitted that the witnesses, particularly PW1-Sajan Bai, were tutored, as she admitted in her cross-examination that the witnesses were made to understand what statements they had to make in the court.

• The appellants also argued that the testimony of PW7-Laxminarayan was unreliable as the front of Devilal’s house, where the incident occurred, was not visible from his house.

• Additionally, it was contended that Amrat Ram was a juvenile at the time of the offense and should be treated under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The State argued that the testimonies of PW1-Sajan Bai and PW2-Saman Bai were consistent and reliable. They were present at the scene and their presence was recorded from the initial stage of reporting the crime.

• The State contended that the distance between the houses was only about 100 feet, and there was no effective cross-examination to challenge their opportunity to witness the incident.

• The State argued that the FIR was rightly relied upon as a dying declaration and that the recoveries of weapons corroborated the prosecution’s case.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issues:

1. Whether the FIR recorded at the instance of the deceased could be relied upon as a dying declaration?
2. Whether the testimonies of the eyewitnesses were reliable?
3. Whether Amrat Ram was a juvenile at the time of the offense and entitled to the benefits of the Juvenile Justice Act?

Additionally, the court also considered the sub-issue of whether the medical evidence presented by PW9-Dr. Kothari could negate the possibility of Ganeshram making a statement to the police.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• Hari Ram vs. State of Rajasthan [ (2009) 13 SCC 211]* The court followed this authority to allow the claim of juvenility to be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court.
• Mumtaz alias Muntyaz vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2016) 11 SCC 786]* The court relied on this authority to explain the effect of Section 20 of the 2000 Act.
• Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand [(2005) 3 SCC 551]* The court used this authority to interpret the scope of Section 20 of the 2000 Act.
• Bijender Singh v. State of Haryana [(2005) 3 SCC 685]* The court used this authority to explain the legal fiction created by Section 20 of the 2000 Act.
• Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2010) 5 SCC 344]* The court cited this authority to emphasize that juvenility can be determined even after conviction.
• Kalu v. State of Haryana [(2012) 8 SCC 34]* The court relied on this authority to reiterate the special provision for pending cases under Section 20 of the 2000 Act.
• Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P. [(2013) 11 SCC 193]* The court followed this authority to direct the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board for determining the appropriate quantum of fine for Amrat Ram.
• Satya Deo alias Bhoorey vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2020) 10 SCC 555]* The court referred to this authority to affirm that the question of juvenility can be determined even if the accused was not a juvenile on the date of the offense under the 1986 Act.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:

• Reliability of the Dying Declaration: The court found no concrete evidence to suggest that Ganeshram was incapable of making a statement to the police at the time of lodging the FIR. The medical evidence did not conclusively prove that he was unconscious or unable to speak.
• Consistency of Eyewitness Accounts: The court noted that the testimonies of PW1-Sajan Bai and PW2-Saman Bai were consistent and corroborated each other. Their presence at the scene of the crime was also established.
• Corroborative Evidence: The recovery of weapons based on the disclosure statements of the accused further strengthened the prosecution’s case.
• Application of Juvenile Justice Act: The court acknowledged that Amrat Ram was a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, and thus, he was entitled to the benefits of the Act.

The court’s reasoning involved a careful analysis of the factual evidence and the applicable legal principles. The court emphasized the importance of corroborative evidence and the reliability of eyewitness accounts. The court also applied the legal fiction created by Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, to ensure that Amrat Ram, being a juvenile, was given the benefit of the Act.

The court rejected the argument that the medical evidence presented by PW9-Dr. Kothari made it impossible for Ganeshram to make a statement. The court noted that the symptoms mentioned by the doctor were not necessarily present at the time the FIR was filed. The court also rejected the argument that the witnesses were tutored, stating that the mere fact that PW1-Sajan Bai’s statement was read over to her does not prove that she was tutored.

The court’s decision was based on the principle that the testimonies of credible eyewitnesses, corroborated by other evidence, can be relied upon to establish guilt. The court also applied the legal fiction created by Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, to ensure that Amrat Ram, being a juvenile, was given the benefit of the Act.

The majority opinion, authored by Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, was concurred by Justice Indira Banerjee and Justice K.M. Joseph. There were no dissenting opinions.

The court quoted the following from the judgment:

• “The testimony of PW9-Dr. Kothari, shows that Ganeshram was alive when the initial examination was undertaken by PW9-Dr. Kothari.”
• “The substantive testimony of both these witnesses clearly discloses that the appellants had opened an assault on Ganeshram which led to his death.”
• “even while holding the appellant Amrat Ram to be juvenile in terms of the 2000 Act and guilty of the offence with which he was charged, we set aside the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon him and remit the matter to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board…”

The implications for future cases are that the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the evidentiary value of an FIR as a dying declaration if there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the person making the statement was incapable of speaking. The court has also clarified the application of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, to cases where an accused was a juvenile at the time of the offense, even if the case was pending before the Act came into force.

Key Takeaways

• The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Devilal and Gokul under Section 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
• The court affirmed that an FIR can be considered a valid dying declaration if there is no conclusive evidence that the victim was unable to speak at the time of filing the report.
• The court emphasized the importance of consistent and corroborative eyewitness testimonies.
• The court held that Amrat Ram was a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, and remitted his case to the Juvenile Justice Board for sentencing.
• The court clarified that the legal fiction created by Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, applies to cases pending when the Act came into force, ensuring that juveniles are given the benefit of the Act.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed Devilal and Gokul to surrender before the concerned Police Station within two weeks, failing which their bail bonds would be forfeited and they would be arrested. The court also directed that the case of Amrat Ram be remitted to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for determining the appropriate quantum of fine.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that an FIR can be considered a valid dying declaration if there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the person making the statement was incapable of speaking. Additionally, the court reaffirmed that the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, applies to cases where the accused was a juvenile at the time of the offense, even if the case was pending when the Act came into force. This case does not change the previous position of law but reaffirms the existing principles.

Conclusion

In the case of Devilal and ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Devilal and Gokul for murder, affirming the reliability of the FIR as a dying declaration and the consistency of eyewitness testimonies. The court also recognized Amrat Ram as a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, and directed his case to the Juvenile Justice Board for sentencing. This judgment reinforces the evidentiary value of dying declarations and the protective provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act.