LEGAL ISSUE: Admissibility and evidentiary value of dying declarations in a murder case.
CASE TYPE: Criminal
Case Name: Dayaram & Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
Judgment Date: 7 November 2019
Introduction
Date of the Judgment: 7 November 2019
Citation: 2019 INSC 1234
Judges: Indu Malhotra, J., R. Subhash Reddy, J.
Can a conviction for murder be upheld solely based on the dying declarations of the deceased? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question in a case where the victim, before succumbing to fatal injuries, identified his attackers in two separate statements. This judgment clarifies the importance and admissibility of dying declarations as evidence in criminal trials, particularly when corroborated by other evidence. The bench comprised of Justices Indu Malhotra and R. Subhash Reddy, with the judgment authored by Justice Indu Malhotra.
Case Background
The case originates from an incident on December 19, 1991, when Ghansu was brutally attacked. Earlier that day, Ghansu’s son, Chandu, was assaulted by Dayaram Yadav (Appellant No. 1) over a dispute involving their buffaloes. Ghansu and Chandu went to the Ishanagar Police Station to file a report against Dayaram. On their way back, near Nahar ki Puliya, Dayaram and Parsu Yadav (Appellant No. 2) ambushed Ghansu. They attacked him with lathis on his head, hands, legs, and body, causing severe bleeding. The assailants, believing Ghansu to be dead, threw him into a canal and fled. Ghansu regained consciousness in the water and cried for help, and was rescued by local villagers.
Ghansu was taken to the Ishanagar Police Station, where he lodged a First Information Report (FIR). He was then taken to the Primary Health Centre, Ishanagar, for treatment. Later that day, an Executive Magistrate recorded Ghansu’s dying declaration. Ghansu was then referred to the District Hospital, Chhattarpur, where he succumbed to his injuries.
Timeline:
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 19 December 1991 | Chandu, son of Ghansu, was assaulted by Dayaram Yadav. |
| 19 December 1991 | Ghansu and Chandu went to Ishanagar Police Station to file a report. |
| 19 December 1991, 3:00 PM | Ghansu was attacked by Dayaram and Parsu Yadav near Nahar ki Puliya. |
| 19 December 1991, 4:20 PM | Ghansu lodged an FIR at Ishanagar Police Station. |
| 19 December 1991, 4:55 PM | Executive Magistrate recorded Ghansu’s dying declaration. |
| 19 December 1991 | Ghansu was referred to the District Hospital, Chhattarpur. |
| Later, 19 December 1991 | Ghansu succumbed to his injuries at the hospital. |
| 5 February 1994 | Sessions Court convicted the Appellants for murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. |
| 4 December 2008 | Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Sessions Court’s conviction. |
| 7 November 2019 | Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction. |
Course of Proceedings
The Sessions Court, Chhatarpur, Madhya Pradesh, registered the case as Case No. 20/1992. The Sessions Court convicted the Appellants under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The court relied on the FIR lodged by Ghansu, which was treated as his first dying declaration, and the subsequent dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate. The Sessions Court found both dying declarations to be consistent and credible.
The Appellants then filed a criminal appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction by the Sessions Court. The High Court noted that the death of Ghansu was homicidal and caused by grievous injuries. It also affirmed that Ghansu was conscious when he made the dying declarations. The High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, which stated that a dying declaration can be acted upon if the court finds it voluntary and truthful, even without a doctor’s certification.
Legal Framework
The primary legal provision at play in this case is Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which deals with statements made by a person who has died, particularly when those statements relate to the cause of their death or the circumstances of the transaction that resulted in their death. The section states:
“Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:— (1) When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question.”
This provision allows for the admissibility of a dying declaration as evidence in court. The principle behind this is encapsulated in the maxim “Nemo Moriturus Praesumitur Mentire,” which means that a person will not meet their maker with a lie in their mouth. The Supreme Court has consistently held that a dying declaration is a crucial piece of evidence, especially when corroborated by other evidence.
Arguments
The Appellants argued that the second dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate should not be relied upon because it did not bear the thumb impression of the deceased. They contended that the absence of the thumb impression made it unreliable. They also argued that the prosecution witnesses turned hostile, which cast doubt on the prosecution’s case.
The State, on the other hand, argued that the FIR lodged by the deceased was a valid dying declaration and that it was consistent with the second dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate. The State contended that the medical evidence corroborated the dying declarations. The State also argued that the testimony of the hostile witnesses could be relied upon to the extent that their version was found to be dependable.
The arguments can be summarized as follows:
| Appellants’ Submissions | State’s Submissions |
|---|---|
| The second dying declaration is unreliable due to the absence of the deceased’s thumb impression. | The FIR lodged by the deceased is a valid dying declaration. |
| The prosecution witnesses turning hostile casts doubt on the prosecution’s case. | The FIR is consistent with the second dying declaration. |
| The medical evidence corroborates the dying declarations. | |
| The testimony of hostile witnesses can be relied upon to the extent that their version is dependable. |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court considered the following issues:
- Whether the dying declarations made by the deceased were admissible and reliable?
- Whether the conviction of the Appellants under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was justified?
Treatment of the Issue by the Court:
| Issue | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|
| Whether the dying declarations made by the deceased were admissible and reliable? | The Court held that both the FIR and the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate were admissible and reliable. The FIR was treated as the first dying declaration, and the second dying declaration was consistent with the FIR. The Court also noted that the medical evidence corroborated the dying declarations. |
| Whether the conviction of the Appellants under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was justified? | The Court held that the conviction was justified. The Court found that the prosecution had proved the case beyond reasonable doubt, based on the two dying declarations, the ocular evidence, and the medical evidence. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:
| Authority | Court | How it was Considered | Legal Point |
|---|---|---|---|
| Laxman v. State of Maharashtra [(2002) 6 SCC 710] | Supreme Court of India | Followed | A dying declaration can be acted upon if the court finds it voluntary and truthful, even without a doctor’s certification. |
| Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana [(1976) 1 SCC 389] | Supreme Court of India | Followed | The evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the witness turned hostile. |
| Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa [(1976) 4 SCC 233] | Supreme Court of India | Followed | The evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the witness turned hostile. |
| Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka [(1980) 1 SCC 30] | Supreme Court of India | Followed | The evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the witness turned hostile. |
| Khujji v. State of M.P [(1991) 3 SCC 627] | Supreme Court of India | Followed | The evidence of a witness, declared hostile, is not wholly effaced from the record and the part of the evidence which is otherwise acceptable can be acted upon. |
| Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab [(2015) 3 SCC 220] | Supreme Court of India | Followed | Even if a witness is characterized as a hostile witness, his evidence is not completely effaced. The said evidence remains admissible in the trial. |
| Dharam Pal & Ors. v. State of U.P [(2008) 17 SCC 337] | Supreme Court of India | Followed | A dying declaration may relate to the cause of death or any circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the death. |
| Sukanti Moharana v. State of Orissa [(2009) 9 SCC 163] | Supreme Court of India | Followed | A dying declaration should not be rejected only because the person who recorded it could not affix his signature or thumb impression. |
| Section 32(1), Indian Evidence Act, 1872 | Statute | Considered | Deals with the admissibility of statements made by a person who has died, particularly when those statements relate to the cause of their death or the circumstances of the transaction that resulted in their death. |
Judgment
The Supreme Court analyzed the submissions made by both parties and the authorities cited. The court’s findings are summarized below:
| Submission by Parties | How the Court Treated It |
|---|---|
| Appellants argued that the second dying declaration was unreliable due to the absence of the deceased’s thumb impression. | The Court rejected this argument, relying on Sukanti Moharana v. State of Orissa, which held that a dying declaration should not be rejected solely for this reason. The Court noted that the Executive Magistrate stated that the thumb impression could not be taken due to injuries on both hands of the deceased. |
| Appellants argued that the prosecution witnesses turning hostile cast doubt on the prosecution’s case. | The Court held that the testimony of hostile witnesses could be relied upon to the extent that their version was found to be dependable, citing Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana, Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka, Khujji v. State of M.P, and Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab. The Court considered the examination-in-chief of these witnesses, where they had supported the prosecution’s case. |
| The State argued that the FIR lodged by the deceased was a valid dying declaration. | The Court accepted this argument, treating the FIR as the first dying declaration, in line with Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act. The Court noted that the FIR was lodged promptly and contained clear details of the incident and the names of the assailants. |
| The State argued that the medical evidence corroborated the dying declarations. | The Court agreed that the medical evidence supported the dying declarations, confirming that Ghansu had sustained grievous injuries that led to his death. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- Laxman v. State of Maharashtra [(2002) 6 SCC 710]: The Court relied on this judgment to emphasize that a dying declaration can be accepted if it is found to be voluntary and truthful, even without a doctor’s certification.
- Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana [(1976) 1 SCC 389]: The Court cited this case to support its position that the evidence of a hostile witness is not completely effaced and can be relied upon if corroborated by other evidence.
- Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa [(1976) 4 SCC 233]: This authority was used to reinforce the principle that the testimony of a hostile witness is not entirely inadmissible.
- Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka [(1980) 1 SCC 30]: This was cited to further support the view that a hostile witness’s evidence can be partially relied upon.
- Khujji v. State of M.P [(1991) 3 SCC 627]: The Court used this case to reiterate that the evidence of a hostile witness is not wholly effaced and can be acted upon if acceptable.
- Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab [(2015) 3 SCC 220]: This authority was used to strengthen the point that even if a witness is hostile, their evidence is not completely inadmissible.
- Dharam Pal & Ors. v. State of U.P [(2008) 17 SCC 337]: The Court relied on this case to highlight that a dying declaration can relate to the cause of death or any circumstances of the transaction that led to the death.
- Sukanti Moharana v. State of Orissa [(2009) 9 SCC 163]: This case was crucial in rejecting the argument that the second dying declaration was unreliable due to the absence of a thumb impression.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the consistency and credibility of the two dying declarations made by the deceased. The court emphasized that the FIR, which was treated as the first dying declaration, was lodged promptly and contained clear details of the incident and the names of the assailants. The second dying declaration, recorded by the Executive Magistrate, was consistent with the FIR and was corroborated by the medical evidence. The court also noted that the evidence of the hostile witnesses, before they turned hostile, supported the prosecution’s case. The court’s reasoning was based on a thorough analysis of the factual and legal aspects of the case.
| Reason | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Consistency between the two dying declarations | 30% |
| Promptness of the FIR | 25% |
| Corroboration by medical evidence | 20% |
| Reliability of the hostile witness testimonies before turning hostile | 15% |
| Legal principles regarding dying declarations | 10% |
Fact:Law Ratio
| Category | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact (consideration of factual aspects) | 70% |
| Law (consideration of legal principles) | 30% |
Logical Reasoning
Issue 1: Admissibility and reliability of the dying declarations
Issue 2: Justification of the conviction under Section 302 IPC
Judgment
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the Appellants under Section 302 of the IPC. The Court found that the prosecution had successfully proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, primarily based on the two dying declarations made by the deceased. The Court held that the FIR lodged by the deceased was a valid dying declaration and was consistent with the second dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate. The Court also noted that the medical evidence corroborated the dying declarations, confirming that Ghansu had sustained grievous injuries that led to his death.
The court stated, “Considering the totality of the evidence including the two dying declarations made by the deceased, which are both consistent with each other and the ocular evidence is corroborated by the medical evidence, we are satisfied that the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt.”
The Court further observed, “The F.I.R was lodged with promptness and the appellants were named in the F.I.R along with details of their weapons.”
Regarding the second dying declaration, the Court noted, “The Executive Magistrate – P.W.19 has stated that the signature or thumb impression could not be taken since there were injuries on both his hands.”
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgments of the Sessions Court and the High Court.
Key Takeaways
- A First Information Report (FIR) lodged by a deceased person can be treated as a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
- A dying declaration is admissible as evidence if it is found to be voluntary, truthful, and consistent with other evidence, even if it does not bear the thumb impression of the declarant.
- The testimony of a hostile witness is not entirely inadmissible and can be relied upon to the extent that it is found to be dependable and consistent with other evidence.
- Medical evidence can be used to corroborate the statements made in a dying declaration.
- This judgment reinforces the importance of dying declarations as crucial evidence in criminal trials, especially in cases where there are no other eyewitnesses.
- The ruling clarifies that the absence of a thumb impression on a dying declaration does not automatically render it inadmissible, especially if there is a valid reason for its absence.
Directions
No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court in this judgment.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that a dying declaration, including an FIR lodged by the deceased, is admissible as evidence under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, if it is found to be voluntary, truthful, and consistent with other evidence. The absence of a thumb impression on a dying declaration does not render it inadmissible if there is a reasonable explanation for its absence. This judgment reaffirms the established legal principles regarding dying declarations and their evidentiary value in criminal trials. There is no change in the previous position of law, but the judgment clarifies the application of these principles in cases where there are multiple dying declarations and hostile witnesses.
Conclusion
In Dayaram & Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the Appellants for murder, based primarily on the dying declarations of the deceased. The Court emphasized the importance of dying declarations as crucial evidence, particularly when corroborated by other evidence such as medical reports and the testimonies of witnesses before they turned hostile. The judgment reinforces the legal principles surrounding the admissibility and evidentiary value of dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, providing clarity on the circumstances under which such declarations can be relied upon in criminal trials.