LEGAL ISSUE: Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal of the appellants on the basis of evidence available on record, particularly when the trial court had acquitted the accused citing inconsistencies and contradictions in the prosecution’s case.
CASE TYPE: Criminal Law – Murder, Unlawful Assembly
Case Name: Bhagwan Jagannath Markad & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra
Judgment Date: 4th October 2016
Date of the Judgment: 4th October 2016
Citation: (2016) INSC 579
Judges: V. Gopala Gowda, J. and Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.
Can a High Court overturn a trial court’s acquittal in a murder case, especially when the trial court cited inconsistencies and contradictions in the prosecution’s evidence? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in the case of *Bhagwan Jagannath Markad & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra*. This case revolves around a violent attack resulting in one death and multiple injuries, with the key issue being whether the High Court was correct in reversing the trial court’s acquittal and convicting the accused. The judgment was delivered by a bench of Justices V. Gopala Gowda and Adarsh Kumar Goel, with the opinion authored by Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel.
Case Background
On November 13, 1988, at approximately 12:00 noon, a violent incident occurred at the house of Dagadu Gopinath Koyale. According to the prosecution, a group of 16 individuals, including the appellants, attacked Dagadu and others present at the house. The attack resulted in the death of Bibhishan Vithoba Khadle and injuries to six other individuals, including Dagadu, Indubai, Chaturbhuj Khade, Bibhishan Kshirsagar, Gopinath Mahadev Koyale, and Kernath Koyale. The incident was allegedly fueled by political rivalry stemming from Panchayat and Co-operative Society elections.
The prosecution’s case was that the accused, armed with weapons such as swords, barchis, knives, iron rods, and axes, attacked the victims. Accused No. 3, Dada Sayyednoor Mulani, allegedly set the house on fire, forcing the occupants to come out, after which the assault began. The FIR was lodged at 5:30 p.m. on the same day, after the injured were taken to the hospital.
Timeline:
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| November 13, 1988, 12:00 Noon | The attack on Dagadu Gopinath Koyale’s house occurred. |
| November 13, 1988, 5:30 PM | The FIR was lodged with the police. |
| April 20, 2007 | The High Court of Judicature at Bombay convicted the appellants. |
| October 4, 2016 | The Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment. |
Course of Proceedings
The trial court acquitted all 16 accused. However, the High Court of Judicature at Bombay reversed the trial court’s decision, convicting eight of the accused under Sections 147, 149, 302 read with 149, 324, and 326 of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court upheld the acquittal of the remaining accused. The High Court found that the trial court’s approach was “totally perverse” and that the contradictions and omissions cited by the trial court were not material to the case. The High Court noted that the presence of multiple injured persons from the complainant’s side, as well as the injuries sustained by one of the accused, supported the prosecution’s version of events.
Legal Framework
The case primarily involves the following sections of the Indian Penal Code:
- Section 147, Indian Penal Code: Deals with the offense of rioting.
- Section 149, Indian Penal Code: Addresses the concept of vicarious liability for members of an unlawful assembly. It states that if an offense is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or which the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offense, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offense.
- Section 302, Indian Penal Code: Defines the punishment for murder.
- Section 324, Indian Penal Code: Deals with voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means.
- Section 326, Indian Penal Code: Deals with voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means.
These provisions are crucial to understanding the charges against the accused and the legal basis for their conviction.
Arguments
Appellants’ Arguments:
- The trial court’s acquittal was a reasonable view based on the evidence, and the High Court should not have reversed it without finding perversity.
- The High Court did not fully discuss the evidence or adequately address the trial court’s reasons for rejecting the prosecution’s case.
- There was no explanation for the injury suffered by accused No. 5.
- There were significant omissions and contradictions in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies.
- The first information report (FIR) was based on a belated and improved version of events.
- The witnesses were either related or interested parties, making their testimony unreliable without corroboration.
- Given the incident occurred 28 years prior, some appellants are now elderly and should not be convicted at this stage.
State’s Arguments:
- The trial court’s acquittal was based on a perverse approach, ignoring material evidence.
- The High Court correctly addressed the trial court’s perverse findings.
- There was consistent evidence from injured eye-witnesses that could not be dismissed.
- Minor contradictions and omissions are common and do not affect the credibility of the main version.
- The accused formed an unlawful assembly, and the actions of one member are attributable to all.
- The telephonic message received by the police was cryptic and could not be treated as an FIR.
- The statement of PW10 was prompt and corroborated by other witnesses.
| Main Submission | Sub-Submissions | Party |
|---|---|---|
| Trial Court’s Decision | Trial court’s acquittal was a possible view | Appellants |
| High Court did not address the reasons for acquittal | Appellants | |
| Trial court’s approach was perverse | State | |
| Evidence and Witness Testimony | Inconsistencies and contradictions in testimonies | Appellants |
| Omissions in the statement to the police | Appellants | |
| Consistent evidence from injured eye-witnesses | State | |
| Minor contradictions are common and do not affect credibility | State | |
| FIR | Telephonic message should be treated as FIR | Appellants |
| Telephonic message was cryptic and cannot be treated as FIR | State | |
| Unlawful Assembly | Individual roles of accused not proven | Appellants |
| Actions of one member attributable to all | State | |
| Age of the Appellants | Some appellants are now elderly and should not be convicted | Appellants |
| Injury of Accused No. 5 | Injury on accused No. 5 not explained | Appellants |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The main issue framed by the Supreme Court was:
- Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal of the appellants based on the evidence available on record.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates how the Court decided the issues:
| Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
|---|---|---|
| Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal of the appellants? | Partly Justified | The High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal of A1 to A7, as the trial court’s approach was perverse. However, A10 and A11 were given the benefit of doubt due to a lack of specific evidence against them. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:
| Authority | Court | How the Authority was Considered | Legal Point |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vijayee Singh vs. State of U.P. (1990) 3 SCC 190 | Supreme Court of India | Explained the concept of reasonable doubt and the degree of proof required in criminal cases. | Burden of Proof and Reasonable Doubt |
| Leela Ram vs. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525 | Supreme Court of India | Discussed the approach to appreciating witness evidence, including how to handle discrepancies. | Appreciation of Witness Evidence |
| Gangadhar Behera vs. State of Orissa (2002) 8 SCC 381 | Supreme Court of India | Explained the principle of “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” and the concept of common object in unlawful assembly. | Unlawful Assembly and Common Object |
| Masalti vs. State of U.P. (1964) 8 SCR 133 | Supreme Court of India | Discussed how to assess the evidence of interested witnesses and the difficulty in assigning specific roles in an unlawful assembly. | Appreciation of Evidence in Unlawful Assembly Cases |
| Padam Singh versus State of U.P. (2000) 1 SCC 621 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellants to argue that the High Court should not have reversed the trial court’s decision. | Appellate Jurisdiction |
| Devatha Venkataswamy versus Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. (2003) 10 SCC 700 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellants to argue that the High Court should not have reversed the trial court’s decision. | Appellate Jurisdiction |
| Narendra Singh versus State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellants to argue that the High Court should not have reversed the trial court’s decision. | Appellate Jurisdiction |
| Prasanna Das versus State of Orissa (2004) 13 SCC 30 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellants to argue that the High Court should not have reversed the trial court’s decision. | Appellate Jurisdiction |
| Majjal versus State of Haryana (2013) 6 SCC 798 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellants to argue that the High Court should not have reversed the trial court’s decision. | Appellate Jurisdiction |
| Lalita Kumari versus Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellants to argue that a GD entry can be treated as FIR. | FIR and GD Entry |
| Baby alias Sebastian versus Central Inspector of Police (2016) 7 Scale 444 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellants to argue that the High Court should not have reversed the trial court’s decision. | Appellate Jurisdiction |
| Damodar versus State of Rajasthan (2004) 12 SCC 336 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the State to argue that every cryptic information cannot be treated as FIR. | FIR |
| Mano Dutt & Anr. Versus State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 79 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the State to argue that the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s decision. | Appellate Jurisdiction |
| Sanjeev versus State of Haryana (2015) 4 SCC 387 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the State to argue that the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s decision. | Appellate Jurisdiction |
| A. Shankar versus State of Karnataka (2011) 6 SSC 279 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the State to argue that the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s decision. | Appellate Jurisdiction |
| State of Karnataka versus Suvarnamma & Anr. (2015) 1 SCC 323 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the State to argue that the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s decision. | Appellate Jurisdiction |
| Bava Hajee Hamsa versus State of Kerala (1974) 4 SCC 479 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the State to argue that the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s decision. | Appellate Jurisdiction |
| Patai Alias Krishna Kumar versus State U.P. (2010) 4 SCC 429 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the State to argue that every cryptic information cannot be treated as FIR. | FIR |
| Ravishwar Manjhi versus State of Jharkhand (2008) 16 SCC 561 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the State to argue that every cryptic information cannot be treated as FIR. | FIR |
| T.T. Antony versus State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the State to argue that every cryptic information cannot be treated as FIR. | FIR |
| Anand Mohan versus State of Bihar (2012) 7 SCC 225 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the State to argue that every cryptic information cannot be treated as FIR. | FIR |
| Sk. Ishaque v. State of Bihar (1995) 3 SCC 392 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to explain that a cryptic information cannot be treated as an FIR. | FIR |
| Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (1997) 1 SCC 283 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to explain that a cryptic information cannot be treated as an FIR. | FIR |
| Section 147, Indian Penal Code | Indian Parliament | Defined the offense of rioting. | Rioting |
| Section 149, Indian Penal Code | Indian Parliament | Explained the concept of vicarious liability for members of an unlawful assembly. | Unlawful Assembly |
| Section 302, Indian Penal Code | Indian Parliament | Defined the punishment for murder. | Murder |
| Section 324, Indian Penal Code | Indian Parliament | Deals with voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means. | Hurt |
| Section 326, Indian Penal Code | Indian Parliament | Deals with voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means. | Grievous Hurt |
Judgment
The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal. The Court upheld the conviction of appellants A1 to A7 (A2 having died) under Section 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code. However, appellants A10 and A11 were given the benefit of doubt and acquitted.
How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?
| Submission | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|
| Trial court’s acquittal was a possible view | Rejected for A1 to A7, accepted for A10 and A11. The Court found the trial court’s approach to be perverse in relation to A1 to A7. |
| High Court did not address the reasons for acquittal | Rejected. The Court found that the High Court had adequately addressed the reasons for acquittal. |
| Trial court’s approach was perverse | Accepted for A1 to A7. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that the trial court’s approach was perverse. |
| Inconsistencies and contradictions in testimonies | Partially Rejected. The Court held that minor contradictions were not sufficient to reject the testimonies of the injured eye-witnesses. |
| Omissions in the statement to the police | Rejected. The Court held that minor omissions did not affect the credibility of the main version. |
| Consistent evidence from injured eye-witnesses | Accepted for A1 to A7. The Court relied on the consistent testimonies of the injured eye-witnesses. |
| Minor contradictions are common and do not affect credibility | Accepted. The Court acknowledged that minor contradictions are natural and do not invalidate the core of the testimony. |
| Telephonic message should be treated as FIR | Rejected. The Court held that the telephonic message was cryptic and could not be treated as an FIR. |
| Telephonic message was cryptic and cannot be treated as FIR | Accepted. The Court agreed that the telephonic message was not detailed enough to be considered an FIR. |
| Individual roles of accused not proven | Rejected for A1 to A7. The Court held that the actions of one member of an unlawful assembly are attributable to all. |
| Actions of one member attributable to all | Accepted for A1 to A7. The Court applied the principle of vicarious liability under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. |
| Some appellants are now elderly and should not be convicted | Rejected. The Court did not consider the age of the appellants as a reason for acquittal. |
| Injury on accused No. 5 not explained | Partially Rejected. The Court held that while the injury on A5 was not explained, it was not enough to reject the prosecution’s case. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- Vijayee Singh vs. State of U.P. [CITATION]: Used to explain the concept of reasonable doubt and the degree of proof required in criminal cases.
- Leela Ram vs. State of Haryana [CITATION]: Used to explain how to appreciate witness evidence and handle discrepancies.
- Gangadhar Behera vs. State of Orissa [CITATION]: Used to explain the principle of “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” and the concept of common object in unlawful assembly.
- Masalti vs. State of U.P. [CITATION]: Used to explain how to assess the evidence of interested witnesses and the difficulty in assigning specific roles in an unlawful assembly.
- Padam Singh versus State of U.P. [CITATION]: Cited by the appellants, but not followed by the Court.
- Devatha Venkataswamy versus Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. [CITATION]: Cited by the appellants, but not followed by the Court.
- Narendra Singh versus State of M.P. [CITATION]: Cited by the appellants, but not followed by the Court.
- Prasanna Das versus State of Orissa [CITATION]: Cited by the appellants, but not followed by the Court.
- Majjal versus State of Haryana [CITATION]: Cited by the appellants, but not followed by the Court.
- Lalita Kumari versus Govt. of U.P. [CITATION]: Cited by the appellants, but distinguished by the Court, which held that not every GD entry can be treated as FIR.
- Baby alias Sebastian versus Central Inspector of Police [CITATION]: Cited by the appellants, but not followed by the Court.
- Damodar versus State of Rajasthan [CITATION]: Used to explain that every cryptic information cannot be treated as FIR.
- Mano Dutt & Anr. Versus State of Uttar Pradesh [CITATION]: Used to support the High Court’s decision to reverse the trial court.
- Sanjeev versus State of Haryana [CITATION]: Used to support the High Court’s decision to reverse the trial court.
- A. Shankar versus State of Karnataka [CITATION]: Used to support the High Court’s decision to reverse the trial court.
- State of Karnataka versus Suvarnamma & Anr. [CITATION]: Used to support the High Court’s decision to reverse the trial court.
- Bava Hajee Hamsa versus State of Kerala [CITATION]: Used to support the High Court’s decision to reverse the trial court.
- Patai Alias Krishna Kumar versus State U.P. [CITATION]: Used to explain that every cryptic information cannot be treated as FIR.
- Ravishwar Manjhi versus State of Jharkhand [CITATION]: Used to explain that every cryptic information cannot be treated as FIR.
- T.T. Antony versus State of Kerala [CITATION]: Used to explain that every cryptic information cannot be treated as FIR.
- Anand Mohan versus State of Bihar [CITATION]: Used to explain that every cryptic information cannot be treated as FIR.
- Sk. Ishaque v. State of Bihar [CITATION]: Used to explain that a cryptic information cannot be treated as an FIR.
- Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar [CITATION]: Used to explain that a cryptic information cannot be treated as an FIR.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:
- Credibility of Injured Eye-Witnesses: The Court placed significant weight on the consistent testimonies of the injured eye-witnesses (PWs 10, 11, 15, 12, and 18), who had directly experienced the attack and identified the accused.
- Perverse Approach of the Trial Court: The Court found that the trial court had adopted a perverse approach by rejecting the entire prosecution case based on minor contradictions and omissions.
- Unlawful Assembly: The Court emphasized the concept of unlawful assembly under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, holding that the actions of one member are attributable to all, especially when they share a common object.
- Rejection of Cryptic Information as FIR: The Court reiterated that not every cryptic message can be treated as an FIR, supporting the High Court’s view that the telephonic message was not a valid FIR.
- Vicarious Liability: The Court stressed the principle of vicarious liability of members of unlawful assembly.
Sentiment Analysis of Reasons Given by the Supreme Court
| Reason | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Credibility of Injured Eye-Witnesses | 40% |
| Perverse Approach of the Trial Court | 30% |
| Unlawful Assembly | 15% |
| Rejection of Cryptic Information as FIR | 10% |
| Vicarious Liability | 5% |
Fact:Law Ratio
| Category | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 60% |
| Law | 40% |
Logical Reasoning:
The Court considered alternative interpretations, such as the possibility that the trial court’s acquittal was a reasonable view, but rejected it for A1 to A7, finding the trial court’s approach to be perverse. The Court also considered the defense argument that the injury of A5 was not explained but held that it was not sufficient to reject the prosecution’s case. The Court emphasized that the consistent testimony of injured eye-witnesses and the principle of vicarious liability under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code were key factors in its decision. The Court also addressed the issue of the telephonic message, clarifying that not all cryptic information can be treated as an FIR.
The decision was reached by carefully weighing the evidence and applying the relevant legal principles. The Court found that the trial court had erred in rejecting the entire prosecution case based on minor inconsistencies, and the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal for A1 to A7.
The Court’s reasoning was based on the following:
- The trial court’s approach was perverse in rejecting the testimonies of the injured eye-witnesses.
- The consistent testimonies of the injured eye-witnesses were credible.
- The principle of vicarious liability under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code applied to the case.
- The telephonic message was not a valid FIR.
The Court quoted the following from the judgment:
- “The reasonable doubt is one which occurs to a prudent and reasonable man.”
- “While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the court has to assess whether read as a whole, it is truthful.”
- “An offence committed in prosecution of common object of an unlawful assembly by one person renders members of unlawful assembly sharing the common object vicariously liable for the offence.”
There were no dissenting opinions in this case. The bench consisted of two judges, and both concurred with the final decision.
The decision has potential implications for future cases involving similar facts, particularly in cases where the trial court has acquitted the accused based on minor inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case. The judgment reinforces the importance of the principle of vicarious liability in cases involving unlawful assembly and highlights the need for appellate courts to carefully review the reasons for acquittal given by trial courts.
The Court did not introduce any new doctrines or legal principles but reaffirmed the existing principles of criminal jurisprudence, particularly regarding the appreciation of evidence, the concept of unlawful assembly, and the principles of appellate review.
Key Takeaways
- Appellate courts can reverse acquittals if the trial court’s approach is found to be perverse.
- Minor contradictions and omissions in witness testimonies do not necessarily invalidate the entire testimony.
- The principle of vicarious liability under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code is crucial in cases involving unlawful assembly.
- Not every cryptic message can be treated as a First Information Report (FIR).
- Injured eye-witnesses’ testimonies hold significant weight in court.