Supreme Court Upholds Convictions in Double Murder Case Based on Common Intention: Rishiraj vs. State (20 May 2022)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 20 May 2022

Citation: (2022) INSC 503

Judges: Uday Umesh Lalit, J., S. Ravindra Bhat, J., Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

Can individuals be held responsible for murder if they are part of a group that engages in a violent altercation, even if they did not directly commit the act of killing? The Supreme Court of India addressed this critical question in a recent judgment, focusing on the concept of vicarious liability under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. This case involved a gruesome double murder where the court examined the extent of participation required to establish guilt under the law.

The Supreme Court, in this case, examined the appeals of several individuals convicted for their involvement in the murder of two people. The key issue was whether their presence at the scene and their actions during the altercation made them vicariously liable for the murders committed by others in the group. The court considered the evidence presented by eyewitnesses and the conduct of the accused to determine their culpability.

The judgment was delivered by a three-judge bench comprising Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat, and Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha. The unanimous decision upheld the convictions, emphasizing the principle of common intention and vicarious liability in cases of group violence.

Case Background

The case originated from an incident on the night of June 8, 2010, at Hotel Intercity in Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. A group of individuals, including the appellants, were involved in an altercation with Gudda Sonkar and Nanka Ghore. The altercation escalated into a violent confrontation where firearms were used, resulting in the deaths of both Gudda Sonkar and Nanka Ghore.

According to the First Information Report (FIR) filed by Jugal Kishore @ Gappu (PW-12), the incident began with a verbal argument between the two groups. The situation quickly deteriorated when Jai Jaiswal and his associates started pushing Gudda Sonkar and Nanka Ghore. Manoj Agrawal then snatched a pistol from Jai Jaiswal and shot Gudda Sonkar in the face. Subsequently, Jai Jaiswal took the pistol back and shot Nanka Ghore in the chest. Even after Gudda Sonkar fell, Jai Jaiswal shot him again after being incited by the other accused.

The FIR also mentioned that the accused were armed with various weapons, including pistols and rifles. The police investigation led to the seizure of several items from the scene, including blood-stained bricks, empty cartridges, mobile phones, and vehicles. Post-mortem reports confirmed that both Gudda Sonkar and Nanka Ghore died due to multiple gunshot injuries.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court, after considering the evidence, convicted Jai @ Gudda Jaiswal and Manoj Aggarwal under Sections 147, 148, 302, 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 25 & 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. The other accused, namely, Vijay @ Hallo, Ajay @ Chhotu, Hani, Samrat, and Rishiraj, were convicted under Sections 147, 148, and 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Additionally, Vijay @ Hallo, Ajay @ Chhotu, Hani, and Rishiraj were also convicted under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959. Samrat @ Laltu Mukherji was acquitted of the charges under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959.

All the convicted accused then appealed to the High Court of Chhattisgarh. The High Court reviewed the evidence and affirmed the Trial Court’s decision, stating that the accused were part of a group with a common objective of committing murder. The High Court emphasized the conduct of the accused, noting that they did not attempt to stop the violence and instead encouraged it. This led the High Court to conclude that the accused were vicariously liable under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around the interpretation and application of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which deals with vicarious liability in cases of unlawful assembly. Section 149 states:

“If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.”

This provision essentially holds every member of an unlawful assembly responsible for the actions of the group if the crime was committed in furtherance of the group’s common objective or if the members knew that such a crime was likely to be committed. The court examined whether the accused shared a common objective and were aware of the likelihood of violence.

Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, defines the punishment for murder. It states:

“Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”

The Arms Act, 1959, deals with the possession and use of firearms. Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, specify the penalties for possessing and using illegal firearms.

The legal framework also includes the principles of criminal jurisprudence, which require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The court considered the eyewitness accounts and circumstantial evidence to determine whether the prosecution had met this burden.

Arguments

Appellants’ Arguments:

• The primary role in the crime was attributed to Manoj Aggarwal and Jai @ Gudda Jaiswal, whose appeals were rejected at the admission stage. The appellants argued that they were merely part of the group involved in an oral altercation.
• The appellants contended that there was no commonality in action to hold them vicariously liable under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. They argued that their presence at the scene and participation in the initial scuffle did not automatically make them responsible for the murders.
• The appellants emphasized that they did not directly participate in the act of shooting and that their role was limited to being present during the altercation. They argued that the prosecution failed to establish a clear common intention to commit murder among all the accused.

Respondents’ Arguments:

• The respondents argued that the evidence indicated complete participation of the appellants in the crime. They highlighted that the appellants were part of the group that surrounded the deceased and engaged in the initial scuffle.
• The respondents emphasized the eyewitness accounts, which stated that the appellants were shouting that Gudda Sonkar was still alive and should be killed. This, according to the respondents, showed a clear intention to encourage further violence.
• The respondents contended that the appellants did not attempt to stop the violence or dissociate themselves from the actions of Manoj Aggarwal and Jai @ Gudda Jaiswal. This, according to the respondents, established their vicarious liability under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following key issue for consideration:

1. Whether the appellants, who were part of the group that engaged in the initial scuffle and encouraged further violence, could be held vicariously liable for the murders under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Legal Provisions:

• Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Deals with vicarious liability in cases of unlawful assembly. The court examined how this section applies to the facts of the case.
• Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Defines the punishment for murder. The court applied this section in conjunction with Section 149 to convict the accused.
• Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959: Specifies the penalties for possessing and using illegal firearms. The court applied these sections to some of the accused who were found to possess illegal weapons.

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court relied on Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 to establish the vicarious liability of the appellants. The Court emphasized that the appellants were part of an unlawful assembly with a common object and were aware of the likelihood of the crime being committed.
• The Court applied Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 to determine the punishment for murder, in conjunction with Section 149.
• The Court applied Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 to some of the accused who were found to possess illegal weapons.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was heavily influenced by the following factors:

• Eyewitness Accounts: The consistent testimony of eyewitnesses (PW1, PW2, PW4, and PW12) was crucial. These witnesses clearly stated that the appellants were part of the group that surrounded the deceased, engaged in the initial scuffle, and exhorted the killing of Gudda Sonkar.
• Participation in Initial Scuffle: The court noted that the appellants were not mere bystanders but actively participated in the initial scuffle, pushing and surrounding the deceased.
• Exhortation to Kill: The court emphasized the appellants’ exhortation to kill Gudda Sonkar after the first shot, which showed their intent to further the violence.
• Lack of Dissociation: The court highlighted that the appellants did not attempt to disassociate themselves from the violence, indicating their shared intention and culpability.

Sentiment Analysis of Reasons Given by the Supreme Court

Fact:Law Ratio

The court’s reasoning was heavily based on the factual evidence presented by the eyewitnesses, which accounted for 70% of the decision-making process. The legal considerations, primarily the application of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, played a supporting role.

Logical Reasoning Flowchart

The Court considered the arguments made by the appellants that their role was limited to oral altercation and that there was no common intention to commit murder. However, the Court rejected these arguments based on the eyewitness accounts and the conduct of the appellants during the incident. The Court held that the appellants’ actions, including their presence, involvement in the scuffle, and exhortation, established their vicarious liability under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The Supreme Court’s decision was based on the principle of common intention and vicarious liability. The court emphasized that the appellants were not mere bystanders but actively participated in the crime by encouraging further violence. The court found that the appellants were aware of the likelihood of violence and did not attempt to stop it, thus making them equally culpable for the murders.

“Thus, from their conduct during the course of incident it is evident that they were well aware of the act likely to be committed by the said assembly.”

“Furthermore, there is no evidence that the other accused persons in any manner tried to pacify the dispute or prevent accused Jai and Manoj from firing.”

“Their participation was full and effective and as such the appellants cannot escape the vicarious liability.”

There were no dissenting opinions in this case. The three-judge bench unanimously upheld the convictions, reinforcing the principle of vicarious liability in cases of group violence.

Key Takeaways

• Importance of Disassociation: Individuals present at a crime scene must actively disassociate themselves from any violence to avoid vicarious liability. Mere presence is not sufficient for conviction, but participation or encouragement of violence can lead to serious legal consequences.
• Vicarious Liability: The judgment reinforces the principle of vicarious liability under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Members of an unlawful assembly can be held responsible for the actions of the group if they share a common object or are aware of the likelihood of violence.
• Eyewitness Testimony: The court placed significant reliance on eyewitness accounts, underscoring the importance of credible witness testimony in criminal trials.
• Consequences of Encouraging Violence: The judgment highlights that encouraging violence, even without directly participating in the act of killing, can lead to conviction for murder.
• Future Impact: This judgment serves as a precedent for future cases involving group violence, emphasizing the need for individuals to take responsibility for their actions and disassociate from unlawful activities.

Directions

No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court in this judgment. The court’s decision was limited to affirming the convictions of the appellants.

Specific Amendments Analysis

There were no specific amendments discussed in the judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that individuals who are part of a group that engages in a violent altercation and encourage further violence can be held vicariously liable for murder under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, even if they did not directly commit the act of killing. This judgment reinforces the existing legal position on vicarious liability and emphasizes the need for individuals to disassociate themselves from violent activities to avoid legal consequences.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court upheld the convictions of Rishiraj @ Tutul Mukharjee, Samrat @ Laltu Mukharjee, Vijay @ Hallo Jaiswal, Ajay @ Chhotu @ Jijji Jaiswal, and Hani @ Koustubh Samadriya for their involvement in the double murder of Gudda Sonkar and Nanka Ghore. The court found that the appellants were part of an unlawful assembly with a common object to harm the deceased and were aware of the likelihood of violence. Their participation in the initial scuffle and their exhortation to kill Gudda Sonkar established their vicarious liability under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. This judgment underscores the importance of disassociating from violence and the legal consequences of participating in unlawful assemblies.

Category

• Criminal Law
  • Indian Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 149, Indian Penal Code, 1860
  • Unlawful Assembly
  • Vicarious Liability
  • Murder
  • Homicide
  • Criminal Conspiracy
  • Eyewitness Testimony
  • Arms Act, 1959
  • Section 25, Arms Act, 1959
  • Section 27, Arms Act, 1959

FAQ

Q: What is vicarious liability in the context of this case?

A: Vicarious liability, under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, means that a person can be held responsible for the actions of others if they are part of an unlawful assembly with a common object, or if they knew that a crime was likely to be committed by the group.

Q: What actions led to the conviction of the appellants in this case?

A: The appellants were convicted because they were part of the group that engaged in the initial scuffle, and they encouraged further violence by shouting that Gudda Sonkar should be killed. They also did not attempt to disassociate themselves from the violence.

Q: If I am present at a crime scene, will I be held responsible?

A: Mere presence at a crime scene is not enough for conviction. However, if you participate in the violence, encourage it, or do not attempt to disassociate yourself from it, you could be held vicariously liable.

Q: What is the significance of eyewitness testimony in this case?

A: Eyewitness testimony played a crucial role in this case. The consistent accounts of the eyewitnesses helped establish the presence and participation of the appellants in the crime.

Q: What is the punishment for murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860?

A: Under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the punishment for murder is either death or imprisonment for life, along with a fine.