Supreme Court Upholds Discharge of Army Personnel for False Documents: Ex. Sepoy Surendra Singh Yadav vs. Chief Record Officer (2019)

Date of the Judgment: September 06, 2019

Citation: (2019) INSC 882

Judges: L. Nageswara Rao, J., Hemant Gupta, J.

Can an army personnel be discharged from service for submitting a false educational certificate, even after being exonerated in a Summary Court Martial for the same offense? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in the case of Ex. Sepoy Surendra Singh Yadav vs. Chief Record Officer & Anr. The court examined whether the discharge of an army personnel for submitting a false certificate was valid, despite the personnel being previously exonerated in a court martial for the same offense. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice Hemant Gupta, with Justice L. Nageswara Rao authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The appellant, Ex. Sepoy Surendra Singh Yadav, was enrolled in the Army on April 26, 1991. At the time of his enrollment, he submitted a matriculation certificate from Madhyamik Shiksha Mandal, Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh. Upon verification, the certificate was found to be not genuine. Consequently, a charge sheet was issued against him under Section 44 of the Army Act, 1950. A preliminary inquiry was conducted, during which the appellant admitted that he did not possess any proof of having passed the matriculation examination in 1988.

Following the inquiry, the appellant was tried by a Summary Court Martial and found guilty under Section 44 of the Army Act, 1950. He was dismissed from service and sentenced to three months of rigorous imprisonment in a civil jail. However, the Reviewing Authority set aside the order of termination and the sentence, recommending the appellant’s reinstatement and subsequent discharge proceedings.

The appellant was reinstated on November 27, 1992. A show cause notice was issued on May 27, 1993, asking why he should not be discharged from service. The appellant did not respond to this notice. He was then discharged from service on July 10, 1993. The appellant challenged this discharge order by filing a Writ Petition in the High Court, which was later transferred to the Armed Forces Tribunal, Lucknow Bench. The Tribunal dismissed the Transfer Application, upholding the discharge order. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The appellant initially filed a Writ Petition in the High Court challenging the order of discharge. This petition was subsequently transferred to the Armed Forces Tribunal, Lucknow Bench. The Tribunal dismissed the Transfer Application, stating that no grounds were made out by the appellant to set aside the discharge order. The appellant, dissatisfied with the Tribunal’s order, then approached the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around Section 44 of the Army Act, 1950, and Rule 13 of the Army Rules, 1954. Section 44 of the Army Act, 1950, deals with false answers on enrolment. It states:

“44. False answers on enrolment. Any person having become subject to this Act who is discovered to have made at the time of enrolment a wilfully false answer to any question set forth in the prescribed form of enrolment which has been put to him by the enrolling officer before whom he appears for the purpose of being enrolled shall, on conviction by court- martial, be liable to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned.”

Rule 13 of the Army Rules, 1954, specifies the authorities empowered to authorize discharge and the grounds for discharge. Specifically, Rule 13(3) lists the grounds for discharge of persons enrolled under the Act who have been attested. The relevant sub-rule is (v):

“Grounds of discharge. III Persons enrolled under the Act who have been attested.

(i) On fulfilling the conditions of his enrolment or having rechecked the stage at which discharged may be enforced.

(ii) On completion of a period of army service only, there being non vacancy in the Reserve.

(iii) Having been Commanding Officer. Found medically unfit for further service.

(iv) At his own request before fulfilling the conditions of his enrolment.

(v) All other classes of discharge.”

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant contended that the order of discharge under Rule 13(3) Table III(v) of the Army Rules, 1954, was without jurisdiction.
• He argued that after being exonerated in the Summary Court Martial, he could not be dismissed under Section 20 of the Army Act, 1950.
• He submitted that the order of discharge was vitiated as it amounted to double jeopardy.
• The appellant relied on the judgment in Union of India and Anr. v. Pursushottam to support his argument.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The respondent justified the order of discharge by stating that exoneration in a Summary Court Martial does not bar initiation of proceedings for discharge.
• They submitted that the subject matter of the charge-sheet for the Summary Court Martial was different from the allegations for discharge.
• The respondent argued that the discharge was passed under item 3 Table III, annexed to Rule 13 of the Army Rules, 1954, which was within the authority’s jurisdiction.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court addressed the following issues:

1. Whether the order of discharge in exercise of the power under Rule 13 (3) Table III (v) of the Army Rules, 1954 is without jurisdiction.
2. Whether the Appellant can be dismissed in exercise of power under Section 20 of the Army Act, 1950 after he was exonerated in the Summary Court Martial.
3. Whether the order of discharge is vitiated as it amounts to double jeopardy.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court distinguished Union of India and Anr. v. Pursushottam [(2015) 3 SCC 779], stating that it was not applicable to the facts of the present case.
• The Court relied upon Union of India and Ors. v. Harjeet Singh Sandhu [(2001) 5 SCC 593] to conclude that disciplinary action can be taken even after exoneration in a Summary Court Martial.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court focused on the following key points:

• The fact that the appellant had submitted a false certificate at the time of enrollment.
• The legal principle that exoneration in a Summary Court Martial does not bar subsequent discharge proceedings.
• The distinction between the charges in the Summary Court Martial and the grounds for discharge.
• The authority of the respondents to discharge the appellant under Rule 13 of the Army Rules, 1954.

The Court considered that the appellant’s submission of a false certificate was a significant factor. The Court also considered that the exoneration in the Summary Court Martial did not bar the subsequent discharge proceedings. The Court emphasized that the charges in the Summary Court Martial and the grounds for discharge were different. The Court also held that the respondents had the authority to discharge the appellant under Rule 13 of the Army Rules, 1954. The court stated, “The proceedings initiated for discharge is on the ground of lack of requisite educational qualification. The charges are not the same.”

The Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the discharge order amounted to double jeopardy. The Court reasoned that the Summary Court Martial was for the offence of submitting a false certificate under Section 44 of the Army Act, 1950, while the discharge was for lack of requisite educational qualifications. The Court stated, “Though, the Respondents committed an error in referring to Section 20 (3) of the Act, a close scrutiny of the material on record would indicate that this is a case of discharge.”

The Court also noted that the appellant did not possess the required educational qualifications and, therefore, could not continue in service. The Court stated, “The Appellant does not possess the requisite educational qualifications. He cannot be continued in service. Therefore, he has been rightly discharged from service.”

Key Takeaways

• Exoneration in a Summary Court Martial does not prevent initiation of discharge proceedings.
• Discharge from service can be initiated for lack of requisite educational qualifications, even if the individual was previously tried for submitting a false certificate.
• The charges for a Summary Court Martial and the grounds for discharge can be different, thus not amounting to double jeopardy.

Directions

No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court in this case.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of the case is that exoneration in a Summary Court Martial does not bar the initiation of discharge proceedings, especially if the grounds for discharge are different from the charges in the Court Martial. This clarifies that disciplinary actions and discharge proceedings can be initiated separately, even if they arise from the same set of facts, provided the legal basis for each is different. This reinforces the principle that the Army has the power to discharge personnel who do not meet the required qualifications, even if they were previously tried for a related offense.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court upheld the discharge of the appellant, Ex. Sepoy Surendra Singh Yadav, ruling that the discharge was valid under Rule 13 of the Army Rules, 1954. The court clarified that exoneration in a Summary Court Martial does not prevent subsequent discharge proceedings, especially when the grounds for discharge are different. The Court emphasized that the appellant’s lack of requisite educational qualifications justified his discharge, despite his previous exoneration in a court martial for submitting a false certificate.