Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal for Employee Convicted of Moral Turpitude Despite Probation: Sushil Kumar Singhal vs. Punjab National Bank (2010)

Date of the Judgment: 10 August 2010

Citation: (2010) INSC 574

Judges: Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J., P. Sathasivam, J.

Can an employee, who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, be dismissed from service even after being granted probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958? The Supreme Court of India addressed this critical question in the case of Sushil Kumar Singhal vs. Punjab National Bank. The court examined whether the benefit of probation nullifies the grounds for dismissal based on conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice Dr. B.S. Chauhan and Justice P. Sathasivam, with the majority opinion authored by Justice Dr. B.S. Chauhan.

Case Background

The appellant, Sushil Kumar Singhal, was employed as a Peon at Punjab National Bank, Kaithal Branch, starting December 1, 1971, and was confirmed on December 28, 1977. On April 26, 1982, he was entrusted with ₹5000 to deposit as payment for a telephone bill at the Post Office. However, he failed to deposit the amount, leading the bank to file a First Information Report (FIR) against him on April 27, 1982, under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. After a trial, he was convicted on January 28, 1988. Subsequently, the bank issued a show cause notice on March 1, 1988, proposing his dismissal, and ultimately dismissed him on March 9, 1988, after considering his reply dated March 8, 1988.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

Aggrieved by his dismissal, the appellant raised an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The matter was referred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II at Chandigarh. Meanwhile, the appellate court upheld the conviction but granted the appellant the benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The Tribunal, on January 3, 2007, rejected the appellant’s claim, affirming his dismissal as justified. The appellant then challenged the Tribunal’s award before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, which dismissed his writ petition on September 10, 2007. This led to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around the interpretation of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, which states:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law.”

The Supreme Court also considered Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, which states:

“No banking company – (b) Shall employ or continue the employment of any person – (i) who is, or at any time has been, adjudicated insolvent, or has suspended payment or has compounded with his creditors, or who is, or has been, convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude.”

The court also discussed the concept of ‘moral turpitude’, referring to Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Edn., 2004) which defines it as:

“Conduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality…shameful wickedness- so extreme a departure from ordinary standards of honest, good morals, justice, or ethics as to be shocking to the moral sense of the community.”

Arguments

Appellant’s Submissions:

• The appellant argued that the benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, removes any disqualification attached to the conviction, as per Section 12 of the Act.
• The appellant contended that the appellate court’s grant of probation should have led the bank to reconsider his reinstatement.

Respondent’s Submissions:

• The respondent-bank contended that probation only suspends the sentence, not the fact of conviction.
• The bank argued that an employee convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude can be removed from service.
• The bank relied on Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, which prohibits the employment of individuals convicted of offenses involving moral turpitude.

Submissions Table

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The sole issue framed by the Supreme Court was:

1. Whether the benefit granted to the appellant under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, entitles him to reinstatement in service.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court held that the judgment in Aitha Chander Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh [1981 (Suppl.) SCC 17]* was not approved and did not lay down any law.
• The Court followed the interpretation of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, as laid down in Harichand vs. Director of School Education [(1998) 2 SCC 383]*, stating that it applies only to disqualifications under the law providing for the offense, not service rules.
• The Court relied on Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway & Anr. vs. T.R. Chellappan [AIR 1975 SC 2216]*, stating that the conviction is not washed away by probation.
• The Court reiterated its view in Trikha Ram vs. V.K. Seth & Anr [(1987) Supp. SCC 39]* that probation only removes disqualifications under other statutes, not for service.
• The Court reaffirmed the view in Union of India & Ors. vs. Bakshi Ram [(1990) 2 SCC 426]*, Karam Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. [(1996) 7 SCC 748]*, and Additional Deputy Inspector General of Police, Hyderabad vs. P.R.K. Mohan [(1997) 11 SCC 571]* that probation does not affect service-related consequences.
• The Court held that the order of dismissal from service is not a disqualification within the meaning of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, in Shankar Dass vs. Union of India & Anr. [AIR 1985 SC 772]*.
• The Court held that the High Court cannot direct that an accused not suffer civil consequences while granting probation in State of U.P. vs. Ranjit Singh [AIR 1999 SC 1201]*.
• The Court clarified that some part of the judgment in Union of India vs. Trilochan Patel [AIR 1985 SC 1612]* was overruled but not the observations regarding conviction and probation.
• The Court followed the view in Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board & Anr. vs. Ram Sajivan & Anr. [(2007) 9 SCC 86]* that Aitha Chander Rao did not lay down any law.
• The Court relied on Swarn Singh vs. State Bank of India & Anr. [(1986) Supp. SCC 566]* to state that Article 311(2) of the Constitution allows dismissal on the ground of conviction.
• The Court relied on Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana & Anr. [AIR 1996 SC 3300]* and Allahabad Bank & Anr. vs. Deepak Kumar Bhola [(1997) 4 SCC 1]* for the definition of moral turpitude.
• The Court followed the definition of moral turpitude as provided in Baleshwar Singh vs. District Magistrate and Collector [AIR 1959 All. 71]*.
• The Court stated that Courts cannot issue directions contrary to law in Manish Goel vs. Rohini Goel [AIR 2010 SC 1099]*.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following:

• Statutory Interpretation: The court emphasized the correct interpretation of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, clarifying that it does not apply to service-related disqualifications.
• Moral Turpitude: The court highlighted that the appellant’s offense involved moral turpitude, which, under Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, is a valid ground for dismissal.
• Precedent: The court relied on a series of its previous judgments to establish that probation does not nullify the fact of conviction or its consequences for service.
• Public Trust: The court underscored the importance of maintaining the integrity of public service, particularly in the banking sector, where trust and honesty are paramount.

Fact:Law Ratio

The court’s reasoning was heavily based on legal interpretations and precedents, with a lesser emphasis on the specific facts of the case.

The court considered alternative interpretations but rejected them, emphasizing the clear legal position that probation does not erase the fact of conviction for service-related purposes.

The court’s decision can be summarized as follows: an employee convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude can be dismissed from service, irrespective of being granted probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The court reasoned that the benefit of probation only suspends the sentence, not the fact of conviction, and that Section 12 of the Act does not apply to service-related disqualifications.

The court’s reasoning is supported by several direct quotes from the judgment:

• “In our view, Section 12 of the probation of offenders Act would apply only in respect of a disqualification that goes with a conviction under law which provides for the offence and its punishment.”
• “The order of release on probation is merely in substitution of the sentence to be imposed by the Court. Thus, the factum of guilt on the criminal charge is not swept away merely by passing the order under the Act, 1958.”
• “The word ‘Disqualification’ contained in Section 12 of the Act, 1958 refers to a disqualification provided in other Statutes, as explained by this Court in the above referred cases, and the employee cannot claim a right to continue in service merely on the ground that he had been given the benefit of probation under the Act, 1958.”

Key Takeaways

• An employee convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude can be dismissed from service, even if granted probation.
• The Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, does not protect employees from service-related consequences of a criminal conviction.
• Banks and other employers can rely on convictions for moral turpitude as a valid ground for dismissal.
• The judgment reinforces the importance of integrity and honesty in public service, particularly in the banking sector.

Directions

No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court in this case. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court’s decision and affirming the dismissal of the appellant from service.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, does not nullify the grounds for dismissal based on conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude. This judgment clarifies that Section 12 of the Act only applies to disqualifications under other statutes, not service rules. It reinforces the position that employers can dismiss employees convicted of offenses involving moral turpitude, even if probation is granted. This ruling solidifies the legal position on the interplay between criminal convictions, probation, and service law, ensuring that employers can maintain the integrity of their workforce.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of Sushil Kumar Singhal, affirming that a conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude is a valid ground for dismissal, regardless of whether the employee is granted probation. The court clarified the scope of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, and its implications for service law, ensuring that employers can maintain the integrity and honesty of their workforce.

Category

Parent Category: Service Law

Child Categories:

• Dismissal from Service
• Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
• Moral Turpitude
• Banking Regulation Act, 1949
• Section 12, Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
• Section 10(1)(b)(i), Banking Regulation Act, 1949

FAQ

Q: Can I be fired from my job if I am convicted of a crime but given probation?

A: Yes, if the crime involves “moral turpitude” (dishonesty, fraud, etc.), your employer can dismiss you, even if you are on probation. Probation only suspends the sentence, not the fact of conviction.

Q: What does “moral turpitude” mean?

A: Moral turpitude is conduct that is considered dishonest, immoral, or against good morals. It includes acts of baseness, vileness, or depravity. Examples include theft, fraud, and embezzlement.

Q: Does the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, protect me from losing my job if I am convicted?

A: No, the Act does not protect you from losing your job. Section 12 of the Act only removes disqualifications under other statutes, like election laws, but not for service-related matters.

Q: What is the significance of this judgment for employees?

A: This judgment makes it clear that a criminal conviction involving moral turpitude can lead to dismissal, regardless of probation. Employees must be aware that their actions can have serious consequences for their employment.

Q: What is the significance of this judgment for employers?

A: This judgment provides clarity to employers, especially in the banking sector, that they can dismiss employees convicted of offenses involving moral turpitude. It reinforces the importance of maintaining a trustworthy workforce.