Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Appeals Under SAFEMA Due to Limitation: Amina Bi Kaskar vs. Union of India (20 April 2018)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 20 April 2018

Citation: 2018 INSC 325

Judges: R.K. Agrawal, J., Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

Can a delay in filing an appeal be condoned even when it exceeds the maximum permissible limit? The Supreme Court of India addressed this crucial question regarding the condonation of delay under the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (SAFEMA). This case examines whether the Appellate Tribunal was correct in dismissing appeals filed beyond the condonable delay period and if the High Court was justified in upholding this decision. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice R.K. Agrawal and Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, with the majority opinion authored by Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre.

Case Background

The case revolves around orders passed by the Competent Authority under Section 7 of SAFEMA against the appellants on 14 July 1998 and 14 October 1998, concerning their properties. Aggrieved by these orders, the appellants filed appeals on 20 October 1998 before the Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property, New Delhi. According to SAFEMA, the limitation period for filing an appeal is 45 days from the date of service of the order. However, the Tribunal can condone a delay of up to 60 days if sufficient cause is shown. The appeals in this case were filed on the 81st day after the service of the order. The appellants claimed they were illiterate, ‘paradanashini’ widows, and had family responsibilities as reasons for the delay.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeals, holding that they were filed beyond the condonable delay period of 60 days and that no sufficient cause had been shown for the delay. The Tribunal stated it had no jurisdiction to condone delays beyond 60 days. The appellants then filed writ petitions before the High Court, which were dismissed by a Single Judge. Subsequently, an intra-court appeal was also dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The core legal provision at play here is Section 12(4) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (SAFEMA), which deals with the filing of appeals before the Appellate Tribunal. The Act prescribes a limitation period of 45 days for filing an appeal from the date of service of the order. However, it also allows the Tribunal to condone a delay of up to 60 days if sufficient cause is shown.

The relevant part of the SAFEMA states:

“12(4) Any person aggrieved by an order made by the competent authority under section 7, may, within forty-five days from the date on which the order is served on him, prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal: Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days, but not after the expiry of sixty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.”

Arguments

Appellants’ Submissions:

• The appellants argued that the service of the order was not done as per the procedure prescribed under Section 22 of SAFEMA.
• They contended that the service was not proper as it was served on their lawyer and minor daughter.
• The appellants claimed they were illiterate, ‘paradanashini’ widows, and had family responsibilities, constituting sufficient cause for the delay.

Respondents’ Submissions:

• The respondents argued that the appellants themselves admitted that they had knowledge of the order passed against them.
• They contended that the appeals were filed beyond the condonable period of 60 days and therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to condone the delay.
• They argued that the manner of service was irrelevant since the appellants admitted to having knowledge of the order.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issues:

1. Whether the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the appellants’ appeals as being barred by time.
2. Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that there was no sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeals.
3. Whether the High Court was justified in upholding the order of the Tribunal.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered several authorities, which were distinguished on facts:

• Kuntesh Gupta Dr.(Smt.) vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur(U.P.) & Ors., 1987 (4) SCC 525 – Supreme Court of India
• Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. Competent Authority, 1997 (11) SCC 421 – Supreme Court of India
• Chingleput Bottlers vs. Majestic Bottling Co., AIR 1984 SC 1030 – Supreme Court of India
• Attorney General For India & Ors. vs. Amartlal Prajivandas & Ors., 1994 (5) SCC 54 – Supreme Court of India

The Court also considered the following legal provision:

• Section 12(4) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (SAFEMA) – Limitation period for filing appeals and condonation of delay.

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The cases of Kuntesh Gupta Dr.(Smt.) vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur(U.P.) & Ors., [1987 (4) SCC 525], Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. Competent Authority, [1997 (11) SCC 421], Chingleput Bottlers vs. Majestic Bottling Co., [AIR 1984 SC 1030] and Attorney General For India & Ors. vs. Amartlal Prajivandas & Ors., [1994 (5) SCC 54] were distinguished on facts by the Court.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court primarily focused on the fact that the appellants had admitted to receiving the order, which nullified any arguments about improper service. The Court emphasized the strict limitation period of 60 days for condoning delays under SAFEMA. The Court’s reasoning was based on the principle that once the appellants had knowledge of the order, the manner of service became inconsequential. The Court also held that the reasons for delay provided by the appellants were not sufficient to condone the delay beyond the statutory limit.

Fact:Law Ratio

The court’s reasoning was primarily driven by the legal interpretation of the limitation period under SAFEMA (70%), while also considering the factual admission of knowledge by the appellants (30%).

The Court’s reasoning was based on the fact that the appeals were filed beyond the condonable period of 60 days, as per Section 12(4) of SAFEMA. The Court did not find merit in the argument that the service was not proper, because the appellants themselves admitted that they had knowledge of the order.

The Supreme Court stated, “In our opinion, when even according to the appellants, the orders impugned in the appeals before the Tribunal were served on them on 29/30th July 1998, then in such event, the question as to the manner in which the service was effected and whether it was in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 22 of SAFEMA has no significance and really does not arise for consideration.”

The Court further stated, “If the appellants had the knowledge of the order passed against them and which they admit to have as per their own admission mentioned above, pursuant to which they filed appeals, then in our opinion, so called irregularity in the manner of effecting the service of the order on them etc. was of no consequence and cannot be termed as illegal per se.”

The Court also stated, “In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered view that the Tribunal, Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court were right in dismissing the appeals as being barred by limitation holding that there was no sufficient cause in filing the appeals beyond the period of limitation and that the Tribunal did not have power to condone the delay beyond 60 days.”

Key Takeaways

• Strict adherence to limitation periods is crucial in legal proceedings.
• Admission of knowledge of an order can nullify arguments about improper service.
• Tribunals have limited power to condone delays, and such power cannot be exercised beyond the statutory limits.
• Reasons for delay must be substantial and sufficient to warrant condonation.

Directions

No specific directions were issued by the Supreme Court in this judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Appellate Tribunal cannot condone a delay in filing an appeal beyond the maximum period of 60 days as prescribed under Section 12(4) of SAFEMA. The Supreme Court upheld the strict interpretation of the limitation period and clarified that once the appellant has knowledge of the order, the manner of service becomes irrelevant. This judgment reinforces the importance of adhering to statutory timelines and the limited scope for condonation of delay. There was no change in the previous position of law.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the decisions of the Tribunal and the High Court. The Court held that the appeals were filed beyond the condonable delay period, and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond 60 days. The Court emphasized that the appellants’ admission of knowledge of the order made the manner of service irrelevant and that the reasons provided for the delay were insufficient.