Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Belated Application Under Order IX Rule 7 CPC: K.B. Lal vs. Gyanendra Pratap (2024)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: April 08, 2024

Citation: 2024 INSC 281

Judges: Sudhanshu Dhulia, J. and Prasanna B. Varale, J.

Can a litigant be allowed to pursue a case after an unexplained delay of 14 years? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this crucial question in a civil appeal concerning the dismissal of an application filed under Order IX Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The case revolves around a property dispute where the appellant sought to set aside an ex-parte order after a significant delay. The Supreme Court, in this case, upheld the decisions of the lower courts, emphasizing the importance of due diligence and reasonable explanation for delays in legal proceedings.

Case Background

The dispute concerns a piece of land in village Gharsaniya, Barabanki. The property was initially sold by Kalawati (Respondent No. 4) to Mansa Ram (Respondent No. 5) on March 30, 2006. Subsequently, on April 13, 2006, Mansa Ram sold the property to K.B. Lal (the Appellant).

On April 22, 2006, Gyanendra Pratap and others (Respondent Nos. 1, 2, and 3) filed a civil suit seeking a permanent injunction and cancellation of the sale deed dated March 30, 2006. They claimed to be the rightful owners of the property, asserting that Kalawati had no transferable rights. They stated that their uncle had executed a will deed on May 20, 1997, in their favor.

The appellant, K.B. Lal, was made Defendant No. 3 in the suit. Although he filed a vakalatnama through his counsel on April 22, 2006, he did not file a written statement. Consequently, the trial court ordered the suit to proceed ex-parte against him on September 6, 2006.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The trial court initially ordered the suit to proceed ex-parte against the appellant on September 6, 2006, as he did not file a written statement despite being served. The appellant then filed an application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the CPC on September 1, 2017, to recall the ex-parte order, which he did not press. He filed another application on November 23, 2020, which was also dismissed by the trial court on October 7, 2021. The trial court noted that the appellant was duly served, filed a vakalatnama, and sought permission to file written statements on July 12, 2011. The explanation for the delay was found to be contradictory and without reasonable cause.

Aggrieved by this, the appellant filed a revision before the Additional District Judge, Barabanki, which was dismissed on March 28, 2022. The revisional court observed that the first application was not pressed due to incorrect facts, and the second application was filed with the same advocate, despite claims that the previous counsel had been negligent. The revisional court found no error in the trial court’s order, noting the long delay of 14 years without satisfactory reasons.

The appellant then filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, which was dismissed on May 19, 2022. The High Court affirmed the orders of the lower courts, noting that the appellant’s counsel remained the same throughout. The High Court concluded that the appellant’s counsel would have known about the ex-parte order in 2011 and that no “good cause” was shown for the delay. The High Court refused to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction, finding no perversity in the orders of the courts below.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around Order IX, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which deals with the procedure when a defendant does not appear on the day fixed for hearing. It states:

“Where the defendant appears on the day fixed for hearing and shows good cause for his previous non-appearance, he may, upon such terms as the Court directs as to costs or otherwise, be heard in answer to the suit as if he had appeared on the day fixed for his appearance.”

The appellant sought to invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows for the condonation of delay if the applicant can show “sufficient cause”. However, the term “sufficient cause” is not defined in the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court has held that this term should be construed liberally to ensure that deserving cases are not dismissed solely on the ground of delay.

Arguments

Appellant’s Submissions:

• The appellant contended that he did not receive the summons and notice of the case.
• He argued that the advocate appointed by him initially belonged to another city and did not pursue the case diligently.
• The appellant claimed that he only came to know about the ex-parte order on September 6, 2006, when he inspected the case file in 2011.
• He submitted that the first application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the CPC filed on September 1, 2017, was not pressed because the correct facts were not mentioned.
• The appellant stated that the second application was filed on November 23, 2020, with the correct facts.
• The appellant sought the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of a delay of almost 14 years.

Respondents’ Submissions:

• The respondents argued that the appellant was duly served and had filed a vakalatnama of his counsel in April 2006.
• They pointed out that the appellant had filed an application seeking permission to file written statements on July 12, 2011, indicating that he was aware of the proceedings.
• The respondents highlighted that the appellant’s counsel remained the same throughout and would have known about the ex-parte order in 2011.
• They contended that the appellant did not provide a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the CPC.
• The respondents argued that the delay of 14 years was inordinate and without any satisfactory reasons.

The innovativeness of the argument by the appellant was in trying to show that the delay was due to the negligence of his previous lawyer.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issue:

1. Whether an application filed by the appellant, under Order IX, Rule 7 of the CPC can be allowed, after a delay of almost 14 years?
2. Was there a sufficient cause for filing such a belated application?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Cases:

• Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. (2021) 18 SCC 384: This case was cited to emphasize that the discretionary power of a court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and not in cases of gross negligence or lack of due diligence. (Supreme Court of India)
• P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 556: This case was cited to highlight that discretion should not be exercised in the absence of any reasonable, satisfactory, or appropriate explanation for the delay. (Supreme Court of India)
• Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer., (2013) 14 SCC 81: This case was cited to state that a liberal construction of ‘sufficient cause’ is only given when no negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fide is attributable to the litigant. (Supreme Court of India)
• Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649: This case was cited to summarize the principles for condonation of delay, including a liberal approach, the elastic nature of “sufficient cause”, and the importance of substantial justice. (Supreme Court of India)

Legal Provisions:

• Order IX, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC): This provision was discussed to explain the procedure when a defendant does not appear on the day fixed for hearing and the conditions for being heard in answer to the suit.
• Section 5, Limitation Act: This provision was discussed as it allows for the condonation of delay if the applicant can show “sufficient cause”.

Authority Analysis Table

Judgment

The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay of almost 14 years in filing the application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the CPC. The Court noted that the appellant was aware of the ex-parte order in 2011, yet did not file the application until 2017. The Court also pointed out that the explanation regarding the negligence of the advocate was not supported by the records.

The Court emphasized that while the term “sufficient cause” should be construed liberally, it cannot be applied in cases of gross negligence and lack of due diligence. The Court cited several precedents to support its view. The Court stated:

“There is no gainsaying the fact that the discretionary power of a court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and it is not to be exercised in cases where there is gross negligence and/or want of due diligence on part of the litigant.”

The Court further observed:

“Thus, it is apparent that the words ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 of the Limitation Act can only be given a liberal construction, when no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona fide is imputable to the litigant.”

The Court concluded that the appellant was grossly negligent in pursuing the matter before the trial court and found no reason to interfere with the High Court’s order. The appeal was dismissed.

“What prevented the appellant from filing the application under Order IX, Rule 7 that year itself has not been satisfactorily explained at all, as the first application was only filed in the year 2017.”

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court was primarily influenced by the lack of a reasonable explanation for the inordinate delay of 14 years. The Court emphasized the importance of due diligence and the need for litigants to pursue their cases with reasonable promptness. The Court also highlighted that the explanation given by the appellant was not supported by the records and was contradictory. The fact that the appellant was aware of the ex-parte order in 2011 but did not file the application until 2017 weighed heavily against him.

The Court’s reasoning was based on the application of established legal principles regarding condonation of delay. The Court emphasized that while a liberal approach should be taken, it cannot be extended to cases of gross negligence. The Court also emphasized that the explanation of the appellant was not supported by the records.

Key Takeaways

• Due Diligence is Crucial: Litigants must pursue their cases with due diligence and reasonable promptness.
• Inordinate Delays Not Tolerated: Courts will not condone inordinate delays without satisfactory explanations.
• “Sufficient Cause” Requires Bona Fide Explanation: The term “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act requires a bona fide and reasonable explanation, not just any excuse.
• Consistency in Pleadings: Litigants must ensure that their pleadings and explanations are consistent and supported by records.
• Impact on Future Cases: This judgment reinforces the importance of timely action in legal proceedings and sets a precedent against condoning gross negligence.

Directions

No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court in this judgment. The Court simply dismissed the appeal and upheld the orders of the lower courts.

Specific Amendments Analysis

There were no specific amendments discussed in the judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that inordinate delays in legal proceedings, particularly in filing applications under Order IX Rule 7 of the CPC, will not be condoned without a reasonable and satisfactory explanation. The judgment reinforces the principle that while the term “sufficient cause” should be construed liberally, it cannot be applied in cases of gross negligence or lack of due diligence. This case does not introduce a new legal principle, but it reaffirms the existing legal position on condonation of delay.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decisions of the lower courts. The Court emphasized that a delay of almost 14 years in filing an application under Order IX Rule 7 of the CPC cannot be condoned without a reasonable and satisfactory explanation. The judgment reinforces the importance of due diligence and timely action in legal proceedings.