Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Damages Claim in Wildlife Sanctuary Land Dispute: M/S. Natesan Agencies vs. State (2020) INSC 77 (05 February 2020)

Date of the Judgment: 05 February 2020
Citation: (2020) INSC 77
Judges: Uday Umesh Lalit, J. and Dinesh Maheshwari, J.
Can a party claim damages from the State for being unable to use land included in a wildlife sanctuary, especially when a subsequent lease was granted after the initial notification for inclusion? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a review petition, ultimately upholding the dismissal of a damages claim. The bench, comprising Justices Uday Umesh Lalit and Dinesh Maheshwari, found no error in the previous judgment that denied damages to the petitioner.

Case Background

M/S. Natesan Agencies (Plantations) (hereinafter referred to as “the appellant”) had leased land from Sri Nanamamalai Jeer Mutt for plantation purposes. The initial lease was for five years, from 01 July 1972 to 30 June 1977. On 06 March 1976, a notification was issued under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, proposing to include the land in a wildlife sanctuary. Despite this, a fresh lease for 25 years was made in favor of the appellant, from 01 July 1977 to 30 June 2002.

The appellant and the Mutt tried unsuccessfully to exclude the land from the sanctuary. While compensation proceedings were contemplated, the collector instead issued an order on 19 November 1993, excluding the land from the wildlife sanctuary. Aggrieved by this exclusion, the Mutt and the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court.

A Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition. However, the Division Bench of the High Court overturned this decision on 18 September 1997. The Division Bench acknowledged the government’s power to withdraw from the notification but dismissed the writ petition, allowing the appellant and the Mutt to pursue their claim for damages in an appropriate forum. Subsequently, on 08 June 1998, the appellant filed a civil suit against the State, seeking damages for being prevented from using the land from 1976 to 1993.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The civil suit filed by the appellant was initially decreed by a Single Judge of the High Court. However, the Division Bench of the High Court reversed this decree on 26 February 2007, dismissing the suit. The Supreme Court, in its judgment dated 20 August 2019, upheld the Division Bench’s decision. The appellant then filed a review petition, which is the subject of this judgment.

Legal Framework

The case primarily involves the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. The notification dated 06 March 1976, issued under this Act, proposed the inclusion of the land in question within a wildlife sanctuary. The court also considered the Limitation Act in the context of the appellant’s claim for damages.

Arguments

The appellant argued that they were prevented from using the land from 1976 to 1993 due to the inclusion of the land in the wildlife sanctuary, and sought damages for the loss suffered during this period. The appellant contended that the exclusion of the land from the sanctuary in 1993 did not negate their right to claim damages for the period when they were restricted from using the land.

The State, on the other hand, argued that the appellant had no right to claim damages since the fresh lease was of no effect after the issuance of the notification under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. The State also contended that there was no evidence to suggest that the appellant was prevented from using the land or collecting usufructs.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in this review petition order. However, the core issue was whether there was any error apparent on the face of the record that would warrant a review of the judgment dated 20 August 2019.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court did not discuss any specific authorities in this review order. The primary focus was on whether there was any error in the previous judgment.

Judgment

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the fact that the appellant’s second lease was of no effect after the land was notified for inclusion in the wildlife sanctuary. Additionally, the Court found no evidence that the State had prevented the appellant from using the land or collecting usufructs.

The Court examined the record and grounds for review and found no error apparent on the face of the record. The Court reiterated that the appellant had no right to claim damages from the State.

The Court stated, “Having examined the matter in its totality, this Court found that after issuance of the notification dated 06.03.1976 and inclusion of the subject land therein, there was no occasion for the appellant acquiring any further right in the land after expiry of the term of lease on 30.06.1977 and hence, the alleged second lease for a period of 25 years was of no effect; and the appellant had no right to claim damages from the State.”

The Court further noted, “It was also found that there was nothing on record to suggest that appellant was prevented by the State from going inside the forest and collecting usufructs and hence, there was no basis for the appellant to maintain an action for damages.”

The Court concluded, “Having examined the record and the grounds stated, we are unable to find any error apparent on the face of the record calling for review of the judgment dated 20.08.2019.”

Key Takeaways

• A lease granted after a notification for inclusion of land in a wildlife sanctuary may be deemed ineffective.
• A party cannot claim damages if they were not demonstrably prevented from using the land or collecting usufructs.
• The Supreme Court will not review a judgment unless there is an error apparent on the face of the record.

Directions

No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court in this order.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a subsequent lease granted after a notification for inclusion of land in a wildlife sanctuary is ineffective, and the lessee cannot claim damages from the State if not demonstrably prevented from using the land. This upholds the previous position of law.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition filed by M/S. Natesan Agencies, upholding its previous decision that the appellant had no right to claim damages from the State for being unable to use land included in a wildlife sanctuary. The Court found no error in the previous judgment and reiterated that the second lease was of no effect.

Category

Parent Category: Environmental Law
Child Category: Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972
Parent Category: Contract Law
Child Category: Leases
Parent Category: Limitation Act
Child Category: Section 14, Limitation Act

FAQ

Q: Can a lease be considered valid if it was granted after a notification for inclusion of the land in a wildlife sanctuary?
A: No, the Supreme Court held that such a lease is of no effect.

Q: Can a party claim damages if they were unable to use the land included in a wildlife sanctuary?
A: Only if they can demonstrate that they were prevented from using the land by the State.

Q: What is the significance of this judgment?
A: This judgment clarifies that a lease granted after a notification for inclusion of land in a wildlife sanctuary is ineffective and that mere inclusion does not automatically entitle a party to claim damages unless there is a clear prevention of use by the State.