Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Delay Condonation in Property Dispute: Mohd. Sahid vs. Raziya Khanam (2018)

Date of the Judgment: October 10, 2018
Citation: (2018) INSC 910
Judges: R. Banumathi, J., Indira Banerjee, J.
Can a party who was aware of court proceedings claim ignorance to justify a delay in filing an appeal? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case concerning a property dispute, ultimately upholding the High Court’s decision to dismiss an appeal due to significant delay. The bench, composed of Justices R. Banumathi and Indira Banerjee, delivered a unanimous judgment.

Case Background

The case revolves around a civil suit filed by Raziya Khanam (since deceased) against Mohd. Sahid and others, seeking cancellation of sale deeds dated February 17, 1979, and May 17, 1979, and a permanent injunction regarding the suit land. Raziya Khanam claimed that the appellants had forged documents to execute a sale deed in their favor on February 17, 1979, and subsequently sold part of the property to Mahesh on May 17, 1979. The respondents contended that Hadisunnissa had executed a Hibanama in favor of Raziya Khanam on February 27, 1979, for her properties.

Initially, the trial court decreed the suit in favor of Raziya Khanam on April 16, 1981, noting that the defendants had been properly served but failed to file a written statement. However, the First Appellate Court reversed this decision on November 29, 1985, finding that one of the defendants, Mohd. Asid, was a minor and not properly represented. The matter was remanded back to the trial court for a fresh hearing.

Raziya Khanam then filed a writ petition before the High Court, which remained pending for fifteen years. The High Court eventually dismissed the writ petition on February 20, 2001, vacating the interim stay. Despite these proceedings, the defendants claimed they were unaware of the trial court’s subsequent ex-parte decree on May 10, 2012, until a constable informed them on May 6, 2013.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The trial court initially decreed the suit ex-parte on April 16, 1981, as the defendants failed to file a written statement despite being served. The First Appellate Court, however, set aside this decree on November 29, 1985, due to the improper representation of a minor defendant and remanded the case. A writ petition filed by the plaintiff challenging the remand order was dismissed by the High Court on February 20, 2001. Subsequently, the trial court again decreed the suit ex-parte on May 10, 2012, when the defendants failed to appear. The appellants then filed an appeal with a delay of 349 days, which was dismissed by both the First Appellate Court and the High Court.

Legal Framework

The primary legal provision at issue is Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows for the condonation of delay in filing an appeal if the appellant can demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay. The court considered whether the appellants had provided a valid reason for the 349-day delay in filing their appeal.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act states:
“Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.”

Arguments

Appellants’ Submissions:

• The appellants claimed they first learned of the trial court’s decree on May 6, 2013, when a constable informed them while they were at the Sub-Divisional Magistrate’s office for another case.
• They stated they contacted their counsel on May 9, 2013, inspected the case file on May 10, 2013, and applied for a copy of the judgment, which they received on May 18, 2013.
• They argued that the delay was due to this late discovery of the judgment.

Respondents’ Submissions:

• The respondents contended that the appellants were aware of the proceedings and the ex-parte decree.
• They pointed to the trial court’s order sheets of October 11, 2011, and October 14, 2011, which indicated the presence of both parties.
• They argued that the appellants had also mentioned the judgment dated May 10, 2012, in their application dated November 23, 2012 before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate.
• They argued that the appellants’ claim of learning about the judgment through a constable on May 6, 2013, was false.

Innovativeness of the argument: The respondents innovatively used the appellants’ own application before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to prove that the appellants were aware of the judgment much before they claimed they were.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues but addressed the following key question:

1. Whether the High Court was correct in upholding the dismissal of the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court did not cite any specific cases or books in its judgment. However, it did refer to Section 5 of the Limitation Act in its analysis of the case.

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court considered Section 5 of the Limitation Act and held that the appellants did not demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Court was primarily influenced by the fact that the appellants had knowledge of the court proceedings and the ex-parte decree well before they claimed to have learned about it. The court found the appellants’ claim of ignorance to be false and contradictory, especially given the evidence presented by the respondents, including the trial court’s order sheets and the appellants’ own application before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The Court emphasized that the appellants’ lack of diligence in pursuing the matter and their attempt to mislead the court weighed heavily against them.

The court’s reasoning can be summarized as follows:

The Court rejected the appellants’ explanation for the delay, stating that the appellants had not come out with the correct facts. The Court noted that the appellants were present in court on October 11, 2011, and October 14, 2011, when the matter was discussed. The Court also noted that the appellants had mentioned the judgment dated May 10, 2012, in their application dated November 23, 2012 before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The Court found that the appellants’ claim of learning about the judgment through a constable on May 6, 2013, was not credible. The Court observed that the appellants were not vigilant and were negligent in pursuing the matter.

The court quoted from the trial court’s judgment:

“In the present case, the defendants have filed their objection at 17 A1 but they had remained absent at the time of adducing evidence. Therefore, on 09.11.2011, their opportunity of adducing evidence was closed and they were declared ex-parte and ex-parte proceeding continued.”

The Court also quoted from the trial court’s judgment:

“In support of their pleadings, the plaintiffs had examined PW-1 Seraj Ahmmed, PW-2 Firoz Alam and PW-3 Salauddin as witnesses. The evidences on affidavit of these witnesses have been placed on records as the Document No.120A2, 128A2 and 129A2. The defendants did not remain present for the cross-examination of the aforementioned witnesses………”

The Court stated:

“The averments in the application that the appellants got knowledge about the judgment in Suit No.591 of 1979 dated 10.05.2012 only on 06.05.2013 through a constable is incorrect.”

There were no dissenting opinions. The decision was unanimous.

Key Takeaways

• Parties must be vigilant in pursuing their cases and cannot claim ignorance of court proceedings if they were previously aware of them.
• Courts will not condone delays in filing appeals if the reasons provided are false, contradictory, or demonstrate a lack of diligence.
• The burden of proof lies on the appellant to show sufficient cause for the delay, and failure to do so will result in the dismissal of the appeal.

Directions

No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court.

Development of Law

The case reinforces the principle that parties must be diligent in pursuing their cases and cannot rely on false claims of ignorance to justify delays. The ratio decidendi of the case is that a party that had knowledge of the proceedings cannot claim ignorance to justify a delay in filing an appeal. There is no change in the previous position of law.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s decision to reject the application for condonation of delay. The Court found that the appellants had knowledge of the proceedings and the ex-parte decree, and their claim of ignorance was not credible. This case highlights the importance of diligence and honesty in pursuing legal remedies.