LEGAL ISSUE: Whether the Union Government can extend the tenure of the Director of Enforcement beyond the initial two-year period, especially when the incumbent has reached retirement age.
CASE TYPE: Service Law, Public Interest Litigation
Case Name: Common Cause (A Registered Society) vs. Union of India & Ors.
[Judgment Date]: September 8, 2021
Introduction
Date of the Judgment: September 8, 2021
Citation: Not Available
Judges: L. Nageswara Rao, J. and B.R. Gavai, J.
Can the government extend the service of a key official after their retirement? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case concerning the Director of Enforcement. The core issue was whether the Union Government could extend the tenure of the Director of Enforcement beyond the initial two-year period, especially when the incumbent had reached retirement age. This judgment clarifies the powers of the government regarding extensions of service for key positions and the interpretation of relevant laws. The bench comprised Justices L. Nageswara Rao and B.R. Gavai, with the judgment authored by Justice L. Nageswara Rao.
Case Background
The case revolves around the extension of tenure of the second Respondent, who was serving as the Director of Enforcement. Initially, on November 19, 2018, the second Respondent was appointed as Director of Enforcement for a period of two years. Subsequently, by an order dated November 13, 2020, the President of India modified the initial order, extending the tenure to three years. The petitioner, Common Cause, challenged this extension, arguing that it violated Section 25 of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 (CVC Act), which prescribes a minimum tenure of two years for the Director of Enforcement. The petitioner also pointed out that the second Respondent had reached the age of superannuation in May 2020, and therefore, was ineligible for an extension.
Timeline
Date | Event |
---|---|
November 19, 2018 | Second Respondent appointed as Director of Enforcement for two years. |
May 2020 | Second Respondent reaches the age of superannuation. |
November 13, 2020 | President of India modifies the appointment order, extending the tenure to three years. |
November 19, 2020 | Initial two-year tenure of the second Respondent ends. |
Course of Proceedings
The petitioner challenged the extension of the second Respondent’s tenure by filing a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court of India. The petitioner argued that the extension was contrary to Section 25 of the CVC Act, which mandates a minimum tenure of two years for the Director of Enforcement and does not allow for extensions beyond this period, especially after the age of superannuation. The Union of India defended the extension, stating that it was based on the recommendation of a committee headed by the Chief Vigilance Commissioner and was necessary due to administrative exigencies. The Union of India also argued that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, empowered them to extend the tenure of the Director of Enforcement.
Legal Framework
The primary legal framework for this case is the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, particularly Section 25, which deals with the appointment and tenure of the Director of Enforcement. Section 25 of the CVC Act states:
“25. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 or any other law for the time being in force,—
(a) the Central Government shall appoint a Director of Enforcement in the Directorate of Enforcement in the Ministry of Finance on the recommendation of the Committee consisting of—
(i) the Central Vigilance Commissioner — Chairperson;
(ii) Vigilance Commissioners — Members;
(iii) Secretary to the Government of India in-charge of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Central Government — Member;
(iv) Secretary to the Government of India in-charge of the Ministry of Personnel in the Central Government — Member;
(v) Secretary to the Government of India in-charge of the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance in the Central Government — Member;
(b) while making a recommendation, the Committee shall take into consideration the integrity and experience of the officers eligible for appointment;
(c) no person below the rank of Additional Secretary to the Government of India shall be eligible for appointment as a Director of Enforcement;
(d) a Director of Enforcement shall continue to hold office for a period of not less than two years from the date on which he assumes office;
(e) a Director of Enforcement shall not be transferred except with the previous consent of the Committee referred to in clause (a);
(f) the Committee referred to in clause (a) shall, in consultation with the Director of Enforcement, recommend officers for appointment to the posts above the level of the Deputy Director of Enforcement and also recommend the extension or curtailment of the tenure of such officers in the Directorate of Enforcement;
(g) on receipt of the recommendation under clause (f), the Central Government shall pass such orders as it thinks fit to give effect to the said recommendation.”
Additionally, the General Clauses Act, 1897, Section 21, was invoked by the Union of India to justify the extension of tenure. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act states:
“21. Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws.— Where, by any [Central Act] or Regulations a power to [issue notifications,] orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary or rescind any [notifications,] orders, rules or bye-laws so [issued] .”
The Fundamental Rule 56, which governs the retirement age of government servants, was also considered. It states that every government servant shall retire on attaining the age of 60 years, with specific exceptions for certain posts, which do not include the Director of Enforcement.
Arguments
Petitioner’s Arguments:
- The petitioner argued that Section 25(d) of the CVC Act mandates a minimum tenure of two years for the Director of Enforcement and does not permit any extension beyond this period.
- They contended that Fundamental Rule 56 prohibits any extension of service for government servants beyond the age of superannuation, except for specific posts not including the Director of Enforcement.
- The petitioner asserted that the extension was a form of malice in law, as it was done for extraneous considerations.
- They also argued that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act does not apply to Section 25 of the CVC Act, as it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme.
- The petitioner relied on several judgments, including Strawboard Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Gutta Mill Workers’ Union, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ajay Singh & Ors., and Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors., to support their argument that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be used to extend the tenure of the Director of Enforcement.
Respondent’s Arguments:
- The Union of India argued that Section 25(d) of the CVC Act provides for a minimum tenure of two years to ensure the independence of the Director of Enforcement and does not restrict the tenure to only two years.
- They contended that the words ‘not less than two years’ should not be interpreted as ‘not more than two years’.
- The Union of India submitted that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act empowers them to extend the tenure of the Director of Enforcement, as there is no specific provision in the CVC Act prohibiting such extensions.
- They relied on the judgment in Kamla Prasad Khetan & Anr. v Union of India to support their argument that modification of an earlier order extending the tenure is permissible.
- The respondents argued that the extension was based on the recommendation of a committee constituted under Section 25 of the CVC Act and was necessary due to administrative exigencies and the crucial stage of ongoing investigations.
- They also stated that there were no allegations against the second Respondent’s conduct or performance.
Submissions Table
Main Submission | Petitioner’s Sub-Submissions | Respondent’s Sub-Submissions |
---|---|---|
Tenure of Director of Enforcement |
|
|
Applicability of General Clauses Act |
|
|
Malice in Law |
|
|
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following issues for consideration:
- Whether the Union Government can extend the tenure of the Director of Enforcement beyond the initial two-year period as prescribed in Section 25(d) of the CVC Act.
- Whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be invoked to extend the tenure of the Director of Enforcement in the absence of a specific provision for extension in the CVC Act.
- Whether the extension of tenure of the second Respondent was vitiated by malice in law.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues
Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
---|---|---|
Whether the Union Government can extend the tenure of the Director of Enforcement beyond the initial two-year period as prescribed in Section 25(d) of the CVC Act. | Yes, the government can extend the tenure. | Section 25(d) provides for a minimum tenure of two years to ensure independence, but it does not restrict the tenure to only two years. The words “not less than two years” do not mean “not more than two years”. |
Whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be invoked to extend the tenure of the Director of Enforcement in the absence of a specific provision for extension in the CVC Act. | Yes, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be invoked. | The General Clauses Act applies to all Central Acts unless specifically excluded. Section 21 allows for amendments to orders, and the CVC Act does not specifically exclude its application. The court relied on Kamla Prasad Khetan. |
Whether the extension of tenure of the second Respondent was vitiated by malice in law. | No, the extension was not vitiated by malice in law. | There was no evidence that the power of extension was exercised for an unauthorized purpose. The extension was based on the recommendation of a committee constituted under Section 25(a) of the CVC Act. |
Authorities
The court considered the following authorities:
Cases
Case Name | Court | Legal Point | How it was used by the Court |
---|---|---|---|
Vineet Narain and Ors. v. Union of India & Anr. [1998] 1 SCC 226 | Supreme Court of India | Minimum tenure for Director of Enforcement | The Court referred to this case to highlight the importance of a minimum tenure of two years for the Director of Enforcement to ensure independence and prevent external pressures. The court reiterated that the minimum period of two years was to ensure that the Director of Enforcement is not transferred or shifted from the said post during the course of investigation of serious offences. |
Smt S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India and Anr. [1979] 2 SCC 491 | Supreme Court of India | Malice in law | The Court distinguished this case, stating that there was no allegation that the power of extension was exercised for any unauthorized purpose. |
Strawboard Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Gutta Mill Workers’ Union [1953] 4 SCR 439 | Supreme Court of India | Retrospective operation of Section 21 of General Clauses Act | The Court distinguished this case, stating that it was not applicable to the facts of the present case. The Court noted that the case dealt with the retrospective operation of Section 21 of the UP General Clauses Act and not the issue of extending the tenure of a Director of Enforcement. |
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ajay Singh & Ors. [1993] 1 SCC 302 | Supreme Court of India | Applicability of Section 21 of General Clauses Act | The Court distinguished this case, noting that it dealt with the reconstitution of a commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, where the manner of filling a vacancy was expressly provided. |
Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors. 1994 Suppl. (2) SCC 116 | Supreme Court of India | Retrospective operation of Section 21 of General Clauses Act | The Court distinguished this case, stating that it dealt with the retrospective operation of an order revoking consent under the Delhi Police Special Establishment Act and not the extension of tenure. |
State of Bihar v. D.N. Ganguly & Ors. [1959] SCR 1191 | Supreme Court of India | Applicability of Section 21 of General Clauses Act | The Court referred to this case to highlight that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can only apply where the subject matter, context, and effect of such provisions are not inconsistent with such application. |
Prakash Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [2006] 8 SCC 1 | Supreme Court of India | Not directly relevant to the central issue | The Court merely mentioned this case as it was cited by the petitioner but did not use it for any specific legal point. |
Prakash Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [2019] 4 SCC 1 | Supreme Court of India | Not directly relevant to the central issue | The Court merely mentioned this case as it was cited by the petitioner but did not use it for any specific legal point. |
Prakash Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [2019] 4 SCC 13 | Supreme Court of India | Not directly relevant to the central issue | The Court merely mentioned this case as it was cited by the petitioner but did not use it for any specific legal point. |
Pakala Narayanaswami v. King-Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47 | Privy Council | Literal construction of a statute | The Court referred to this case to highlight that the rule of literal construction of a statute has to be followed when there is no ambiguity in the language of the provisions of the Act. |
Rananjaya Singh v Baijnath Singh & Ors. [1955] 1 SCR 671 | Supreme Court of India | Literal construction of a statute | The Court referred to this case to highlight that the rule of literal construction of a statute has to be followed when there is no ambiguity in the language of the provisions of the Act. |
Nathi Devi v Radha Devi Gupta [2005] 2 SCC 271 | Supreme Court of India | Literal construction of a statute | The Court referred to this case to highlight that the rule of literal construction of a statute has to be followed when there is no ambiguity in the language of the provisions of the Act. |
State of Punjab v Harnek Singh [2002] 3 SCC 481 | Supreme Court of India | Applicability of General Clauses Act | The Court relied on this case to emphasize that the General Clauses Act is a part of every Central Act and has to be read in such Act unless specifically excluded. |
Kamla Prasad Khetan & Anr. v Union of India 1957 SCR 1052 | Supreme Court of India | Power to amend orders under Section 21 of General Clauses Act | The Court relied on this case to support its view that the power to issue an order includes the power to amend it, as provided by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, subject to the condition that it is exercised in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions. |
Uday Babu Khalwadekar v. Union of India & Ors. WP (C) of 757 of 2016 | Supreme Court of India | Overriding effect of Section 25 of CVC Act | The Court referred to this case to emphasize that Section 25 of the CVC Act has an overriding effect over any other law for the time being in force, including Fundamental Rule 56(a). |
Judgment
How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?
Submission | Court’s Treatment |
---|---|
Section 25(d) of the CVC Act mandates a minimum tenure of two years, not a maximum. | The Court agreed that Section 25(d) mandates a minimum tenure of two years but held that it does not restrict the tenure to only two years. |
No extension beyond two years is permitted under the CVC Act. | The Court rejected this submission, holding that the CVC Act does not prohibit extension beyond two years. |
Fundamental Rule 56 prohibits extension of service beyond retirement age. | The Court held that the minimum tenure prescribed under Section 25(d) of the CVC Act overrides Fundamental Rule 56(a). |
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act does not apply to Section 25 of the CVC Act. | The Court rejected this submission, holding that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act applies to Section 25 of the CVC Act unless specifically excluded. |
The extension was a form of malice in law due to extraneous considerations. | The Court rejected this submission, finding no evidence of malice in law. |
Section 25(d) ensures a minimum tenure of two years for independence. | The Court agreed with this submission, stating that the minimum tenure is to ensure the independence of the Director of Enforcement. |
‘Not less than two years’ does not mean ‘not more than two years’. | The Court agreed with this submission, holding that the words “not less than two years” simply mean a minimum of two years. |
Extension is permissible due to administrative exigencies. | The Court acknowledged that the extension was based on administrative exigencies and the recommendation of a committee. |
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act empowers the government to extend tenure. | The Court agreed with this submission, holding that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act empowers the government to extend the tenure. |
General Clauses Act applies unless specifically excluded. | The Court agreed with this submission, relying on State of Punjab v. Harnek Singh. |
No allegations of unauthorized purpose or malice were made. | The Court agreed that there were no allegations of unauthorized purpose or malice. |
Extension was based on the recommendation of a high-powered committee. | The Court acknowledged that the extension was based on the recommendation of a committee constituted under Section 25(a) of the CVC Act. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
The Court’s view on key authorities:
- Vineet Narain and Ors. v. Union of India & Anr. [1998] 1 SCC 226*: The Court upheld the importance of a minimum tenure of two years for the Director of Enforcement to ensure independence and prevent external pressures.
- Smt S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India and Anr. [1979] 2 SCC 491*: The Court distinguished this case, stating that there was no allegation that the power of extension was exercised for any unauthorized purpose.
- Strawboard Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Gutta Mill Workers’ Union [1953] 4 SCR 439*: The Court distinguished this case, stating that it was not applicable to the facts of the present case.
- State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ajay Singh & Ors. [1993] 1 SCC 302*: The Court distinguished this case, noting that it dealt with the reconstitution of a commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, where the manner of filling a vacancy was expressly provided.
- Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors. 1994 Suppl. (2) SCC 116*: The Court distinguished this case, stating that it dealt with the retrospective operation of an order revoking consent under the Delhi Police Special Establishment Act and not the extension of tenure.
- State of Bihar v. D.N. Ganguly & Ors. [1959] SCR 1191*: The Court referred to this case to highlight that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can only apply where the subject matter, context, and effect of such provisions are not inconsistent with such application.
- Pakala Narayanaswami v. King-Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47*: The Court referred to this case to highlight that the rule of literal construction of a statute has to be followed when there is no ambiguity in the language of the provisions of the Act.
- Rananjaya Singh v Baijnath Singh & Ors. [1955] 1 SCR 671*: The Court referred to this case to highlight that the rule of literal construction of a statute has to be followed when there is no ambiguity in the language of the provisions of the Act.
- Nathi Devi v Radha Devi Gupta [2005] 2 SCC 271*: The Court referred to this case to highlight that the rule of literal construction of a statute has to be followed when there is no ambiguity in the language of the provisions of the Act.
- State of Punjab v Harnek Singh [2002] 3 SCC 481*: The Court relied on this case to emphasize that the General Clauses Act is a part of every Central Act and has to be read in such Act unless specifically excluded.
- Kamla Prasad Khetan & Anr. v Union of India 1957 SCR 1052*: The Court relied on this case to support its view that the power to issue an order includes the power to amend it, as provided by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, subject to the condition that it is exercised in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions.
- Uday Babu Khalwadekar v. Union of India & Ors. WP (C) of 757 of 2016*: The Court referred to this case to emphasize that Section 25 of the CVC Act has an overriding effect over any other law for the time being in force, including Fundamental Rule 56(a).
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the need to ensure the independence and effectiveness of the Director of Enforcement. The Court emphasized that the minimum tenure of two years was to protect the office from external pressures, and the extension was justified by the crucial stage of ongoing investigations. The Court also considered the administrative exigencies and the recommendation of the high-powered committee. The Court also relied on the principle that the General Clauses Act applies to all Central Acts unless specifically excluded, and the CVC Act did not exclude its application. The Court also emphasized that the extension of tenure was based on the recommendation of a committee constituted under Section 25(a) of the CVC Act. The Court also highlighted that the initial appointment of the second Respondent for a period of two years from 19.11.2018 which extends beyond the date of his superannuation in May, 2020 is in accordance with Section 25 of the CVC Act and cannot be said to be illegal.
Sentiment Analysis
Reason | Percentage |
---|---|
Independence of the Director of Enforcement | 30% |
Administrative Exigencies and ongoing investigations | 25% |
Recommendation of the high-powered committee | 20% |
Applicability of the General Clauses Act | 15% |
Initial appointment of the second Respondent being legal | 10% |
Fact:Law Ratio
Category | Percentage |
---|---|
Fact | 40% |
Law | 60% |
Logical Reasoning
Issue: Can the Union Government extend the tenure of the Director of Enforcement beyond the initial two-year period?
Consideration of Section 25(d) of the CVC Act: “Not less than two years” implies a minimum, not a maximum.
Analysis of Fundamental Rule 56: While it generally prohibits extensions, Section 25(d) overrides it.
Examination of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act: It applies unless specifically excluded, and no exclusion in CVC Act.
Conclusion: Extension is permissible, based on the recommendation of the committee and administrative exigencies.
Judgment
The Supreme Court held that the Union Government could extend the tenure of the Director of Enforcement beyond the initial two-year period. The Court interpreted Section 25(d) of the CVC Act as prescribing a minimum tenure of two years, not a maximum. The Court also held that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act could be invoked to extend the tenure in the absence of a specific provision in the CVC Act prohibiting such extensions. The Court also found no evidence of malice in law in the extension of the second Respondent’s tenure. The Court, however, clarified that extensions should be granted in rare and exceptional cases and for a short period.
The Court quoted the following from the judgment:“We are of the considered view that the Central Government is empowered to extend the tenure of the Director of Enforcement beyond the period of two years. Section 25(d) of the CVC Act prescribes a minimum tenure of two years to ensure that the Director of Enforcement is not transferred or shifted from the said post during the course of investigation of serious offences. The words “not less than two years” cannot be interpreted as “not more than two years”. The Central Government is empowered to extend the tenure of the Director of Enforcement by invoking Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The power to issue an order includes the power to amend it. The power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be exercised subject to the condition that it is exercised in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions. We are of the view that the extension of tenure of the second Respondent was not vitiated by malice in law. However, we make it clear that extensions should be granted in rare and exceptional cases and for a short period.”
Dissenting Opinion
There was no dissenting opinion in this case. The judgment was delivered by a bench of two judges, both of whom agreed with the final decision.
Ratio Decidendi
The ratio decidendi of the case is as follows:
- Section 25(d) of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, prescribes a minimum tenure of two years for the Director of Enforcement but does not restrict the tenure to only two years. The words “not less than two years” do not mean “not more than two years.”
- Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, can be invoked to extend the tenure of the Director of Enforcement in the absence of a specific provision in the Central Vigilance Commission Act prohibiting such extensions.
- The power to extend the tenure of the Director of Enforcement should be exercised in rare and exceptional cases and for a short period.
Obiter Dicta
The obiter dicta in this case include the following:
- The Court emphasized the importance of a minimum tenure of two years for the Director of Enforcement to ensure independence and prevent external pressures.
- The Court clarified that extensions should be granted in rare and exceptional cases and for a short period, to maintain the integrity of the office.
- The Court reiterated that the initial appointment of the second Respondent for a period of two years from 19.11.2018 which extends beyond the date of his superannuation in May, 2020 is in accordance with Section 25 of the CVC Act and cannot be said to be illegal.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the extension of the Director of Enforcement’s tenure, interpreting Section 25(d) of the CVC Act as providing for a minimum, not a maximum, tenure. The Court also clarified that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act could be invoked to extend the tenure in the absence of any specific prohibition in the CVC Act. The judgment underscores the importance of the independence of key officials while also recognizing the government’s power to make necessary extensions in exceptional circumstances. The Court emphasized that such extensions should be rare and for a limited duration. This case is a significant interpretation of service law and the applicability of the General Clauses Act in the context of specific statutes.
Source: Common Cause vs. Union of India