Supreme Court Upholds Haryana Amendments on Village Common Lands: State of Haryana v. Jai Singh (2022)

Date of the Judgment: April 7, 2022
Citation: 2022 INSC 371
Judges: Hemant Gupta, J. and V. Ramasubramanian, J.
Can amendments to land laws retroactively change the definition of village common lands? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this complex question in a significant judgment, clarifying the scope and implications of amendments made to the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 by the State of Haryana. This case, State of Haryana v. Jai Singh, delves into the intricacies of land ownership, usage, and the powers of the state in the context of village common lands. The judgment clarifies the definition of “shamlat deh” and its implications for land ownership and management in Haryana. The bench comprised Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian.

Case Background

The case revolves around amendments made by the Haryana state legislature to the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, specifically through Haryana Act No. 9/1992, which was published on February 11, 1992. These amendments sought to redefine “shamilat deh” (village common land) to include lands reserved for common purposes under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. This redefinition had significant implications for the ownership and management of such lands.

The core dispute arose when the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Jai Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana (Jai Singh I), struck down these amendments. The High Court held that the amendments violated Article 31-A of the Constitution of India by effectively acquiring land without compensation. The State of Haryana appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court, in State of Haryana v. Jai Singh, remanded the matter back to the High Court, directing it to record a finding on whether the land affected by the legislative measure was within the ceiling limit of each proprietor and under their personal cultivation. Following the remand, the Full Bench of the High Court again examined the issue in Jai Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana (Jai Singh II), leading to the current appeals before the Supreme Court.

The main parties involved in this case are the State of Haryana, representing the government’s interest in regulating village common lands, and various landowners (proprietors) who claim rights over the disputed lands. The relief sought by the landowners is primarily the restoration of their ownership rights over the lands that were redefined as “shamilat deh” by the amendments. The State of Haryana, on the other hand, sought to uphold the amendments, asserting its right to regulate such lands for the benefit of the village community.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The amendments introduced by Haryana Act No. 9/1992 were initially challenged before the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jai Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana (Jai Singh I). The High Court struck down the amendments, holding them to be in violation of Article 31-A of the Constitution, which protects certain laws related to agrarian reform from challenges based on fundamental rights.

The State of Haryana appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in State of Haryana v. Jai Singh, set aside the High Court’s judgment and remanded the matter back. The Supreme Court directed the High Court to specifically examine whether the land affected by the amendments was within the ceiling limit of each proprietor and under their personal cultivation, which is a key aspect of Article 31-A.

Following the remand, the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court re-examined the issue in Jai Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana (Jai Singh II). The High Court upheld the amendments in part, leading to the present appeals before the Supreme Court. The High Court’s decision in Jai Singh II was then reviewed by a five-judge bench in the case of Suraj Bhan & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr., which further clarified the legal position, leading to the current appeals before the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The core legal framework of this case involves several key statutes and constitutional provisions:

• The Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961: This Act regulates the rights in village common lands, known as “shamilat deh.” The amendments made by Haryana in 1992 sought to expand the definition of “shamilat deh.” Section 2(g) of the Act defines ‘shamilat deh’ and the amendments by Haryana Act No. 9/1992 added sub-section (6) to Section 2(g) which reads as:
  
  “(6) lands reserved for the common purposes of a village under Section 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of 1948), the management and control whereof vest in the Gram Panchayat under Section 23-A of the aforesaid Act.”
  
  An explanation was also added to this section:
  
  “Explanation- Lands entered in the column of ownership of record of rights as ‘Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Haqdarana Arazi Hassab Rasad, ‘Jumla Malkan’ or ‘Mushtarka Malkan’ shall be Shamilat Deh within the meaning of this Section.”
• The East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948: This Act provides for the consolidation of agricultural holdings and the reservation of land for common purposes. Section 18 of the Act allows the Consolidation Officer to direct that any land specifically assigned for any common purpose shall cease to be so assigned and to assign any other land in its place. Section 23A of the Act states that the management and control of all lands assigned or reserved for common purposes of the villages under Section 18, shall vest in the Panchayat of that village.
• The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953: This Act deals with land reforms and the rights of tenants.
• Article 31-A of the Constitution of India: This article protects certain laws related to agrarian reforms from being challenged on the grounds of violating fundamental rights. The second proviso to Article 31A(1) states that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.
• Article 300A of the Constitution of India: This article states that no person shall be deprived of his property save by the authority of law.
• Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994: This Act deals with the establishment of Panchayats in the State of Haryana. Section 7(4) of the Act states that if the whole of the sabha area is included in a municipality or a cantonment, the Gram Panchayat shall cease to exist and the assets and liabilities of it shall vest in the municipality or cantonment, as the case may be.
• Haryana Municipal Act, 1973: This Act deals with the constitution and administration of municipalities in the State of Haryana. Section 3 of the Act empowers the State Government to propose any local area to be a municipality under this Act. Section 4 empowers the State Government to alter the limits of municipality whereas Section 5 empowers the State Government to exclude any area from the municipality.
• Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994: This Act provides for the constitution of Municipal Corporations in the State of Haryana.

Arguments

The arguments presented before the Supreme Court can be broadly categorized into those made by the State of Haryana and those made by the landowners (proprietors):

Arguments by the State of Haryana

• Clarificatory Amendment: The State argued that the 1992 amendments were not a new provision but merely a clarification of existing law. They contended that the definition of “shamilat deh” in Section 2(g)(6) of the 1961 Act was always intended to include lands reserved for common purposes during consolidation, and the amendment simply made this explicit.
• Common Purpose: The State asserted that the land reserved for common purposes under Section 18(c) of the 1948 Act, read with Section 23-A and Rule 16(ii) of the 1949 Rules, is for both present and future needs. Therefore, even if a piece of land reserved for common purposes is not immediately utilized, it does not revert to the proprietors.
• No New Acquisition: The State argued that the amendments did not constitute a new acquisition of land. Instead, they maintained that the land was already vested with the Panchayat under the consolidation scheme and that the amendment merely clarified the definition of “shamilat deh.”
• Benefit to Village Community: The State contended that the ultimate use of the land by the Panchayat benefits the entire village community, including both proprietors and non-proprietors. Therefore, the reservation of land for common purposes was a benefit conferred to the proprietors in the consolidation scheme.
• “Nil” Compensation: Alternatively, the State argued that even if the amendment was considered an acquisition, it was an acquisition with “nil” compensation. The proprietors were already conferred the right to use a larger tract of common land in lieu of the small portions deducted by applying a pro-rata cut from their holdings.
• Transfer of Land: The State argued that if the whole or part of the Panchayat area comes within the municipal limits, the land would vest with the municipality and will not revert back to the proprietors.

Arguments by the Landowners (Proprietors)

• Divestment of Ownership: The proprietors argued that the amendments effectively divested them of their ownership rights over the land, without providing adequate compensation. They contended that the vesting of land with the Panchayat allowed the Panchayat to sell or alienate the land, which was not in line with the Supreme Court’s judgment in Ajit Singh.
• Violation of Article 300A: The proprietors contended that the amendments violated Article 300A of the Constitution, which states that no person shall be deprived of their property save by the authority of law. They argued that they were deprived of their land without due process and without adequate compensation.
• Bachat Land: The proprietors argued that the land reserved for common purposes during consolidation, which was more than the land specifically assigned for common purposes, was in fact a surplus land or a Bachat land. The unutilized land should be revested with the proprietors.
• No Agrarian Reform: The proprietors contended that the amendments were not part of any agrarian reform and thus not protected by Article 31A of the Constitution. They argued that the amendments were intended to benefit the Panchayat, not to bring about agrarian reform.
• Limited Management Rights: The proprietors argued that the 1948 Act did not contemplate divesting their ownership rights, but the vesting of land by the Amending Act read with Section 4 of 1961 Act divests the owners of their title over the land without compensation. They also argued that the Panchayat only had management and control over the land, not ownership rights.
• Shamilat Deh and Municipal Laws: The proprietors argued that shamilat deh land is a concept of rural areas and its import into urban municipal laws is wholly erroneous construction by the State Legislature. The transfer of such land to the municipal bodies would be to the detriment of villagers.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court addressed the following key issues:

1. Whether sub-section (6) of Section 2(g) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 and the explanation appended thereto, is only an elucidation of the existing provisions of the said Act read with provisions contained in the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948.
2. Whether the un-amended provisions of the Act of 1961 and, in particular, Section 2(g)(1) read with Sections 18 and 23-A of the Act of 1948 and Rule 16(ii) of the Rules of 1949 cover all such lands which have been specifically earmarked in a consolidation scheme prepared under Section 14 read with Rules 5 and 7 and confirmed under Section 20, which has been implemented under the provisions of Section 24 and no other lands.
3. Whether the lands which have been contributed by the proprietors on the basis of pro-rata cut on their holdings imposed during the consolidation proceedings and which have not been earmarked for any common purpose in the consolidation scheme prepared under Section 14 read with Rules 5 and 7 and entered in the column of ownership as Jumla Mustarka Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Hasab Rasad Arazi Khewat and in the column of possession with the proprietors, shall not vest with the Gram Panchayat or the State Government, as the case may be, on the dint of sub-section (6) of Section 2(g) and the explanation appended thereto or any other provisions of the Act of 1961 or the Act of 1948.
4. Whether all such lands, which have been, as per the consolidations scheme, reserved for common purposes, whether utilized or not, shall vest with the State Government or the Gram Panchayat, as the case may be, even though in the column of ownership the entries may be Jumla Mustarka Malkans Wa Digar Haqdaran Hasab Rasad Arazi Khewat etc.
5. Whether the land reserved for common purposes can be re-partitioned amongst the proprietors only because at a particular given time, the land so reserved has not been put to common use.
6. Whether the provisions of the Haryana Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1999 and to Section 2(52A) and Section 161(1)(g) of the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 are constitutional and whether the land owners are entitled to a direction that the land reverts back to them.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court relied upon several key judgments and legal provisions in its analysis:

Judgment

The Supreme Court delivered a comprehensive judgment, addressing each of the issues raised. The Court’s findings can be summarized as follows:

Ratio Decidendi

The ratio decidendi, or the legal principle upon which the decision is based, can be summarized as follows:

1. Clarificatory Nature of Amendments: The 1992 amendments to the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, specifically Section 2(g)(6), were held to be clarificatory in nature rather than a new provision. This means that the amendments merely elucidated the existing law, rather than creating new legal obligations or rights.
2. Vesting of Land: Land reserved for common purposes during consolidation proceedings, whether utilized or not, vests with the Gram Panchayat. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Panchayat has the right to use this land for the benefit of the village community at any point of time and that there is no time limit within which the land reserved for common purposes is to be used.
3. No Re-partition of Reserved Land: Land reserved for common purposes cannot be re-partitioned among the proprietors merely because it is not immediately utilized. The Court rejected the concept of “Bachat Land” as the land was already vested with the Panchayat.
4. Unconstitutionality of Municipal Amendments: The Haryana Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1999, and related provisions in the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994, were declared unconstitutional. The Court held that these amendments amounted to a compulsory acquisition of land by the State without payment of compensation, violating Article 300A of the Constitution.
5. Agrarian Reform: The Court held that the amendments were part of agrarian reforms and were thus protected by Article 31A of the Constitution.

The table below outlines the ratio of the case:

Obiter Dicta

While the main judgment focused on the specific issues before the Court, there were several obiter dicta, or remarks made in passing, that provide additional context and guidance:

• Importance of Common Lands: The Court emphasized the importance of village common lands for the social and economic well-being of the community. The Court noted that the land reserved for common purposes was for both present and future needs of the village community.
• Role of Panchayats: The Court reiterated the role of Panchayats in managing and utilizing village common lands for the benefit of the entire community. The Court reaffirmed that the Panchayat has the right to use this land for the benefit of the village community at any point of time.
• Constitutional Safeguards: The Court highlighted the constitutional safeguards against deprivation of property without due process and compensation, as enshrined in Article 300A of the Constitution.
• Need for Specific Legislation: The Court noted the need for specific legislation to address the transfer of village common lands to municipal bodies, ensuring that the interests of the villagers are protected.

Dissenting Opinions

There were no dissenting opinions in this case. The judgment was unanimous, with both Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian agreeing on the legal principles and conclusions.

Sentiment Analysis

The sentiment of the judgment can be analyzed from the perspective of the different parties involved:

Implications

The Supreme Court’s judgment in State of Haryana v. Jai Singh has several significant implications:

• Clarity on Common Lands: The judgment provides clarity on the definition of “shamilat deh” and the scope of the 1992 amendments, which will help in resolving land disputes in Haryana.
• Protection of Village Common Lands: The judgment reinforces the importance of village common lands for the community’s benefit and the role of Panchayats in managing these lands.
• Limitations on State Power: The judgment sets limitations on the State’s power to acquire land without compensation, particularly when it comes to village common lands.
• Municipal Laws: The judgment highlights the need for specific legislation to address the transfer of village common lands to municipal bodies, ensuring that the interests of the villagers are protected.
• Precedent for Similar Cases: The judgment will serve as a precedent for similar cases involving village common lands in other states.

Flowchart Summary