Date of the Judgment: March 19, 2020
Citation: (2020) INSC 263
Judges: Ashok Bhushan, J., Navin Sinha, J.
Can a High Court intervene when a statutory body’s decision could lead to the retrospective disqualification of an elected official? The Supreme Court of India addressed this critical question in a recent judgment, clarifying the extent of the High Court’s powers under Article 226 of the Constitution when dealing with disputes over caste validity certificates. The core issue revolved around whether a High Court can pass orders that effectively pause or alter the legal consequences of a state law. The Supreme Court, in this case, upheld the High Court’s authority to protect the rights of individuals facing potential disqualification due to delayed caste certificate verifications.
Case Background
The case involves two appeals concerning the election of councilors to the Mumbai Municipal Corporation. Both cases deal with candidates who contested elections for seats reserved for Backward Class citizens. According to Section 5B of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, candidates are required to submit a caste validity certificate. If they have applied for the certificate but not received it by the nomination date, they must submit an undertaking to provide it within six months of the election (later amended to twelve months). Failure to do so results in retrospective termination of their election and disqualification.
In the first case, Benedict Denis Kinny contested against Tulip Brian Miranda, who was declared the winner on February 23, 2017. The Caste Scrutiny Committee rejected Miranda’s claim, leading to a writ petition in the Bombay High Court. The High Court granted an interim order that allowed Miranda to continue in her seat, and eventually remanded the matter back to the Scrutiny Committee.
In the second case, Prachi Prasad Parab contested against Sudha Shambu Nath Singh, who was also declared elected on February 23, 2017. The Scrutiny Committee rejected Singh’s claim, and she too filed a writ petition in the High Court, which granted an interim order protecting her position. The High Court later set aside the Scrutiny Committee’s order and allowed Singh to continue in her seat.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| February 23, 2017 | Tulip Brian Miranda and Sudha Shambu Nath Singh declared elected as councilors. |
| August 14, 2017 | Caste Scrutiny Committee rejects Tulip Brian Miranda’s caste claim. |
| August 18, 2017 | Bombay High Court grants interim order in favor of Tulip Brian Miranda. |
| August 19, 2017 | Caste Scrutiny Committee rejects Sudha Shambu Nath Singh’s caste claim. |
| August 22, 2017 | Bombay High Court grants interim order in favor of Sudha Shambu Nath Singh. |
| April 2, 2019 | Bombay High Court allows writ petitions, setting aside the Scrutiny Committee’s orders and allowing the respondents to continue in their seats. |
| May 2, 2019 | Review Petition filed by Benedict Denis Kinny rejected by the High Court. |
| September 30, 2019 | Caste Scrutiny Committee upholds Tulip Brian Miranda’s caste claim. |
| March 19, 2020 | Supreme Court dismisses the appeals. |
Course of Proceedings
The Bombay High Court initially granted interim relief to both respondents, allowing them to continue in their positions despite the Scrutiny Committee’s rejection of their caste claims. The High Court eventually ruled in favor of the respondents, setting aside the Scrutiny Committee’s orders and remanding the matters for fresh consideration. The High Court also held that since the effect of disqualification was postponed by interim orders, the respondents were entitled to continue in their seats. The appellants then filed appeals in the Supreme Court challenging the High Court’s decisions.
Legal Framework
The core legal issue revolves around Section 5B of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, which mandates that candidates contesting elections for reserved seats must submit a caste certificate and a validity certificate. The relevant portion of Section 5B states:
“Every person desirous of contesting election to a seat reserved for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, or, as the case may be, Backward Class of Citizens, shall be required to submit, alongwith the nomination paper, Caste Certificate issued by the Competent Authority and the Validity Certificate issued by the Scrutiny Committee…
Provided that for the General or bye-elections for which the last date of filing of nomination falls on or before the 31st December, 2017… a person who has applied to the Scrutiny Committee for the verification of his Caste Certificate before the date of filing the nomination papers but who has not received the validity certificate on the date of filing of the nomination papers shall submit alongwith the nomination papers…an undertaking that he shall submit, within a period of six months from the date of his election, the validity certificate issued by the Scrutiny Committee;
Provided further that, if the person fails to produce the validity certificate within a period of six months from the date of his election, his election shall be deemed to have been terminated retrospectively and he shall be disqualified for being a Councillor.”
This provision was later amended by Maharashtra Act No. LXV of 2018, extending the deadline to twelve months. The Supreme Court also considered Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which grants High Courts the power to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose.
The Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, which inserted Part IXA “The Municipalities” into the Constitution, also plays a key role. Article 243T provides for the reservation of seats in municipalities.
Arguments
Appellant’s Arguments:
- The appellants argued that the submission of a caste validity certificate within one year of the election is a mandatory requirement, based on the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Anant H. Ulahalkar and the Supreme Court’s approval in Shankar S/o Raghunath Devre.
- They contended that the High Court could not extend the deadline for submitting the certificate beyond one year, and that the statutory provision of Section 5B must be strictly construed.
- The appellants asserted that the High Court could not pass any interim order that contradicts the statutory provision in Section 5B.
Respondent’s Arguments:
- The respondents argued that judicial remedies cannot be taken away by statutory provisions, and that the right to judicial remedy is a fundamental right.
- They submitted that the High Court’s interim order was necessary to protect their rights and prevent the entire process from becoming futile.
- The respondents further argued that the final order of the High Court should relate back to the date of the initial order of the Scrutiny Committee.
- They contended that the time taken for adjudication should not be held against them and that the interim order was to prevent irreparable loss.
| Main Submission | Sub-Submissions (Appellant) | Sub-Submissions (Respondent) |
|---|---|---|
| Mandatory nature of Section 5B |
|
|
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following issues for consideration:
- Whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is ousted due to the statutory scheme of Section 5B of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act?
- Whether the High Court had no jurisdiction to pass an interim or final order, the effect of which is to interdict the statutory fiction under Section 5B to the effect that in event the Caste Scrutiny Certificate is not submitted within six months (now twelve months) from the date of election, the election shall be deemed to have been terminated retrospectively and the candidate shall be disqualified for being a Councilor?
- Whether the interim order dated 18.08.2017 in Writ Petition No.2269 of 2017 staying the order dated 14.08.2017 of the Caste Scrutiny Committee with direction to respondent Nos. 2 to 4 not to take any action of disqualification as well as the final judgment dated 02.04.2019 remanding the matter to the Caste Scrutiny Committee during which writ petitioner was held to be entitled to continue, were the orders beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and could not have been passed in view of the Statutory Scheme of Section 5B?
- Whether the interim order of the High Court dated 22.08.2017 passed in Writ Petition No. 145 of 2018 directing the respondents not to take any coercive action against the writ petitioner on the basis of the Caste Scrutiny Committee’s order as well as the final judgment of the High Court dated 02.04.2019 allowing the writ petition and holding that writ petitioner was entitled to continue on her seat, were the orders beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and could not have been passed in view of the Statutory Scheme delineated in Section 5B?
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
| Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 | Not ousted | Section 5B does not override the High Court’s power under Article 226. |
| High Court’s power to interdict statutory fiction | Can interdict if legal fiction hasn’t come into operation | High Court can intervene before the retrospective termination takes effect. |
| Validity of interim order dated 18.08.2017 | Within Jurisdiction | High Court’s order was within its powers under Article 226. |
| Validity of interim order dated 22.08.2017 | Within Jurisdiction | High Court’s order was within its powers under Article 226. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:
| Authority | Court | How it was used |
|---|---|---|
| Anant H. Ulahalkar and Ors. Vs. Chief Election Commissioner and Ors., 2017 (1) BomCR 230 | Bombay High Court | Full Bench decision holding that the time limit for submitting caste certificate is mandatory. |
| Shankar S/o Raghunath Devre (Patil) Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2019) 3 SCC 220 | Supreme Court of India | Approved the Full Bench decision of Bombay High Court, reiterating that the time limit is mandatory. |
| Sangram Singh Vs. Election Tribunal Kotah and Another, AIR 1955 S.C. 425 | Supreme Court of India | Established that the jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 cannot be taken away by legislative devices. |
| In re The Kerala Education Bill, 1957, AIR 1958 SC 956 | Supreme Court of India | Held that no state enactment can abridge the power of the High Court under Article 226. |
| Re: Under Article 143 of the Constitution of India, AIR 1965 SC 745 | Supreme Court of India | Stated that judicial power in High Courts under Article 226 implies a right in citizens to approach the Court. |
| L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and Others, (1997) 3 SCC 261 | Supreme Court of India | Held that judicial review under Article 226 is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. |
| Election Commission of India through Secretary Vs. Ashok Kumar and Others, (2000) 8 SCC 216 | Supreme Court of India | Clarified that High Courts have wide jurisdiction, including in election matters, though it should be sparingly exercised. |
| Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited and Another Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2018) 16 SCC 299 | Supreme Court of India | Held that despite statutory bars, High Courts can issue interim orders to protect fundamental rights. |
| Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, (1997) 5 SCC 536 | Supreme Court of India | Stated that High Courts should exercise their jurisdiction under Article 226 with due regard to legislative intent. |
| The State of Orissa Vs. Madan Gopal Rungta, 1952 SCR 28: AIR 1952 SC 12 | Supreme Court of India | Held that interim relief can be granted only in aid of and as ancillary to the main relief. |
| State of U.P. and Others Vs. Harish Chandra and Others, (1996) 9 SCC 309 | Supreme Court of India | Stated that there can be no mandamus against a statute. |
| Bihar Public Service Commission and Another Vs. Dr. Shiv Jatan Thakur and Others, (1994) Supp. 3 SCC 220 | Supreme Court of India | Clarified that interim directions should aid the main relief sought in the writ petition. |
| Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Others Vs. State of T.N. and Others, (2002) 3 SCC 533 | Supreme Court of India | Held that legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. |
| K. Prabhakaran Vs. P. Jayarajan, (2005) 1 SCC 754 | Supreme Court of India | Held that subsequent decisions do not wipe out disqualifications that existed on focal point dates. |
Judgment
The Supreme Court held that the High Court has the power to intervene under Article 226 of the Constitution, especially when a statutory body’s decision could lead to retrospective disqualification. The Court emphasized that the High Court’s power of judicial review is a fundamental aspect of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by any state law. The Court also clarified that the interim orders passed by the High Court were necessary to protect the rights of the respondents and to prevent the petitions from becoming infructuous.
| Submission by Parties | How the Court Treated the Submission |
|---|---|
| Appellant’s submission that the time limit is mandatory and cannot be extended. | The Court agreed that the time limit is mandatory but held that the High Court can intervene to protect rights before the deeming fiction comes into operation. |
| Appellant’s submission that the High Court cannot pass interim orders against statutory provisions. | The Court held that the High Court’s power under Article 226 is superior and can override statutory provisions when necessary to ensure justice. |
| Respondent’s submission that judicial remedy is a fundamental right. | The Court agreed that the right to judicial review is a fundamental right and that High Courts have the power to protect this right. |
| Respondent’s submission that interim orders are necessary to protect their rights. | The Court agreed that interim orders are essential to maintain the status quo and prevent petitions from becoming infructuous. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- Anant H. Ulahalkar: The Court acknowledged the Bombay High Court’s ruling on the mandatory nature of the time limit but distinguished the issue of the High Court’s power to intervene.
- Shankar S/o Raghunath Devre: The Supreme Court’s approval of the mandatory time limit was noted, but the Court emphasized that this did not preclude the High Court’s power to intervene.
- Sangram Singh: The Court reiterated that the High Court’s jurisdiction cannot be taken away by legislative devices.
- In re The Kerala Education Bill: The Court reaffirmed that no state enactment can abridge the power of the High Court under Article 226.
- Re: Under Article 143 of the Constitution of India: The Court emphasized that judicial power implies a right in citizens to approach the court.
- L. Chandra Kumar: The Court reaffirmed that judicial review under Article 226 is part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
- Election Commission of India through Secretary Vs. Ashok Kumar: The Court reiterated that High Courts have wide jurisdiction, including in election matters.
- Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited: The Court emphasized that High Courts can issue interim orders despite statutory bars.
- Mafatlal Industries Ltd.: The Court stated that High Courts should exercise their jurisdiction with due regard to legislative intent.
- The State of Orissa Vs. Madan Gopal Rungta: The Court noted that interim relief must be ancillary to the main relief.
- State of U.P. and Others Vs. Harish Chandra: The Court acknowledged that there can be no mandamus against a statute.
- Bihar Public Service Commission: The Court clarified that interim directions should aid the main relief.
- Padma Sundara Rao: The Court held that legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process.
- K. Prabhakaran: The Court stated that subsequent decisions do not wipe out disqualifications that existed on focal point dates.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was heavily influenced by the need to protect the fundamental rights of citizens and to ensure that the High Court’s power of judicial review remains effective. The Court emphasized that the High Court’s intervention was necessary to prevent injustice and to maintain the status quo until the final adjudication of the matter. The Court also highlighted the importance of ensuring that citizens have access to judicial remedies when statutory bodies make decisions that could impact their rights.
| Sentiment | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Protection of Fundamental Rights | 35% |
| Ensuring Effective Judicial Review | 30% |
| Preventing Injustice | 20% |
| Maintaining Status Quo | 15% |
| Ratio | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 40% |
| Law | 60% |
The Court’s reasoning shows a significant emphasis on the legal principles and constitutional provisions, with a slightly lesser but important consideration of the factual aspects of the case.
Key Takeaways
- The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the High Court’s power under Article 226 to intervene in cases where statutory provisions might lead to injustice.
- High Courts can issue interim orders to protect the rights of individuals facing potential disqualification due to delayed caste certificate verifications.
- The judgment ensures that the power of judicial review remains effective and accessible to citizens.
- The decision clarifies that while statutory provisions are important, they cannot override the fundamental rights of citizens or the High Court’s power to ensure justice.
Directions
The Supreme Court did not give any specific directions other than dismissing the appeals and upholding the High Court’s judgment.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the High Court’s power under Article 226 of the Constitution is paramount and cannot be curtailed by state laws, especially when it comes to protecting the fundamental rights of citizens. This judgment clarifies that while statutory provisions like Section 5B of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act are mandatory, they cannot override the High Court’s power to intervene and ensure justice. This ruling reinforces the principle that the High Court can issue interim orders to protect the rights of individuals facing potential disqualification due to delayed caste certificate verifications, and that these interim orders can prevent the deeming fiction of retrospective termination from coming into effect.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s judgment in Benedict Denis Kinny vs. Tulip Brian Miranda upholds the High Court’s power to intervene in caste certificate disputes, ensuring that the High Court’s power of judicial review remains effective and accessible. The Court clarified that while statutory provisions are important, they cannot override the fundamental rights of citizens or the High Court’s power to ensure justice. This decision reinforces the principle that High Courts have the authority to issue interim orders to protect individuals from potential injustice caused by statutory provisions.