Supreme Court Upholds High Court’s Power to Re-Initiate Disciplinary Proceedings: Hari Niwas Gupta vs. State of Bihar (2019)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 8th November 2019

Citation: (2019) INSC 1234

Judges: Indu Malhotra, J., Sanjiv Khanna, J.

Can a disciplinary authority re-initiate disciplinary proceedings after a dismissal order is quashed due to procedural errors? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a case involving three judicial officers dismissed from service by the High Court of Judicature at Patna. The core issue was whether the High Court could re-initiate disciplinary action after its initial dismissal order was overturned for not recording reasons for dispensing with a departmental inquiry. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice Indu Malhotra and Justice Sanjiv Khanna.

Case Background

The case revolves around three judicial officers from Bihar: Hari Niwas Gupta, Komal Ram, and Jitendra Nath Singh. On January 29, 2013, a local newspaper reported that these officers were allegedly found in a compromising situation with Nepali women in a guest house in Biratnagar, Nepal, on January 26, 2013. The Nepal police briefly detained them but released them due to external pressure. The High Court of Judicature at Patna took cognizance of the news and initiated an inquiry. The judicial officers denied the allegations, claiming they were not in Nepal. However, the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, provided information that the officers’ mobile phones were switched off simultaneously on January 26th and 27th, 2013, and when active, were within the range of a tower near the Nepal border, contradicting their claims. Furthermore, a hotel bill submitted by Komal Ram was found to be fabricated.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The Standing Committee of the High Court recommended the dismissal of the judicial officers without an inquiry, invoking Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India. The Full Court of the High Court accepted this recommendation on February 10, 2014, and the Governor of Bihar issued a dismissal order on February 12, 2014. The judicial officers challenged this order through separate writ petitions. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed these petitions on May 19, 2015, primarily because the Full Court had not recorded reasons for dispensing with the disciplinary inquiry. The Division Bench, while setting aside the dismissal, granted the High Court the liberty to re-initiate proceedings under Article 311(2)(b), provided it recorded reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. The judicial officers then appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s liberty to re-initiate proceedings.

Legal Framework

Article 311 of the Constitution of India safeguards civil servants from arbitrary dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank. It mandates a disciplinary inquiry, providing the concerned individual with an opportunity to be heard. However, the second proviso to Article 311(2) outlines exceptions where an inquiry can be dispensed with. Specifically, clause (b) of the second proviso states that an inquiry is not required where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such an inquiry. The authority must record this satisfaction in writing. The relevant text of Article 311(2) is as follows:

“No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: Provided further that this clause shall not apply—(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry.”

Arguments

Arguments by the Judicial Officers (Appellants):

• The judicial officers argued that the High Court’s liberty to re-initiate proceedings under Article 311(2)(b) after the initial dismissal order was set aside was illegal. They contended that reasons for dispensing with an inquiry must be recorded before the dismissal order, not after.
• They referred to cases like Mohinder Singh Gill and Another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others (1978) 1 SCC 405 and East Coast Railway and Another v. Mahadev Appa Rao and Others (2010) 7 SCC 678, asserting that reasons for dispensing with an inquiry cannot be recorded subsequently.
• They also argued that the Division Bench had erred in holding that a departmental inquiry was possible, implying that dispensing with it was not justified.
• Furthermore, they contended that the power to dispense with an inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) rests solely with the Governor, not the High Court, citing State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, AIR 1966 SC 447.

Arguments by the State of Bihar and the High Court (Respondents):

• The respondents did not file an appeal and accepted the High Court’s decision.
• They argued that the Division Bench’s decision was correct in setting aside the dismissal order due to lack of recorded reasons.
• They asserted that the High Court, as the disciplinary authority, has the power to re-initiate proceedings, including invoking Article 311(2)(b), provided it follows the prescribed procedure and records reasons.
• They contended that the High Court’s observations about the possibility of an inquiry were not a bar to invoking Article 311(2)(b) if circumstances warranted.

The core contention of the judicial officers was that the High Court could not re-initiate disciplinary proceedings under Article 311(2)(b) after the initial dismissal order was set aside. They argued that the reasons for dispensing with an inquiry must be recorded before the dismissal order, not after. They relied on several cases to support their argument that the reasons cannot be provided subsequently. The State of Bihar and the High Court, on the other hand, argued that the High Court was within its rights to re-initiate the proceedings, provided it followed the due process and recorded the reasons for dispensing with the inquiry.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issues:

1. Whether the High Court can invoke the power under clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry after the earlier order of dismissal was set aside for failure to record reasons for dispensing with the inquiry.
2. Whether the High Court or the Governor is the competent authority to decide if an inquiry should be dispensed with under Article 311(2)(b).

Treatment of the Issue by the Court:

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court’s power to re-initiate disciplinary proceedings. The Court clarified that setting aside the initial dismissal order due to procedural flaws did not bar the High Court from re-examining the case and invoking Article 311(2)(b) again, provided it followed the correct procedure and recorded reasons for dispensing with an inquiry. The Court also clarified that the High Court, and not the Governor, is the competent authority to decide whether an inquiry should be dispensed with, although the formal order of dismissal is passed by the Governor.

How each authority was viewed by the Court:

• Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991) 1 SCC 362: The Court relied on this case to affirm the mandatory nature of recording reasons when dispensing with an inquiry under Article 311(2)(b).
• Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398: The Court reaffirmed the principle that a disciplinary inquiry should not be dispensed with lightly or arbitrarily.
• Mohinder Singh Gill and Another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others (1978) 1 SCC 405 and East Coast Railway and Another v. Mahadev Appa Rao and Others (2010) 7 SCC 678: The Court distinguished these cases, stating that they dealt with the submission of reasons after the dismissal order, not the re-initiation of proceedings.
• Chief Security Officer and Others v. Singasan Rabi Das, (1991) 1 SCC 729, State of Orissa and Others v. Dinabandhu Beheta and Others, (1997) 10 SCC 383, Sudesh Kumar v. State of Haryana and Others, (2005) 11 SCC 525, Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab and Others, (2006) 13 SCC 581, Reena Rani v. State of Haryana and Others, (2012) 10 SCC 215, and Risal Singh v. State of Haryana and Others, (2014) 13 SCC 244: The Court used these cases to support the view that orders under Article 311(2)(b) must be struck down for want of recorded reasons but also permitted authorities to proceed further.
• State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, AIR 1966 SC 447: The Court clarified that while the Governor has the power to dismiss, the High Court has control over the subordinate judiciary, including the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings.
• Ajit Kumar v. State of Jharkhand (2011) 11 SCC 458: The Court relied on this case to reiterate that the High Court can invoke Article 311(2)(b) and recommend dismissal to the Governor.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the need to ensure procedural correctness while also recognizing the High Court’s authority over the subordinate judiciary. The Court emphasized that the High Court must record reasons for dispensing with an inquiry before passing a dismissal order, as mandated by Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution and previous judgments. However, the Court also acknowledged that setting aside an order for procedural flaws does not preclude the High Court from re-initiating proceedings, provided it follows the correct procedure. The Court’s reasoning balanced the need for procedural fairness with the High Court’s disciplinary powers. The Court was also conscious of the seriousness of the allegations against the judicial officers and wanted to ensure that the matter was dealt with appropriately.

Logical Reasoning:

The Court considered alternative interpretations, such as the argument that the High Court could not re-initiate proceedings after the initial dismissal was set aside. However, it rejected this interpretation, emphasizing that the High Court’s power to re-initiate proceedings is not a new right but a clarification of the consequences of quashing the initial order. The Court also rejected the argument that the power to dispense with an inquiry rests solely with the Governor, clarifying that the High Court has control over the subordinate judiciary. The final decision was reached by balancing the need for procedural correctness with the High Court’s disciplinary powers.

The Court’s decision is based on the following reasons:

• The High Court’s failure to record reasons for dispensing with the inquiry in the initial dismissal order was a procedural flaw that necessitated setting aside the order.
• Setting aside the order for procedural flaws does not bar the High Court from re-examining the case and invoking Article 311(2)(b) again, provided it follows the correct procedure.
• The High Court, and not the Governor, is the competent authority to decide whether an inquiry should be dispensed with, although the formal order of dismissal is passed by the Governor.
• The High Court’s control over the subordinate judiciary includes the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings and recommend dismissal to the Governor.

“Striking down and setting aside the earlier order dated 12th February, 2014 under clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) for failure to record reasons for dispensing with the departmental inquiry annuls the earlier order, which ceases to exist and stands obliterated, but does not adjudicate on the merits of the allegations so as to attract the bar of res judicata.”

“The expression ‘at appropriate stage’ used by the Division Bench is not a direction for initiation of a regular departmental inquiry nor does it prohibit recourse to clause (b) to the second proviso of Article 311(2) of the Constitution in accordance with law.”

“The observations do not hold that the Governor, and not the High Court, is vested with the jurisdiction and is the competent authority to decide whether the inquiry should be dispensed with upon recording of satisfaction in terms of clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution.”

Key Takeaways

• The High Court has the power to re-initiate disciplinary proceedings against judicial officers even after a previous dismissal order has been set aside for procedural flaws.
• When dispensing with a disciplinary inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution, the disciplinary authority must record reasons in writing before passing the dismissal order.
• The High Court, as the disciplinary authority, has the power to decide whether it is reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, subject to the Governor’s formal order.
• The judgment reinforces the principle that procedural fairness is essential in disciplinary proceedings, while also recognizing the High Court’s authority over the subordinate judiciary.
• The ruling emphasizes the importance of adhering to legal precedents and constitutional provisions in disciplinary matters.

Directions

The Supreme Court vacated the stay order and directed the respondents to proceed in accordance with law, based on the judgment passed by the Division Bench. The Court also clarified that it had expressed no opinion on the merits of the allegations made against the three judicial officers.

Specific Amendments Analysis

Not Applicable

Impact on Legal Landscape

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Hari Niwas Gupta vs. State of Bihar clarifies the scope of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution and establishes crucial precedents for disciplinary proceedings against civil servants, particularly judicial officers. The ruling reinforces the High Court’s authority to oversee the subordinate judiciary and re-initiate proceedings when necessary, provided that procedural norms are strictly followed. This judgment has the following implications:

• Clarification of Re-Initiation Power: The judgment definitively establishes that setting aside a dismissal order for procedural flaws does not bar the disciplinary authority from re-initiating proceedings. This interpretation provides clarity on the procedural aspects of disciplinary actions and prevents technicalities from impeding the pursuit of justice.
• Emphasis on Procedural Fairness: The Court reiterated the importance of recording reasons for dispensing with an inquiry under Article 311(2)(b). This requirement ensures transparency and prevents arbitrary actions by disciplinary authorities. It emphasizes that procedural fairness is not merely a formality but a fundamental aspect of the rule of law.
• High Court’s Disciplinary Authority: The judgment affirms the High Court’s control over the subordinate judiciary, including the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings and recommend dismissal. This reinforces the High Court’s role as the primary disciplinary authority for judicial officers, subject to the Governor’s formal order.
• Precedent for Future Cases: This ruling sets a precedent for future cases involving disciplinary proceedings against civil servants, particularly those under the purview of the High Court. It provides a clear framework for the interpretation of Article 311(2)(b) and the process for re-initiating proceedings after a previous order is set aside.
• Balance of Powers: The judgment strikes a balance between the need for procedural correctness and the High Court’s disciplinary powers. It ensures that while procedural fairness is maintained, the High Court’s authority to take appropriate disciplinary action is not undermined.

In summary, the judgment in Hari Niwas Gupta vs. State of Bihar is a significant contribution to service law jurisprudence, providing clarity on the re-initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the interpretation of Article 311(2)(b). It emphasizes the importance of procedural fairness, the High Court’s disciplinary authority, and the need to adhere to legal precedents in disciplinary matters. This ruling will likely influence the handling of similar cases in the future, ensuring a more transparent and just disciplinary process for civil servants.