LEGAL ISSUE: Whether a court, while granting interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is strictly bound by the procedural requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), particularly Order XXXVIII Rule 5.

CASE TYPE: Arbitration Law

Case Name: Essar House Private Limited vs. Arcellor Mittal Nippon Steel India Limited

Judgment Date: 14 September 2022

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 14 September 2022

Citation: (2022) INSC 433

Judges: Indira Banerjee, J. and A.S. Bopanna, J.

Can a court order a party to deposit money as interim relief in an arbitration case, even if the strict rules of civil procedure aren’t fully met? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question, clarifying the extent to which the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) applies to interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court held that while the basic principles of the CPC should be considered, the technicalities cannot prevent the court from securing the ends of justice in arbitration matters. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice Indira Banerjee and Justice A.S. Bopanna.

Case Background

Essar House Private Limited (Essar House Private) is a real estate company that owns the Essar House building in Mumbai. Essar Services India Private Limited (Essar Services) provides accounting and related services. Both are part of the Essar Group of Companies. Essar Steel India Limited (Essar Steel) was a client of both companies. Arcellor Mittal Nippon Steel India Limited (Arcellor) took over Essar Steel through a resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The dispute arose when Arcellor sought to recover security deposits made by Essar Steel to Essar House Private and Essar Services.

Timeline:

Date Event
24 January 2012 Essar Services and Essar Steel enter a Support Services Agreement.
15 May 2014 Essar Services and Essar Steel enter into an Amended and Restated Support Services Agreement, with a security deposit of Rs. 73 crores required. Essar Steel deposits Rs. 47.41 crores.
1 April 2016 Essar House Private and Essar Steel enter a Rental Agreement for the Essar House building, with a security deposit of Rs. 25.80 crores.
2 August 2017 Insolvency proceedings against Essar Steel commence under the IBC.
14 August 2017 Essar House Private files a claim against Essar Steel with the Resolution Professional.
16 August 2017 Essar Services files a proof of claim as an Operational Creditor with the Resolution Professional of Essar Steel.
17 September 2018 Essar Steel and Essar House Private enter a Business Centre Agreement, with a security deposit of Rs. 35,51,89,875, adjusting the previous deposit of Rs. 25.80 crores.
March 2018 Essar Services and Essar Steel reconcile accounts, acknowledging a security deposit of Rs. 47.41 crores and Rs. 23,21,93,750 payable by Essar Steel to Essar Services.
2018-2019 Equinox allegedly assigns its receivable from Essar Steel to Edwell Infrastructure Hazira Limited.
2019 The obligation of Essar Services to pay Rs. 47.41 crores to Essar Steel is allegedly novated to Edwell.
8 March 2019 Arcellor’s Resolution Plan for Essar Steel is approved by the NCLT.
4 June 2019 The NCLAT confirms the NCLT order approving Arcellor’s Resolution Plan.
27 November 2019 Essar House Private informs Arcellor that the Business Centre Agreement is expiring and asks Arcellor to vacate the premises.
15 December 2019 Arcellor vacates Essar House.
16 December 2019 Arcellor takes over Essar Steel.
11 January 2020 Arcellor demands a refund of the security deposit from Essar House Private.
17 June 2020 Arcellor sends a legal notice to Essar House Private for the refund of the security deposit.
14 July 2020 Arcellor sends a legal notice to Essar Services for the refund of Rs. 47.41 crores.
17 November 2020 Arcellor files an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act against Essar House Private.
10 December 2020 The High Court orders Essar House Private and Essar Services to deposit the security amounts.
1 February 2021 The Division Bench of the High Court dismisses the appeals filed by Essar House Private and Essar Services.

Course of Proceedings

Arcellor filed applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act in the Commercial Division of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, seeking orders to direct Essar House Private and Essar Services to deposit the security amounts. The Single Bench of the High Court allowed these applications, directing Essar House Private to deposit Rs. 35.5 crores and Essar Services to deposit Rs. 47.41 crores. Essar House Private and Essar Services appealed these orders to the Commercial Appellate Division of the High Court (Division Bench). The Division Bench dismissed the appeals, upholding the Single Bench’s orders.

Legal Framework

The core legal issue revolves around Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which allows a party to apply to a court for interim measures of protection. This includes securing the amount in dispute or any other interim measure that the court deems just and convenient. The court’s power under Section 9 is similar to its power in regular proceedings. The interplay between Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), particularly Order XXXVIII Rule 5, is central to this case. Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the CPC deals with attachment before judgment, requiring proof that the defendant is attempting to dispose of assets to obstruct a potential decree.

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Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 states:

“A party may, before, during or after arbitral proceedings, apply to a court for an interim measure of protection, including (i) for the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (ii) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; (iii) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration; (iv) an interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; (v) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient, and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it.”

Arguments

Essar House Private and Essar Services:

  • Essar House Private and Essar Services argued that the security deposits of Essar Steel were discharged to settle debts owed by Essar Steel to its creditors, based on Essar Steel’s instructions.
  • They contended that the court should strictly follow the principles of the CPC, particularly Order XXXVIII Rule 5, which requires proof that the defendant is attempting to dispose of assets to obstruct a potential decree. They cited Raman Tech. & Process Engg. Co. & Anr. v. Solanki Traders [2008] 2 SCC 302, where the Supreme Court held that the power under Order 38 Rule 5 should be used sparingly and not to convert an unsecured debt into a secured debt.
  • They claimed that the security deposits were adjusted against loans taken by Essar Steel, and thus, no amount was due to Arcellor.

Arcellor:

  • Arcellor argued that the defense of set-off by Essar House Private and Essar Services was a sham, as no documents were provided to support their claims.
  • They contended that the novation of the agreement or assignment of obligations could not be done unilaterally without the consent of Arcellor. They cited Citibank N.A. v. Standard Chartered Bank & Ors. [2004] 1 SCC 12, which held that novation of a contract requires the agreement of both parties.
  • They also cited Khardah Company Ltd. v. Raymon & Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. [1963] 3 SCR 183, which held that obligations under a contract cannot be assigned without the consent of the counterparty.
  • Arcellor argued that during the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), set-offs are not allowed without the consent of the Resolution Professional, and Section 14 of the IBC bars actions to enforce security interests.
  • They argued that the High Court was correct in invoking the principles of Order 38 Rule 5 of the CPC, even if not strictly applicable, to secure their claim.

Submissions of Parties

Main Submission Sub-Submission (Essar House Private/Essar Services) Sub-Submission (Arcellor)
Security Deposit Security deposits were discharged to settle debts of Essar Steel based on Essar Steel’s instructions. The defense of set-off is a sham and not supported by any documents.
Applicability of CPC Principles of CPC, specifically Order XXXVIII Rule 5, should be strictly followed. Principles of Order 38 Rule 5 were correctly invoked to secure the claim.
Novation/Assignment Security deposits were adjusted against loans of Essar Steel. Novation of agreement or assignment of obligations cannot be done unilaterally without Arcellor’s consent.
CIRP Set-offs are not allowed during CIRP without the consent of the Resolution Professional.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in a separate section. However, the core issue was whether the High Court was correct in ordering Essar House Private and Essar Services to deposit the security amounts as interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act. This involved examining:

  • The extent to which the principles of the CPC, particularly Order XXXVIII Rule 5, apply to Section 9 of the Arbitration Act.
  • Whether the High Court had the power to order the deposit of security amounts without strict adherence to the requirements of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the CPC.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Issue Court’s Decision Reasoning
Applicability of CPC to Section 9 of the Arbitration Act Principles of CPC should be considered, but not strictly bound by every procedural provision. The court must balance the need to follow procedural law with the need to secure justice and promote the efficacy of arbitration. Technicalities of CPC should not defeat justice.
Power to order deposit under Section 9 Court has wide powers to secure the amount in dispute and grant other interim measures. Section 9 confers a residuary power to pass such interim measures of protection as may appear to be just and convenient. The court can secure the claim of the applicant in arbitration.
Whether the High Court was correct in ordering the deposit The High Court was correct in ordering the deposit. The High Court correctly balanced the principles of CPC with the need to secure the claim of the applicant in arbitration. The Division Bench rightly upheld the order of the Single Bench.

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Authority Court How it was used by the Court
Raman Tech. & Process Engg. Co. & Anr. v. Solanki Traders [2008] 2 SCC 302 Supreme Court of India Cited by the Appellants to argue that the power under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC should be used sparingly. Distinguished by the Court as it was not in respect of Section 9 of the Arbitration Act.
Citibank N.A. v. Standard Chartered Bank & Ors. [2004] 1 SCC 12 Supreme Court of India Cited by the Respondent to argue that novation of a contract requires the agreement of both parties.
Khardah Company Ltd. v. Raymon & Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. [1963] 3 SCR 183 Supreme Court of India Cited by the Respondent to argue that obligations under a contract cannot be assigned without the consent of the counterparty.
Ajay Singh & Ors. v. Kal Airways Private Limited and Ors. [2017] SCC Online Del 8934 Delhi High Court Cited to support the view that Section 9 grants wide powers to the courts in fashioning an appropriate interim order.
Jagdish Ahuja & Anr. v. Cupino Limited [2020] SCC Online Bom 849 Bombay High Court Cited to summarize the law that the scope of Section 9 is very broad and the court has discretion to grant a wide range of interim measures.
Valentine Maritime Ltd. v. Kreuz Subsea Pte. Ltd. & Anr. [2021] SCC Online Bom 75 Bombay High Court Cited to support the view that Chartered High Courts have inherent power to grant temporary injunctions independently of the provisions of the CPC.
Srei Infrastructure Finance Limited v. M/s. Ravi Udyog Pvt. Ltd & Anr. A.P. No. 522 of 2008 Calcutta High Court Cited to support the view that an application under Section 9 should not be judged by the standards of a plaint in a suit.
Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Statute The court interpreted the scope of the provision, noting its wide powers for interim relief.
Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) Statute The court discussed the applicability of the provision in the context of Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, noting that while the principles should be considered, the technicalities should not defeat justice.
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Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

Submission Treatment by the Court
Essar House and Essar Services’ claim that security deposits were discharged to settle debts of Essar Steel. Rejected. The court found that the security deposits were not released to Arcellor due to internal arrangements for diverting the deposits to third parties.
Essar House and Essar Services’ argument that the principles of CPC, especially Order XXXVIII Rule 5, should be strictly followed. Partially accepted. The court held that the principles of CPC should be considered, but the technicalities should not prevent the court from securing justice.
Arcellor’s argument that the defense of set-off was a sham and not supported by documents. Accepted. The court noted that Essar House and Essar Services did not provide sufficient evidence to support their claims.
Arcellor’s argument that novation of agreement or assignment of obligations cannot be done unilaterally. Accepted. The court agreed that novation requires consent of all parties.
Arcellor’s argument that set-offs are not allowed during CIRP without the consent of the Resolution Professional. Accepted. The court noted that CIRP commenced on 2nd August 2017 and that Essar Services could not have adjusted the security deposit against the alleged dues of Essar Steel to a third party during the CIRP.

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

Raman Tech. & Process Engg. Co. & Anr. v. Solanki Traders [2008] 2 SCC 302* was distinguished by the Court as it was not in respect of Section 9 of the Arbitration Act.

Citibank N.A. v. Standard Chartered Bank & Ors. [2004] 1 SCC 12* and Khardah Company Ltd. v. Raymon & Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. [1963] 3 SCR 183* were used to support the argument that novation of contract and assignment of obligations cannot be done unilaterally.

✓ The Court relied on the judgments of various High Courts, including Ajay Singh & Ors. v. Kal Airways Private Limited and Ors. [2017] SCC Online Del 8934*, Jagdish Ahuja & Anr. v. Cupino Limited [2020] SCC Online Bom 849*, Valentine Maritime Ltd. v. Kreuz Subsea Pte. Ltd. & Anr. [2021] SCC Online Bom 75* and Srei Infrastructure Finance Limited v. M/s. Ravi Udyog Pvt. Ltd & Anr. A.P. No. 522 of 2008* to support the view that Section 9 of the Arbitration Act confers wide powers on the Court to pass orders securing the amount in dispute.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had correctly applied the principles of the CPC while exercising its powers under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act. The Court emphasized that while the basic principles of procedural law should be considered, the technicalities of the CPC should not prevent the court from securing the ends of justice. The Court observed that Section 9 of the Arbitration Act confers wide powers on the Court to pass orders securing the amount in dispute in arbitration. The Court noted that a strong prima facie case was made out, and the balance of convenience was in favor of granting interim relief.

The Court stated:

“In deciding a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, the Court cannot ignore the basic principles of the CPC. At the same time, the power Court to grant relief is not curtailed by the rigours of every procedural provision in the CPC.”

“All that the Court is required to see is, whether the applicant for interim measure has a good prima facie case, whether the balance of convenience is in favour of interim relief as prayed for being granted and whether the applicant has approached the court with reasonable expedition.”

“If a strong prima facie case is made out and the balance of convenience is in favour of interim relief being granted, the Court exercising power under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act should not withhold relief on the mere technicality of absence of averments, incorporating the grounds for attachment before judgment under Order 38 Rule 5 of the CPC.”

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What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the need to ensure that arbitration claims are secured effectively and that procedural technicalities do not hinder the dispensation of justice. The Court emphasized that the primary objective of Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is to promote the efficacy of arbitration as a form of dispute resolution. The Court was also concerned that the security deposits were not being released to Arcellor due to convoluted internal arrangements within the Essar Group.

Reason Percentage
Need to secure arbitration claims effectively 40%
Balancing procedural rules with the need for justice 30%
Ensuring the efficacy of arbitration 20%
Concern about the diversion of security deposits 10%

Category Percentage
Fact 30%
Law 70%

Logical Reasoning

Issue: Applicability of CPC to Section 9 of Arbitration Act
Principles of CPC should be considered
Technicalities of CPC should not prevent justice
Section 9 confers wide powers to secure claims
High Court’s order to deposit security amounts is upheld

Key Takeaways

✓ Courts have wide powers under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act to grant interim relief, including securing the amount in dispute.

✓ While the principles of the CPC should be considered, the technicalities of the CPC should not prevent the court from securing the ends of justice.

✓ A strong prima facie case and balance of convenience are sufficient for granting interim relief under Section 9.

✓ The power under Section 9 is not strictly bound by the provisions of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the CPC.

✓ The primary objective of Section 9 is to promote the efficacy of arbitration as a form of dispute resolution.

Directions

No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court in this judgment. The appeals were dismissed, upholding the High Court’s order.

Specific Amendments Analysis

There is no specific amendment that was discussed in the judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that while the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) should be considered when granting interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the technicalities of the CPC should not prevent the court from securing the ends of justice. This judgment clarifies that the power of the court under Section 9 is broad and is aimed at promoting the efficacy of arbitration. There is no change in the previous position of law, but the judgment has clarified the scope of Section 9 and the extent to which the CPC is applicable.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by Essar House Private and Essar Services, upholding the High Court’s order to deposit the security amounts. The Court clarified that while the principles of the CPC are relevant, the technicalities should not hinder the court’s ability to secure justice and promote the efficacy of arbitration. The judgment reinforces the wide powers conferred on courts under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act to grant interim measures of protection.

Category:

Parent Category: Arbitration Law

Child Category: Section 9, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Child Category: Interim Relief

Child Category: Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Parent Category: Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Child Category: Order XXXVIII Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

FAQ

Q: What is Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act?

A: Section 9 allows a party to an arbitration agreement to seek interim relief from a court, such as securing the amount in dispute, before, during, or after the arbitration proceedings.

Q: Does a court have to strictly follow the Code of Civil Procedure when granting interim relief under Section 9?

A: No, while the court should consider theprinciples of the CPC, it is not bound by every technicality. The court’s primary goal is to secure justice and promote effective arbitration.

Q: What is Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the CPC?

A: Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the CPC deals with attachment before judgment, requiring proof that the defendant is attempting to dispose of assets to obstruct a potential decree.

Q: What did the Supreme Court decide in the Essar House vs. Arcellor Mittal case?

A: The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly ordered Essar House and Essar Services to deposit security amounts as interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act. It clarified that while CPC principles should be considered, technicalities should not prevent the securing of justice in arbitration matters.

Q: What is the practical implication of this judgment?

A: This judgment clarifies that courts have wide powers to grant interim relief in arbitration cases, even if the strict requirements of the CPC are not fully met. It emphasizes the importance of securing the amount in dispute to ensure the effectiveness of arbitration proceedings.

Q: What is the ratio decidendi of the case?

A: The ratio decidendi is that while the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) should be considered when granting interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the technicalities of the CPC should not prevent the court from securing the ends of justice.