Supreme Court Upholds KCOCA Invocation in Gauri Lankesh Murder Case: Kavitha Lankesh vs. State of Karnataka (21 October 2021)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 21 October 2021

Citation: 2021 INSC 732

Judges: A.M. Khanwilkar, J., Dinesh Maheshwari, J., C.T. Ravikumar, J.

Can a High Court quash charges under the Karnataka Control of Organised Crimes Act, 2000 (KCOCA) based on its interpretation of the law, even after a competent court has taken cognizance of the charges? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in the case of Kavitha Lankesh vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. The core issue revolved around the validity of invoking KCOCA against individuals allegedly involved in the murder of journalist Gauri Lankesh. The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s decision, emphasizing that prior approval for investigating organized crime is about the offense itself, not the individual offender. This judgment clarifies the scope of KCOCA and its application in cases involving organized crime. The judgment was authored by Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, with Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and C.T. Ravikumar concurring.

Case Background

On September 5, 2017, Gauri Lankesh, a prominent journalist, was murdered near her residence in Bengaluru. Her sister, Kavitha Lankesh, filed a complaint at Rajarajeshwari Nagar Police Station, leading to the registration of FIR No. 221/2017 under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959. The investigation was later transferred to a Special Investigating Team (SIT) on September 6, 2017.

A preliminary chargesheet was filed on May 29, 2018, and the case was committed to the City Civil and Sessions Judge. The SIT, during further investigation, found that the accused were part of an organized crime syndicate, attracting the provisions of Section 3 of the KCOCA. The SIT sought approval from the Commissioner of Police, Bengaluru City, on August 7, 2018, to invoke KCOCA. The Commissioner granted prior approval on August 14, 2018.

After completing the investigation, the Additional Director General of Police and Commissioner of Police, Bengaluru City, sanctioned the filing of a final police report under Section 24(2) of the KCOCA. The final report was filed on November 23, 2018, before the Special Court at Bengaluru, charging the accused under various sections of the IPC, the Arms Act, and the KCOCA. The Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge Court (CCH-1) took cognizance of the charges on December 17, 2018.

Mohan Nayak.N, one of the accused, filed Writ Petition No. 9717 of 2019 before the High Court on February 25, 2019, seeking to quash the prior approval order and the additional chargesheet against him under KCOCA.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The High Court of Karnataka partly allowed the writ petition filed by Mohan Nayak.N, quashing the order dated 14.08.2018 issued by the Commissioner of Police, Bengaluru City, which had granted prior approval to invoke Section 3 of the KCOCA. The High Court also quashed the chargesheet filed against Mohan Nayak.N under Sections 3(1)(i), 3(2), 3(3), and 3(4) of the KCOCA.

The High Court’s decision was based on its interpretation that Mohan Nayak.N was not involved in “continuing unlawful activity” as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the KCOCA, and that the chargesheet allegations did not attract the definition of organized crime under Section 2(e) of the KCOCA. The High Court relied on previous judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra & Ors. vs. Lalit Somdatta Nagpal & Anr., State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Brijesh Singh @ Arun Kumar & Anr., and Muniraju R. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors.

Aggrieved by the High Court’s decision, Kavitha Lankesh and the State of Karnataka filed separate appeals before the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around the interpretation and application of the Karnataka Control of Organised Crimes Act, 2000 (KCOCA). Key provisions include:

• Section 2(1)(d) of the KCOCA: Defines “continuing unlawful activity” as an activity prohibited by law, which is a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment of three years or more, and in respect of which more than one charge-sheet has been filed in a competent court within the preceding ten years.
• Section 2(e) of the KCOCA: Defines “organised crime” as any continuing unlawful activity by an individual or a group of individuals, acting singly or collectively, either as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate, by use of violence or threat of violence or intimidation or coercion, or other unlawful means, with the objective of gaining pecuniary benefits, or gaining undue economic or other advantage for himself or any other person or promoting insurgency.
• Section 24(1)(a) of the KCOCA: States that “No information about the commission of an offence of organized crime under this Act shall be recorded by a police officer without the prior approval of the police officer not below the rank of the Deputy Inspector General of Police.”
• Section 3 of the KCOCA: Specifies the punishment for organized crime.

The Supreme Court emphasized that Section 24(1)(a) of the KCOCA requires prior approval for recording information about the commission of an organized crime, not for recording a crime against an individual offender.

Arguments

The appellant, Kavitha Lankesh, and the State of Karnataka argued that the High Court erred in quashing the prior approval order and the chargesheet against Mohan Nayak.N. They contended that:

• The prior approval under Section 24(1)(a) of the KCOCA was valid because it was based on information about the commission of an organized crime by an organized crime syndicate.
• The High Court incorrectly focused on whether Section 3 of the KCOCA applied to Mohan Nayak.N, rather than on the validity of the prior approval for recording information about an organized crime.
• The High Court failed to consider the material collected by the SIT, which indicated that Mohan Nayak.N was a member of the organized crime syndicate.
• The High Court misinterpreted the judgments in Lalit Somdatta Nagpal and Brijesh Singh, which do not apply to the facts of this case.

The respondent, Mohan Nayak.N, argued that:

• He was not involved in “continuing unlawful activity” as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the KCOCA, as there were not more than two chargesheets against him.
• The chargesheet allegations did not attract the definition of organized crime under Section 2(e) of the KCOCA.
• The prior approval order was illegal and violated his personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
• The High Court correctly applied the principles laid down in Lalit Somdatta Nagpal, Brijesh Singh, and Muniraju R.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following key issue for consideration:

1. What is the correct interpretation of Section 24 of the Karnataka Control of Organised Crimes Act, 2000, particularly Section 24(1)(a), regarding the requirement of prior approval for recording information about the commission of an organized crime?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court:

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s decision was incorrect. The Supreme Court emphasized that the prior approval under Section 24(1)(a) of the KCOCA is for recording information about the commission of an organized crime, not for recording a crime against an individual offender. The focus at this stage should be on the existence of information regarding an organized crime, not the specific role of each accused.

The Court noted that the High Court had erroneously focused on whether Section 3 of the KCOCA applied to Mohan Nayak.N, instead of assessing the validity of the prior approval for recording information about an organized crime. The High Court also failed to analyze the material collected by the SIT, which indicated that Mohan Nayak.N was a member of the organized crime syndicate.

The Supreme Court clarified that the requirement of more than two chargesheets against an individual applies only to offenses under Section 3(1) of the KCOCA. For offenses under Sections 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), or 3(5), a person can be proceeded against if there is material to indicate that they are a member of the organized crime syndicate or have a nexus with the accused or the offense.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:

• The interpretation of Section 24(1)(a) of the KCOCA, which focuses on the recording of information about organized crime, not on the individual offender.
• The need to ensure that investigations into organized crime are not hampered by premature challenges to prior approvals based on individual roles.
• The fact that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by quashing the chargesheet against Mohan Nayak.N, especially after the competent court had taken cognizance of the charges.
• The material collected by the SIT, which indicated that Mohan Nayak.N was a member of the organized crime syndicate.

The Court emphasized that at the stage of prior approval, the focus should be on the existence of credible information about the commission of an organized crime by an organized crime syndicate. The specific role of each accused is to be determined during the investigation and at the stage of sanction under Section 24(2) of the KCOCA.

The Court also highlighted that the High Court had glossed over the fact that the writ petition was filed after the sanction was accorded and cognizance was taken by the competent court.

Logical Reasoning

Key Takeaways

• Prior approval under Section 24(1)(a) of the KCOCA is for recording information about the commission of an organized crime, not for recording a crime against an individual offender.
• The focus at the stage of prior approval should be on the existence of credible information regarding the commission of an organized crime by an organized crime syndicate.
• The specific role of each accused is to be determined during the investigation and at the stage of sanction under Section 24(2) of the KCOCA.
• The requirement of more than two chargesheets against an individual applies only to offenses under Section 3(1) of the KCOCA, not to offenses under Sections 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), or 3(5).
• High Courts should not interfere with investigations into organized crime at the stage of prior approval, especially after the competent court has taken cognizance of the charges.

Directions

The Supreme Court did not issue any specific directions in this judgment, except to set aside the High Court’s judgment and dismiss the writ petition filed by Mohan Nayak.N.

The Court clarified that its decision would not prevent Mohan Nayak.N from pursuing other remedies available to him under the law.

Specific Amendments Analysis

There was no specific amendment discussed in this judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the prior approval under Section 24(1)(a) of the KCOCA is for recording information about the commission of an organized crime by an organized crime syndicate, not for recording a crime against an individual offender. The focus at the stage of prior approval should be on the existence of credible information regarding the commission of an organized crime by an organized crime syndicate.

This judgment clarifies the scope of Section 24(1)(a) of the KCOCA and emphasizes that the High Court should not interfere with investigations into organized crime at the stage of prior approval, especially after the competent court has taken cognizance of the charges.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by Kavitha Lankesh and the State of Karnataka, setting aside the High Court’s judgment. The Court held that the prior approval granted by the Commissioner of Police, Bengaluru City, for invoking Section 3 of the KCOCA was valid. The Court clarified that the focus at the stage of prior approval is on the commission of an organized crime by an organized crime syndicate, not on the specific role of each accused. The judgment reinforces the importance of allowing investigations into organized crime to proceed without premature challenges based on individual roles.