Supreme Court Upholds Land Acquisition Challenge Based on Precedent: Union of India vs. Gopaldas Bhagwan Das (2020)

Date of the Judgment: 04 February 2020

Citation: [Not Available in Source]

Judges: R. F. Nariman J., S. Ravindra Bhat J., V. Ramasubramanian J.

Can a land acquisition be challenged years after the initial notification if a similar acquisition has already been declared invalid by the Supreme Court? This was the core question before the Supreme Court in this case. The Court had to decide if a previous judgment, which quashed a land acquisition due to procedural irregularities, should apply to a similar case, even though there was a significant delay in bringing the challenge. The judgment was delivered by a three-judge bench consisting of Justices R. F. Nariman, S. Ravindra Bhat, and V. Ramasubramanian, with Justice Nariman authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The case revolves around land in Mumbai that was initially requisitioned by the Government of India in 1943 under the Defence of India Rules, 1939. The land, measuring 4 acres and 34 gunthas, belonged to Rajabahadur Bhagwandas Haridas. About 2.68 acres of this land was de-requisitioned in 1949. However, in 1975, the government issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to acquire 8623 square meters of the same land. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act followed in 1978. A Draft Award was passed in 1986, which led to references under Sections 18 and 30 of the Act. Symbolic possession of the land was taken by the State on 06 January 1987, and it has remained with the State since then.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The respondents filed a writ petition challenging the acquisition, primarily on the ground that there was no due publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which is a mandatory requirement. The High Court upheld the respondents’ plea, relying on a previous judgment of the Supreme Court in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 6 SCC 348. In that case, the Supreme Court had quashed the acquisition of other lands under the same Section 4 notification due to non-compliance with mandatory publication requirements. The Union of India appealed the High Court’s decision, leading to the present case before the Supreme Court.

A Division Bench of the Supreme Court referred the matter to a larger three-judge bench due to doubts about the correctness of the decision in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala, particularly regarding the issue of delay and laches in challenging land acquisition proceedings.

Legal Framework

The case primarily involves the interpretation and application of Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This section mandates that a notification of proposed land acquisition must be published in the Official Gazette and public notices of the substance of such notification must be published at convenient places in the locality where the land is situated. The Supreme Court in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala held that both these requirements are cumulative and mandatory. The relevant portion of Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as discussed in the judgment, is as follows:

“4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon.—(1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality.”

Arguments

Appellant (Union of India) Arguments:

• The writ petition challenging the Section 4 notification was filed after a significant delay, and the High Court should have dismissed it on the ground of laches.
• The judgment in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala is “per incuriam” because it applied the 1984 Amendment Act retrospectively, even though the Section 4 notification was issued in 1975.
• The land in question has been used for defence purposes since 1942, and quashing the acquisition would severely affect public interest.
• The respondents were personally served with notices, unlike in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala.
• The decision in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala did not amount to quashing of the entire section 4 notification.

Respondent (Gopaldas Bhagwan Das & Ors.) Arguments:

• The Section 4 notification in this case is the same as the one struck down in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala, and that judgment should apply directly to this case.
• The issue of delay was not directly answered in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala because the Court held that non-compliance with mandatory conditions of Section 4 meant there was no valid acquisition in the eyes of the law.
• The fact that notices were served personally does not negate the mandatory requirement of public notice as per Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues, but the core issue was whether the judgment in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala, which quashed the land acquisition for non-compliance with Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, should apply to the present case, despite the delay in filing the writ petition and other arguments raised by the Union of India.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court:

• Kulsum R. Nadiadwala v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 6 SCC 348: The Court followed this precedent, emphasizing that the judgment had declared the entire acquisition proceedings null and void.
• J&K Housing Board v. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul: The Court reiterated that statutory provisions must be strictly complied with, even if parties are aware of the proceedings.
• Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: The Court interpreted this section to mean that both publication in the Official Gazette and public notice in the locality are mandatory requirements for a valid land acquisition.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily driven by the principle of legal consistency and the binding nature of its own precedents. The Court emphasized that when a prior judgment has declared a land acquisition invalid due to non-compliance with mandatory procedures, that judgment must be applied to similarly situated parties. The Court was not persuaded by the arguments of delay and laches, or that the respondents were personally served notice as the mandatory requirement of public notice was not followed. The Court also clarified that the previous judgment in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala had indeed quashed the entire acquisition proceedings, not just a portion of it.

Logical Reasoning:

The court considered the argument that the acquisition was for a defence project and that the land has been with the Union since 1942. However, it held that the same facts existed in the Kulsum R. Nadiadwala case, and therefore, the same relief must be granted.

The Court stated, “Given the fact that this is a Defence project in which possession has been with the Union since 1942, the same facts would obtain as in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala’s case in which relief has been granted to Kulsum R. Nadiadwala. This case, therefore, cannot lead to a different conclusion on similar facts.”

The Court also addressed the argument that the Kulsum R. Nadiadwala judgment had only restricted the claim to 50% of the land. The Court clarified that the restriction was due to the specific facts of the case, where there were multiple claimants to the land, and the declaration of law was still that the entire acquisition was invalid. The Court stated, “On a reading of paragraph 16 of Kulsum R. Nadiadwala’s judgment, it is important to note that though the appellant’s claim was restricted to only 50 per cent of the land in question, so far as the other 50 per cent is concerned, the judgment itself makes a reference to the fact that the appellants are legal heirs of one deceased Ismail Nadiadwala and that there was another claimant whose name was Ibrahim Nadiadwala to whom, presumably, 50 per cent of the property went.”

The Court also stated, “We may also note that in paragraph 13 of the Kulsum R. Nadiadwala’s case set out hereinabove, this Court quashed the entire acquisition proceedings stating that they be declared as null and void.”

Key Takeaways

• A prior judgment of the Supreme Court declaring a land acquisition invalid due to non-compliance with Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, will apply to similarly situated parties, even if there is a delay in challenging the acquisition.
• The mandatory requirements of Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which include publication in the Official Gazette and public notice in the locality, must be strictly complied with.
• Personal service of notices does not negate the requirement of public notice.
• The principle of legal consistency and the binding nature of Supreme Court precedents are paramount.
• The Court will not discriminate between similarly placed parties and will ensure that the law is applied equally to all.

Directions

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the Union of India, thereby upholding the High Court’s decision to quash the land acquisition proceedings.

Specific Amendments Analysis

There is no specific amendment analysis in the judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a prior judgment of the Supreme Court striking down a land acquisition notification due to non-compliance with mandatory procedures under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, will apply to similarly situated parties, even if there is a delay in challenging the acquisition. This case reinforces the importance of strict compliance with mandatory legal procedures and the binding nature of judicial precedents. There is no change in the previous position of law but it reaffirms the principle of stare decisis.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the Union of India, upholding the High Court’s decision to quash the land acquisition proceedings. The Court emphasized that the judgment in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala, which declared the acquisition invalid due to non-compliance with mandatory procedures, applied directly to this case. The Court rejected arguments of delay and laches, as well as the claim that personal service of notices negated the requirement of public notice. This judgment underscores the importance of adherence to mandatory legal procedures and the principle of legal consistency.