Supreme Court Upholds Land Acquisition: DDA vs. Sunil Khatri (2022)

Date of the Judgment: 19 May 2022

Citation: Civil Appeal No. 3862 of 2022 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 21353 of 2015)

Judges: Hemant Gupta, J., V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Can a land acquisition be deemed lapsed if the authorities couldn’t take possession due to court-ordered stays? The Supreme Court of India recently tackled this complex question in a case involving the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and several landowners. The core issue revolved around the interpretation of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, and whether interim court orders could prevent the lapsing of acquisition proceedings. This judgment clarifies the interplay between land acquisition laws and judicial interventions. The bench was composed of Justice Hemant Gupta and Justice V. Ramasubramanian, with the judgment authored by Justice Hemant Gupta.

Case Background

The case involves land in Village Chattarpur, Delhi, which was initially notified for acquisition on 25 November 1980, under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The land, measuring 14 Bigha 8 Biswa, was intended for planned development in Delhi. Declarations under Section 6 of the Act were published on various dates in 1985 and 1986, and the award was announced on 5 June 1987.

The acquisition process faced multiple legal challenges. Initially, the notification under Section 4 was contested, but the challenge was unsuccessful. Later, notifications under Section 6 were challenged for exceeding the time limit, leading to a Full Bench decision by the High Court. Subsequently, some notifications under Section 6 were set aside due to procedural irregularities in handling objections.

The landowners, including Sunil Khatri, sought a declaration that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, arguing that the authorities had failed to take possession of the land for an extended period. The DDA, on the other hand, contended that various court orders had prevented them from taking possession, thus nullifying the claim of lapsing.

Timeline

Legal Framework

The case primarily revolves around the interpretation of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the 2013 Act). This section states:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said Act has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act) is also relevant, particularly Sections 4 and 6, which deal with the notification and declaration of land acquisition. Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, pertains to the publication of a preliminary notification for acquisition of land for public purpose. Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, deals with the declaration of intended acquisition after considering objections under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The Supreme Court also considered the implications of various court orders, particularly interim orders staying dispossession, and how they interact with the timeline under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

Arguments

The arguments presented by both sides centered on the interpretation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, and the effect of various court orders on the acquisition process.

Arguments of the Landowners:

• The landowners argued that since the award was announced on 5 June 1987, and they received an interim stay order on 9 July 1999, a period of 12 years had passed without any stay. Therefore, the acquisition proceedings should be deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

• They contended that the stay orders granted in favor of other landowners could not be used by the State to exclude the time in their case. They emphasized that Section 24(2) does not explicitly provide for the exclusion of time due to stay orders, unlike other provisions of the Act.

• They argued that the State had taken possession of some lands on different dates, indicating that the stay in other cases did not prevent the State from taking possession of their land.

• They relied on the principle that a judgment is an authority for what it actually decides (ratio decidendi) and not what follows from it (obiter dictum), arguing against the inclusion of additional words in the statute (Casus Omissus).

Arguments of the Delhi Development Authority (DDA):

• The DDA argued that there was a stay of dispossession operating in one or the other writ petition, even after the decision in Balak Ram-II on 14 October 1988/18 November 1988.

• They contended that the High Court had taken conflicting views in various judgments, such as Balbir Singh and Gurdeep Singh Uban, which had created uncertainty about the status of acquisition proceedings.

• The DDA submitted that the issue of the validity of the notification under Section 6 attained finality only after the judgments in Gurdip Singh Uban-I and II. Therefore, the five-year period under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act had not expired before the Act came into force.

• They argued that the quashing of notifications under Section 6 in some cases prevented them from taking possession, and this period should be excluded when calculating the five-year period under Section 24(2).

Submissions Table

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in a separate section. However, the core issue that the Court addressed was:

1. Whether the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land in question stood lapsed in view of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered several cases and legal provisions to arrive at its decision. These are categorized below for clarity:

Cases

• 
  Munni Lal v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, 1983 SCC OnLine Del 321 – The High Court dismissed the challenge to the notification under Section 4 of the Act, holding that it was for a public purpose.
• 
  Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India, 1987 SCC OnLine Del 227 : AIR 1987 Del 239 – The Full Bench of the High Court held that the period during which stay orders were in force should be excluded in computing the validity of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.
• 
  Shri B.R. Gupta v. Union of India & Ors., 1988 SCC OnLine Del 367 : (1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB) – The High Court set aside the notification issued under Section 6 of the Act due to the lack of a personal hearing for the writ petitioner and the absence of records for consideration of objections.
• 
  Abhey Ram & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1997) 5 SCC 421 – The Supreme Court maintained the judgment in Balak Ram-I. It clarified that the quashing of the entire Section 5A inquiry and land acquisition proceedings was limited to the specific cases where objections were not considered.
• 
  Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan Singh, (1997) 5 SCC 430 – The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s order in Balbir Singh, which had quashed the Section 6 notification. However, this case was later overruled.
• 
  Balbir Singh v. Union of India & Ors., 1989 SCC OnLine Del 211 : (1989) 39 DLT 233 (DB) – The High Court quashed the notification under Section 6 and directed the handover of possession to the landowners upon refund of compensation.
• 
  Brig. Gurdip Singh Uban v. Union of India, 1996 SCC OnLine Del 879 – The High Court quashed the notification under Section 6 of the Act, relying on the judgment in Balak Ram Gupta’s case.
• 
  Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors., (1999) 7 SCC 44 – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment in Gurdip Singh Uban, holding that the judgment in Abhey Ram was binding.
• 
  Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 296 – The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, reaffirming the decision in Abhey Ram.
• 
  Chatro Devi v. Union of India, 2005 SCC Online Delhi 279 – The Division Bench of the High Court differed on whether objections under Section 5A must be decided by the same collector who heard them, but held that Balak Ram Gupta was no longer good law.
• 
  Union of India v. Shiv Raj, (2014) 6 SCC 564 – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the majority view of the High Court that objections are required to be decided by the same Collector who heard them.
• 
  Om Prakash v. Union of India and Others, (2010) 4 SCC 17 – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of landowners who had not filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act, relying upon Abhey Ram and Gurdip Singh Uban-I.
• 
  Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others, (2020) 8 SCC 129 – The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court clarified the interpretation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, holding that the twin conditions of failure to take possession or payment of compensation alone can lead to the lapse of notification.
• 
  Delhi Development Authority v. Godfrey Phillips (I) Ltd. & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 3073 of 2022 – The Supreme Court examined the judgments in Balbir Singh and Gurdeep Singh Uban, clarifying that Balak Ram-II was a judgment in personam and not in rem.
• 
  Delhi Development Authority v. Rajan Sood, Civil Appeal No. 1927 of 2022 – The Supreme Court held that the period during which an interim order is operative has to be excluded in the computation of the five-year period under Section 24(2).
• 
  Delhi Development Authority v. Bhim Sain Goel & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 3151 of 2022 – The Supreme Court held that landowners cannot take shelter under Section 24(2) if they obtained interim orders that prevented the authority from taking possession.

Legal Provisions

• 
  Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – This section deals with the publication of a preliminary notification for acquisition of land for public purpose.
• 
  Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – This section deals with the declaration of intended acquisition after considering objections under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
• 
  Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – This section deals with the lapsing of acquisition proceedings if possession is not taken or compensation is not paid within five years of the award.

Authority Table

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• The Court relied on Abhey Ram & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [CITATION (1997) 5 SCC 421]* as a binding precedent, clarifying that the quashing of the entire Section 5A inquiry and land acquisition proceedings was limited to specific cases where objections were not considered.
• The Court overruled Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan Singh [CITATION (1997) 5 SCC 430]*, stating that it did not lay down good law, as it was not in line with the decision in Abhey Ram.
• The Court relied on Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others [CITATION (2020) 8 SCC 129]* to interpret Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, holding that the twin conditions of failure to take possession or payment of compensation alone can lead to the lapsing of acquisition proceedings.
• The Court also relied on Delhi Development Authority v. Rajan Sood [CITATION Civil Appeal No. 1927 of 2022]* and Delhi Development Authority v. Bhim Sain Goel & Ors. [CITATION Civil Appeal No. 3151 of 2022]* to hold that the period during which interim orders were in effect must be excluded from the computation of the five-year period under Section 24(2).

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the principle that a party should not benefit from their own wrong (“commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet”). The Court emphasized that the landowners had obtained interim orders that prevented the DDA from taking possession of the land, and therefore, they could not claim that the acquisition had lapsed due to the DDA’s failure to take possession.

The Court also highlighted the principle that the law does not expect the impossible (“lex non cogit ad impossibilia”). The DDA was prevented from taking possession due to court orders, and thus the period during which these orders were in effect had to be excluded from the calculation of the five-year period under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

The Court’s reasoning was further influenced by the need to uphold the public interest. Allowing the acquisition to lapsewould have frustrated the planned development of Delhi, which was the purpose of the acquisition. The Court emphasized that the acquisition was for a public purpose, and the DDA should not be penalized for the delays caused by court orders.

Final Order

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the Delhi Development Authority and set aside the order of the High Court. The Court held that the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land in question had not lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

Flowchart of the Case