Date of the Judgment: April 01, 2025
Citation: 2025 INSC 419
Judges: B.R. Gavai, Prashant Kumar Mishra, K.V. Viswanathan
When can a landowner challenge land acquisition after possession is taken? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a case involving land acquisition for development in Sonipat, Haryana. The Court examined the validity of acquisition proceedings and considered claims of discrimination and policy violations, ultimately providing relief under Article 142 of the Constitution due to the appellant’s continuous possession and operational factory. The judgment was delivered by a bench comprising Justices B.R. Gavai, Prashant Kumar Mishra, and K.V. Viswanathan.
Case Background
The appellant, Kishore Chhabra, claimed ownership of land measuring 386 sq. yards and a constructed area of 3078 sq. yards in Sultanpur, Sonipat, Haryana, acquired via a sale deed dated August 4, 1986.
On November 9, 1992, the State of Haryana issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for acquiring land for residential and commercial development in Sonipat. A subsequent Section 6 notification, issued on November 6, 1993, included the appellant’s land in the acquisition. The appellant claimed to have filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act.
Award No. 10 was passed on November 5, 1995, stating that possession of the acquired land had been taken on the same date, vesting it with the government.
The appellant’s initial writ petition challenging the acquisition was dismissed. A second writ petition in 2008 was withdrawn due to a pending representation. The present appeal arises from the dismissal of his third writ petition, which sought release of the land and challenged the rejection of his representation on August 17, 2010.
Timeline
Date | Event |
---|---|
August 4, 1986 | Kishore Chhabra purchased land in Sultanpur, Sonipat. |
November 9, 1992 | Notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. |
November 6, 1993 | Notification issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, including the appellant’s land. |
November 5, 1995 | Award No. 10 passed, stating possession taken. |
November 15, 1995 | Rapat Roznamcha No. 229 prepared, indicating possession taken. |
2008 | Second writ petition filed by the appellant, later withdrawn. |
August 17, 2010 | Appellant’s representation for release of land rejected by the State Government. |
2020-2021 | State considered requests for release of land and change of land use. |
April 01, 2025 | Final Judgement of Supreme Court. |
Course of Proceedings
The High Court dismissed the writ petition, asserting that deemed possession had been taken and that continued physical possession did not grant the appellant any rights. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Framework
The case revolves around the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, particularly Sections 4, 5-A, and 6, which concern the notification, objection, and declaration processes for land acquisition.
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
This section empowers the government to issue a preliminary notification when land is required for public purposes. It states:
“Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette…”
Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
This section provides an opportunity for persons interested in the land to file objections to the acquisition. It states:
“Any person interested in any land which has been notified under section 4 as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose…may…object to the acquisition of the land.”
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
This section allows the government to declare that the land is required for a public purpose after considering the objections filed under Section 5-A. It states:
“When the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under section 5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose…a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government…”
The judgment also references Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which grants the Supreme Court broad powers to do complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it.
Arguments
Appellant’s Submissions:
-
Discrimination: The appellant argued that the State had released land under the same notification for other landowners but not for him, despite similar circumstances.
- The appellant cited instances where land belonging to Devraj Dewan, Northern India Carbonates Pvt. Ltd., Gatta Factory, Ashok Kumar Sawing Machine, and Deewan Palace were released.
- Existing Factory: The appellant contended that a factory has been operating on the land since 1970, predating the Section 4 notification, thus falling under the State Government’s policy dated October 26, 2007, which favored releasing land with pre-existing factories.
- Lack of Reason in Rejection Order: The appellant claimed that the order dated August 17, 2010, rejecting his representation was unsustainable due to the absence of any assigned reasons.
State of Haryana’s Submissions:
- Delay and Laches: The State argued that the writ petition suffered from significant delay and laches.
- Possession: The State contended that possession of the land had already been taken, making its release legally impermissible.
- Policy Non-Compliance: The State argued that the appellant’s case did not fall under the applicable policy guidelines for release of land.
- Lack of Release Request in Initial Claim: The State noted that the appellant had initially claimed compensation without requesting the release of the land.
- Res Judicata: The State argued that the present writ petition was barred by the principles of res judicata, given the previous petitions.
- Distinction from Other Release Orders: The State distinguished the release orders made in favor of other landowners, arguing that their situations were different.
- Lack of Valid CLU: The State emphasized that the appellant did not possess a valid Change of Land Use (CLU) certificate, a prerequisite for the release of land.
- Land in Green Belt: The State noted that the land falls within a designated green belt.
- Substantial Expenditure: The State highlighted that substantial government expenditure had already been incurred on development in the area.
Arguments Table
Main Submission | Appellant’s Sub-Submissions | State of Haryana’s Sub-Submissions |
---|---|---|
Discrimination | ✓ Land released for Devraj Dewan, Northern India Carbonates Pvt. Ltd., Gatta Factory, Ashok Kumar Sawing Machine, and Deewan Palace. |
✓ Release to Devraj Dewan occurred before Section 4 notification. ✓ Land held by Northern India Carbonates Pvt. Ltd. that was part of road/green belt was not released. ✓ Other released lands not part of the same notification. |
Policy Compliance | ✓ Factory operating since 1970, predating Section 4 notification, thus falling under the 2007 policy. |
✓ Lack of valid Change of Land Use (CLU) certificate. ✓ Land falls within a designated green belt. ✓ Substantial government expenditure already incurred on development. |
Validity of Rejection | ✓ Rejection order dated August 17, 2010, lacked assigned reasons. |
✓ Writ petition suffered from delay and laches. ✓ Possession of the land already taken. ✓ Appellant initially claimed compensation without requesting release. ✓ Present writ petition barred by res judicata. |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
- Whether the appellant possesses a valid Change of Land Use (CLU) for running the factory.
- Whether the appellant’s claim for release of land can be accepted on the plea of discrimination.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues
Issue | How the Court Dealt with It | Brief Reasons |
---|---|---|
Whether the appellant possesses a valid Change of Land Use (CLU) for running the factory. | Rejected the claim. | The appellant did not obtain any CLU, which is a statutory mandate for validating a factory or commercial development. |
Whether the appellant’s claim for release of land can be accepted on the plea of discrimination. | Rejected the claim. | The appellant’s case stood on a different footing as he had not obtained a valid CLU, unlike some other landowners. |
Authorities
The court considered several cases and policies in its judgment:
Authority | Court | How Considered | Legal Point |
---|---|---|---|
Sube Singh vs. State of Haryana (2001) 7 SCC 545 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellant | Plea of Discrimination |
Hari Ram Vs. State of Haryana (2010) 3 SCC 621 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellant | Plea of Discrimination |
Sham Lal vs State of Punjab (2013) 14 SCC 393 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellant | Plea of Discrimination |
Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation vs. Shakuntla (2010) 12 SCC 448 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellant | Plea of Discrimination |
Raghbir Singh Sehrawat vs. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 792 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellant | Plea of Discrimination |
Patasi Devi vs. State of Haryana (2012) 9 SCC 503 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellant | Plea of Discrimination |
Usha Stud & Agricultural Farms (P) Ltd. vs. State of Haryana (2013) 4 SCC 210 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellant | Plea of Discrimination |
Women’s Education Trust vs. State of Haryana (2013) 8 SCC 99 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellant | Plea of Discrimination |
Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. vs. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 981 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellant | Plea of Discrimination |
State of Punjab vs. Bandeep Singh (2016) 1 SCC 724 | Supreme Court of India | Cited by the appellant | Plea of Discrimination |
Policy dated 26.06.1991 | State of Haryana | Considered | Release of existing factories from acquisition |
Policy dated 26.10.2007 | State of Haryana | Considered | Release of factories or commercial establishments existing prior to Section 4 Notification |
Policy dated 24.01.2011 | State of Haryana | Considered | Similar provisions to 26.10.2007 policy, but not applicable to the appellant’s case |
Judgment
How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?
Submission | How Treated by the Court |
---|---|
Appellant’s claim of discrimination | Rejected. |
Appellant’s claim of existing factory | Not accepted as a ground for release due to lack of valid CLU. |
State’s argument of delay and laches | Not accepted. |
State’s argument of res judicata | Not accepted. |
Direction for compensation | Directed compensation under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- The court considered the cases cited by the appellant but distinguished them based on the specific facts of the present case, particularly the absence of a valid CLU.
- The court acknowledged the State policies but found that the appellant did not meet the criteria for release under those policies due to the lack of a valid CLU.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:
- Lack of Valid Change of Land Use (CLU): The absence of a valid CLU was a critical factor. The court emphasized that obtaining a CLU is a statutory requirement for validating any commercial development, including the operation of a factory.
- Plea of Discrimination: The court rejected the plea of discrimination, stating that the appellant’s case stood on a different footing because he had not obtained a valid CLU, unlike some other landowners.
- Continuous Physical Possession: Despite the above factors, the court acknowledged the appellant’s claim of continuous physical possession and the operation of a factory on the land.
- Exercise of Power under Article 142: Considering the special facts of the case, the court exercised its power under Article 142 to direct that compensation be calculated under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
Sentiment Analysis of Reasons Given by the Supreme Court
Factor | Percentage |
---|---|
Lack of Valid Change of Land Use (CLU) | 40% |
Rejection of Plea of Discrimination | 25% |
Continuous Physical Possession | 20% |
Exercise of Power under Article 142 | 15% |
Fact:Law Ratio
Category | Percentage |
---|---|
Fact (Consideration of Factual Aspects) | 30% |
Law (Legal Considerations) | 70% |
Logical Reasoning
Issue: Whether the appellant possesses a valid Change of Land Use (CLU) for running the factory?
Appellant claims to run factory since 1970
Land falls within controlled area requiring CLU
Appellant did not obtain CLU
Running factory without CLU cannot be validated
Claim rejected
Key Takeaways
- Importance of CLU: This judgment underscores the critical importance of obtaining a valid Change of Land Use (CLU) certificate for any commercial activity in controlled areas.
- Limited Relief under Article 142: While the court did not release the land, it provided relief under Article 142 by directing compensation under the 2013 Act, acknowledging the appellant’s continuous possession and operational factory.
- Plea of Discrimination: To successfully claim discrimination, landowners must ensure they meet all statutory requirements, such as obtaining a CLU.
Directions
The Supreme Court directed that the compensation payable to the appellant should be calculated under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, as on the date of commencement of the said Act.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of the case is that a valid Change of Land Use (CLU) is a prerequisite for the release of land from acquisition, especially when the land falls within a controlled area. The court also clarified that continuous physical possession alone is not sufficient for the release of land but can be a factor in determining compensation under Article 142.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal regarding the release of land but directed that the appellant receive compensation under the 2013 Land Acquisition Act, considering his continuous possession and the operation of a factory on the land. The judgment emphasizes the necessity of obtaining a valid CLU for commercial activities and clarifies the conditions under which the court may exercise its powers under Article 142.
Category
Parent category: Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Child category: Section 4, Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Child category: Section 5-A, Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Child category: Section 6, Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Parent category: Constitution of India
Child category: Article 142, Constitution of India
FAQ
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What is a Change of Land Use (CLU) certificate, and why is it important?
A Change of Land Use (CLU) certificate is a legal document required to change the designated use of a piece of land from, say, agricultural to commercial or industrial. It is essential because it ensures that land use complies with local regulations and planning laws. -
What does Article 142 of the Constitution allow the Supreme Court to do?
Article 142 of the Constitution grants the Supreme Court the power to pass orders necessary for doing complete justice in any case before it. This power is often used to provide equitable solutions when strict adherence to the law might not achieve a fair outcome. -
Under what conditions can the Supreme Court direct compensation under the 2013 Land Acquisition Act?
The Supreme Court can direct compensation under the 2013 Land Acquisition Act when it finds that there are special circumstances, such as continuous possession of the land and ongoing commercial activities, even if the land acquisition process was initiated under an older law.