Supreme Court Upholds Life Sentence with 30-Year Cap in Double Murder Case: Jitendra @ Kalla vs. State of NCT of Delhi (25 October 2018)

Date of the Judgment: 25 October 2018

Citation: (2018) INSC 958

Judges: A.K. Sikri, J., Ashok Bhushan, J.

Can a court impose a life sentence with a condition that the convict cannot seek remission for a specified period, such as 30 years? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question concerning sentencing in a double murder case. This case involved an appellant convicted for two separate murders, with the trial court imposing life sentences with specific restrictions on remission and consecutive terms. The Supreme Court clarified the legal position on these aspects, setting aside some of the High Court’s modifications while upholding the conviction.

The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice A.K. Sikri and Justice Ashok Bhushan.

Case Background

The case involves two separate incidents. In the first incident, on March 10, 1999, the appellant, Jitendra @ Kalla, murdered Anil Badana at a wedding reception. Sumit Nayyar, an eyewitness, reported the incident to the police, specifically naming the appellant as the perpetrator. Later that night, between March 10 and 11, 1999, the appellant went to Sumit Nayyar’s house and fatally shot his father, Kimti Lal Nayyar.

Two FIRs were registered: FIR No. 67 of 1999 for the murder of Anil Badana and FIR No. 68 of 1999 for the murder of Kimti Lal Nayyar. The trial court convicted the appellant in both cases.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The trial court convicted the appellant in both FIR No. 67/1999 and FIR No. 68/1999. In FIR No. 67/1999, the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a condition that he would not be considered for remission until he served 30 years, along with a fine of Rs. 3 lakh. In FIR No. 68/1999, the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the remainder of his life, also with a fine of Rs. 3 lakh. The trial court ordered that the sentence in FIR No. 68/1999 would commence only after the completion of the sentence in FIR No. 67/1999.

The appellant appealed to the High Court, which, while not contesting the conviction, addressed the sentencing. The High Court concluded that the sentences should run concurrently and that the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction by imposing a 30-year cap on remission and ordering consecutive life sentences. The High Court modified the sentence to the period already undergone (16 years and 10 months). However, the High Court later issued a ‘correction’ order, removing the sentence reduction.

Legal Framework

The judgment primarily revolves around the interpretation of Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), which deals with the sentencing of a person already undergoing imprisonment. Specifically, Section 427(2) of the CrPC states:

“When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.”

This provision mandates that if a person is already serving a life sentence and is subsequently sentenced to another term of imprisonment (including life imprisonment), the subsequent sentence must run concurrently with the previous one. The court also considered the concept of remission, which is the reduction of a sentence based on good behavior or other factors, and whether a court can impose a life sentence with a condition that the convict cannot seek remission for a specified period.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that the trial was biased and that there was a denial of a fair trial, leading to an illegal conviction.
• The appellant’s counsel at the High Court conceded on the conviction without proper instructions, which should not have been accepted by the court, and the High Court should have decided the case on merits.
• The High Court erred in rectifying its order regarding the sentence, as it had become functus officio after delivering the judgment.
• The appellant contended that the High Court’s initial order reducing the sentence to the period already undergone was correct and that the subsequent correction was beyond the court’s powers.
• The appellant raised several points about the merits of the case, including improper motive, unreliable eyewitnesses, and procedural lapses in the investigation.

State’s Arguments:

• The State argued that the appellant’s counsel had specifically conceded on the conviction at the High Court, and this statement should be upheld.
• The High Court had, in fact, reviewed the evidence and upheld the conviction.
• The trial court was justified in imposing a 30-year cap before remission could be considered, relying on the Constitution Bench judgment in Sriharan @ Murugan.
• The State contended that the High Court’s modification of the sentence was incorrect and that the trial court’s sentence should be upheld.

Complainants’ Arguments:

• The complainants supported the State’s arguments, emphasizing that the High Court’s modification of the sentence was improper.
• They argued that the High Court’s initial order reducing the sentence was incorrect and that the trial court’s sentence should be upheld.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issues for consideration:

1. Whether the appellant has been rightly convicted for the offences mentioned in the two charge sheets?
2. Whether the order of the High Court modifying the sentences as awarded by the trial court is proper and justified?
3. Whether the High Court could pass the ‘correction’ orders on February 14, 2017, on the ground that a typographical error had been noticed in the main judgment dated December 24, 2016?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered several authorities to arrive at its decision:

On the issue of concession by counsel:

• State of Maharashtra v. Shrinivas Nayak and Another [ (1982) 2 SCC 463] – Supreme Court of India
• Muthuramalingam and others v. State represented by Inspector of Police [(2016) 8 SCC 313] – Supreme Court of India

On the issue of sentencing and remission:

• Swamy Shraddananda (I) v. State of Karnataka [(2007) 12 SCC 288] – Supreme Court of India
• Swamy Shraddananda (II) v. State of Karnataka [(2008) 13 SCC 767] – Supreme Court of India
• Shri Bhagwan v. State of Rajasthan [(2016) 6 SCC 296] – Supreme Court of India
• Union of India v. V . Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors. [(2016) 7 SCC 1] – Supreme Court of India
• Birju v. State of M.P. [(2014) 3 SCC 421] – Supreme Court of India
• Sumer Singh v. Surajbhan Sing and Ors. [2014 (3) JCC 2282] – Delhi High Court
• State of M.P. v. Babulal [AIR 2008 SC 582] – Supreme Court of India
• Jameel v. State of Uttar Pradesh; [(2010) 12 SCC 532] – Supreme Court of India
• Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand [2013 (2) SCALE 533] – Supreme Court of India
• Dulla and Ors. v. State [AIR 1958 All 198] – Allahabad High Court
• Ranjit Singh v. UT of Chandigarh, [(1991) 4 SCC 304] – Supreme Court of India

Legal Provisions:

• Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court:

• The Court relied on State of Maharashtra v. Shrinivas Nayak and Another [(1982) 2 SCC 463]* and Muthuramalingam and others v. State represented by Inspector of Police [(2016) 8 SCC 313]* to hold that the court records must be believed and that if there is an error, the aggrieved party should approach the same court for correction.
• The Court referred to Swamy Shraddananda (I) v. State of Karnataka [(2007) 12 SCC 288]*, Swamy Shraddananda (II) v. State of Karnataka [(2008) 13 SCC 767]*, Shri Bhagwan v. State of Rajasthan [(2016) 6 SCC 296]*, Union of India v. V . Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors. [(2016) 7 SCC 1]*, Birju v. State of M.P. [(2014) 3 SCC 421]* and Sumer Singh v. Surajbhan Sing and Ors. [2014 (3) JCC 2282]* to discuss the concept of special category of sentence in lieu of death penalty and the power of the court to impose a modified punishment.
• The Court cited State of M.P. v. Babulal [AIR 2008 SC 582]*, Jameel v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2010) 12 SCC 532]*, Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand [2013 (2) SCALE 533]* and Dulla and Ors. v. State [AIR 1958 All 198]* regarding the principles of sentencing.
• The Court also relied on Ranjit Singh v. UT of Chandigarh, [(1991) 4 SCC 304]* to support the principle that consecutive life sentences cannot be awarded as humans have only one life.
• The Court interpreted Section 427 of the CrPC to mean that subsequent life sentences must run concurrently with previous life sentences.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:

• The sanctity of court records and the principle that statements made by counsel on instructions are binding.
• The need to uphold the trial court’s sentence, which was considered appropriate given the gravity of the crimes.
• The legal position that life sentences should run concurrently, as per Section 427(2) of the CrPC.
• The precedent set by the Constitution Bench judgments regarding the imposition of a 30-year cap on remission.
• The principle that a High Court cannot correct its judgment on the pretext of a typographical error when the error is substantive.

Ratio: The ratio of fact to law is 30:70, indicating a strong emphasis on the legal aspects of the case.

The Supreme Court reasoned that the High Court’s modification of the sentence was not a typographical error but a substantive change and, therefore, beyond its jurisdiction to correct in that manner. The Court emphasized that the trial court’s imposition of a 30-year cap on remission was consistent with the law, and the sentences should run concurrently, as provided by Section 427(2) of the CrPC.

The Court stated:

“It does not need further elaboration to hold that the last sentence in the aforesaid paragraph by which the Court modified the punishment to the period already undergone, i.e., 16 years and 10 months was not a typographical error.”

“For the offence of murder, minimum sentence is ‘life imprisonment’. For that reason, obviously, the High Court could not have modified the sentence to the one already undergone.”

“Parliament, it manifests from the provisions of Section 427(2) CrPC, was fully cognizant of the anomaly that would arise if a prisoner condemned to undergo life imprisonment is directed to do so twice over.”

Key Takeaways

• Life sentences for multiple offences must run concurrently, as per Section 427(2) of the CrPC.
• A court can impose a life sentence with a condition that the convict cannot seek remission for a specified period, such as 30 years.
• High Courts cannot rectify their judgments on the pretext of typographical errors when the error is substantive.
• Statements made by counsel on instructions are binding on the client, and the court record has to be believed.
• The principle of proportionality in sentencing requires a balance between the heinousness of the crime and the punishment.
• The Supreme Court’s judgment reinforces the idea that the judiciary must maintain a balance between justice for the victim and the rights of the accused.

Directions

The Supreme Court issued the following directions:

• The order dated February 14, 2017, of the High Court was set aside.
• The High Court’s modification of the sentence in the judgment dated December 24, 2016, was set aside. The trial court’s sentence of life imprisonment with a 30-year cap on remission was upheld.
• The sentences in both cases will run concurrently.
• The conviction of the appellant was sustained.

Specific Amendments Analysis

There is no discussion on specific amendments in the judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of the case is that life sentences for multiple offences must run concurrently, and a court can impose a life sentence with a condition that the convict cannot seek remission for a specified period. The judgment clarifies the interpretation of Section 427(2) of the CrPC and reinforces the principles laid down in previous Constitution Bench judgments regarding sentencing and remission. There is no change in the previous position of law, but the judgment reinforces and clarifies the existing legal principles.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant, set aside the High Court’s modification of the sentence, and reinstated the trial court’s sentence of life imprisonment with a 30-year cap on remission. The Court clarified that the sentences should run concurrently. The judgment reinforces the legal principles regarding sentencing, remission, and the sanctity of court records.