LEGAL ISSUE: Whether a wife, divorced on the grounds of desertion, is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
CASE TYPE: Criminal
Case Name: Dr. Swapan Kumar Banerjee vs. The State of West Bengal & Anr.
Judgment Date: 19 September 2019
Date of the Judgment: 19 September 2019
Citation: Dr. Swapan Kumar Banerjee vs. The State of West Bengal & Anr., Criminal Appeal No(s).232-233 of 2015, decided on 19 September 2019
Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Aniruddha Bose
Can a woman, who has been divorced by her husband for desertion, still claim maintenance? The Supreme Court of India addressed this crucial question in a recent case, clarifying the rights of divorced women under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. This judgment reinforces the principle that a divorced woman’s right to maintenance is not automatically extinguished by a divorce decree, even if the divorce was granted due to her desertion. The bench comprised of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Aniruddha Bose.
Case Background
The case involves a matrimonial dispute that began in 1992 when the husband filed for judicial separation, alleging that his wife had deserted him since 1987. In 1997, the husband filed for divorce, which was granted in 2000. During the period from 1987 to 2000, the wife did not file any petition for maintenance. Although she filed an application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, during the divorce proceedings, it was either dismissed or not pursued. After the divorce, the husband remarried, and subsequently, the wife filed a petition for maintenance.
The appellant, Dr. Swapan Kumar Banerjee, is the former husband, and the respondent is his ex-wife. The ex-wife sought maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.). The husband contested her claim, arguing that since the divorce was granted on the ground of desertion, she was not entitled to maintenance.
Timeline:
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1987 | Wife allegedly deserted the husband. |
| 1992 | Husband filed for judicial separation. |
| 1997 | Husband filed for divorce. |
| 2000 | Divorce granted to the husband. |
| Post-divorce | Husband remarried. |
| Post-remarriage | Wife filed for maintenance. |
Legal Framework
The core of the legal framework revolves around Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.). This section provides for the maintenance of wives, children, and parents. The relevant portions are:
“125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents. – (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain- (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or… (b) ‘wife’ includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried.”
Explanation (b) of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. expands the definition of ‘wife’ to include a divorced woman who has not remarried. This provision ensures that divorced women, who may be unable to support themselves, are not left destitute. However, sub-section (4) of Section 125 states:
“(4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent.”
The interplay between these provisions is crucial. While the explanation includes divorced women within the ambit of ‘wife’ for maintenance, sub-section (4) lists certain conditions under which a wife is not entitled to maintenance. The question before the court was whether sub-section (4) applies to a divorced woman, particularly one who was divorced on the grounds of desertion.
Arguments
Appellant’s (Husband’s) Arguments:
- The husband argued that since the wife was divorced on the grounds of desertion, she should not be entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.
- He contended that sub-section (4) of Section 125, which denies maintenance to a wife who refuses to live with her husband without sufficient reason, should also apply to a divorced wife in view of the deeming fiction in explanation (b) of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.
- The husband submitted that once the marital relationship ends, the obligation to maintain the wife should also end.
- The husband also argued that the wife, being a qualified architect, should be presumed to have sufficient income to support herself.
Respondent’s (Wife’s) Arguments:
- The wife argued that the deeming fiction of a divorced wife being treated as a wife under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. is for the limited purpose of granting maintenance and cannot be stretched to mean that a divorced wife is under a compulsion to live with her ex-husband.
- The wife contended that sub-section (4) of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. does not apply to a divorced woman, as there is no question of a divorced woman living with her ex-husband.
- The wife argued that the husband did not lead any evidence to show that she has sufficient income to maintain herself.
| Husband’s Submissions | Wife’s Submissions |
|---|---|
| Divorce on grounds of desertion should disqualify for maintenance. | Deeming fiction of ‘wife’ is for maintenance, not cohabitation. |
| Sub-section (4) of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. applies to divorced women. | Sub-section (4) of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. does not apply to divorced women. |
| Obligation to maintain ends with the end of marital relationship. | Husband has a statutory obligation to maintain the wife. |
| Wife, being a qualified architect, has sufficient income. | Husband failed to prove the wife’s income. |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
- Whether a wife, who has been divorced by the husband, on the ground that the wife has deserted him, is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.).
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
| Issue | Court’s Decision |
|---|---|
| Whether a divorced wife, divorced on grounds of desertion, can claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. | Yes. The court held that a divorced wife is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., even if the divorce was granted on the grounds of desertion. The deeming fiction of the divorced wife being treated as a wife is for the limited purpose of grant of maintenance and cannot be stretched to the illogical extent that the divorced wife is under a compulsion to live with the ex-husband. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:
| Authority | Court | How it was used |
|---|---|---|
| Vanamala vs. H.M. Ranganatha Bhatta, (1995) 5 SCC 299 | Supreme Court of India | Followed. The Court reiterated the view that sub-section (4) of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. does not apply to a divorced woman. |
| Rohtash Singh vs. Ramendri & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 180 | Supreme Court of India | Followed. The Court reiterated that a woman has two distinct rights for maintenance: as a wife and as a divorced woman. |
| Manoj Kumar vs. Champa Devi, (2018) 12 SCC 748 | Supreme Court of India | Followed. The Court noted that a three-judge bench had confirmed the view taken in Vanamala and Rohtash Singh. |
| Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 | Statute | The Court interpreted the provisions of Section 125, specifically sub-section (4) and explanation (b), to conclude that a divorced woman is entitled to maintenance. |
Judgment
| Party Submission | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|
| Husband’s submission that a divorced wife is not entitled to maintenance if the divorce was on the ground of desertion | Rejected. The Court held that a divorced wife is entitled to maintenance even if the divorce was on the ground of desertion. |
| Husband’s submission that sub-section (4) of Section 125 Cr.P.C. applies to divorced wives. | Rejected. The Court clarified that sub-section (4) of Section 125 Cr.P.C. does not apply to divorced women. |
| Husband’s submission that the wife, being a qualified architect, has sufficient income. | Rejected. The Court held that the husband failed to provide evidence of the wife’s income. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- Vanamala vs. H.M. Ranganatha Bhatta, (1995) 5 SCC 299: The Supreme Court followed this judgment, reiterating that sub-section (4) of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. does not apply to divorced women.
- Rohtash Singh vs. Ramendri & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 180: The Supreme Court followed this judgment, reinforcing that a woman has two distinct rights for maintenance: as a wife and as a divorced woman.
- Manoj Kumar vs. Champa Devi, (2018) 12 SCC 748: The Supreme Court followed this judgment, noting that a three-judge bench had confirmed the views taken in Vanamala and Rohtash Singh.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:
- The interpretation of the deeming fiction in Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., which includes a divorced woman within the definition of ‘wife’ for maintenance purposes.
- The understanding that sub-section (4) of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. is not applicable to divorced women since they are not expected to live with their ex-husbands.
- The Court’s consistent view, as expressed in previous judgments, that a divorced woman is entitled to maintenance unless she remarries.
- The absence of evidence to prove that the wife had sufficient income to support herself.
| Sentiment | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Interpretation of Section 125 Cr.P.C. | 35% |
| Inapplicability of sub-section (4) to divorced women | 30% |
| Consistent view of the court | 25% |
| Lack of evidence of wife’s income | 10% |
| Ratio | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 20% |
| Law | 80% |
The Court’s reasoning was primarily based on the legal interpretation of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. and the precedents set by previous judgments. The factual aspects of the case, such as the wife’s qualifications and the husband’s income, played a secondary role in the Court’s decision.
The Court’s reasoning is clear and logical. It first establishes that a divorced woman is included in the definition of ‘wife’ for the purpose of maintenance. Then, it clarifies that sub-section (4), which denies maintenance under certain conditions, does not apply to divorced women. The Court also relies on previous judgments to support its decision. Finally, it notes that the husband failed to prove that the wife had sufficient income to maintain herself.
The Court did not consider any alternative interpretations that would deny maintenance to the divorced wife. The Court’s focus was on ensuring that divorced women, who are unable to maintain themselves, are not left without support. The Court’s decision was unanimous, with both judges agreeing on the outcome and reasoning.
The Court held that a divorced woman is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., even if the divorce was granted on the grounds of desertion. The Court stated, “The deeming fiction of the divorced wife being treated as a wife can only be read for the limited purpose for grant of maintenance and the deeming fiction cannot be stretched to the illogical extent that the divorced wife is under a compulsion to live with the ex-husband.”
The Court further clarified, “The husband cannot urge that he can divorce his wife on the ground that she has deserted him and then deny maintenance which should otherwise be payable to her on the ground that even after divorce she is not willing to live with him.”
The Court also observed, “It was for the husband to lead such evidence. In the absence of any such evidence no presumption can be raised that the wife is earning sufficient amount to support herself.”
The decision is unanimous and there is no minority opinion.
Key Takeaways
- A divorced woman is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., even if the divorce was granted on the grounds of desertion.
- Sub-section (4) of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., which denies maintenance to a wife who refuses to live with her husband without sufficient reason, does not apply to divorced women.
- The burden of proof lies on the husband to show that the wife has sufficient income to maintain herself.
- The right to claim maintenance is a statutory right and is not extinguished by a divorce decree.
- The deeming fiction of the divorced wife being treated as a wife is for the limited purpose of grant of maintenance and cannot be stretched to the illogical extent that the divorced wife is under a compulsion to live with the ex-husband.
Directions
The appeals were dismissed, and the order of the lower court granting maintenance to the wife was upheld.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that a divorced woman is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., even if the divorce was granted on the grounds of desertion. This judgment reaffirms the established position of law and clarifies that the conditions under sub-section (4) of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. do not apply to divorced women. There is no change in the previous position of law, but this judgment reinforces the existing legal framework.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the maintenance rights of a divorced woman, even when the divorce was granted on the grounds of desertion. This judgment clarifies the interpretation of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., ensuring that divorced women are not left without support. The Court’s decision reinforces the statutory obligation of the husband to maintain his ex-wife unless she remarries or has sufficient means to support herself.