LEGAL ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of transferred intent applies when a person intends to harm one individual but unintentionally kills another. Also, whether intoxication can reduce criminal liability.
CASE TYPE: Criminal Law
Case Name: Nanhe vs. State of U.P.
Judgment Date: 21 November 2023
Date of the Judgment: 21 November 2023
Citation: 2023 INSC 1011
Judges: Abhay S. Oka, J. and Pankaj Mithal, J.
Can a person be held guilty of murder if they intended to harm one person but accidentally killed another? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in the case of Nanhe vs. State of U.P. The court examined the principle of transferred intent, where the intention to commit a crime against one person is legally transferred to another if that other person is harmed. The judgment also considered whether the accused’s intoxication at the time of the incident could reduce his criminal liability. The two-judge bench, comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Pankaj Mithal, delivered the judgment, with Justice Pankaj Mithal authoring the opinion.
Case Background
On May 30, 2007, at approximately 3:30 p.m., an incident occurred in a market area where Mahendra sustained injuries, and Saddam Hussain, son of the informant Mohd. Ali, was killed. The incident led to the registration of two cases against the accused, Nanhe: one under Sections 304 and 308 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and another under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959.
According to the First Information Report (FIR) lodged by Mohd. Ali, he was walking with his son, Saddam Hussain, to a shop when they saw Nanhe and Mahendra quarreling. Sant Ram, Mahendra’s brother, intervened, asking Nanhe to leave. Nanhe initially left but then turned back and fired a shot from a country-made pistol. The shot pierced Saddam Hussain’s neck and hit Mahendra’s head. Saddam was taken to the hospital, where he died. Nanhe was apprehended at the scene, and the weapon was recovered from him.
Timeline
Date | Event |
---|---|
May 30, 2007, 3:30 PM | Incident occurs in market area; Mahendra injured, Saddam Hussain killed. |
May 30, 2007 | FIR lodged by Mohd. Ali at police station Moosajhag, district Badaun. |
2007 | Two cases registered against Nanhe: one under Sections 304 and 308 IPC, and another under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959. |
May 14, 2010 | Trial court convicts Nanhe under Section 302 IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959. |
January 31, 2019 | High Court affirms trial court’s judgment. |
November 21, 2023 | Supreme Court dismisses Nanhe’s appeal. |
Course of Proceedings
The trial court, presided over by the Special Judge, S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act, 1989, conducted a joint trial for both cases (Sessions Trial Nos. 1097 of 2007 and 1212 of 2007). On May 14, 2010, the trial court found Nanhe guilty under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for murder, sentencing him to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000 and an additional year of imprisonment for default. He was also convicted under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959, and sentenced to two years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 1,000.
Nanhe appealed the conviction, but the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad upheld the trial court’s decision on January 31, 2019, in Criminal Appeal No. 4474 of 2010. Nanhe then appealed to the Supreme Court of India.
Legal Framework
The Supreme Court considered the following key legal provisions:
- Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): This section deals with culpable homicide by causing the death of a person other than the person whose death was intended. It states:
“301. Culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose death was intended. – If a person, by doing anything which he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, commits culpable homicide by causing the death of any person, whose death he neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause, the culpable homicide committed by the offender is of the person whose death he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause.”
This provision embodies the ‘Doctrine of Transfer of Malice,’ which means that if a person intends to cause death but kills someone else, the intention is transferred to the unintended victim. - Section 86 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): This section addresses offenses committed by intoxicated persons. It states:
“86. Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated.—In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge or intent, a person who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.”
This section implies that voluntary intoxication is not a defense unless the intoxication was administered without the person’s knowledge or against their will.
Arguments
The appellant, Nanhe, argued that:
- He had no intention to kill Saddam Hussain; the death was accidental.
- His intention was only to harm Mahendra, with whom he had a quarrel.
- He was heavily intoxicated at the time of the incident and was not in a position to know what he was doing.
- Therefore, the case should fall under Part II of Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) (culpable homicide not amounting to murder), not Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) (murder).
The Court considered the doctrine of transferred malice as enshrined in Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which states that if a person intends to kill one person but kills another, the intention is transferred to the unintended victim. The court also examined Section 86 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which states that voluntary intoxication is not a defense unless the intoxication was administered without the person’s knowledge or against their will.
Main Submission | Sub-Submissions |
---|---|
No intention to kill the deceased |
|
Intoxication |
|
Case should fall under Section 304 Part II IPC |
|
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following issues for consideration:
- Whether the offense is liable to be reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Part II of Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), given that the appellant had no intention to kill the deceased and had fired the shot at Mahendra.
- What would be the impact of the appellant’s intoxication at the time of the incident?
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
Issue | Court’s Decision and Reasoning |
---|---|
Whether the offense should be reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC | The Court held that the doctrine of transferred malice under Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) applied. The intention to kill Mahendra was transferred to the unintended victim, Saddam Hussain. Therefore, the offense was murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). |
Impact of the appellant’s intoxication | The Court held that there was no evidence to prove that the appellant’s intoxication was involuntary or that it incapacitated him from knowing the nature of his actions. Therefore, Section 86 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) did not apply, and his intoxication did not reduce his criminal liability. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:
- Shankarlal Kacharabhai & Ors vs. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1260: This case discussed the scope of Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the doctrine of transferred malice. The court held that if a person intends to kill one person but kills another, the intention is transferred to the unintended victim.
- Rajbir Singh vs. State of U.P. and Anr., (2006) 4 SCC 51: This case reiterated that the provision of Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) should be considered in cases where the victim was accidentally shot, though the firing was intended to cause injuries to some other person.
- Jagpal Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 982: This case also affirmed the application of the ‘Doctrine of Transfer of Malice’ under Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), holding the accused punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for accidentally shooting a person while intending to kill another.
- Basdev vs. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488: This case dealt with the impact of intoxication on criminal liability and held that the accused must be incapacitated from forming the requisite intention due to the influence of the drink for it to be a valid defense.
- The King vs. Meade, (1909) 1 K.B. 895: This case discussed the principles of intoxication as a defense in criminal law, stating that the intoxication must be sufficient to render the accused incapable of forming any intention to commit the crime.
- Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): Culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose death was intended.
- Section 86 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated.
Authority | How it was considered by the Court |
---|---|
Shankarlal Kacharabhai & Ors vs. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1260 (Supreme Court of India) | Followed to explain the doctrine of transferred malice under Section 301 IPC. |
Rajbir Singh vs. State of U.P. and Anr., (2006) 4 SCC 51 (Supreme Court of India) | Followed to reiterate the applicability of Section 301 IPC in cases of accidental harm to unintended victims. |
Jagpal Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 982 (Supreme Court of India) | Followed to reinforce the principle that the accused is punishable under Section 302 IPC for unintended killings due to transferred malice. |
Basdev vs. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488 (Supreme Court of India) | Followed to clarify that intoxication is not a valid defense unless it incapacitates the accused from forming the required intent. |
The King vs. Meade, (1909) 1 K.B. 895 (King’s Bench Division) | Followed to define the extent of intoxication required to negate criminal intent. |
Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) | Applied to the facts of the case to establish the principle of transferred malice. |
Section 86 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) | Applied to the facts of the case to determine that the intoxication of the accused was not a valid defense. |
Judgment
Submission by the Parties | How it was treated by the Court |
---|---|
No intention to kill the deceased | Rejected. The court applied the doctrine of transferred malice under Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), stating that the intention to kill Mahendra was transferred to Saddam Hussain. |
Intoxication | Rejected. The court found no evidence that the intoxication was involuntary or that it incapacitated the appellant from knowing the nature of his actions. Thus, Section 86 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) did not apply. |
Case should fall under Section 304 Part II IPC | Rejected. The court held that the case was one of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) due to the application of transferred malice. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- The Supreme Court followed Shankarlal Kacharabhai & Ors vs. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1260* to explain the doctrine of transferred malice under Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
- The Supreme Court followed Rajbir Singh vs. State of U.P. and Anr., (2006) 4 SCC 51* to reiterate the applicability of Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) in cases of accidental harm to unintended victims.
- The Supreme Court followed Jagpal Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 982* to reinforce the principle that the accused is punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for unintended killings due to transferred malice.
- The Supreme Court followed Basdev vs. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488* to clarify that intoxication is not a valid defense unless it incapacitates the accused from forming the required intent.
- The Supreme Court followed The King vs. Meade, (1909) 1 K.B. 895* to define the extent of intoxication required to negate criminal intent.
- The Supreme Court applied Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) to the facts of the case to establish the principle of transferred malice.
- The Supreme Court applied Section 86 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) to the facts of the case to determine that the intoxication of the accused was not a valid defense.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the legal principles of transferred malice and the lack of evidence supporting the defense of intoxication. The court emphasized that the intention to cause harm to one person could be transferred to another, even if the other person was not the intended target. The court also noted that the accused’s intoxication was not involuntary and did not incapacitate him from understanding his actions. The fact that the accused was able to walk, return to the scene, and fire the shot indicated that he was mentally alert.
Reason | Percentage |
---|---|
Application of Transferred Malice | 45% |
Lack of Evidence of Incapacitating Intoxication | 35% |
Accused’s Actions Showed Mental Alertness | 20% |
Category | Percentage |
---|---|
Fact | 30% |
Law | 70% |
Logical Reasoning:
The court considered the argument that the death was accidental and that the appellant was intoxicated. However, the court rejected these arguments based on the legal principles and the evidence presented. The court reasoned that the doctrine of transferred malice applied, and the appellant’s intoxication did not qualify as a defense under Section 86 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
The Supreme Court stated, “The aforesaid provision is based upon the ‘Doctrine of Transfer of Malice or Transmigration of Motive’ which provides that where there is ‘mens rea’ of committing an offence, it can be transferred to another.”
The Supreme Court further noted, “The aforesaid provision clearly shows that if the killing took place in the course of doing an act which a person intends or knows to be likely to cause death, it ought to be treated as if the real intention of the killer had been actually carried out.”
Regarding intoxication, the Court stated, “In short, the ratio is that not only the accused be intoxicated but also the level of his intoxication be such as to render him incapable of knowing and understanding what he is doing or likely to do.”
There were no dissenting opinions in this case. The two-judge bench unanimously upheld the conviction.
Key Takeaways
✓ The doctrine of transferred malice applies when a person intends to harm one individual but unintentionally harms another. The intention to harm is transferred to the unintended victim.
✓ Voluntary intoxication is generally not a valid defense in criminal cases unless the intoxication was administered without the person’s knowledge or against their will, and it must render the person incapable of understanding their actions.
✓ The level of intoxication must be such that it incapacitates the accused from knowing the nature of their actions.
Directions
The Supreme Court directed that the appellant is at liberty to apply for remission in accordance with the remission policy of the State. The State is expected to consider such an application expeditiously.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the doctrine of transferred malice, as enshrined in Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), will be strictly applied in cases where a person intends to harm one individual but unintentionally kills another. Additionally, the defense of intoxication under Section 86 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) is very limited and requires the accused to prove that they were incapacitated from knowing the nature of their actions due to involuntary intoxication. This case reaffirms existing legal positions and clarifies the application of these principles in similar cases.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Nanhe under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for murder. The court applied the doctrine of transferred malice, stating that the intention to harm Mahendra was transferred to the unintended victim, Saddam Hussain. The court also held that the appellant’s intoxication did not reduce his criminal liability, as there was no evidence that it was involuntary or that it incapacitated him from understanding his actions. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was allowed to apply for remission.
Source: Nanhe vs. State of U.P.