Supreme Court Upholds Patta Grant, Dismisses Title Suit: Jagdish Prasad Patel vs. Shivnath (2019)

Date of the Judgment: April 9, 2019

Citation: 2019 INSC 358

Judges: R. Banumathi, J. and R. Subhash Reddy, J.

Can a lease (patta) granted to one party be considered valid if a previous lease to another party was not formally cancelled? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a property dispute case, focusing on the validity of land leases granted decades ago. The court examined whether the absence of a formal revocation of an earlier lease automatically invalidates a subsequent lease. This judgment clarifies the importance of documented land transfers and the legal implications of revenue records in property disputes.

Case Background

The case involves a dispute over land ownership in Village Bairath, Tehsil Gopad Banas. Shivnath and Vishwanath (predecessor of respondents No. 2 to 10) filed a suit against Hanuman Din (father of the appellants) seeking a declaration of title and possession of several khasra numbers, except khasra No. 164. The respondents claimed their fathers, Ram Sahai and Rameshwar, were joint lessees of the land and cultivated it until a partition occurred. They alleged that Hanuman Din never had possession or entitlement to the land. However, the appellants claimed that their grandfather, Gaya Din, obtained a lease for the disputed land, which they contended was a forged document. Based on this lease, Gaya Din’s name was entered as khatedar in revenue records.

Vishwanath applied to the Collector in August 1969, stating that the lease to Gaya Din was wrongly issued and requested cancellation of records in Gaya Din’s name. The Revenue Inspector’s report favored the respondents, and the Collector registered it after approval. In a separate proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate found Hanuman Din in possession of lands in khasra Nos. 162 and 163, while the respondents were in possession of land in khasra No. 164. The respondents claimed that Hanuman Din forcibly took possession of land in khasra No. 41, leading to the suit for declaration and permanent injunction.

Hanuman Din contested, stating that the respondents never owned or possessed the land. He argued that the land belonged to Ram Raj Singh, who allowed the respondents’ predecessors to cultivate it on a crop-sharing basis, which led to the patta being granted in their names. The appellants claimed that the respondents’ fathers abandoned the land, leading to the cancellation of the khata. They asserted that Gaya Din’s bid for the lease was accepted in an auction in Samvat 1986 (1929 A.D.), and that they have been in continuous possession since then.

Timeline:

Legal Framework

The case involves several legal provisions, including:

• Section 58 of the Evidence Act, 1872: Deals with facts admitted need not be proved. However, the court has the discretion to require proof of admitted facts.
• Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872: Allows the court to presume that a document that is thirty years old is genuine.
• Section 44 of the Rewa Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1935: Specifies the revenue officers authorized to confer a patta (lease).
• Section 2 of the Rewa Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1935: Repeals all earlier government notices, rules, etc. that are inconsistent with the Act but saves the actions taken thereunder.
• Section 28 of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952: States that occupants of Jagir land entered in revenue records for a continuous period of three years shall be deemed pattedar tenants.
• Section 158(1)(d)(i) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959: States that a pattedar-tenant in Vindhya Pradesh in possession of the lands, became their Bhumiswami.
• Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Governs the production of additional evidence in appellate courts.

The interplay of these provisions within the context of the Constitution is crucial. The court examined how these laws impact the rights of landholders and the validity of land transfers, particularly concerning the transition from Jagirdari to a tenant system.

Arguments

Appellants’ Arguments (Defendants):

• The appellants contended that the respondents’ fathers were given the land for cultivation on a crop-sharing basis, and they later abandoned it.

  “The appellants further averred that the forefathers of respondents-plaintiffs abandoned the suit lands and since revenue tax was not paid, the lease of the suit lands in favour of respondents-plaintiffs was cancelled.”

• They argued that Gaya Din’s bid for the lease was accepted in an auction in 1929, and a lease was issued in his name, which is a genuine document being more than thirty years old, supported by revenue records.

  “Case of the appellants-defendants is that in the auction held by Pawaidar for lease of suit lands and other lands, bid of Gaya Din was accepted and in this regard, a lease was issued in his name in Samvat 1986 (1929 A.D.).”

• They submitted that the patta (Ex. D-20) was validly granted by the competent authority, and they have been in continuous possession of the land since then.

  “The appellants-defendants have claimed ownership and possession over the lands in dispute on the basis of the patta Ex.D-20 (Ex. P-21) that was issued in their favour in Samvat 1986 (1929 A.D.) and averred that since then they are in possession of the disputed lands.”

• They relied on the order of the Commissioner (Ex. D-1) and the Tahsildar’s order dated 28.07.1971, which indicated that the respondents had interpolated revenue entries in connivance with the Patwari.

• They argued that the respondents failed to prove their title as they did not produce the original patta granted to their fathers.

Respondents’ Arguments (Plaintiffs):

• The respondents argued that their fathers were the original lessees of the land, and their names were included as ‘lessees’ during the settlement.

  “Respondents-Shiv Nath and deceased Vishwanath/predecessor in interest of respondents No.2 to 10 filed a suit for declaration of title over the suit lands…on the plea that a lease/ patta was issued in favour of their fathers and that their names were included as ‘lessees’ of the suit lands during settlement…”

• They contended that the lease to Gaya Din was a forged document and that they were forcibly dispossessed by Hanuman Din.

  “Respondents-plaintiffs alleged that pursuant to the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Hanuman Din forcibly took possession of land in khasra No.41 and therefore, the respondents filed suit for declaration and permanent injunction.”

• They argued that the patta in favor of Gaya Din was not valid as it was issued after the abolition of the Jagirdari system, and there was no formal abandonment or revocation of the patta granted to their forefathers.

• They relied on the revenue entries in their favor for the years 1955-56 and 1956-57.

• They argued that the admission of the appellants in their written statement regarding the lease in favor of the respondents’ fathers should be considered as an admitted fact that need not be proved.

Submissions of Parties:

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issue for consideration:

1. Whether the High Court was right in upholding the judgment of the first Appellate Court by observing that in the absence of any order of abandonment or revocation of the patta given to the respondents-plaintiffs, grant of patta (Ex.D-20) in 1929 in favour of the appellants-defendants was illegal and that the appellants-defendants cannot claim right based upon Ex.D-20 and other documents.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Cases:

• Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 11 SCC 141 – Supreme Court of India: Cited to emphasize that concurrent findings cannot be interfered with unless there are compelling reasons.
• Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Iccharam alias Brijram and others (1974) 1 SCC 242 – Supreme Court of India: Cited regarding the principle that admitted facts need not be proved.
• Executive Officer, Arulmigu Chokkanatha Swamy Koil Trust, Virudhunagar v. Chandran and others (2017) 3 SCC 702 – Supreme Court of India: Cited regarding the principle that admitted facts need not be proved.
• Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin & Another (2012) 8 SCC 148 – Supreme Court of India: Cited regarding the conditions for allowing additional evidence in appellate courts.
• K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy AIR 1963 SC 1526 – Supreme Court of India: Cited regarding the discretion of the court in allowing additional evidence.
• Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham AIR 1965 SC 1008 – Supreme Court of India: Cited regarding the discretion of the court in allowing additional evidence.
• Soonda Ram v. Rameshwarlal (1975) 3 SCC 698 – Supreme Court of India: Cited regarding the discretion of the court in allowing additional evidence.
• Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy (1979) 2 SCC 601 – Supreme Court of India: Cited regarding the discretion of the court in allowing additional evidence.
• Haji Mohammed Ishaq v. Mohd. Iqbal and Mohd. Ali and Co. (1978) 2 SCC 493 – Supreme Court of India: Cited regarding the principle that a party who fails to discharge the onus is not entitled to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence.
• Karewwa and others v. Hussensab Khansaheb Wajantri and others (2002) 10 SCC 315 – Supreme Court of India: Cited regarding the bar to adduce additional evidence in the appellate court.
• Roop Chand v. Gopi Chand Thelia (1989) 2 SCC 383 – Supreme Court of India: Cited regarding the bar to adduce additional evidence in the appellate court.
• Union of India and others v. Vasavi Co-operative Housing Society Limited and others (2014) 2 SCC 269 – Supreme Court of India: Cited to emphasize that in a suit for declaration of title, the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of their own title.

Legal Provisions:

• Section 58 of the Evidence Act, 1872: Regarding the need to prove admitted facts.
• Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872: Regarding the presumption of genuineness of documents thirty years old.
• Section 44 of the Rewa Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1935: Regarding the authority to confer pattas.
• Section 2 of the Rewa Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1935: Regarding the repeal of earlier inconsistent rules and saving of actions taken thereunder.
• Section 28 of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952: Regarding pattedar tenants.
• Section 158(1)(d)(i) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959: Regarding Bhumiswami rights.
• Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Regarding the production of additional evidence in appellate courts.

Judgment

How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?

How each authority was viewed by the Court?

• Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 11 SCC 141: *Cited* to emphasize that concurrent findings cannot be interfered with unless there are compelling reasons.
• Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Iccharam alias Brijram and others (1974) 1 SCC 242: *Cited* regarding the principle that admitted facts need not be proved, but the court clarified that it has discretion under proviso to Section 58 of the Evidence Act.
• Executive Officer, Arulmigu Chokkanatha Swamy Koil Trust, Virudhunagar v. Chandran and others (2017) 3 SCC 702: *Cited* regarding the principle that admitted facts need not be proved, but the court clarified that it has discretion under proviso to Section 58 of the Evidence Act.
• Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin & Another (2012) 8 SCC 148: *Cited* regarding the conditions for allowing additional evidence in appellate courts, the court allowed the Tahsildar’s order as additional evidence.
• K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy AIR 1963 SC 1526: *Cited* regarding the discretion of the court in allowing additional evidence.
• Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham AIR 1965 SC 1008: *Cited* regarding the discretion of the court in allowing additional evidence.
• Soonda Ram v. Rameshwarlal (1975) 3 SCC 698: *Cited* regarding the discretion of the court in allowing additional evidence.
• Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy (1979) 2 SCC 601: *Cited* regarding the discretion of the court in allowing additional evidence.
• Haji Mohammed Ishaq v. Mohd. Iqbal and Mohd. Ali and Co. (1978) 2 SCC 493: *Cited* regarding the principle that a party who fails to discharge the onus is not entitled to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence.
• Karewwa and others v. Hussensab Khansaheb Wajantri and others (2002) 10 SCC 315: *Cited* regarding the bar to adduce additional evidence in the appellate court, but the court allowed the Tahsildar’s order as additional evidence in the interest of justice.
• Roop Chand v. Gopi Chand Thelia (1989) 2 SCC 383: *Cited* regarding the bar to adduce additional evidence in the appellate court, but the court allowed the Tahsildar’s order as additional evidence in the interest of justice.
• Union of India and others v. Vasavi Co-operative Housing Society Limited and others (2014) 2 SCC 269: *Cited* to emphasize that in a suit for declaration of title, the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of their own title, and not the weakness of the defendant’s case.
• Section 58 of the Evidence Act, 1872: *Considered* regarding the need to prove admitted facts, but the court clarified that it has discretion under proviso to Section 58 of the Evidence Act.
• Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872: *Applied* to presume the genuineness of the patta granted to Gaya Din.
• Section 44 of the Rewa Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1935: *Considered* to determine the authority to confer pattas.
• Section 2 of the Rewa Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1935: *Considered* to determine the validity of the patta granted to Gaya Din.
• Section 28 of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952: *Considered* to determine the status of the appellants as pattedar tenants.
• Section 158(1)(d)(i) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959: *Considered* to determine the status of the appellants as Bhumiswami.
• Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: *Considered* regarding the production of additional evidence in appellate courts, the court allowed the Tahsildar’s order as additional evidence.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:

• Validity of Patta (Ex.D-20): The court held that the patta granted to Gaya Din in 1929 was valid, as it was issued by the competent authority and was supported by revenue records. The court also noted that the document was more than thirty years old and thus presumed genuine under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
• Failure of Respondents to Prove Title: The respondents failed to produce the original patta granted to their fathers and did not provide sufficient evidence to prove their title. The court emphasized that in a suit for declaration of title, the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of their own title, not on the weakness of the defendant’s case.
• Revenue Records and Commissioner’s Order: The court relied heavily on the revenue records, which consistently showed the appellants in possession of the suit properties. The court also considered the Commissioner’s order (Ex.D-1) and the Tahsildar’s order dated 28.07.1971, which indicated that the respondents had interpolated revenue entries in connivance with the Patwari.
• Abandonment of Land by Respondents’ Fathers: The court noted that the respondents’ fathers had abandoned the land, which led to the auction and subsequent grant of lease to Gaya Din.
• Additional Evidence: The court admitted the Tahsildar’s order dated 28.07.1971 as additional evidence, which further supported the appellants’ case.

Sentiment Analysis of Reasons Given by the Supreme Court:

Fact:Law Ratio:

Logical Reasoning

Issue: Whether the High Court was right in upholding the judgment of the first Appellate Court by observing that in the absence of any order of abandonment or revocation of the patta given to the respondents-plaintiffs, grant of patta (Ex.D-20) in 1929 in favour of the appellants-defendants was illegal and that the appellants-defendants cannot claim right based upon Ex.D-20 and other documents.

Final Decision

The Supreme Court, after considering all the facts, evidence, and legal provisions, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restored the judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court held that the patta granted to Gaya Din in 1929 was valid, and the appellants had a better claim to the land. The Court emphasized that the respondents failed to prove their title and that the revenue records and other evidence supported the appellants’ claim. The Court also highlighted the interpolation of entries by the respondents in connivance with the Patwari.

Legal Implications:

• Importance of Documented Land Transfers: The judgment underscores the importance of documented land transfers and the legal implications of revenue records in property disputes. It emphasizes that a subsequent lease can be valid even without a formal cancellation of a prior lease, particularly if the prior leaseholders have abandoned the land, and the subsequent lease is supported by revenue entries and other evidence.
• Burden of Proof in Title Suits: The case reiterates that in a suit for declaration of title, the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of their own title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case. The plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence to prove their ownership.
• Presumption of Genuineness of Old Documents: The judgment reaffirms the principle under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872, that documents more than thirty years old are presumed to be genuine. This presumption can be rebutted, but the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the document.
• Role of Revenue Records: The judgment highlights the significance of revenue records in property disputes. The court relied on the revenue records, which consistently showed the appellants in possession of the suit properties.
• Discretion of the Appellate Court: The judgment also clarified the discretion of the appellate court to admit additional evidence in the interest of justice, as was done in this case by admitting the Tahsildar’s order.