Supreme Court Upholds Reinstatement: Simple Hurt Not Moral Turpitude in SBI Employee Case (26 April 2019)

Date of the Judgment: 26 April 2019
Citation: [Not provided in the document]
Judges: L. Nageswara Rao, J., M.R. Shah, J.
Can a bank employee be dismissed for a conviction of simple hurt? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a case involving a State Bank of India employee who was discharged for being convicted under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The core issue was whether the conviction involved “moral turpitude,” a ground for dismissal under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The two-judge bench, comprising Justices L. Nageswara Rao and M.R. Shah, delivered the judgment, with Justice L. Nageswara Rao authoring the opinion.

Case Background

The respondent, P. Soupramaniane, was working as a Messenger at the State Bank of India (SBI) in Puducherry. On 17 June 1983, he was involved in an incident where he voluntarily stabbed two individuals with a broken soda bottle. A police report was filed, and a charge sheet was submitted against him under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for attempted murder. However, the trial court found that there was no intention to cause murder and convicted him under Section 324 of the IPC for voluntarily causing hurt. He was sentenced to three months imprisonment. The Appellate Court upheld the conviction but released him on probation, considering his employment at the bank and the potential impact of imprisonment on his career. Subsequently, on 15 May 1986, SBI discharged him from service based on his conviction. His appeal against the discharge was dismissed on 3 July 1986. A representation by the Staff Union was also rejected on 4 May 1992. He then filed a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Madras, which was initially dismissed, but later allowed in a writ appeal.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The respondent’s initial writ petition challenging his discharge was dismissed by a single judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras. However, a Division Bench of the same High Court allowed the writ appeal, setting aside the discharge order and directing the bank to reinstate the respondent with partial back wages. The High Court reasoned that the criminal court had released the respondent on probation to allow him to continue in service, and that the discharge order did not mention the specific provision of law under which the action was taken. The State Bank of India then filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court, which granted leave and stayed the High Court’s judgment.

Legal Framework

The core legal provision in this case is Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, which states that a person convicted by a criminal court for an offense involving moral turpitude is disqualified from continuing in the employment of a banking company. The provision reads as follows:

“Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 provides that conviction by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude shall disentitle a person from continuing in employment of a banking company.”

Arguments

The arguments presented before the Supreme Court revolved around whether the respondent’s conviction under Section 324 of the IPC involved moral turpitude, which would justify his dismissal under Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.

Arguments of the Appellants (State Bank of India)

• The Appellants contended that the respondent’s conviction under Section 324 of the IPC, for causing hurt with a dangerous weapon, constituted an offense involving moral turpitude.
• They argued that the High Court had erred in setting aside the discharge order, as the bank was obligated to discontinue the services of an employee convicted of such an offense.
• The Appellants submitted that the criminal court’s decision to release the respondent on probation did not negate the employer’s right to terminate his services.

Arguments of the Respondent (P. Soupramaniane)

• The Respondent argued that the conviction under Section 324 of the IPC did not involve moral turpitude.
• He relied on the fact that the criminal court had released him on probation to enable him to continue in service.
• He also argued that the bank did not mention the specific provision of law under which he was discharged and did not provide reasons for his discharge.

The High Court had agreed with the Respondent that the criminal court’s order of probation was to enable him to continue in service, and that the discharge order was defective for not mentioning the provision of law. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court’s reasoning.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the following issue:

1. Whether the conviction of the Respondent under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) can be said to be for an offense involving moral turpitude.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court referred to several authorities to define and interpret the concept of “moral turpitude” and to determine whether the respondent’s conviction fell within its ambit.

Judgment

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not correct in setting aside the order of discharge of the Respondent. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in holding that no reasons had been given by the bank for discontinuing the Respondent from service. The Court also held that the High Court was wrong in holding that the order of discharge should be set aside on the ground that the provision of law under which the Respondent was discharged was not mentioned in the order. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the High Court’s ultimate conclusion that the respondent should be reinstated, but on different grounds.

The Court examined whether the conviction under Section 324 of the IPC involved “moral turpitude”. The Court observed that while every offense is a crime against society, discontinuance from service under the Banking Regulation Act is only for offenses involving moral turpitude. The Court noted that acts disclosing depravity and wickedness of character are considered offenses involving moral turpitude. The Court also noted that the tests to determine moral turpitude include whether the act shocks the moral conscience of society, whether the motive was base, and whether the perpetrator is considered depraved.

The Court also noted that the factors to be kept in mind are the person who commits the offence, the person against whom it is committed, the manner and circumstances in which it is committed and the values of the society. The Court observed that while certain offenses like those under the Prevention of Corruption Act or the NDPS Act are clearly involving moral turpitude, the question of whether an offense involving bodily injury falls under the ambit of moral turpitude is more nuanced. The Court held that a simple assault is different from aggravated assault and not every case of assault or simple hurt can be categorized as a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court noted that the injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature and there was no motive for the Respondent to cause the death of the victims. On an overall consideration of the facts of this case, the Court was of the opinion that the crime committed by the Respondent does not involve moral turpitude. Therefore, the Court upheld the High Court’s decision to reinstate the respondent, but on the ground that the crime did not involve moral turpitude.

The following table shows how the authorities were viewed by the Court:

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the specific facts of the case and the nature of the offense committed by the respondent. The Court emphasized that not every assault constitutes moral turpitude, and that the circumstances of the offense must be considered. The Court highlighted that the injuries were simple, there was no motive to cause death, and the respondent was not found to be of a depraved character. The Court’s reasoning was based on the principle that moral turpitude involves acts of baseness, vileness, or depravity that shock the moral conscience of society. The Court’s analysis focused on the absence of such elements in the respondent’s actions, leading to the conclusion that his offense did not involve moral turpitude, and therefore, he could not be dismissed from service. The court also noted that the criminal court’s observations are not binding on the employer, and that the employer is under an obligation to discontinue the services of an employee convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude.

The court’s reasoning can be summarized as follows:

• The Court emphasized that not every assault constitutes moral turpitude.
• The Court considered the specific facts of the case, including the nature of the injuries, the lack of motive to cause death, and the circumstances of the incident.
• The Court relied on dictionary definitions and previous case law to define moral turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity that shocks the moral conscience of society.
• The Court concluded that the respondent’s actions did not meet the threshold for moral turpitude, and therefore, he could not be dismissed from service.

The Court also considered and rejected the following alternative interpretations:

• The Court rejected the argument that the criminal court’s decision to release the respondent on probation was binding on the employer.
• The Court rejected the argument that the bank’s discharge order was invalid because it did not mention the specific provision of law or provide reasons for discharge.

Key Takeaways

• A conviction under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for causing simple hurt does not automatically constitute an offense involving moral turpitude.
• The determination of whether an offense involves moral turpitude depends on the specific facts and circumstances of the case.
• Employers are obligated to discontinue the services of employees convicted of offenses involving moral turpitude, but this does not apply to all convictions.
• Criminal courts’ observations regarding the impact of a conviction on an employee’s service are not binding on the employer.
• The employer is under an obligation to discontinue the services of an employee convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude.

This judgment clarifies that not all convictions for assault or hurt will lead to dismissal from service. It emphasizes the need to assess the nature of the offense and its implications for morality and depravity.

Directions

No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court in this judgment.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a conviction under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code for causing simple hurt does not automatically constitute an offense involving moral turpitude. The Court clarified that the determination of moral turpitude depends on the specific facts and circumstances of the case, including the nature of the injuries, the motive behind the act, and the overall context of the offense. This ruling refines the understanding of “moral turpitude” in the context of employment law and clarifies the circumstances under which an employee can be dismissed for a criminal conviction. There is no change in the previous positions of law, but the judgment clarifies the application of existing legal principles.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the State Bank of India, affirming the High Court’s decision to reinstate the respondent. The Court held that the respondent’s conviction under Section 324 of the IPC for causing simple hurt did not involve moral turpitude, and therefore, he could not be dismissed from service. This judgment clarifies that not all convictions for assault or hurt will lead to dismissal from service and emphasizes the need to assess the nature of the offense and its implications for morality and depravity.