LEGAL ISSUE: Whether the Armed Forces Tribunal was correct in upholding the rejection of a statutory complaint regarding Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) and promotion.
CASE TYPE: Service Law (Armed Forces)
Case Name: Surgeon Rear Admiral Manisha Jaiprakash vs. Union of India & Ors.
Judgment Date: 16 October 2019
Introduction
Date of the Judgment: 16 October 2019
Citation: (2019) INSC 1118
Judges: L. Nageswara Rao, J., Hemant Gupta, J.
Can an Armed Forces Tribunal’s decision be challenged if it upholds the rejection of a statutory complaint regarding promotion? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case involving a Surgeon Rear Admiral’s grievance about her Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs). The core issue revolved around whether the Tribunal was correct in its assessment of the ACRs and the subsequent denial of promotion. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice Hemant Gupta.
Case Background
The appellant, Manisha Jaiprakash, was commissioned in the Indian Army in 1975 and rose through the ranks to become a Surgeon Rear Admiral by 2007. She retired on 31 May 2012. After not being promoted to Surgeon Vice Admiral, she filed a statutory complaint on 15 July 2010, contesting her ACRs from 2006 to 2008. She sought a comparison of her five previous ACRs with the 2007 and 2008 reports, and the expunction of the 2007 and 2008 ACRs, alleging that the markings were inadequate for selection to the next rank.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1975 | Manisha Jaiprakash commissioned in the Indian Army as a Lieutenant. |
| 05 December 2005 | Promoted to Brigadier. |
| 24 November 2007 | Promoted to Rear Admiral/Major General. |
| 15 July 2010 | Filed a statutory complaint seeking review of ACRs and promotion. |
| 02 September 2011 | Statutory complaint partially allowed. |
| 31 May 2012 | Retired as Surgeon Rear Admiral. |
| 04 November 2009 | Considered for promotion (Chance I), found unsuitable. |
| 04 February 2011 | Considered for promotion (Chance II), found unsuitable. |
| 07 October 2011 | Review Board held after disposal of statutory complaint. |
| 16 October 2019 | Supreme Court dismisses the appeal. |
Course of Proceedings
The statutory complaint was partially allowed on 02 September 2011, with some aberrations in the ACRs from 2006 to 2009 being removed, and a direction for reconsideration by a Promotion Board. Dissatisfied with the partial relief, the appellant filed O.A. No. 19/2011 before the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Mumbai, which was dismissed. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court of India.
Legal Framework
The judgment refers to Army Regulation 364, which stipulates that statutory complaints should be resolved within six months. Specifically, clause (e) of the regulation states:
“(e)All statutory complaints will be made through proper channel as given in sub-para (e) below and copies will not be forwarded directly to higher authorities. If the final decision on the statutory complaint is not taken within a period of six months from the date, such a complaint is submitted to the immediate superior, the applicant will have a right to represent directly to Army Headquarters of the Central Government as the case may be after informing his commanding Officer.”
The judgment also discusses Special Army Order No. 8/S/91, which pertains to the initiation of Confidential Reports by immediate Commanding Officers, including officers of the same rank. Navy Order (Spl.) 02/2009 is also discussed, which states:
“65.Whenever the DGAFMS/ DGMS (Navy)/ DGDS are included in the main channel of reporting as IO/ FTO, RO/ STO/ HTO or SRO, they will not make any further endorsement as HOS.”
Arguments
The Appellant argued that:
- The ACR for 2008, initiated by Brigadier G.S. Manchanda, was biased as he was her colleague of the same rank.
- The statutory complaint was not disposed of within the stipulated six-month period as per Army Regulation 364.
- The retrospective application of Navy Order (Spl.) 02/2009 to ACRs of 2006 and 2009 was incorrect.
- The ACRs for 2006 and 2009 were declared technically invalid by relying on Navy Order (Spl.) 02/ 2009, which was not applicable to reports initiated before 01.01.2010.
The Respondent argued that:
- There was no bias or malice proven on the part of the officers who recorded the Confidential Reports.
- The Appellant did not resort to remedies available in the Army Regulation for delayed disposal of the statutory complaint.
- The concept of self-moderation, where an officer reviews their own assessment, is against the basic tenet of objective assessment.
- The practice followed prior to Navy Order (Spl.) 02/2009 was against the basic tenets of law, and corrective measures were taken uniformly.
The innovativeness of the argument was that the appellant contended that the Navy Order (Spl.) 02/2009 was applied retrospectively, which was not correct.
Submissions of Parties
| Main Submission | Sub-Submissions by Appellant | Sub-Submissions by Respondent |
|---|---|---|
| Bias in ACR 2008 |
|
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| Delay in Statutory Complaint |
|
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| Retrospective Application of Navy Order (Spl.) 02/2009 |
|
|
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in a separate section. However, the core issues that were addressed by the court were:
✓ Whether the Armed Forces Tribunal was correct in upholding the rejection of the statutory complaint.
✓ Whether the ACR for 2008 was biased.
✓ Whether the delay in disposing of the statutory complaint warranted relief.
✓ Whether the Navy Order (Spl.) 02/2009 was correctly applied retrospectively to the ACRs of 2006 and 2009.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues:
| Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
|---|---|---|
| Whether the Armed Forces Tribunal was correct in upholding the rejection of the statutory complaint? | Upheld | The Tribunal was correct in its assessment and no prejudice was caused to the Appellant. |
| Whether the ACR for 2008 was biased? | No Bias | No malice or bias was proven, and the ratings were in the range of ‘Outstanding’ to ‘Exceptionally Outstanding’. |
| Whether the delay in disposing of the statutory complaint warranted relief? | No Relief | The Appellant did not resort to available remedies, and relief cannot be granted solely on the grounds of delay. |
| Whether the Navy Order (Spl.) 02/2009 was correctly applied retrospectively to the ACRs of 2006 and 2009? | Incorrect Application, but No Prejudice | While the Navy Order should not have been applied retrospectively, the Appellant would not have been promoted even if the ACRs of 2006 and 2009 were not technically invalid. |
Authorities
The following authorities were considered by the court:
| Authority | Court | How it was used |
|---|---|---|
| State Bank of Patiala & Ors. v. S.K. Sharma [1996] 3 SCC 364 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to support the view that violation of every provision does not furnish a ground for interference unless prejudice is demonstrated. |
| Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. & Ors. [1996] 5 SCC 460 | Supreme Court of India | Cited to support the view that violation of every provision does not furnish a ground for interference unless prejudice is demonstrated. |
| Army Regulation 364 | Indian Army | Discussed in relation to the stipulated time for disposal of statutory complaints. |
| Special Army Order No. 8/S/91 | Indian Army | Discussed in relation to the initiation of Confidential Reports by immediate Commanding Officers. |
| Navy Order (Spl.) 02/2009 | Indian Navy | Discussed in relation to the endorsement of ACRs by DGAFMS/DGMS. |
Judgment
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the decision of the Armed Forces Tribunal. The court found that while the Navy Order (Spl.) 02/2009 should not have been applied retrospectively, the appellant would not have been promoted even if the ACRs of 2006 and 2009 were not technically invalid. The court emphasized that a mere violation of a provision does not warrant interference unless prejudice is demonstrated.
The following table shows how each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court:
| Submission | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|
| Bias in ACR 2008 | Rejected. The court agreed with the Tribunal that no bias was found. |
| Delay in Statutory Complaint | Rejected. The court held that the appellant did not resort to available remedies and delay alone is not a ground for relief. |
| Retrospective Application of Navy Order (Spl.) 02/2009 | Acknowledged as incorrect, but ultimately held that no prejudice was caused to the appellant. |
The following table shows how each authority was viewed by the Court:
| Authority | Court’s View |
|---|---|
| State Bank of Patiala & Ors. v. S.K. Sharma [1996] 3 SCC 364 | Cited to support the view that violation of every provision does not furnish a ground for interference unless prejudice is demonstrated. |
| Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. & Ors. [1996] 5 SCC 460 | Cited to support the view that violation of every provision does not furnish a ground for interference unless prejudice is demonstrated. |
| Army Regulation 364 | The court noted that the statutory complaint was not disposed of within the stipulated time, but held that the appellant did not resort to available remedies. |
| Special Army Order No. 8/S/91 | The court acknowledged the provision that an officer of the same rank can initiate Confidential Reports, but will not endorse the recommendation for promotion to the next rank. |
| Navy Order (Spl.) 02/2009 | The court agreed that the Navy Order should not have been applied retrospectively, but held that no prejudice was caused to the appellant. |
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:
- The absence of proven bias in the ACR of 2008.
- The lack of prejudice to the appellant, even if the ACRs of 2006 and 2009 were not technically invalid.
- The principle that a mere violation of a provision does not warrant interference unless prejudice is demonstrated.
The following table shows the sentiment analysis of the reasons given by the Supreme Court:
| Reason | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Absence of Bias | 30% |
| Lack of Prejudice | 50% |
| Principle of No Interference Without Prejudice | 20% |
The ratio of fact:law that influenced the court to decide was:
| Category | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 40% |
| Law | 60% |
The court’s reasoning can be summarized as follows:
The court considered the argument that the Navy Order (Spl.) 02/2009 was applied retrospectively, which was not correct. However, it was rejected because the court found that the appellant was not prejudiced by this incorrect application. The court emphasized that the appellant would not have been promoted even if the ACRs of 2006 and 2009 were not technically invalid.
The court’s reasoning was based on the principle that a mere violation of a provision does not warrant interference unless the affected person demonstrates prejudice caused by such violation. The court stated:
“Violation of every provision does not furnish a ground for the Court to interfere unless the affected person demonstrates prejudice caused to him by such violation.”
The court also noted that the endorsements made by Brigadier G.S. Manchanda as Initiating Officer were in the range of ‘Outstanding’ to ‘Exceptionally Outstanding,’ which did not indicate any bias.
The court also stated:
“We are convinced that the Tribunal was right in holding that no prejudice is caused to the Appellant by applying Navy Order (Spl.) 02/ 2009.”
The court also stated:
“Even if the ACRs of 2006 and 2009 were not technically invalid, the Appellant is not entitled for any relief as she would not have been promoted due to her comparative merit.”
Key Takeaways
- A mere violation of a provision does not warrant judicial interference unless prejudice is demonstrated.
- The retrospective application of a rule or order may be deemed incorrect, but it will not be grounds for relief if no prejudice is caused.
- The Armed Forces Tribunal’s decisions are upheld by the Supreme Court if they are based on sound reasoning and lack of prejudice.
Directions
No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court in this case.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of the case is that a mere violation of a provision does not warrant judicial interference unless prejudice is demonstrated. There is no change in the previous position of law.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the Armed Forces Tribunal’s decision. The court found no bias in the ACRs and that the appellant was not prejudiced by the incorrect application of the Navy Order. The judgment reinforces the principle that a mere procedural violation is not sufficient for judicial intervention without a showing of prejudice.