LEGAL ISSUE: Whether the prosecution of Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs) for acts of vandalism within the Assembly can be withdrawn by the Public Prosecutor, citing parliamentary privileges and public interest.
CASE TYPE: Criminal Law, Legislative Privileges
Case Name: The State of Kerala vs. K. Ajith & Ors.
Judgment Date: 28 July 2021
Introduction
Date of the Judgment: 28 July 2021
Citation: 2021 INSC 489
Judges: Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J and M R Shah, J
Can elected representatives claim immunity from criminal prosecution for acts of vandalism committed within the legislative assembly? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this critical question, examining the extent of parliamentary privileges and the limits of prosecutorial discretion in cases involving public figures. This judgment clarifies that while legislators have freedom of speech, this does not extend to acts of destruction and that they are not above the law.
Case Background
On 13 March 2015, during the presentation of the budget for the financial year 2015-2016 in the Kerala Legislative Assembly, several MLAs from the opposition disrupted the proceedings. These MLAs climbed onto the Speaker’s dais, damaging furniture and articles, including the Speaker’s chair, computer, microphone, emergency lamp, and electronic panel, causing a loss of Rs. 2,20,093. The Legislative Secretary reported the incident to the Museum Police Station, leading to the registration of Crime No. 236 of 2015 under Sections 447 and 427 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 and Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act 1984. After investigation, a final report was submitted under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and cognizance of the offenses was taken by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam.
On 21 July 2018, the Assistant Public Prosecutor filed an application under Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking to withdraw the case against the accused MLAs. The Prosecutor cited immunities and privileges under Article 194(3) of the Constitution, breach of privilege, the need for the Speaker’s sanction, public interest, absence of mens rea, lack of evidence, and the government’s consent as reasons for withdrawal. The Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Thiruvananthapuram, rejected the withdrawal application on 22 September 2020, stating that the alleged offenses were not related to speech or vote, the case was registered with the Speaker’s knowledge, damage to public property is a loss to the public exchequer, and the application did not serve the interests of justice.
The State of Kerala filed a criminal revision petition before the High Court, which was dismissed on 12 March 2021, affirming the CJM’s order. The High Court held that the MLAs’ conduct was not in furtherance of democracy, there was no requirement for the Speaker’s permission to register a crime, and arguments about the inadequacy of evidence should be raised during discharge proceedings. The State of Kerala and the accused MLAs then filed independent Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) before the Supreme Court.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 13 March 2015 | Incident of vandalism in the Kerala Legislative Assembly during budget presentation. |
| 13 March 2015 | Crime No. 236 of 2015 registered at Museum Police Station |
| 21 July 2018 | Application filed by the Assistant Public Prosecutor to withdraw the case under Section 321 of the CrPC. |
| 9 February 2018 | Government of Kerala consented to the withdrawal of the prosecution. |
| 22 September 2020 | Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) declined consent for withdrawal of prosecution. |
| 12 March 2021 | High Court of Kerala dismissed the criminal revision petition filed by the State of Kerala. |
| 28 July 2021 | Supreme Court of India dismissed the appeals filed by the State of Kerala and the accused MLAs. |
Course of Proceedings
The case was initially registered at the Museum Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram, following a complaint by the Legislative Secretary. After completing the investigation, the police submitted a final report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam, took cognizance of the offenses. Subsequently, the case was transferred to the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Thiruvananthapuram.
The Assistant Public Prosecutor then filed an application under Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking to withdraw the case against the accused MLAs. The CJM declined to grant consent for the withdrawal, leading to a criminal revision petition by the State of Kerala before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the revision petition, affirming the CJM’s order. Both the State of Kerala and the accused MLAs then filed independent Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) before the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s decision.
Legal Framework
The case involves several key legal provisions. Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, allows a Public Prosecutor to withdraw from a prosecution with the court’s consent. The Indian Penal Code 1860, Sections 447 and 427, define the offenses of criminal trespass and mischief causing damage. The Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act 1984, Section 3(1), addresses mischief causing damage to public property.
Article 194 of the Constitution of India outlines the powers, privileges, and immunities of the State Legislatures and their members. Specifically, Article 194(1) ensures freedom of speech in the legislature, Article 194(2) provides immunity for anything said or any vote given in the legislature, and Article 194(3) defines other privileges. The court also considered the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, regarding the prosecution of public servants.
Arguments
Submissions by the State of Kerala:
- The Public Prosecutor’s power to withdraw from prosecution is to further public justice, including social, economic, and political aspects, as held in Rajendra Kumar Jain vs State through Special Police Establishment & Ors. The actions of the MLAs were a form of political protest and should be considered a valid ground for withdrawal.
- The court’s role in granting permission for withdrawal is supervisory, not adjudicatory. The court should only check if the Public Prosecutor acted as a “free agent” without external influence.
- The High Court incorrectly relied on the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Bhagwati in Sheonandan Paswan vs State of Bihar & Ors.
- Since the incident occurred inside the Legislative Assembly, prosecution cannot be initiated without the Speaker’s sanction, citing P.V. Narasimha Rao vs State (CBI/SPE) etc.
- The incident was a political protest against the budget presentation, and the government decided to bring a quietus to the matter.
- The actions of the MLAs are a manifestation of their right to protest, a facet of freedom of speech. Article 194 protects the exercise of free speech by MLAs inside the Assembly, and the video procured from the Electronic Control Room is a publication of the proceedings of the House, protected under Article 194(2).
- The High Court, despite finding no mala fides in the withdrawal petition, incorrectly reviewed the grounds provided by the Public Prosecutor.
Submissions by the Respondent-Accused:
- There is a clear difference between the majority and minority judgments in Sheonandan Paswan (supra). The majority focuses on the Public Prosecutor’s function, while the minority imposes additional conditions.
- The Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) did not apply the correct principles, and the High Court should have intervened.
- The real test is whether the Public Prosecutor’s decision will destroy the administration of justice, which is not the case here.
Submissions by Respondent Nos 7 and 8:
- Freedom of speech does not include the right to destroy property. Privileges under Article 194 cannot be a cover for violent actions.
- Privileges are only to the extent needed for members to perform their functions without hindrance, as held in Lokayukta, Justice Ripusudan Dayal (Retired) and Ors. vs State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., and cannot be used to circumvent criminal law.
- The observation in P.V Narasimha Rao (supra) about the Speaker’s sanction was specific to Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and not a general requirement.
- Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, does not apply to MLAs, as they cannot be removed by the government.
- The High Court incorrectly relied on the minority opinion in Sheonandan Paswan (supra). Both the majority and concurring opinions in that case held that the court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of lower courts.
- The court should be guided by the concurrent findings on the illegality of the withdrawal application, the overriding aspect of public interest, and the object of the law. Damage to public property is a grave offense.
Submissions Table
| Main Submission | Sub-Submissions of State of Kerala | Sub-Submissions of Respondent-Accused | Sub-Submissions of Respondent Nos 7 & 8 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Withdrawal of Prosecution |
|
|
|
| Privileges and Immunities |
|
|
|
| Sanction of Speaker |
|
|
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the following issues for consideration:
- Whether the application made by the Public Prosecutor under Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, falls within the interpretative understanding of Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as elucidated by the decisions of this Court.
- Whether the sanction of the Speaker of the House is required for prosecuting MLAs for occurrences within the precincts of the Assembly.
- Whether the members are protected by privilege under Article 194(2) which is available in case of publication of proceedings that take place inside the House.
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
| Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Withdrawal of Prosecution | Rejected | The court found that the acts of vandalism did not fall under the purview of legislative privileges and that the Public Prosecutor’s application was an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons. |
| Sanction of Speaker | Rejected | The court clarified that the requirement for the Speaker’s sanction was specific to cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and did not apply generally to all offenses. |
| Privilege under Article 194(2) | Rejected | The court held that the video recording of the incident was not a “proceeding” of the Assembly and that the acts of vandalism were not protected under the freedom of speech provisions of Article 194. |
Authorities
The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:
| Authority | Court | How it was used | Legal Point |
|---|---|---|---|
| State of Bihar vs Ram Naresh Pandey & Anr. | Supreme Court of India | Explained the judicial function in granting consent to withdraw prosecution. | Scope of Section 321 of CrPC |
| M.N Sankarayaraynan Nair vs P.V Balakrishnan | Supreme Court of India | Stated that powers under Section 321 of CrPC should be exercised in furtherance of the object of law. | Scope of Section 321 of CrPC |
| Rajender Kumar Jain vs State through Special Police Establishment and Ors. | Supreme Court of India | Highlighted the importance of the independence of the Public Prosecutor. | Scope of Section 321 of CrPC |
| Sheonandan Paswan vs State of Bihar & Ors. | Supreme Court of India | Explained the limitations of the Court’s power in granting consent for withdrawal of prosecution. | Scope of Section 321 of CrPC |
| Yerneni Raja Ramchandar vs State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. | Supreme Court of India | Discussed the implications of disciplinary action on the withdrawal of prosecution. | Scope of Section 321 of CrPC |
| Bairam Muralidhar vs State of Andhra Pradesh | Supreme Court of India | Stressed the importance of independent application of mind by the Public Prosecutor. | Scope of Section 321 of CrPC |
| P.V. Narasimha Rao vs State (CBI/SPE) etc | Supreme Court of India | Discussed the interpretation of Article 105(2) of the Constitution and the requirement of prior sanction for prosecution of MPs under the PC Act. | Parliamentary Privileges and Immunities |
| Raja Ram Pal vs Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha | Supreme Court of India | Established that the Court has the authority to examine claims of privilege under Article 105(3) and 194(3). | Parliamentary Privileges and Immunities |
| Lokayukta, Justice Ripusudan Dayal (Retired) and Ors. vs State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. | Supreme Court of India | Clarified that privileges are only those essential for members to carry out legislative functions. | Parliamentary Privileges and Immunities |
| R vs Eliot, Holles and Valentine | King’s Bench | Discussed the limits of parliamentary privilege in cases of seditious speech and assault. | Parliamentary Privileges and Immunities (UK) |
| Bradlaugh vs Gossett | Queen’s Bench | Explained the use of force to prevent trespass and the concept of “ordinary crimes” within the House. | Parliamentary Privileges and Immunities (UK) |
| R vs Chaytor and others | UK Supreme Court | Defined “proceedings in Parliament” and limited the scope of parliamentary privilege. | Parliamentary Privileges and Immunities (UK) |
| Attorney General of Ceylon vs de Livera | Privy Council | Discussed what constitutes the real or essential function of a member of the House. | Parliamentary Privileges and Immunities (UK) |
| K. Veeraswami vs Union of India | Supreme Court of India | Discussed the need for consultation with the Chief Justice of India before initiating criminal proceedings against a judge. | Sanction for Prosecution |
| Satish Chandra vs Speaker, Lok Sabha | Supreme Court of India | Discussed the powers of the Speaker to control and regulate the House. | Sanction for Prosecution |
| Ramdas Athawale (5) vs Union of India | Supreme Court of India | Discussed the powers of the Speaker to control and regulate the House. | Sanction for Prosecution |
Judgment
How each submission made by the Parties was treated by the Court?
| Submission | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|
| State of Kerala’s submission that the Public Prosecutor’s power to withdraw from prosecution is to further public justice, including social, economic, and political aspects. | Rejected. The court held that while the Public Prosecutor has the power to withdraw, it must be in the interest of justice and not to shield criminal acts. |
| State of Kerala’s submission that the court’s role in granting permission for withdrawal is supervisory, not adjudicatory. | Partially Accepted. The court agreed that the court’s role is supervisory but also clarified that it must ensure the Public Prosecutor’s decision is legitimate and not an abuse of power. |
| State of Kerala’s submission that the High Court incorrectly relied on the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Bhagwati in Sheonandan Paswan vs State of Bihar & Ors. | Partially Accepted. The court acknowledged that the High Court cited the minority opinion, but it also analyzed the case based on the majority opinion. |
| State of Kerala’s submission that since the incident occurred inside the Legislative Assembly, prosecution cannot be initiated without the Speaker’s sanction, citing P.V. Narasimha Rao vs State (CBI/SPE) etc. | Rejected. The court clarified that the sanction requirement in P.V. Narasimha Rao was specific to cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. |
| State of Kerala’s submission that the incident was a political protest against the budget presentation, and the government decided to bring a quietus to the matter. | Rejected. The court held that acts of destruction cannot be equated to legitimate forms of protest. |
| State of Kerala’s submission that the actions of the MLAs are a manifestation of their right to protest, a facet of freedom of speech and that Article 194 protects the exercise of free speech by MLAs inside the Assembly, and the video procured from the Electronic Control Room is a publication of the proceedings of the House, protected under Article 194(2). | Rejected. The court held that freedom of speech does not extend to acts of vandalism and that the video was not a publication under the authority of the House. |
| State of Kerala’s submission that the High Court, despite finding no mala fides in the withdrawal petition, incorrectly reviewed the grounds provided by the Public Prosecutor. | Rejected. The court held that good faith is not the only consideration, and the court must also ensure that the application is in the interest of justice. |
| Respondent-Accused’s submission that there is a clear difference between the majority and minority judgments in Sheonandan Paswan (supra). | Accepted. The court acknowledged the difference but analyzed the case based on the majority view. |
| Respondent-Accused’s submission that the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) did not apply the correct principles, and the High Court should have intervened. | Rejected. The court held that the CJM and High Court correctly applied the law. |
| Respondent-Accused’s submission that the real test is whether the Public Prosecutor’s decision will destroy the administration of justice, which is not the case here. | Rejected. The court held that withdrawing prosecution in this case would interfere with the normal course of justice. |
| Respondent Nos 7 and 8’s submission that freedom of speech does not include the right to destroy property. Privileges under Article 194 cannot be a cover for violent actions. | Accepted. The court agreed that privileges do not extend to criminal acts. |
| Respondent Nos 7 and 8’s submission that privileges are only to the extent needed for members to perform their functions without hindrance, as held in Lokayukta, Justice Ripusudan Dayal (Retired) and Ors. vs State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., and cannot be used to circumvent criminal law. | Accepted. The court affirmed that privileges are for legislative functions and do not exempt members from criminal law. |
| Respondent Nos 7 and 8’s submission that the observation in P.V Narasimha Rao (supra) about the Speaker’s sanction was specific to Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and not a general requirement. | Accepted. The court clarified that the sanction requirement was not a general rule. |
| Respondent Nos 7 and 8’s submission that Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, does not apply to MLAs, as they cannot be removed by the government. | Accepted. The court held that Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, does not apply to MLAs. |
| Respondent Nos 7 and 8’s submission that the High Court incorrectly relied on the minority opinion in Sheonandan Paswan (supra). Both the majority and concurring opinions in that case held that the court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of lower courts. | Partially Accepted. The court acknowledged that the High Court cited the minority opinion, but it also analyzed the case based on the majority opinion. |
| Respondent Nos 7 and 8’s submission that the court should be guided by the concurrent findings on the illegality of the withdrawal application, the overriding aspect of public interest, and the object of the law. Damage to public property is a grave offense. | Accepted. The court agreed that public interest and the gravity of the offense are important considerations. |
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the need to uphold the rule of law and ensure that elected representatives are not above the law. The Court emphasized that while legislators enjoy certain privileges to perform their duties effectively, these privileges do not extend to criminal acts such as vandalism. The Court also noted that the Public Prosecutor’s application for withdrawal was based on a misinterpretation of the scope of parliamentary privileges and that the decision to withdraw prosecution should be based on legitimate reasons and not to shield criminal acts. The Court emphasized that the destruction of public property is a grave offense that cannot be condoned under the guise of political protest.
| Reason | Sentiment Analysis | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Need to uphold rule of law and ensure equality before law. | Strongly Positive | 30% |
| Criminal acts such as vandalism are not protected under legislative privilege. | Strongly Negative | 25% |
| Public Prosecutor’s application was based on misinterpretation of scope of parliamentary privileges. | Negative | 20% |
| Decision to withdraw prosecution should be based on legitimate reasons and not to shield criminal acts. | Positive | 15% |
| Destruction of public property is a grave offense that cannot be condoned under guise of political protest. | Strongly Negative | 10% |
Fact:Law Ratio
| Category | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 40% |
| Law | 60% |
The court’s reasoning was based more on the legal principles and interpretation of the Constitution and relevant statutes (60%), while also considering the factual aspects of the case (40%).
Logical Reasoning
Issue 1: Withdrawal of Prosecution
Issue 2: Sanction of Speaker
Issue 3: Privilege under Article 194(2)
Key Takeaways
- Legislative Privileges are Not Absolute: The judgment clarifies that while legislators have freedom of speech and certain immunities, these do not extend to criminal acts.
- Public Interest vs. Political Expediency: The Court emphasized that the withdrawal of a criminal case must be in the interest of justice and not for political expediency.
- No Immunity for Vandalism: Elected representatives cannot claim immunity from criminal prosecution for acts of vandalism committed within the legislative assembly.
- Role of the Court in Withdrawal Applications: The Court has a supervisory role to ensure that the Public Prosecutor’s decision to withdraw a case is legitimate and not an abuse of power.
- Sanction of Speaker: The requirement for the Speaker’s sanction is specific to cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and does not apply generally to all offenses.
- Definition of “Proceedings” and “Publication”: The Court clarified that video recordings of incidents are not considered “proceedings” of the House and that the acts of vandalism are not protected under the freedom of speech provisions of Article 194.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of The State of Kerala vs. K. Ajith & Ors. serves as a landmark decision that reinforces the principle that elected representatives are not above the law. It clarifies the limits of parliamentary privileges and ensures that public figures are held accountable for their actions, especially when they involve criminal acts. The judgment underscores the importance of maintaining the integrity of legislative bodies and upholding the rule of law. It also highlights the supervisory role of the courts in ensuring that the Public Prosecutor’s decisions are in the interest of justice and not influenced by political considerations.