Supreme Court Upholds Right of Way Based on Prior Sale Deed: Dr. S. Kumar & Ors. vs. S. Ramalingam (2019)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: July 16, 2019
Citation: 2019 INSC 718
Judges: L. Nageswara Rao, J. and Hemant Gupta, J.

Can a seller grant exclusive rights to a buyer over a pathway when a previous buyer already has a right of way over the same path? The Supreme Court of India addressed this question in a dispute concerning property rights and easement. This case involves a conflict over the use of a pathway between two property owners, where one claims exclusive rights based on a later sale deed, and the other asserts their right of way based on an earlier sale deed. The Supreme Court of India, in this case, clarified the legal position regarding conflicting rights over a property, particularly concerning easements and the priority of rights created by transfers. The judgment was authored by Justice Hemant Gupta.

Case Background

The case revolves around a property dispute in Chennai involving three parties: C.L. Rajasekaran (the original owner), B. Shivaraman (Defendant No. 1), Lakshmi Shivaraman (Defendant No. 2, wife of Defendant No. 1), and S. Ramalingam (the Plaintiff). Rajasekaran owned a large piece of land on Mowbrays Road, which he divided and sold in three separate transactions.

On December 5, 1973, Rajasekaran sold a portion of the land to B. Shivaraman (Defendant No. 1). This plot had access to Mowbrays Road. Subsequently, on April 1, 1976, Rajasekaran sold an adjacent plot to Lakshmi Shivaraman (Defendant No. 2). This plot was located behind the property of Defendant No. 1. The sale deed to Defendant No. 2 included a recital of easement rights and a 12-foot wide strip of land providing access. Later, on May 31, 1988, Rajasekaran sold another portion of land to S. Ramalingam (the Plaintiff). This land was behind the property of Defendant No. 2. The sale deed to the Plaintiff included a 16-foot wide pathway (ABCD) for his exclusive use.

The dispute arose when the Plaintiff claimed exclusive right to use the pathway (ABCD), while Defendant No. 2 asserted her right to use the same pathway to access her property. The Plaintiff filed two suits seeking an injunction to prevent the Defendants from using the pathway.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The Trial Court dismissed the suits filed by the Plaintiff on April 22, 1991, holding that the Defendants had a right of necessity to access their property through the pathway (ABCD). However, the First Appellate Court reversed the Trial Court’s decision on September 16, 1993, granting an injunction in favor of the Plaintiff. The First Appellate Court reasoned that since Defendant No. 2 had access to her property through her husband’s property on Mowbrays Road, there was no necessity for an easement. The High Court of Judicature at Madras upheld the decision of the First Appellate Court on March 6, 2007. The Defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court of India.

Legal Framework

The Supreme Court considered the following legal provisions:

• Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882:

  This section deals with the priority of rights created by transfer. It states:
  “Where a person purports to create by transfer at different times rights in or over the same immoveable property, and such rights cannot all exist or be exercised to their full extent together, each later created right shall, in the absence of a special contract or reservation binding the earlier transferees, be subject to the rights previously created.”

  This provision establishes that earlier rights prevail over later rights, unless there is a specific agreement to the contrary.

• Section 41 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882:

  This section states the extinguishment of easement of necessity.

Arguments

The arguments presented by both sides are summarized below:

Arguments of the Appellants (Defendants)

• Right of Way Reserved:

  The Defendants argued that the sale deed dated April 1, 1976, in favor of Defendant No. 2, reserved a right of way to access her property. Therefore, the vendor (Rajasekaran) could not grant exclusive rights over the same passage to the Plaintiff in the later sale deed.

• Section 48, Transfer of Property Act, 1882:

  The Defendants contended that the exclusive right given to the Plaintiff was in contravention of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as the seller had no saleable interest to confer exclusive rights since a right of way was already granted to Defendant No. 2.

• Easement of Necessity:

  The Defendants argued that even if the right of way was not explicitly reserved, Defendant No. 2 had an easement of necessity to access her land. The subsequent transfer of part of her property to her husband would not deprive her of this right.

• Independent Right of Access:

  The Defendants asserted that Defendant No. 2’s right to access her property was independent of her relationship with Defendant No. 1. The right was granted to her in the sale deed dated April 1, 1976.

Arguments of the Respondent (Plaintiff)

• Types of Easements:

  The Plaintiff argued that easements can be granted specifically, by necessity, or by prescription. The Defendants had not established a case for easement by prescription.

• No Easement of Necessity:

  The Plaintiff contended that there was no easement of necessity as per Section 41 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, as any such necessity would have extinguished when an alternative access became available.

• Generic Recitals:

  The Plaintiff argued that the recitals in the sale deed to Defendant No. 2 were generic in nature and did not specifically grant easement rights.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court considered the following issues:

1. Whether the right of way to access the property purchased by Defendant No. 2 was reserved in the sale deed dated April 1, 1976?
2. Whether the vendor of Defendant No. 2 and the Plaintiff could confer exclusive right of use of passage for the use of the Plaintiff?
3. Whether the exclusive right given to the Plaintiff is in contravention of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
4. Whether Defendant No. 2 has an easement of necessity to approach her land?
5. Whether the subsequent transfer in favor of her husband of part of the property purchased by her will deprive the independent right of access to such property merely because she happens to be the wife of the other defendant?

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates how the Court decided the issues:

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Judgment

The Supreme Court analyzed the submissions and authorities as follows:

The Supreme Court viewed the authorities as follows:

• Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882: The Court applied this provision to prioritize the rights of Defendant No. 2, which were created earlier, over the rights of the Plaintiff, which were created later.
• Section 41 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882: The Court held that the rights of the defendants were not of easement of necessity, but a right granted to Defendant No. 2 in the sale deed, and thus, Section 41 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 was not applicable.
• Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal [(2006) 5 SCC 545]: The Court distinguished this case, stating that the principle of extinguishment of easement of necessity was not applicable to the present case because the right of access was granted in the sale deed, not by necessity.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the principle of priority of rights, as enshrined in Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Court emphasized that the right of way granted to Defendant No. 2 in the sale deed dated April 1, 1976, had precedence over the exclusive right given to the Plaintiff in the subsequent sale deed dated May 31, 1988. The Court also noted that the right of way was not an easement of necessity, but a right granted to Defendant No. 2 in the sale deed.

The Court’s reasoning was based on the principle of priority of rights, which states that earlier rights prevail over later rights unless there is a specific contract or reservation to the contrary. The Court found that the sale deed dated April 1, 1976, in favor of Defendant No. 2, explicitly reserved a right of way to access her property. Therefore, the vendor (Rajasekaran) could not grant exclusive rights over the same passage to the Plaintiff in the later sale deed.

The Court rejected the argument that the recitals in the sale deed to Defendant No. 2 were generic, noting that the recitals were supported by a 16-foot wide strip of land providing access to the property. The Court also clarified that the principle of easement of necessity did not apply in this case, as the right of access was granted in the sale deed itself.

The Court emphasized that the rights of the parties must be adjudicated as they existed on the date of filing of the suit. Subsequent events, such as the inheritance of the property by a common legal heir, did not negate the rights of the defendants.

The Court quoted the following from the judgment:

• “The said provision contemplates that where a person i.e. Rajasekaran has created different rights in or over the same property i.e. 16 feet wide strip of land and such rights cannot be exercised to their full extent together, then each later created right shall be subject to the rights previously created.”
• “Since the right of access to defendant No. 2 was reserved in the sale deed dated April 1, 1976, therefore, the vendor could not confer exclusive right to the plaintiff vide sale deed dated May 31, 1988.”
• “The appellants have been granted right to use passage in the sale deed. Thus, it is not easement of necessity being claimed by the appellants. It is right granted to defendant No. 2 in the sale deed therefore, such right will not extinguish in terms of Section 41 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882.”

There were no dissenting opinions in this case.

Key Takeaways

• Priority of Rights: Earlier property rights take precedence over later ones, unless there is a specific agreement to the contrary.
• Easement Rights: If a sale deed reserves a right of way, the seller cannot grant exclusive rights over the same passage to a subsequent buyer.
• Section 48, Transfer of Property Act, 1882: This section is crucial in determining the priority of rights created by transfer.
• Easement of Necessity: The principle of extinguishment of easement of necessity does not apply if the right of access is granted in the sale deed itself.
• Independent Rights: A person’s right to access their property is independent of their relationship with other property owners.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed that the 16 feet x 103 feet passage adjoining the property of the defendants leading to the property of the plaintiff is reserved for the common use of Defendant No. 2 and of the Plaintiff.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that when a property is sold with a right of way, the seller cannot later grant exclusive rights over the same pathway to another buyer. This decision reinforces the principle of priority of rights under Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Supreme Court clarified that the right of way granted to Defendant No. 2 was not an easement of necessity but a right granted in the sale deed itself. This clarifies the distinction between easement rights and rights granted by specific contract.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgment of the High Court. The Court held that the 16 feet x 103 feet passage would be for the common use of Defendant No. 2 and the Plaintiff. This judgment underscores the importance of prior rights and the limitations on a seller’s ability to grant exclusive rights over property when prior rights have already been established.